China’s role in the Iran war may be far deeper than it looks. While Beijing presents itself as a mediator, new reports point to a “double game”—supporting Iran behind the scenes while easing tensions with the U.S.
At the center of it is Xi Jinping’s defining trait: one message in public, another behind closed doors.
But that strategy may be backfiring.
Rising oil prices, supply chain stress, and mounting costs are now hitting China’s economy. From discounted Iranian oil to a potential $110 billion shock, this episode breaks down what China is really doing in Iran—and why the pressure is now coming home.
Hello, everyone. Welcome. Welcome to Ladies Real Talk. Happy Thursday. Happy Friday.
All right. Well, a week went by fast. I feel like this is already the weekend, but it's not.
It's okay. Well, President Trump spoke last night about the war in Iran,
and now the whole world is watching what happens next. Will the U.S. deploy ground forces? Will
control of the Strait of Hormuz be handed off to NATO allies? But one thing is already clear.
Trump does not want a prolonged war. And that's where this gets interesting,
because that urgency may be colliding with something else entirely, what I would call
Beijing's double game. Because behind that, there has always been a question on people's mind.
After suffering successive blows, losing leadership, losing capability, how is the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps still able to show resilience and continue provoking?
Are China and Russia helping? Well, according to recent media reports,
Western intelligence assessments indicate that Russia is transporting drones,
medicine, and food to Iran in phases. The reports also detail Moscow's efforts to support Iran
in sustaining the war, even though that might change today because an Iranian
missile hit a Russian property. Anyway, that was the media reports a couple of days ago.
But think about it. Something doesn't add up here. Russia itself is already entangled in a war.
So where does it find the extra resources to help Iran? A U.S. defense official put it bluntly,
every munition sent to Iran is one less available for Russia's own war in Ukraine.
So that raises a more fundamental question. If Russia is stretched,
then who is really behind Iran's ability to keep going? We have a China expert,
Professor Yuan Hongbin, who is a Chinese dissident and scholar living in Australia.
He reviewed insider information received from his contacts in Beijing. He argues that China
is the real agent behind Iran, and that Russia may only be the facade. He also points to what
he calls Xi Jinping's two-faced strategy. So let's get to the bottom of that tonight.
Professor Yuan relayed information from what he described as conscientious party insiders
within the CCP system. He said, on the issue of Iran, the CCP is in fact fully supporting
the stability of the Iranian government. According to these insiders, the CCP has
already established a covert supply route through Pakistan to transport various types
of military equipment to Iran. And this channel is currently accelerating. And this is where the
picture begins to shift. Because according to Yuan, what we're seeing on the surface,
Iran fighting, Russia assisting, is only the outer layer of a deeper structure.
Yuan argues that both Iran and Russia's performance in this war is backed at a deeper level
by the CCP regime, operating under a broader political strategy dictated by Xi Jinping.
At present, Iran's long-range missile strike capability relies heavily on
support from China's Beidou navigation system, its drones and missile systems,
their core technologies, and even some of their raw materials
are also sourced from China. And then comes the strategic intent.
At a recent CCP Politburo meeting, Xi Jinping reportedly gave a clear directive. He aims to
turn the current US-Iran conflict into a repeat of the Afghanistan war. In other words, not a
conflict, but a prolonged entanglement. The goal is to draw US military resources into Iran,
just as the US was once bogged down in Afghanistan. And if that's the objective,
then everything we're seeing begins to connect. Because this, according to Yuan, reflects Xi's
fundamental strategy, turn Iran into America's next Afghanistan, trap US military and national
resources, and create strategic space for a potential move in the Taiwan Strait.
And the way this strategy is executed reveals something even more important,
which is Xi Jinping's two-faced approach. As explained by the professor, on one hand,
Xi Jinping is attempting to improve relations with the United States.
Beijing has noticeably toned down its wolf warrior rhetoric. Pakistan, which is China's
strategic partner, has helped facilitate the ceasefire negotiations between the US and Iran.
Pakistan is now acting as a key intermediary. Xi Jinping hopes this will win favor with
Donald Trump. In addition, Beijing has been buying large amounts of US soybeans and is
potentially placing large orders with Boeing. The objective is very clear—secure Trump's
visit to Beijing, stabilize relations on the surface, and thereby reinforce Xi Jinping's
domestic political standing. And Professor Yuan describes this as Xi's highly deceptive side.
But that's only one side of the story. Because once you look past the surface,
a very different picture emerges. On the other hand, Xi's real actions tell a completely different
story. The CCP's domestic and international propaganda apparatus is actively waging an
information war, pushing narratives designed to convince the world that Iran still retains
strong retaliatory capability, and the United States is struggling, and the conflict is
becoming increasingly constrained. And these narratives are not contained within China.
They are now echoed in significant parts of Western media as well. And the reality does
seem to move in that direction, on the surface. But the propaganda is only the surface layer.
The more critical issue is what's happening behind the scenes. Here's the crucial part.
Professor Yuan claims that Xi Jinping is supplying the IRGC, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,
with direct combat support through two main routes. Okay, let me take a sip of water before
I tell you the routes. Okay. A northern route, that is via Russia, across the Caspian Sea.
And there's a southern route, via Pakistan, across the land border. So two corridors,
two directions, one coordinated system to help Iran. With deep structural support,
in terms of technology, infrastructure, and military systems.
The professor states that many of Iran's underground bunker systems, especially those
built into mountainous terrain, were designed by Chinese military engineering units. Some of
these facilities extend as deep as 400 meters underground. Iran's missile and drone operations
are guided by China's Beidou system. Key technologies, critical components,
chips, electronic warfare systems, are all tied back to Chinese manufacturing.
And these are not one-time transfers, they are continuous. Supplies are reportedly moving through
maritime routes across the Caspian Sea, and land routes through Pakistan. So on the surface,
it appears that Russia is supporting Iran, and Pakistan is helping, mediating. But underneath,
the supply chain leads back to China. Now, layer this on top of the battlefield
reality. Under heavy strikes from US-Israel coalition forces, Iran's original leadership
structure has been mostly eliminated. A new centralized command has not yet been fully
established. Iran's military response is now entering a phase of forced decentralization,
where operational decisions are increasingly made by mid- and lower-level officers. Less control,
more unpredictability, but continued resistance. And this is where things go even deeper.
Professor Yuan claims that over the years, CCP-linked technical personnel entering Iran,
under the disguise of providing equipment and technical support,
have effectively functioned as Beijing's intelligence operatives. These individuals
are still active inside Iran today, and their role is not limited to technical support.
According to Yuan's contacts in Beijing, they are also providing political assurances
to IRGC officers. What are the assurances? Well, continue fighting. Even if defeat comes,
the CCP will provide political asylum to them. And that promise matters, because in a decentralized
battlefield environment, morale becomes the deciding factor. And according to Yuan,
this assurance from Beijing is playing a key role in sustaining the IRGC's willingness
to continue fighting. Okay, so when you put all of this together, a pattern begins to emerge.
From these developments, Yuan concludes that a key reason Iran has not yet surrendered,
despite severe losses and sustained military pressure, is that the CCP is doing everything
it can through this dual strategy, this double game, to keep the regime alive. And that shifts
how we should understand this war. Because at this point, it is no longer just a conflict between the
US, Israel, and Iran. It becomes, at least in part, a confrontation involving the CCP as well.
And as for Russia, the professor makes a critical point. Russia is already deeply entangled in the
war in Ukraine. Its military and economic resources are stretched thin. So if Russia
is still appearing in this conflict, then it may not be acting alone. And his conclusion is direct.
The primary force sustaining Iran behind the scenes is the CCP. And to some extent,
even Russia's own warfighting capability or capacity is supported by China.
All right, so having said all of that, we should come back to what we discussed earlier,
the idea of a two-faced strategy. Because according to his sources in Beijing,
this is not just a policy, this is personal. And Yuan traces back to Xi Jinping himself.
So let me show you a picture. Oh, this is a protagonist. Do you know this woman?
She is Xi's former wife, his first wife. Her name is Ke Lingling, who now, I believe,
lives in the UK. She once described Xi Jinping in a single sentence, and she said,
that's a person who is very fake. So what does that mean? In Chinese, henjia. Well, it means
one thing to your face and another behind your back, saying all the right things while doing
the opposite. And over time, this personal trait has evolved into a governing method,
a state-level strategy. Basically, it's a system defined by duplicity. Say what's expected while
executing something entirely different behind the scenes. And according to the professor,
there is even a saying circulating within Beijing's political circles right now.
You know, Xi Jinping fears and constantly denounces what he calls two-faced individuals.
But the most two-faced person of all, they say, is Xi himself. All right, and this pattern,
it doesn't stop with Iran. It extends into other areas of strategy. And maybe I should
go back to this picture. Another example is fentanyl. So at a previous internal
CCP Politburo meeting, Xi Jinping made a striking comparison. He said, Western powers once used
opium to weaken China. Now it's time for the U.S. to face a crisis of drug abuse.
So Xi framed this as part of a broader historical shift that he called the East rising,
the West declining. And from his perspective, China's export of fentanyl or fentanyl
precursor chemicals is simply normal international trade. He does not see anything wrong with that.
He believes that if drugs are flooding the U.S., that's America's problem, not China's
responsibility. And then internally, the message becomes even more explicit. At another Politburo
meeting, he reportedly said that China should use fentanyl precursor exports as a form of
economic warfare to weaken America's national strength. So taken together,
these remarks suggest that a large scale production of fentanyl or fentanyl precursors
is not merely economic activity, but part of a broader political strategy.
And more importantly, it's a strategy that has not changed. So when Beijing makes
commitments during U.S.-China negotiations or trade talks or whatever,
or makes promises to restrict precursor production, Yuan's conclusion is blunt.
Those are all empty promises. Beijing's underlying strategy remains intact and will never change.
All right, let's back to Iran. Let's talk about the hidden cost of China's strategy.
Actually, before I get into the discussion on the hidden cost, I want to say one thing. I want to
say Western media has in some cases corroborated parts of Professor Yuan's claims. For example,
according to multiple recent media reports citing U.S. officials, China's largest chipmaker,
SMIC, allegedly sent chipmaking tools to Iran's military sector.
And the activity began about a year before the war and may still be ongoing. And that
cooperation almost certainly included technical training. But technical transfer is only one
layer, and behind that are people. And this is where the story becomes far more serious,
because Xi's double game is not without consequences. In fact, it comes with a cost,
and that cost is beginning to surface. And according to another Chinese dissident based in
Canada, Shengxue, she cited her sources and saying that three radar experts from the 14th
Research Institute of the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation have reportedly
been killed in Iran. And this institute is one of the most critical centers of China's
development system. And according to these reports, these experts were involved in radar
technology support, detection systems, maintenance targeting U.S. stealth aircraft. In addition,
seven personnel linked to China's drone maker, DJI, have also reportedly been killed in the war.
And here's a deeper issue. This is no longer just about isolated incidents. It's about exposure,
because what these reports review is something much bigger. An entire network of previously
hidden operations now beginning to surface. These individuals are said to come from multiple
institutes under China's aerospace science and industry corporation, covering air defense
systems, cruise missiles, and rocket technologies. And for years, they have allegedly been providing
covert support to Iran's military development. And now new information suggests that China
might have sent around 500 military and technical personnel to Iran. Of those, 300 to 400 are now
currently missing. Their fate remains unknown. Beijing is forced to swallow the loss in silence,
because acknowledging it will come at a much higher cost. So for those who have not returned,
the official explanation is uniform. They're away on assignment. Inside China, the response has
already begun. Authorities have launched strict internal investigations to prevent any leaks from
happening. Leaks are being suppressed. Families have been warned not to speak. But as time passes
and communication remains absent, information is going to spread through informal networks.
Because we have missing people that's not going to be not noticed. So this is where everything
starts to connect, because what began as a hidden support system is now revealing its cost
in lives, in exposure, and in risk. So this war has unexpectedly exposed
the heavy price for China. And now I want to give you an assessment of the economic impact on China
if the war drags on. Because if China is successful, I don't think it will be successful.
Let's say if it's successful in its strategy of making Iran another Afghanistan for the US,
what's the economic impact on China? Let's run some numbers. First, let's quantify the
energy shock. Now before the war began in February 2026, oil prices were around $65 per barrel.
Now prices have risen to be above $100. Looking ahead, if prices stabilize between $85 and $100,
that's an average increase of about $25 per barrel. China imports roughly 4 billion barrels
of crude oil every year. That alone translates into an additional $100 billion in cost.
And that's just the beginning, because China doesn't just buy oil, it buys discounted oil.
China imports Iranian oil at what people believe is $10 to $20 below market price. I think the
discount is deeper, it's more than $10 to $20. And then when you combine that with supply from
Venezuela, we're talking about roughly half a billion barrels from Iran and another 180
million barrels from Venezuela a year. And if China is forced to pay full price or global prices,
that discount disappears. And that adds at least another $10 billion in cost annually.
So now combine the two, you have $100 billion from price increases and you have $10 billion
from lost discounts. That's over $110 billion in total pressure annually.
Putting it in perspective, so what does it mean? $110 billion sounds a lot, but what does it mean?
Well, China's official GDP last year was about $120 trillion renminbi. That's the official
number. But we know China's real GDP is not nearly $120 trillion. It's severely overstated.
I once did a program and estimated that China's real GDP is between one third to a half of the
official numbers. So let's just say, let's be conservative. Let's just say, let's cut it in
half. So instead of 120 trillion yuan, it should be 60 trillion yuan, which is about $8.5 trillion,
which is about half of U.S. GDP. What's U.S. GDP, 17 trillion or 22 trillion? It might be 22 trillion.
Anyway, yeah, U.S. is 22 trillion. Okay. So it's less than half of U.S.
So let's say it's $8.5 trillion GDP. This energy shock alone
consumes 1.4% of the country's economic output. And here's the key point, because this is not a
one-time cost. It's a cascading, there's a cascading effect. And there's a second layer,
corporate collapse begins. This is where the pressure starts to move.
Let's just start with the plastics industry, because China dominates the world in plastic
manufacturing. Raw materials account for about 70% of production costs in the plastic packaging
industry. And those materials are petrochemical-based. So when oil prices rise,
costs rise immediately, and plastics is just the beginning. This is already a low-margin industry.
Companies with fragile cash flow cannot absorb these increases, which means a wave of bankruptcies
could begin as early as the second quarter. Yeah, China makes 40% of the world's plastic
packaging. That's, yeah, 40%. Okay, so that's the second layer. The third layer, it moves
into food and agriculture, because the same pressure moves directly into fertilizers,
pesticides, plastic film, and all of them are energy-dependent. And we're already seeing the
impact. Fertilizer prices is up by 5%. Urea is up by 12%. And potash, potash, potash,
jiafei, we say in Chinese, is up by 15%. So these are double-digit increases.
They're enough to matter. And agriculture works on a lag, which means the real impact shows up
later in food prices. And then there's a fourth layer, the system that connects everything,
logistics. Fuel accounts for about 30% to 35% of total logistics costs in China.
With current oil price increases, transport costs are rising significantly, over 5%.
Now consider the margin. Major logistics firms in China operate at 2.5% to 4% net margins.
Smaller firms often operate below 2%, which means this cost increase in oil or in energy
can wipe out profits entirely. It will first happen to smaller firms, and then it will go up.
And this can be fatal, because when logistics breaks, everything becomes more expensive.
Freight companies raise prices, costs pass downstream, businesses absorb what they can
and pass the rest to customers. So now combining everything, higher input costs,
rising transport costs, weak margins, falling profits, it's what economists call dual squeeze,
pressure on businesses, pressure on consumers. And we're talking about an economy that's already
struggling in China. And once you factor that in, the total economic impact is going to be felt.
And some people, I saw a China analyst who said that the total economic impact could double
the oil price, the energy price hit, to be around 3% of China's GDP. And even that is conservative,
because it does not yet include bankruptcies, unemployment, wage cuts, China's unique debt
problems. So at its core, rising energy prices act like a tax. But can China offset this? Well,
I think this is very important, because theoretically, China should be able to have
something in its toolbox to handle this, like tax cuts, or releasing strategic oil reserves.
But has Beijing done that? No, nothing. Neither one. Because tax cuts are,
I mean, Chinese local governments are under so much fiscal pressure, they're not going to cut
any taxes. In fact, they're trying to extract more revenue, tax revenue, not less. And as for
strategic reserves, the United States is releasing them, the International Energy
Agency is coordinating globally, but China has not taken similar action. It has not even signaled
that it will. Instead, it has relied on commercial inventories, corporate stockpiles, and raising
prices to absorb the shock. So why are other countries reacting, but Beijing is not? Instead,
it appears to be calm. And that's what the CCP experts call, they call this China's strategic
resilience. When other democratically elected governments are reacting, the CCP is remaining
quiet, or it's not doing anything. And their experts are calling it China's strategic resilience.
But that only works under one assumption, that cost to ordinary people does not matter.
And there's also a deeper reason for that. China releases its reserves now. If it does that,
it will have to buy oil later at higher prices to replenish, which means higher foreign exchange
costs. It will create pressures on the reserves, on foreign exchange reserves. And in China,
foreign exchange reserves are not just financial tools, they are strategic assets,
and they're controlled by the party. So for now, Beijing is not doing anything to
help its businesses and its people. Instead, they're just sitting tight and watching.
So in the end, this is the conclusion. The longer Beijing tries to have Iran tie down the United
States, the more pressure builds on China itself. And that pressure doesn't stay abstract.
It moves through the system, into prices, into businesses, into jobs,
and eventually into society. And that's where the real risk lies.
They will translate into economic stress, social tension, and internal political strain.
So in the end, this war may not break the United States, but it will test China because
the longer this conflict drags on, the more Beijing is forced to pay,
not just in money, but in stability. And that is the real risk Xi Jinping is facing,
not what happens in Iran, but what comes back home. And interestingly, speaking of stability,
there are more rumors coming out of China regarding the political status within the CCP
after Wen Jiabao appeared in that video at the Geographical Institute of Beijing.
The rumors coming out, and I don't want to prematurely discuss them because it could
give you the wrong messages, but I really think something major has happened internally.
The video that we saw about Wen Jiabao appearing in public is just a small sign of what has
happened. I think in a week or so, we may have more information. I think something has happened.
All right, that's what I have for you tonight. I want to tell you about the video from
Lace Looking Glass. It's a very interesting video about the relations between the Thai-Cambodian
War that broke out last December and CCP's secretive longevity project. You wouldn't
think that there's a tie between the two, but there is. It's released an hour ago. I hope you
can check it out. The link is in the description. In the beginning part, it appears that I was
talking about the war, but you should watch until the end. It's not just about the war.
It begins with the war, and then I go into the scam compound and then this longevity project.
And then I came back. I finished the program with the war between Thailand and Cambodia.
All right, I seem to have lost my voice. Let me take a sip of water. What happened to my voice?
All right, let's see. All right, let's see. What do people say?
Good evening, Lei. Good evening, everyone. All right. Lei must be Cuban. She works at her own
time. George Washington. Why Cuban? Are Cubans always fashionably late? Are you saying that?
I'm right on time today. I started at 9.30. Yeah, I'm right on time. You're frozen on my screen.
Am I? I hope. All right, here's a question. Dave Rongyan, 4239. Lei, why do we not see more
impact on Xi of the failure of Chinese weapons in Venezuela and Iran? Good question. Because
he has effectively put the blame on someone else. Guess who that is? The two generals he
arrested in January. There are overwhelming information coming out of China saying that
Xi Jinping has decided to blame the failure of Chinese weapons in those two countries
on Zhang Youxia, who at one point had headed up the equipment department of the CMC.
So he's blaming that on Zhang Youxia. He's also accusing him of spying espionage activities,
or selling, I don't know. They didn't say which country. I assume the United States.
So they're sticking with the original narratives, which the Wall Street Journal published a week
after Zhang Youxia was arrested. The story about him selling China's military secrets to the US.
So, yeah, Xi Jinping is still using that accusation and blaming him for the failed
Chinese equipment and weapons in Venezuela and Iran. But the thing is, not a lot of people
will believe that. I mean, you could say that he's partly responsible for the failed equipment,
because at one point he did head up the equipment department of the PLA. But when he accuses him,
accuses Zhang Youxia to be an American spy, that just doesn't make sense. Because Zhang Youxia at
one point said at a Politburo meeting, because there were 24 of them, he said, I'm the only
Politburo member who does not have children and grandchildren who ever studied in the US,
or who have any connections with the US. And I think that's true. Almost all the Politburo
members have family members or relatives who went to the US or are still living in the US,
or even other Western countries. But his children work in the military. And he said,
I'm the only one, I'm the only one who do not have any family members associated with the West.
And now you're accusing him of colluding with the US? It just doesn't make sense. He doesn't need
to. If he comes up with an accusation that people actually believe, then he's successful.
But if he slaps some crimes on the general that don't make any sense, then I think it's
counterproductive. Someone said, by the way, UN's clothing is king to what prisoners wear in some
states in America. I noticed that. I think it's also similar to what referees wear on football
field, right? The stripes? Yeah. I don't know. Yeah, I noticed that. Who knows? All right.
Mark Irvin. Well, thank you, Mark. I appreciate that. Thank you for supporting me. Okay,
let me see. Any other comments? Julian Rocher. If every Chinese whisper you have reported
for the last year had come true, there would be a new government in China now, and CCP leaders
would be banished or imprisoned. Not necessarily. Why do you say that? If every whisper that I have
reported last year had come true, that doesn't mean that. Because you need people with courage
to overthrow the regime. Because there's a fundamental difference between people who
oppose Xi Jinping and people who oppose the communist regime. And those people, if people
are mostly just opposed to Xi Jinping, then they can effectively take down Xi Jinping.
Only those who dare to challenge the regime and wants to end the communist regime,
those people are capable of removing Xi Jinping. You see what I mean? Because Xi Jinping has
somehow bound himself with the regime. And he's saying that if you want to remove me,
then you're really taking down this regime. And then they're guilty of destroying the communist
party and our legacy. So those people who still want to protect the regime back off.
And so far, that's what has happened. Those party elders, there's so many people who
want to remove Xi Jinping, but none of them, or we don't know who, we haven't really seen anyone
who has the vision and the courage to say, it's not a Xi Jinping issue. It's the regime's
problem. We need to end this regime. Because if you remove Xi Jinping and put somebody in,
that person could be even worse. If you put another Deng Xiaoping
in Xi Jinping's position, who follows Deng Xiaoping's policy of what,
tao guang yang hui, hide your strength and bide your time, then it's more deceptive.
So that's why I think all of the whispers I have reported may still be true, but that doesn't mean
that the CCP leaders will be banished or imprisoned, because it needs someone with
the courage to end the regime. If they just want to remove Xi Jinping, they will fail.
That's the fatal mistake Zhang Youxia made. That's the fatal mistake of all the party elders
made. They compromised with Xi Jinping, and then ended up being taken down.
And then if they still don't see this, if they don't see this point, if they still don't realize
that the regime is the problem, then they're going to pay a bigger price. Xi Jinping is going to take
down everyone, and then that may not be bad for the US government. That's why Trump calls him his
best friend, because Xi Jinping is more effective than anyone. He has taken down so many PLA
generals. He's more effective than a war. That's why Trump is calling him his best friend,
or good friend. I shouldn't say best friend.
Lei looks marvelous in this color, tone of green. Yeah, I look good in green,
and it looks like wisdom to me. You look like a Christmas tree. You have a red background and
green in the front. Someone said, Lei, your hair is fabulous. Yes, I spent the time and did my hair
because I noticed someone said that they're curious what hairstyle I would exhibit last
time we did the live stream. So that gave me the incentive to do my hair, to be more presentable.
Not that I don't. Okay, all right, questions, comments? Okay, I think that's all. Have I
reached the bottom? No. Future GDP loss? She was trying to replace the petrodollar with bricks.
Yes, he's trying, but I don't think he will be successful.
Lei, go back to glass. Fake gold issues. Okay, those are not addressed to me.
Okay, I think I reached the bottom. I don't see any questions, which is a good sign.
Someone said, Christine Bauer, Lei is teasing us. Something big has happened. I really think
something big has happened, but we need to give it a bit more time to find out what really happened.
There are unusual signs in all directions, but I don't want to prematurely say anything.
All right, Lei, not sure if you touched the subject on China's situation of precious
metals. No, I did not touch that subject. Good night, Lei, please take care of your beautiful
hair. I will. Lei, you know China is tearing down some mosques, yes, but what is the reason
for tearing down and restructuring the mosques? Well, Xi Jinping is someone who does not believe
that the Chinese people should have religious beliefs in foreign faith. He does not believe
that Christianity should have a place in China because he sees that as Western.
That's why he's taking down churches, he's taking down mosques, but he's also persecuting
traditional Chinese faith like Falun Gong. Maybe he just wants people to believe in communism
or the communist ideology because that is a religion in China and CCP is a
theocratic government. All right, Lei, what will the demographic consequences be from this energy
and economic shock? Stephen Jay Shaw says in his documentary, the birth gap that crisis causes
childlessness, the birth gap that crisis causes demographic from this energy economic shock.
Chinese people are not getting married. Even if they do, they are not having children because
it's too costly to raise a kid. First of all, it's too costly to be married. It's too expensive
to date. Then it's too expensive to be married. Then it's too expensive to raise a family and
have children. That's why they're not having children. This economic shock or energy shock
would just exacerbate that problem. Also, China doesn't have that many people to begin with.
I haven't done a program about Chinese population, but recently there have been
screenshots. People who went to funeral homes for services took screenshots of the monitor
in the lobby because Chinese funeral homes are massive. They're not like small-scale
funeral homes in the community. They're massive. In the reception area, you have a monitor
that displays all the names of the deceased for the day. Then as family, you need to find
your loved ones on that monitor and then go to the designated room or area.
People took screenshots and then they list the names and age. It's shocking.
Most of them are people in their 40s, 50s. There are also many people in their teens and 20s.
The deceased on that list who are over 70s are not even 10%.
The Chinese are not talking. How could that be the case? Out of 20 people that died on that day,
most of them are young people and people in their prime age. That is shocking.
People think that has to do with the vaccines that they took.
There's also some information coming out of China about people working in the funeral
she's giving their insights on the number of people who died during COVID. The numbers are
in the hundreds of millions based on what they saw. It's not enough information for me to make
a program, but I definitely see some statistics coming out. There's some mad people here. People
want to irritate me, so they wrote Chinese to harass me.
Here's a question addressed to Lei. Please talk about the anchor baby situation.
By the way, somebody asked me about the tunnel explosion a couple of days ago. I thought they
were asking about the famous tunnel explosion from last fall. It turned out to be a tunnel
explosion in Sichuan last week. I looked into that. It turned out to be an infrastructure failure.
There's just so many infrastructure failures in China right now. Bridges collapse, roads slide.
I think that tunnel explosion is also caused by some kind of infrastructure, maybe lack of
maintenance or some substandard construction, but it turned out to be a quality issue.
Someone asked me about that. What do you think if the Europeans enter the war? Would it tip
the balance in favor of the West? I do not think the Europeans will enter the war because
their behavior is very predictable. I was thinking about this issue today. I need to give it some
more thought. The Europeans are so caught up in their desire to be the gentile class,
to be a gentleman. Have you noticed that there are a lot of people in our lives
who want to do good, who want to be good to you or want to be good to other people,
but they do it not because you need it. They do it because they want to appear superior or they
want to be called good. There are people who are so concerned with their reputation and their image
so they do all these seemingly great deeds, but they're doing that for themselves. They're not
doing that for the good of the larger community or the world. I think the Europeans are actually
caught up in that syndrome. They sound grand in their vision and they all sound great.
They look down upon people who are just very down to earth. There are a lot of people like that. I
used to be like that too. By the way, I used to be like that. I think being a YouTuber changed me
because people don't want that because the internet is all about authenticity.
People don't want you to waste their time. That's why people don't trust mainstream media anymore
because it all sounds very good, aloof, grand, proper, politically correct,
grand sounding, but then they don't necessarily deliver any substance and they're not genuine
and authentic. They're afraid to say a lot of things. So I think the Europeans are caught in
that syndrome and they can't free themselves to say what's truly on their mind. They can't do
what's really good for their country, for their people because they're so attached to appear
proper. It's not just them. It's a syndrome in our society nowadays.
People do not know how to be authentic anymore. Anyways, okay. I said too much. I'm in trouble.
All right. Should we end it here? We should end it here. I know I'm in trouble. Okay. All right.
How about we end it here? Europeans are overly caught up in this political correctness.
I mean, that's politicians. I understand the need for politicians to be politically correct,
but you still need to be genuine. People have lost the ability to be genuine.
Even in our life, I notice the family members. I do that too. Sometimes we want to be good to
someone, not because that person needs it, but because we need to be good to them.
And then your being good to them becomes a pressure. It's not like they would appreciate
that. And so if we could really be good to people in a way they want or accept or appreciate,
then that'll be really helping people or doing them a favor. And it's very subtle.
I think I used to be like that, but I noticed that. So I'm trying to change. Okay. All right.
Lei is Maga. Lei is Maga. Okay. Well, I think it's hard to label me. I don't see any label
that could be put on me because people, it's hard to put label on people. And I don't think people,
I don't believe any of these labels. So, oh, it's make authenticity great again.
I like that. I love that. Make authenticity great again. I love that. All right. This is cool.
Okay. All right. Well, we had too much fun. Lei had too much fun tonight. How about we end it
here? I'll be back this weekend. This weekend, I'll talk about CCP's infiltration strategy.
I have some good information to share with you on CCP's strategy in its influence campaign.
It should be very interesting to you. All right. Zaijian. Bye. Bye.