Session 17: Optimal Financing Mix I - The Trade Off

Profit Playbook
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In this session 17 of a 36 session corporate finance class,
I'd like to talk about the trade off on using debt as opposed to equity.
I'd like to talk about the advantages of borrowing money, primarily tax, and
the disadvantages.
And in the process, lay the foundations for
coming up with the optimal mix of debt and equity for your business.
Now that we've talked about the investment principle that we should take
projects that earn returns greater than a minimum acceptable hurdle rate,
let's move on to the second principle in corporate finance.
The financing principle.
In terms of where we are in the big picture, we're now starting on the process
of looking at what the right mix of debt and equity should be for a company.
And it's the first of six sessions we will do on the topic.
So to begin the process, let's set up the trade off, okay?
You're looking at finding the optimal mix of debt and equity for a company.
And in addition, you're trying to find the right type of debt for the company.
And in these next few sessions,
we're going to try to address both components of the financing principle.
Before we get into the trade off of debt versus equity, let's step back and
look at something we've already done, which is differentiate debt from equity.
What is it that makes debt different from equity?
And here are some of the things that you might want to look at.
The first is, debt gives you a contractual or fixed claim.
Equity has a residual claim.
Debt payments are tax deductible.
Equity payments usually are not.
Debt investors get first claim if the company goes bankrupt in the assets.
Equity investors are last people in line.
Debt investors usually take no role in how the companies run.
Equity investors usually do.
Debt usually comes with a finite maturity.
Equity doesn't.
So those are the things that separate debt from equity.
And if you use that distinction, you can see why some items are easy to categorize
and some might be a little messy.
So bank loans, corporate bonds are clearly debt.
Equity, whether it's your own savings, whether it's venture capital,
whether it's private equity or common stock, is equity.
But there are hybrids, hybrids such as convertible debt,
which is part debt and part equity.
So generically, when we think about the debt and equity trade-off,
we're looking at what proportion of a company's value of financing
should come from debt.
And as a setup for what's coming, I'd like to define before I get started
what I mean when I say debt ratios or debt-to-capital ratios.
Debt ratio to me is debt as a percentage of overall capital.
It's debt over debt plus equity.
It can be stated in book value or market value terms,
but when I talk about debt ratios, I'm usually talking in market value terms.
So effectively, when I say the optimal debt ratio for a company is 20%,
I'm talking about a market value debt-to-capital ratio.
Now that we've got that out of the way,
let's look at the four companies that we're going to break down
and look at what their existing debt looks like.
So here you have Disney, you have Vale, you have Tata Motors, and you have Baidu.
Why didn't I look at BookScape?
BookScape's only debt is actually lease debt,
so I don't have to worry about breaking them down too much.
And Deutsche Bank, I'm not even going to try breaking their debt down
because debt to a bank is really not a source of capital.
It's raw material.
So looking at these four companies,
let's look at what they share in common and what's different.
Here's where Disney is probably different from the remaining companies.
Most of Disney's debt is in the form of corporate bonds,
and that's not unusual.
U.S. companies historically have been far more dependent
on the corporate bond market than companies outside the U.S.
In fact, until about 20 years ago,
many emerging markets, the only source of debt was bank debt.
You're starting to see the shift away from that,
even with the emerging market companies that I have in my sample.
Some of their debt, though not as high as for Disney,
comes from corporate bonds.
If you look at the maturity of the debt,
Disney has a lot of short-term debt, about 13%,
and also a lot of long-term debt.
Of all the companies, Vale has the longest-term debt.
Again, that does make sense at a generic level
because if you think about a typical project for Vale,
which is an iron ore mine, it could have a 25- to 30-year life.
Disney has some floating-rate debt, about 5%,
but mostly fixed-rate debt.
When you look at the currency breakdown for the debt,
Disney's debt is not as foreign currency-based as you'd expect it to.
If you remember, Disney's operations,
82% came from the U.S., 18% came from outside.
Its debt is not as foreign-currency-focused
as its operations would suggest.
It has about 94% U.S. dollar debt, about 6% foreign-currency debt,
and much of it takes the form of Indian rupee debt and yen debt,
not euro debt, not Latin American currencies.
Baidu is predominantly U.S. dollar debt,
surprising given that it gets almost all of its revenues in China.
But the objective of this particular table
is to just give you a sense of the debt breakdown of these four companies.
So one of the questions we're trying to examine then
is are the mixes of debt and equity that these companies are using the right mix?
And later on, we'll come back and look at whether the type of debt
that they're using is, in fact, the right type of debt for them as companies.
So let's look at one way of thinking about this trade-off.
Should you use debt or equity?
Here's a very simple way to answer the question.
You tell me where you are in the corporate life cycle,
and I can pretty much tell you
whether you should be predominantly a user of equity
or predominantly a user of debt.
Early in the life cycle, when you're a young startup company
or you're building up to high growth,
you should be predominantly or primarily equity-funded
because you can't afford to borrow money.
You don't have the cash flows to service debt,
either because you're not making money or even if you're making money,
everything is going back into the business.
As your growth starts to level off, what I mean by that
is your earnings continue to grow,
but you don't need to reinvest as much for future growth.
You start to get the first vestiges of debt capacity.
You have the capacity to borrow money.
Initially, companies fight.
What company wants to be mature?
So much more fun being a growth company.
So initially, you see debt capacity,
the actual debt ratios lagging what the company can afford to borrow.
Eventually, the company catches on.
It starts borrowing more money because it has more debt capacity.
As it matures, its debt capacity continues to increase
because it becomes a more mature company.
And in decline, the debt ratio might continue to be high
depending on how you deal with decline.
So you tell me where you are in the life cycle as a company,
and I can pretty much guess
what kind of debt ratio I'd expect to see.
So this is a very simplistic way of thinking about
what the right mix of debt and equity for you is,
but it's a fairly effective way.
Now, let's think about the broader question.
What's the trade-off on using debt as opposed to equity?
Debt has two big benefits over equity and three costs.
Here are the two big benefits.
The biggest benefit is a tax benefit.
Interest is tax deductible.
Cash flows to equity are not.
And the higher the tax rate you face as a company,
the greater the tax benefit to borrowing money.
So companies and countries with much higher marginal tax rates
like the U.S. and Japan should borrow more
than companies and countries
with much lower marginal tax rates, say Ireland.
So that's the first benefit is a tax benefit.
The second benefit is what I'm going to call added discipline,
but let me explain what I mean by that.
If you're the managers of a company
which is primarily equity-funded and it's a mature company,
you can afford to borrow money,
but you've chosen not to borrow money,
you have a tendency to get sloppy.
Sloppy in what sense?
If you take bad projects, who's going to notice?
You hide your mistakes under those big earnings and cash flows.
Here's what I'm going to try to make you do.
I'm going to try to make you go out and borrow money,
and here's what that borrowing is going to create.
It's going to create interest expenses
you've got to pay in good times and bad times.
So effectively, it means that if you take bad projects now,
you face a much larger consequence.
You might not be able to make interest payments,
company might default, and you might lose your job.
An extreme way of getting your attention
might be the only way in some companies.
So tax benefit's an added discipline,
and the benefit of that added discipline is going to be far greater
if there's a bigger separation between stockholders and managers.
In other words, if managers don't own very many shares
and they work for equity investors.
It shouldn't be as big of a benefit if you have a private business.
On the other side of the equation, you have three big costs.
The first is an expected bankruptcy cost.
What is that?
It's a product of two numbers.
The first is the probability that you will go bankrupt,
and every company, no matter how large and mature it is,
as it borrows money, that probability will go up.
So even an ExxonMobil with its huge earnings,
as it borrows an extra 10, 50, 100 billion,
will have a higher probability of bankruptcy
than it did before it borrowed the money.
The other cost is a bankruptcy cost.
What's the cost of going bankrupt?
Sounds like an absurd question, but let's flesh it out.
There's a direct cost, which is the cost you create once you go bankrupt.
Once you go bankrupt, you end up in the legal system,
an incredibly inefficient system where time has no value.
You could wait years to see your cash.
That cost is called a direct cost,
and it can amount to 30%, 35%, or 40% of the assets of a company
once it's declared bankruptcy.
The other cost is what I call an indirect cost of bankruptcy.
What's an indirect cost?
If people perceive you're in trouble.
You're in trouble, right?
What I mean by that is your customers stop buying your products,
your suppliers start demanding cash,
your employees start looking for better jobs.
Everything starts to spiral down.
The greater the cost you face as a company in terms of bankruptcy,
indirect or direct, the less you will borrow.
That's the first big cost.
The second cost is an agency cost.
An agency cost reflects the fact that what's good for equity investors
might be very different from what's good for lenders.
Equity investors left to their own devices
will often take far riskier projects than lenders want them to take,
might pay themselves bigger dividends than lenders want them to pay out,
and in fact, might borrow more money on the existing assets
if lenders don't stop them.
So what do lenders do?
They put constraints or covenants.
Every time you borrow money, those covenants get tighter and tighter.
It's like being in a straitjacket.
And the more you borrow, the more difficult it becomes for you to move.
If you're a company that values flexibility, don't go out and borrow money.
So that's the second cost, is an agency cost.
And that cost is going to be higher again for some companies than others.
This might not be fair, but bankers seem to be much more comfortable
lending to companies with tangible assets,
physical assets that they can see, real estate, factories,
than they are lending companies with assets that are intangible,
more difficult to see, even if those assets are big earnings and cash flow providers.
Because companies with intangible assets have larger agency costs,
they should borrow less money.
And the third and final cost is a cost of lost flexibility.
Every time you borrow money, you lose future borrowing capacity.
So what?
If you have the need to borrow money, it's nice to have excess debt capacity.
And that's got to be weighed in.
Companies that have much more uncertain future financing needs
should borrow less because they like to hold back some debt capacity.
So that's the effective trade-off.
Tax benefits, an added discipline, expected bankruptcy cost,
agency cost, and future flexibility.
So let's try this on our four companies.
Let's take each of the trade-off items and look at how they vary across the companies.
Let's start with tax benefits.
Given the marginal tax rates across our companies,
I would expect Disney to get the largest tax benefit from debt, from borrowing.
Baidu to have a much smaller tax benefit because the marginal tax rate in China is lower.
Tata Motors to fall in the middle with a 29.5% or 32.5% tax rate.
You're saying, what about Vale?
Brazil has a very interesting quirk to its tax law,
where cash flows to equity get a partial tax reduction.
So even though the marginal tax rate in Brazil is 34%,
the tax benefit to debt in Brazil is lower than it is in other countries
because I give you a partial tax benefit for your cash flows to equity.
So overall, I'd expect Vale to have a smaller tax benefit than the other companies
because of that quirk in the Brazilian tax law.
So Disney will have the highest tax benefits.
There'll be three companies in the middle,
and Vale probably has the lowest tax benefits.
Talk about added discipline.
Here again, I expect Disney to get the largest benefit from borrowing money
because it is the biggest separation between stockholders and managers.
Vale, if you remember, has voting shares held by those seven entities
that are inside stockholders.
They can keep an eye on managers to make sure they don't take bad projects.
Baidu is a young company controlled by its founder CEO.
He can keep an eye on the management again.
And for Tata Motors, which is part of a family group,
you shouldn't need the borrowing to make yourself more disciplined.
So in terms of added discipline, Disney should get the biggest benefit.
So from the benefit perspective,
you can see that Disney probably gets the largest benefit from borrowing money.
Let's look at the cost.
From an expected bankruptcy cost perspective,
Baidu probably has a pretty high expected bankruptcy cost
because it's a technology company with all its value in its future growth.
Much more to be uncertain about, right?
Vale and Tata Motors are going to have volatile earnings
not because they're not mature companies,
but because one is a cyclical company, Tata Motors.
And if the economy goes into recession, its earnings are going to reflect it.
And Vale is a commodity company.
If iron ore prices collapse, its earnings are going to collapse as well.
That's going to make their earnings more volatile,
increase the likelihood of bankruptcy.
Disney, depending on the business,
but collectively as a diversified entertainment company,
probably has the most stable earnings here.
And because it has most stable earnings,
it can afford to borrow more money.
So when you look across the companies,
again, very different expected bankruptcy costs.
Agency costs.
I think Baidu is going to have the highest agency costs
because it's a company with intangible assets.
If you look at Tata Motors and Vale,
physical assets, much smaller agency costs.
And Disney should probably vary across businesses.
It should be fairly large in the movie business
and the broadcasting business,
much smaller in the theme park business
where you can actually see what you're lending on
if you're a lender.
Finally, future flexibility.
Again, as a growth company,
Baidu probably values its future flexibility the most.
It should be lower than the other companies
because they're all pretty stable, mature companies
where they should know their future investment needs
with some degree of certainty.
With Disney, the changing landscape in entertainment
where the business model is changing
and new ways of delivering old products is emerging,
it might turn out that you might want to hold back
some borrowing capacity just in case you need it.
But in terms of the trade-off,
looking across these companies,
you can see again why you'd expect Disney
to have perhaps the highest debt ratio
across these companies
and Baidu to have the lowest debt ratio
across these companies.
Now, let's take a hypothetical.
Let's assume that you are looking at a company
and you were trying to make this judgment.
This is a good way to start thinking about the trade-off
is pick any company and take it through this process.
Look at your company,
look at what the expected benefits from debt will be,
the tax benefits and the added discipline.
To do that, look at the marginal tax rate,
look at who runs the company.
Are they managers who are separated from stockholders
or is it one of the owners who's running the company?
Then look at the cost, the expected bankruptcy cost,
the expected agency cost and your need for flexibility.
Make a judgment.
I'm not expecting precision here,
but start thinking through,
given the characteristics of your company,
whether you'd expect this company to borrow more money
or less money.
I know you're not going to get a specific answer.
We'll have tools that we can use to get that,
but this is a good place to start thinking about
what the right mix of debt and equity is for your company.
Now, let me create a hypothetical scenario.
Let's assume you live in a world with no taxes.
Let's also assume this world managers do the right thing.
They take good projects, they reject bad projects,
they do what's right for stockholders.
Let's assume no company ever goes bankrupt in this world.
Let's assume that equity investors,
when they go to borrow money, tell the truth.
They tell you they're going to take risky projects,
they take risky projects.
They claim they're going to take safe projects,
they take safe projects.
And finally, let's assume that every company
knows its future financing needs with certainty.
You think, so what?
Think about the trade-off.
With no tax rate or no taxes,
the tax benefits are zero, right?
When managers already do the right thing,
there is no need for added discipline.
No company ever goes bankrupt,
the expected bankruptcy cost is zero.
If equity investors don't lie,
there are no agency costs.
And if every firm knows its future financing needs
with certainty,
the value for future flexibility is also zero.
So you have zero benefits and zero costs.
How much would you borrow in this world?
If you borrow a dollar, there are no benefits, no costs.
You borrow a hundred million dollars,
there are no benefits, no costs.
You borrow a billion, there are no benefits, no costs.
In effect, it doesn't matter how much you borrow.
Congratulations, you've just derived
corporate finance's most famous theorem.
In a world with no taxes, no default risk,
no agency costs,
it doesn't matter how much you borrow.
This is the Milamudugliani theorem,
the theorem that gave birth to corporate finance
as a modern discipline.
But remember again, for this theorem to hold,
there can be no taxes, no default risk,
no agency costs.
I know it's completely unrealistic,
but it's a great starting point
for thinking about when debt really doesn't matter.
In fact, if you're in the Milamudugliani world,
not only can you make the argument
that debt doesn't matter,
but the cost of capital you compute for your company
at any debt ratio
will be the same at every other debt ratio.
The value that you compute for your firm
at any debt ratio will not change
if you change the debt ratio.
One of the great tragedies
of the Milamudugliani theorem
is there are generations of business students
who if you ask them,
what's the only thing you remember
about the capital structure lecture,
will say the Milamudugliani theorem.
How convenient.
You don't remember any of it,
but it doesn't matter anyway.
But in fact, for the Milamudugliani theorem to hold,
you can have no taxes,
no default risk,
and no agency costs,
and that doesn't resemble the world I live in
if you live in that world.
But if you live in the world that I live in,
debt does matter.
And what we will do in the coming sessions
is talk about what the right mix of debt
and equity is for a company
given taxes,
given default risk,
and given agency costs.
Thank you very much for listening.
