【公開課】耶魯大學《資本主義》(中英雙語字幕)全20講 P14 - 14.14.第14講 西方世界的大眾富裕

財富導航
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2 次觀看·2026年6月17日
Okay. Today, the coming of mass affluence to the advanced economies,
principally the economies of the West. Jennifer, speaking of informal property rights,
I thought you owned a chair right up there. No, I'm just kidding.
I'm going to take it in three chunks. We're going to look at big picture causal explanations
for the rise of mass affluence and for explanations, first for its rise,
and second for its rise, beginning in Western Europe and North America.
Second, I'm going to reintroduce the joint stock corporation into that conversation.
And finally, we're going to look at the phenomenon of mass affluence and the advertising culture
of mid-20th century America. Then on Wednesday, we're going to descend to details.
And the challenge for you in preparing for Wednesday is to imagine a country and imagine
that you somehow have been granted a fund amounting to 5% of its gross domestic product.
And with that 5%, you want to make whatever changes you can imagine
will increase the overall wealth of that country as much as possible.
So it's a pragmatic question. It has a causal side to it. But ultimately, it's pragmatic.
And it is not one size fits all. That is, you've got to know something about the country to know
something about what needs doing. 5% of the GDP in Ghana will be wisely spent very differently
than 5% of the GDP in Bolivia or Mexico or Norway.
Okay, so the first of the three topics is capitalist takeoff. The portrait of this
corpulent and obviously affluent gent is Sir Richard Arkwright, who was the creator of the
most efficient early textile machinery and who, unlike many others about whom Clark talks,
actually profited very handsomely from that work.
By takeoff in the West, and this goes back to the first day of class, and by Wednesday,
we'll go back again to gapminder.org and look at the bubbles moving through space.
This still photograph, so to speak, covers a longer time horizon, a 500-year time horizon.
And it shows an abrupt northward movement in GDP per capita in the US,
lagging a bit in Japan, lagging further in China, India, and Indonesia.
And if we just throw all the countries in the world in a pot,
we get a picture that looks something like this, where gross GDP is in blue,
population in green, and the one divided by the other in gold. And what we're interested in
from here to the end of term, really, is in understanding what lies behind these curves
and in thinking about from a given country's point of view or from a given class of people
in a given country's point of view, how can we increase the rate at which things get better?
Now, before I go further, some of you are thinking green thoughts. Wave at me if you're
thinking green thoughts and wondering whether it's really a good idea to have so many people
with so much money in their pockets. Sasha, tell us. We've got a mic here. Thanks, Morgan.
I think basically the root of all environmental problems is you care about the fact that there
are too many people. So you have more people who can consume more. The simple thing to think is
Okay, so you would like to kill off a portion of the world's population?
Yeah. Okay. That's very straightforward. Good, clear MBA thinking.
And given a constant world population, if we had it, would you prefer that that population on
average be a little less affluent than it is or than I seem to want it to be?
I'm not sure that it's that straightforward because if people, societies don't have the
means to advance technology, even though consumption does go up, you have cleaner
technology that would be developed with greater economic prosperity. So I'm not as clear on that.
Okay, not as clear that you would acknowledge that as hundreds of millions of people living
in places like China and India come into income enough to have a family car or even two,
that there's a challenge there. Certainly.
Okay, so let's keep the natural environment in the background as we talk about this.
But let's for the moment focus on economics. And let's start with a curve like this. The red,
the curve shows low income to the left, high income to the right. And the frequency of each
income stratum is indicated vertically. And the red curve is a fairly typical
market economy income distribution with a truncated tail on the left and an elongated
tail on the right, with the mean income being much higher than the median because it is pulled
to the right by the very high incomes. If this chart were drawn to scale, that right hand tail
would probably be even more elongated, but wondrously thin out to the right. Well, the
phenomenon of takeoff is the upward shift in that distribution. It may change shape a little,
but it's not mainly that it's changing shape. It's that it's mean is drifting upward and to the
right. And if we think about two distributions, two or three generations removed from one another
in a given society, let's say the United States 1920 and the United States today,
it will often be the case that the difference is so dramatic that the material condition of
people living in the top tenth then will be about like the top half today. And you keep that up
for ten generations or so and you have something like this, where the top decile in, let's say,
1800 is living in material conditions that would be equivalent to perhaps the ninth decile today.
Not the very bottom, but people living relatively near the bottom. And this is particularly true
if you take into account not just income, but what it is that income can buy in the way of
medical care, comfort in lodging, quality of diet, and so forth. So there's an enormous
explosive change in the background here. And that change is our subject. Now, how you feel about
that change is more complicated. And we often hear that money doesn't buy happiness.
The people who say that have evidence of a kind. None of them volunteer to become poor.
And there is something that money buys that people want. And we'll return to that from time
to time. But imagine now that there are, just think about an economy with two people in it.
A's income or wealth is measured vertically. B's is measured horizontally. And you're Mr. A.
Which of these two outcomes would you prefer? On, by one way of thinking, if you're maximizing
your own income, you'd like to be there. If, on the other hand, what you're doing
is staying ahead of the Joneses, you'd like to be there. More generally, if you're just
trying to maximize your own household income, you will have indifference curves like these
horizontal ones and just seek to climb as high as possible. And you'll be perfectly content
if others climb at the same rate or even a higher rate. On the other hand, you may be
calculating the ratio of your household to other households that you choose to compare yourself
with. And the indifference curve will then become raised from the origin like that. And you'll be
trying to swing your position from bottom right to upper left. So one function is just maximize
one variable and the other is maximize the ratio of two variables. And most people tend to mix
these two things. And their contentment with their material position is partly relative and partly
absolute here, relative there. And if you think about the employees of a firm,
the way they're compensated raises both concerns. Suppose everybody in a law firm
is making between $150,000 and $200,000. And along comes Jim Alexander,
ace corporate lawyer. Never, I know. I'm abusing you. Never. And all right, Leslie Huff,
an ace corporate lawyer. And we really need her. And we've got to pay her $800,000.
And we make the offer and she takes it. There will be a, if this fact becomes public within the
firm, which is quite likely, everybody else will in some measure feel impoverished by it.
She's making four times what I'm making. Surely she's not four times better than me, right? And
the relative and the absolute are always at play. Now, let's look through Clark's explanations.
And I spent almost all of yesterday reviewing Clark. And he's kind of all over the place.
There's some of everything in this book. But let's pick out some of his main explanations
for economic takeoff and for the fact that the takeoff occurred first and most dramatically
in Western countries and among Western countries first in the United Kingdom.
And there's a recurring theme. It's in the beginning, the middle, and the end of the book
about his speculative interpretation of wills from England in late medieval and early modern
and right into modern times. And the phenomenon he finds is a fountain of well-born children
who cannot replicate their parents' place in society. And the empirics on this are pretty
strong, that well-to-do families, by and large, had more than two surviving children,
more than two children reaching adulthood. And indeed, the survival rate among well-to-do
children was quite a lot higher than the survival rate among other children.
And if you read all the way to the end of the book, you discover that if you compare this with
Asian societies, such as Japan and China, the effect is stronger in England. And from this,
he induces several consequences, the most obvious of which is that many of these well-born children
will be downward mobiles. They will marry beneath their class. They will take up occupations or
roles beneath their parents' class. And Clark is trying to say two things at once. One is
that the universalization of culture from the top could, in some measure, be promoted by
this downward mobility, that children raised with high expectations and
upbringing may be cultural carriers which would infuse lower economic strata with a
more energetic, more performance-oriented outlook. Now, for that, there's no evidence in this story.
It's just a speculation. And the other speculation, for which there is also no specific evidence,
is a Darwinian genetics story in which, and here Clark is, you know, this is dangerous territory
in the way of politics. He seems to believe that the genes carried at the top of the
income curve may be better genes than those elsewhere in the income curve,
and that the downward, forced downward mobility of progeny from that top-level gene pool
might upgrade the whole society in a genetic sense. Anybody want to comment on that thought?
Yes. Genetically speaking, it's just sort of silly because traits don't pass directly.
You aren't a clone of your parents, or you've been just a 50-50 combo. In terms of carrying
skills downward, though, I mean, that makes a lot of sense. If you're well-educated,
when you bring that down, you might educate your children about values, et cetera.
Okay. That's precisely my own view, but does anybody want to defend Clark here?
It could be more of a bell curve situation, if you know what I mean, that people on the
higher end of the income ladder have, over time, been privy to better situations and
better selection pressures leading to the evolution of skills like, I don't know,
analytical thinking, intelligence skills that are necessary for the professions that are
characteristic of the higher classes. Okay. Let's have a vote here. How many people
think it's likely that there is some validity to, let's start with the cultural story and then
go to the genetic story. How many people find the cultural story broadly plausible?
And the opposite, implausible? Okay. And how many find the genetic story broadly plausible?
Fewer, but a substantial number. And how many find it implausible? I have no idea,
and Clark provides not one shred of evidence with which we could test this.
My own guess is that a few hundred years is a pretty short time for carrying out the kind of
selection process he has in mind. It's also the case that the association between parental,
let's call it IQ. The twin studies actually do confirm this, that where identical twins are
born to Mr. and Mrs. Smith and raised by Mr. and Mrs. Jones, in IQ and several other variables,
the association between the identicals will be greater than between them and the siblings
belonging to the new family. So genetics is not wholly out of the picture.
On the other hand, from a pragmatic point of view, which is where we're going with all this,
the idea of, well, what was eugenics? Has anybody in a history course picked up eugenics?
Anyone? Back with the mic here.
There's an idea that in some form has existed since ancient times,
but really picked up in the late 19th century, and then especially under the Third Reich,
where it was essentially believed that people at the top tended to have better genes,
or in the case of the Third Reich, a specific racial group, and therefore you want to maximize
the number of people with certain desirable traits for reproducing and minimize the ability
of people with undesirable traits to reproduce, resulting in a better, stronger, smarter,
in the case of the Nazis, blonder race. Okay, that's the gist of it.
The part of it which was most influential had to do with trying to prevent
people who were mentally retarded from reproducing, and a lot of that happened.
The vulgar prejudices that lay behind much of it, much of it was conducted by something called
the Vineland Institute, located near Princeton, New Jersey. No guilt by association there.
And the Vineland Institute published data showing that all the immigrant groups streaming into the
in the early 20th century were inferior to wasps mentally, and they were very tough on the Jews.
The Jews are just not bright at all, and they did this by administering English language
questionnaires to immigrants just after they got here. The pragmatics of culture are something
that's a lot easier to deal with, and which fits more readily into the humanistic framework
that we share. After the fountain, which really doesn't fit in any of his categories,
Clark has three broad categories. One is exogenous growth theories, exogenous meaning
economic growth caused by something that has its origin outside the market economy.
And one of these ideas, which I think he's right about, he doesn't run with it very far,
but the emergence of the nation-state system, the rule of law, the existence of
well-formalized property rights, all that stuff is pretty powerful. And the western world
was the initial focal point of the Westphalian nation-state system. Clark is at pains to show
that that by itself isn't enough of an explanation. And in general, no one should expect
one story to explain the evolution of capitalist wealth. This is way too complex a story,
way too complex a phenomenon for simple theories to carry the day. A special case of that would be
wealth-maximizing law, as illustrated a week ago in Genn versus Rich, or in U.S. versus Cosby,
or any of hundreds of legal precedents. Clark also briefly, toward the end of the book,
takes up the work of a guy named Kenneth Pomerantz. And Pomerantz has a book called
The Great Divergence, which asks the question, well, he begins with a proposition that from
a social and economic point of view, China and Japan both looked a lot like Europe in about 1800.
And there's lots to quibble with in that generalization, but it's not crazy.
And then he says, well, Europe takes off well over a century ahead of those Asian countries.
And he wants to know why. And his thesis is that it has to do with natural resources.
And in particular, that large population centers, like the cities of England,
were located close to large energy resources, such as the coal mining areas of the Midlands
in the United Kingdom. And also, of almost equal importance for Pomerantz,
access to vast agricultural land in the form of North America. And that about 1800 was the time
when the exploitation of the largely empty continent in the United States was feeding
resources into Western Europe. And there's some plausibility in those ideas.
Then Clark talks about multiple equilibrium theories. And the idea here is,
think of time passing that way, and standard of living or productivity going this way.
And the idea is that a country could climb this small hill and get stuck here. And then there'd
be some exogenous shock, some huge event outside the economic system, which would allow it to pass
from that equilibrium to a new equilibrium on top of the taller hill. And the world demographic
transition is such a story, and not a crazy story at all. The notion that the falling death rate
created by better public health, probably more than any single factor by clean water,
and elementary vaccinations, but clean water probably above all else.
And the eventual adjustment of the birth rate to that, so that you go from high birth rate,
high death rate, short lives, to low birth rate, low death rate, long lives. That by itself
is, I think without question, a powerful element in the story wherever a nation-state society
has gone from poor to rich. Then the endogenous growth theories. And
the idea here is that something happens inside the economy that creates a dynamic change,
and that dynamic change leads to mass affluence. And I think there's a lot in this idea,
which of course is not Clark's. Clark is merely cataloging other people's ideas.
And does anybody recognize either of these two handsome gentlemen? I prefer the haircut on the
left. This is Joseph Schumpeter, and this is F. A. Hayek. And each of them had an idea about
market societies that has to be central to our thinking. In Schumpeter's case,
it was creative destruction. And I'm told by the teaching fellows that most of you knew that quite
well on the midterm. And creative destruction is a way of reshuffling the deck economically
at short intervals. So that looking back at this story, so that sitting still on this hill
is difficult for any given firm, and arguably impossible for society at large,
once you're into a capitalist market economy. One way to diagram that is,
this diagram we have the capital invested in a given kind of product or production
rising from left to right, and the productivity of that capital rising
from bottom to top. And each of these curves is a production function,
representing a technology and a way of organizing people and handling information.
And the idea would be that change occurs in the sequence 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 here,
where there's a process of climbing to the right as we go to more capital intensive
production, more capital per worker. And then while Tal is doing that,
Jennifer is saying, well, no, we should reorganize this entirely. We should use a different
technology, a different method of attracting investments, a different method of compensating
employees. And she shifts to the lower end of 3, and then that gets carried to here,
and then a similar shift to the blue production function, and then up that.
And so a kind of zigzag story of change, where people compete not within one production function,
but between production functions. And a chaotic pattern of creative destruction occurs. What
makes it creative is that it is ultimately an upward movement in productivity.
And a version of that story is in Clarke, but he doesn't really think in the dynamic way that
Schumpeter and Hayek and others do. Hayek's story is the one about the creative potential of
a free society, which I think you had a memo to write about. And the notion there is that social
learning will accrue, that the society at large will have a higher learning rate than any
individual within it. And that as each of us goes about her or his work, we are spewing off
insights for others, both when we succeed and when we fail. When we succeed, people
will copy our ideas. When we fail, people will know an idea not to trust. And that over time,
society actually smartens up. And if you look at the first chapter in the assignment for today
in Clarke, he has all the factors of growth as he conceives them in a very simplified model.
And the residual, the residual, which accounts for about half the variance,
its most natural interpretation is it is social learning. It isn't the specific capital embodied
in a given worker's education or in the factory plant and equipment with which that worker is
supplied by an employer, but in the less tangible forms of social knowledge, which the society is
generating. And Hayek's idea then is that over time, social learning makes the whole system
smarter, taken as a whole. And that learning to navigate unfamiliar information, which
arguably would be something you're all doing right now, becomes not only an advantage to the
individual, but to the society at large. Well, the most glaring omission in Clarke in talking
about the surge of wealth in the West is the joint stock corporation. And the joint stock
corporation goes back, of course, many centuries. But the kind of joint stock corporation which has
become dominant in the world goes back only to about the middle of the 1800s.
In the UK, it's dated to the Corporation Act of 1862. In the US, I think you'd probably say
somewhere in the 1840s it becomes important. You can find legal traces of it much earlier in both
cases. But it gets to be a big deal in the middle years of the 19th century. And as we saw with the
reading from Alfred Chandler, the rise of the large-scale railroad in the US provoked the
creation of the equity and bond markets in New York, and the feverish development
of joint stock corporations in virtually every field of endeavor thereafter. These slides,
I'm going to show a series of proprietary slides constructed by Ibbotson Associates. Ibbotson
Associates is named for Roger Ibbotson at the School of Management here. Ibbotson
became filthy rich by being the first one to systematically compile, analyze, and sell
long-trend data about stocks and bonds. And it's only because he likes to teach that he bothers
to continue. The timescale here is 1925 to more or less the present. And the
earnings of various classes of assets are traced here, beginning in this case with treasury bills
issued by the government, and as safe as the government is. Then municipal bonds,
government bonds of other kinds, corporate bonds. So this would be debt taken on by a corporation,
and they might be junk bonds if the corporation is a little risky,
and they might be blue chip bonds if not. And then this is the blue curve is an amalgam of
stock returns. And in every case, we start with $1 in 1925 and keep investing the money.
The way these charts are generated is we assume that every dollar of dividend is plowed back,
and that we don't pay any taxes. So this would sort of be Yale that we're
charting. You and I wouldn't quite have the same tax privilege Yale has. And the most striking
thing there is, what's the most striking thing about that chart? First of all, there is some
magic in compound interest, right? You can just leave your money to grow. It really does eventually
do that. But how about the blue curve versus the others? Pretty startling. We're going to get
somebody else. Yes, Tom. There seems to be a rather large equity premium. Okay. What I mean
by that is that there seems to be excess returns if you put your money in stocks versus any of the
other categories, treasuries, corporate bonds. Okay. I mean, you're obviously taking up more
risk in stocks versus the other categories, certainly more than treasury bills, but you
could possibly argue that the difference in risk doesn't seem as great as the difference
in returns over the long run. Okay. The equity premium is the punchline here, well said. And
what's the standard way one might manage the risk of a portfolio? You could diversify. Okay.
So we wouldn't put all our money in mining stocks or even in Apple,
which is right now one of the most expensive stocks in the universe.
But the equity premium is huge. And look here what happens. This is 1925. The depression is here.
The great crash is here. These people got jolted, right? And of course, the temptation when that
happens to you is to imagine that it's going to go right to the middle of the earth and therefore
to sell at this point, which lots and lots of people did. And of course, the effect was
to ruin their wealth. Let's take another set of these. We let inflation go unnoticed in that one.
And here we'll show inflation by the red curve. And then the T-bills, government bonds,
large company stocks, small company stocks. And you get a huge premium there.
Now, back to the question of the accumulation of mass affluence, the power of large enterprise
to generate enormous wealth over long periods, right? This is a 75, 80, 85-year period we're
looking at. But money patiently invested in joint stock corporations is a solid strategy
for the accumulation of wealth within a given household or institutional portfolio.
It's not anywhere near the sexiest or the fastest way, but it is one of the most solid ways.
And the only conclusion I want to get out of this is that in talking about economic takeoff
and the sustained growth in mass affluence, companies, joint stock companies with limited
liability are a big part of that. Third and last, remember the variable here is gross domestic
product per capita. And part of that has to do with the propensity to consume. And in the Posner
book about what went wrong with the mortgage markets, Keynes, Lord Keynes is mentioned,
and Keynesian economics, which are directed to the question of stabilizing mass demand
for products so that the economy keeps going around and around, is an important element.
Well, the joint stock corporation was, from its birth, really good at selling. And the move,
which would be called forward integration, we're not just going to make cigarettes,
we're going to sell cigarettes. We're not just going to make soap, we're going to sell soap.
We're not just going to make cars, we're going to sell them. That forward integration,
I'm going to, without comment now, just show you 20 slides from the middle decades
of the 20th century, and then we'll stop briefly and segue to our next meeting.
Some of these are a little pernicious. This one is not. A repeated trope is using products to
solve marital problems. And the large glove compartment on this mercury
will solve the marital problem between these two. When my grandfather died, and I was 17,
I inherited a mercury from him. It lasted one year before I crashed it. Quiet substance.
There's a series of palm olives here. They all have to do with men and women. Women are the
sales target. Does palm olive soap exist still? Does anybody use it? That's pretty nasty stuff,
right? This is rouge, not soap now. You get the gist of it. So, in the consumer culture that's
embodied in these, and which is powerfully represented all around us, we live in a very
consumption-oriented culture, is arguably a misleadingly favorable aspect of wealth.
That is, if you think about those ads and how silly it seems with 70 years' hindsight that
using palm olive soap will save your marriage, my offhand guess is that it didn't save a single
marriage. That whole angle of kind of the hucksterish aspect of a capitalist society
can give one pause. Now, I'd like you to come to class Wednesday having thought a little about
a country and what 5% of its GDP would amount to in dollars. If you need to look that up,
you can Google it. The easiest Google is CIA Factbook. But the World Bank will give you the
data too, the World Bank or the WTO. There are all kinds of organizations that produce these data.
Pick a country and think about 5% and think about how you would deploy the 5%
if you wanted to maximize the expected wealth of that society over, let's say, a 20-year future.
The reading is the more policy-oriented part of de Soto, and it should in some ways guide and
support your thinking, although you surely want to think well beyond de Soto's framework.
So I'll see you on Wednesday.
