Session 27: Dividend Policy - Action & Follow Up

Profit Playbook
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In session 27 of this 36 session corporate finance class,
I'd like to complete our discussion of dividend policy by looking at what to do
about companies that do not return what they can afford to in dividends.
Either pay out too much or pay out too little.
In particular, I will argue that dividend policy,
more than any other aspect of corporate finance, is about trust.
Trust you have in the management of a company to do the right things with your
money.
In these last few sessions, we've been wending our way through first a description
of how companies set dividends and how they change them,
into an assessment of how much companies can afford to pay in dividends.
In fact, in the last session, we came up with a measure called free cash flow
equity, a potential dividend, that we compared to what companies actually paid
out, either as dividends or in the form of stock buybacks.
In this session, I'd like to follow up on that measurement.
In other words, I want to look at what you do next once you find out that your
company's either withholding cash or paying out too much in dividends.
So let's get the process started.
Here's a framework that I use to assess dividend policy.
It starts off by comparing what your company actually returns to its
stockholders, either as dividends or stock buybacks, to what it could have returned.
That's basically what we did in the last session.
Take that comparison.
When you make that comparison, one of three things is going to be true.
Your company might be one of those rare companies that returns exactly what it
should in dividends.
There are some companies that do.
But odds are, the company you're assessing fall into one of two groups.
Either it's going to be a company that pays out too little in dividends, it
withholds cash from its stockholders, or it's a company that actually pays out
too much in dividends.
Let's again start off with a company that pays out too little in dividends,
and let's follow through.
Let's say that you're a stockholder in a company.
It pays out too little in dividends, and it's building up cash.
As I said, this is all about trust.
The question you need to ask then is, do I trust the managers of this company
with my cash?
And remember again, asking managers whether you can trust them is kind of
pointless because, of course, they're going to say, you can trust us.
So look at their history.
If this is a company with a good history, good history in what sense?
It has picked good projects in the past.
Remember, we looked at return on capital versus cost of capital to measure that.
And it's delivered good stock returns in the past.
We used to Jensen's Alpha to measure that.
If you're a company that has picked good projects and delivered good stock price
performance, then I'm going to argue that you're a company that's more likely
to be trusted.
And if you're trusted, you're probably going to be allowed to keep your existing
dividend policy, accumulate cash, and get away with it.
If, on the other hand, I look at your track record and I decide I don't trust
you, either because you picked bad projects or my stock hasn't done well,
then I think the follow-up there is for me to put pressure on you to give the
cash back to me.
That doesn't make me a greedy investor.
It makes me a realistic investor.
So if you're building up cash, whether I trust you with the cash will determine
whether I let you hold on to the cash or whether I'm going to ask for that
cash back.
Now, let's take the other route.
Let's assume you're one of those rarer companies that pays out more than it can
afford to in dividends.
Here again, I'm going to ask you whether you have good investment opportunities
or projects on the line.
And here's the reason I care.
If you're paying out too much in dividends, you might be doing double
damage to yourself.
In addition to digging a cash hole for yourself, you might now find yourself
rejecting some of those good investments you have in the roster.
That reduces your value as a company.
So if you're a company with good projects returning too much cash, then I'm going
to ask you to hold back some of that cash.
I'm going to say, don't pay me as much as you do in dividends.
Don't buy back this much stock.
Put the money back into the business.
If, conversely, you're a company with bad projects, then I'm facing a serious
problem because I'm afraid of what you will do if I ask you to cut dividends.
Because even though you're paying out too much in dividends, my concern is if I
ask you to cut dividends, that you might take that cash and take more bad
projects.
I'm going to argue that your problem, your dividend problem here stems from the
fact that you're making bad investments.
And maybe if you fix your investment problem, take fewer bad projects, your
dividend problem might go away.
Why?
Because if you take fewer bad projects, you'll have more cash flow available to
pay dividends, in which case you might not have a dividend problem in the first
place.
So what I do for you as a company will depend first on whether you pay out too
much or too little, and second, on what kind of investment opportunities you
have.
I like to think of this in terms of a matrix.
On one axis, I'm going to look at whether a company returns more than it can
afford to in dividends by comparing the dividends to the free cash or equity.
So let's call it the cash deficit companies, or the companies that return
less than they can afford to, which would be the cash surplus companies.
And on the other axis, I'm going to look at the quality of your projects.
Measure it whatever way you want to, by comparing the return on equity or the
return on capital to the cost of capital.
So essentially, I'm going to divide the world up into good projects and bad
projects.
How I treat you as a company will depend on which quadrant you fall into.
So let's take the most favorable quadrant.
You're a company that builds up a cash surplus because you return less than you
can afford to, and you have good projects.
I'm going to give you maximum flexibility when it comes to dividend policy.
As a stockholder, I'm OK with you accumulating my cash.
If, on the other hand, you're a company that accumulates cash, you have a cash
surplus, but you're taking bad projects, you have a history of taking bad
projects, you're exactly the kind of company I want to put pressure on to
return more cash to stockholders because I don't trust you with the cash.
If you have a cash deficit and you have good projects, as I said, you have an
investment problem.
I'd much rather you fix the investment problem first before you come to me and
say you want to fix the dividend problem.
And finally, if you have a cash deficit and you have good projects, I'd like you
to cut your dividend payout or buy back less stock and redirect that cash
towards your investments.
So a good place to start assessing your companies to see which quadrant it falls
into.
So let me take the companies I have in my sample and take them through these
quadrants.
You take Disney in 2003, for instance.
In 2003, here's what Disney looked like.
It had a free cash rate equity over the prior 10 years of about $969 million a
year, and it returned about $639 million each year.
So it was holding back cash.
It built up a cash balance of about $3.3 billion plus, maybe even $4 billion in
2003.
Now let me flesh out the rest of the details.
Over those 10 years where it accumulated this cash, Disney's track record was not
very good.
It took bad projects.
It earned about 2% less than it should.
Its return on equity was less than its cost of equity, and its stock price lagged
the market and the sector by about 3%.
So this is a company that's accumulating cash.
It's had a pretty bad decade in terms of history, right?
Let's assume you're a stockholder in the company, and I get up there as the CEO of
Disney and say, trust me with your cash.
Now think about it.
Given my track record, would you trust me?
I wouldn't blame you if you said no.
And in fact, if I add to the fact that I'm Michael Eisner, a man who has, in
fact, treated you badly for the last decade as a stockholder, you can see why
stockholders in 2003 did not trust Disney with their cash.
And there was much talk about returning cash back to stockholders that year.
Now let's move forward six years, because remember, in the intervening period, a
new CEO came into Disney, Bob Iger.
He changed the way the company was run in a couple of ways.
One is he switched to a policy of returning more than what the company
could afford to in cash.
The dividends and buybacks actually exceeded the free cash for equity.
The company actually turned the battle around in terms of investments,
started taking good investments, earning more than the cost of equity.
So now you have a different problem in 2009.
The company's returning too much in cash, and it has good projects.
Now if I get up in front of you, a stockholder, and say, hey, you know what?
I'd like to cut back on buybacks.
Pay out less cash to you and redirect that cash.
Would you trust me with the cash?
No guarantees, but I would argue that I have a much better standing in 2009 as
Bob Iger making this pitch than I was in 2003.
In fact, moving forward to 2013, the company started accumulating cash again.
And remember, we talked about how corporate governance had deteriorated
between 2009 and 2013.
Here again, you might see Disney starting to run into more problems trying to
accumulate cash because with its track record,
stockholders are going to start trusting it less.
So what I'm arguing for is that companies earn the right to accumulate cash.
They don't preserve that right because you've got to go back to earning the right.
In fact, the way I describe it is every time you have a good year as a company,
it's like making a deposit into a bank.
Every time you have a bad year, it's a withdrawal.
If you make too many withdrawals at some point in time,
you're going to run out of money in the bank, and
your stockholders are going to start to demand that you return more cash to them.
So you earn the right to accumulate cash, and you can see that happen with Disney.
Let's take a second example.
This is Vale.
It's a company that has, at least looking across the five years that I looked at it,
returned too much in cash.
Its free cash flows equity were actually negative, but
it chose to return large amounts in cash.
That's a problem, right?
It's got a dividend problem.
It's returning too much cash to its stockholders.
And let me play the role of a Vale CEO and
ask you as stockholders whether you let me cut back.
After all, Vale is a commodity company.
It might need the cash to buy more mines, start more projects.
So I ask you, will you give me the right to hold back your cash?
Now before you say yes, there's some detail I need to add.
One reason for Vale's dividend problem is its controlled structure.
If you remember, Vale has common shares and preferred shares.
The common shares are voting shares.
The preferred shares are actually common shares without voting rights,
which get dividends first to compensate for the lack of voting rights.
Now what I'm asking of you, I'm asking you whether I can cut dividends, right?
You're the non-voting shareholders.
In return for giving you no control, I've essentially offered to pay you this dividend.
Now if I want to cut dividends, what's a reasonable thing for you to ask in return?
I would assume you want voting rights back, right?
And here's where we're gonna run into a problem.
Most Asian and Latin American companies value control so much that they're willing
to dig themselves into a dividend hole to preserve control.
So if it becomes a choice between paying a reasonable dividend and giving up control,
many of them will actually argue that they would keep control and
pay an unreasonable dividend.
So this is a factor to keep in mind, is corporate governance and
control can affect your dividend policy sometimes in really bad ways.
Third example, this is British Petroleum, way back in time, 1991.
I looked at how much they could have afforded to pay in dividends between 1982
and 91, and it's not a bad number, it's 571 million.
That's their free cash flow equity.
How much can a company with 571 million in free cash flow equity pay out?
Well, the answer is pretty simple, 571 million, right?
They managed to return about a billion and
a half in dividends every year for an entire decade.
That's a promise, well, you're returning almost a billion dollars more in dividends
than you can afford to each year.
How did they come up with the cash?
There was one year, 1987, they actually made an initial public offering,
raised equity to pay a dividend.
In every other year, British Petroleum went to a bank and
borrowed the money to pay this additional dividend.
So every year, you're borrowing a billion dollars not to take projects, but
to pay a dividend you can't afford to.
Big problem, right?
It's a problem that's been going on for a decade.
You'd think somebody would have done something about it.
Why didn't they?
There's an old saying in dividend policy, you get the stockholders you deserve.
And while BP was paying these very large dividends,
it accumulated people who liked very large dividends.
In fact, I'm going to call them dividend addicts.
And I use that word for a reason.
If you as BP decide in 91 or 88 or 86 that you're paying too much in dividends,
what do you have to do?
You have to go in front of these dividend addicts and
tell them that you're going to pay them less in dividends, right?
It's not going to happen.
So basically, what BP did was it kept putting off this decision
until it could not put it off anymore.
What do I mean by that?
Remember it went to the bank every year to borrow a billion?
Finally in 91 or 92, when they went to the bank and
tried to borrow the money, the bank said no more.
BP was forced to cut dividends.
The right thing to do because they couldn't afford to pay these dividends,
right, but to show you there's no justice in the world.
This is the news story that showed up the day they cut dividends.
The share prices plummeted.
Now to complete the story, six weeks later they'd fully recovered.
But during the six week period, you know what was happening, right?
Those stockholders they'd accumulated, those dividend addicts,
were leaving the company and
new branch of stockholders or a new group of stockholders was coming in.
But that transition is not easy.
In fact, it was pretty bloody at BP.
Half the top managers lost their jobs because of this dividend cut, and
they deserved to.
They deserved to because they did not deal with the dividend problem when they had
the capacity to deal with it on their own terms, which would have been in 1986 or 87.
They waited for the bank to force them to cut dividends, and
as a consequence, the stock price reflected that.
So if your company has a dividend problem, it's paying too much in dividends,
it's better to deal with it early rather than let it build up over time.
Which brings me to a question of what happens when you cut dividends.
When you cut dividends,
the reaction is almost always negative no matter what your motives are.
So you're saying, what do I do then?
If I'm a company with great projects and I want to cut dividends, what do I do?
My suggestion is you cut dividends, take your medicine,
because on the day you cut the dividends, your stock price will go down.
But package your dividend cut, explain to markets what you plan to do with that cash.
Explain to them what projects you plan to take.
You might not get an immediate positive reaction, but
as this study indicates, if you follow through,
you will find that in the quarters after your stock price does recover.
So if you're going to cut dividends and
you're going to do it because you want to take projects, it's good to be open with
markets, but be realistic.
Don't expect markets to stand up and
cheer when you cut dividends, because there's always an adjustment phase involved
when you have a dividend cut.
Fourth case, I want to look at a growth company.
This is a limited, a retail company that had tremendous growth in the 1980s.
There's a period where their free cash flow equity was negative.
And I could again ask you how much a company with negative free cash flow
equity can afford to pay out in dividends.
The answer is, of course, intuitive.
They should not pay out dividends.
And over this period, if you look at what the limited actually did,
they paid out $41 million a year in dividends.
And this is not unusual.
I've seen growth companies initiate dividends, often because of a sales pitch.
And I'll review the sales pitch with you, and
you tell me whether you would go along with this.
You're a growth company.
You have negative free cash flow equity.
I'm your banker.
I show up and say, look, you're not paying a dividend, and
because you don't pay a dividend, there are stockholders that cannot buy your stock.
Is that true?
There are pension funds, for instance,
that cannot buy shares in companies that don't pay dividends.
So as a banker, I make a suggestion.
I say, why don't you pay a token dividend, a small dividend?
That'll bring you on the list of these potential investors,
increase the demand for your stock, push up your stock price.
Sounds awfully good, right?
And that's the way this problem gets started.
You initiate a small dividend.
The limited started with a million dollars in dividends.
But here's the problem.
Once those stockholders who like dividends come into your company,
guess what they want next year?
More dividends, and still more dividends, and you can't blame them.
If you cannot afford to pay dividends, don't get this process started.
So don't fall for the sales pitch.
If you cannot afford to pay dividends, it's best not to pay dividends.
There are enough investors out there who will buy your stock in spite of the fact,
or maybe because of the fact that you don't pay dividends,
that you don't have to go looking for new stockholders.
As a final example, I looked at Tata Motors.
Now, the reason I want to look at Tata Motors is if you look at their free cash
load equity, like Vale's, it was negative.
But they still managed to pay a dividend, saying,
where did they come up with the cash?
Remember, they're part of a family group of companies.
This family group of companies cross-subsidizes itself.
We saw this happen with the debt ratio.
Tata Motors had too much debt, and
we said they were using Tata Consulting Services' debt capacity to borrow money.
I think something similar is happening here.
And with family group companies, again,
do not be surprised to see these distortions.
Where some family group companies pay far less than they should, and
that cash goes into other family group companies that pay out far more than
they should.
What can you do about it?
Not much, but you got to, you in a sense have to see this coming
when you see a company become part of a family group.
So take your company and take it through this process.
Start off by estimating what the company could have afforded to pay out,
the free cash load equity.
Do it across a period, don't do it for just a year.
Maybe five years, maybe ten.
Look at what it actually returned.
Then ask yourself, do I trust the managers of this company with my cash?
By looking at their track record, both in terms of investments and
what they've done for you as a stockholder.
Then decide what the right path for them is in terms of dividend policy.
Unlike investment policy and financing policy, as I said,
dividend policy is built on trust.
See if you trust the managers of this company with your cash.
Thank you very much for listening.
