LIVE: House Homeland Security Holds Hearing on Arctic Security

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10 Video Views·Mar 26, 2026
The U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security holds a hearing titled “Arctic Security in an Era of Global Competition: Safeguarding U.S. Interests in Frigid Waters” at 2 p.m. ET on March 26.
Witnesses:
• Bryan Clark, senior fellow and director of the Hudson Institute's Center for Defense Concepts and Technology
• Heather Conley, nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute
• Marisol Maddox, senior Arctic fellow at Dartmouth College's Institute of Arctic Studies
AI Generated·May contain errors
And, you know, we don't run like, you know, like the trains in Europe, I guess they're right on time.
So we were in the United States, we don't we don't do that. But first of all, again,
apologize to for everybody that's here. And also the witness, especially the witnesses for,
you know, indulging us for the 90 minutes. The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the
current readiness of US Arctic forces, evaluate interagency capabilities and account for strategic
investments in Arctic security assets. And I recognize myself for an opening statement.
Good afternoon, everybody. And thank you to our witnesses for joining us today. Today's hearing
will focus on the importance of Arctic security, and the urgent need for the United States to
strengthen its presence, coordination and defense capabilities in this challenging,
yet vital region. The Arctic, long considered a strategic frontier for the United States,
has become a competitive tundra, with melting ice opening new shipping routes,
and expansive new access and critical to critical minerals. Given these developments,
Russia has stepped up its Arctic posture. Despite its ongoing war with Ukraine,
Russia has quietly expanded its military footprint in the high north and reactivated its Cold War
era bases to deploy more advanced air and missile defense systems and increase complex naval
operations across the region. Over the years, Moscow has built up the world's largest fleet
of heavy icebreakers, and increased investment in northern ports, airfields, nuclear powered
vessels and critical energy infrastructure. This allows Russia to strengthen its projection of
maritime power and close in on critical maritime borders along the northern sea route.
At the same time, China is positioning itself as a quote, near Arctic state, and steadily expanding
its presence along the region. Beijing has invested in Arctic infrastructure and pursued
scientific research activities to gain greater access to critical minerals and natural resources.
China is actively integrating the Arctic into its broader global strategy,
leveraging investments in dual use capabilities that could support future military and intelligence
gathering activities. These aggressive tactics by Russia and China demonstrate a clear intent
by two of our greatest adversaries to expand their Arctic domain and put pressure on the United
States. Meanwhile, as our adversaries plot in the Arctic, the United States has limited
operations in the region. To support our national security priorities, we must re-engage as an Arctic
nation and harness the power of the high north. Last year, congressional Republicans bestowed
the Coast Guard with unprecedented resources through the One Big Beautiful Bill Act,
signed into law by President Trump. This $25 billion investment, including tens of billions
directed towards the procurement of new icebreaking, polar security, and national
security and Arctic security cutters, gives the U.S. an unprecedented opportunity to deploy the
Coast Guard's Arctic assets and exert greater dominance. As such, the Coast Guard has commissioned
the building of a new medium polar icebreaker called Storus, in addition to its one medium
icebreaker, the Healy. The Coast Guard's only operational heavy icebreaker, the Polar Star,
just completed its 29th Antarctic tour despite being long past its intended service life.
This widening gap in U.S. Arctic capability is unacceptable, and the U.S. cannot afford to fall
behind Russia and China. We must implement this historic investment expeditiously to expand U.S.
presence, capability, and commitment to Arctic security. For years, the Coast Guard has been
plagued by delays, cost overruns, and contract mismanagement, and this subcommittee has sounded
the alarm. These are not just acquisition challenges. They are growing national security
vulnerabilities. While these investments act as a down payment on Coast Guard readiness,
Congress must also consider future opportunities and challenges on the frozen frontier,
including through improving international partnerships and hardening our intelligence
gathering methods to improve our Arctic strategy on all fronts. We must recognize that the Arctic
is a challenging but promising frontier, and the competition to dominate it is increasing day by
day. Trump administration is appropriately considering how to leverage strategic vantage
points such as Greenland to improve U.S. military readiness in the Arctic. Today, we should explore
those opportunities and examine why the Arctic matters. The U.S. stands with our Arctic allies
and what must be done to prepare and protect our interests.
Thank you again to our witnesses for appearing in today's hearing, and I look forward to your
testimony. I now recognize a Ranking Member,
MacGyver, the gentlewoman from New Jersey, to deliver her opening statements.
Thank you, Chair. Good afternoon, and thank you to our witnesses for being here today and for
your patience. The Arctic is no longer a remote or frozen frontier. It is rapidly emerging as a
arena of geopolitical competition, economic activity, and national security risk.
As sea ice recedes and access to the region increases, so too does the urgency for the
United States to define and defend its role in the Arctic. Russia has significantly expanded
its military footprint, and China is actively attempting to position itself as a global
Arctic stakeholder. The reality is simple. The Arctic is becoming more contested,
more accessible, and more significant to our national security.
Unfortunately, at the very moment when strategic focus and coordination are most needed,
the United States is falling behind. We are operating with limited icebreaking capacity,
underdeveloped infrastructure, and significant gaps in domain awareness.
The Coast Guard, which serves as the primary federal presence in the Arctic,
continues to face workforce strain, aging assets, and increasing mission demands.
This is not suitable. We cannot expect the Coast Guard to carry out complex and expanding missions
in one of the most challenging environments on Earth without the tools, personnel,
and resources necessary to do so. But capability gaps are only part of the problem.
Our strength in the Arctic has always depended not just on our presence, but on partnership.
Cooperation with allies like Canada and our border Arctic partners is essential to maintaining a
stable and secure region. Yet, recent actions by Trump and his administration have placed
unnecessary strain on those relationships at a time when unity is critical. Trump has
threatened to invade Greenland, an insane proposition that has angered and made our
NATO allies very weary. And Trump has launched a reckless illegal war in Iran without attempting
to build support among NATO allies, only to then call upon those allies to place their service
members in harm's way to assist the U.S. These actions have increased terrorist threats to the
homeland, and our allies generated a growing energy crisis and emboldened our adversaries
around the globe, including the Arctic. When we undermine trust with our closest partners,
we do not strengthen our position. We weaken it. The United States cannot lead in the Arctic alone,
and we cannot afford to create conditions where our allies question our trustworthiness.
When we fail to lead with clarity, purpose, and credibility, we risk ceding influence in
a region that is increasingly vital to our national security and economic future.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how we can close these gaps,
strengthen our partnerships, and ensure that the United States is prepared
to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing Arctic. With that, I yield back.
And I'm grateful to them and to Chairman Jimenez for bringing this forum together.
Until recently, the Arctic was really only a peripheral place in our strategic guidance,
and understandably so, but limited navigability constrained our access to its sea lanes.
With NORAD established at the height of the Cold War, North America airspace remained well
protected. Arctic security at that time was largely unquestioned.
Today, however, the strategic landscape has shifted dramatically. New sea lanes and rapid
advances in military capabilities have expanded the region's operational significance,
while our capacity to detect, monitor, and mitigate these threats has really largely
stayed the same. And this widening gap demands a renewed and more deliberate approach
to that security. It can no longer be viewed as a safe haven or a peripheral theater.
Complacency severely reduces our competitive advantage. ODNI's annual threat assessment
released just last week underscores the ambitions of our adversaries. They assess that Russia seeks
to leverage its Arctic presence as a pillar of its broader efforts to reshape the global balance
of power, relying on persistent military activity and assured access to the region's natural
resources. And China, for its part, continues to pursue dual-use scientific and commercial
investments that could advance its own strategic aims. The challenge for the U.S. now is to ensure
that we can detect and defeat threats to the homeland in a way that keeps pace with the
environment and the tools that adversaries are using. Aside from sustained investments
in polar-capable ships and aircraft, vulnerabilities below the surface, especially
surrounding subsea cable infrastructure, should inform our posture to prevent any actor from
being able to exploit or disrupt everyday service used by Americans. Like the Arctic itself,
the space domain presents new challenges and opportunities. As ground-based assets start
to wear and provide a soft target for our adversaries, space-based assets can help
complete our operational picture and enhance our defense posture. But beyond physical assets,
we must ensure the U.S. security interests in the Arctic are not casually interagency silos.
The intelligence community, the Department of Homeland Security,
and the Department of War, and many of our NATO allies, are all Arctic stakeholders.
A spirit of partnership and cohesive information sharing should characterize this security,
and relationships do serve as force multipliers. And if that's not the case now,
then our job as policymakers is to engage the experts and create the needed efficiencies.
As this committee knows well, threats to our interests and our homeland are pervasive.
It is through dedication of the service members, the skill of our intelligence analysts,
and the consistency in our homeland workforce that we remain proactive and agile in confronting
these threats. Today's Arctic may remain a forum for great power competition for the foreseeable
future, but we have a small window of opportunity to prevent it from becoming exploited
and weaponized by bad actors. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
I want to thank Chairman Kluger for your opening statements. Other members of the committee are
reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. I would now like to formally
introduce our witnesses. Ms. Heather Conley is a non-resident senior fellow at the American
Enterprise Institute, where she focuses on transatlantic security, Europe, Eurasia,
and Arctic geopolitics. She previously served as president of the German Marshall Fund of
the United States and held senior leadership roles at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies. Earlier in her career, she worked at the U.S. State Department, including as deputy
assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs. She is widely recognized as
an expert on security policy regarding Russia, Europe, and NATO security. Mr. Brian Clark is a
senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, serving as the director of its Center for Defense Concepts
and Technology, specializing in naval operations and autonomous systems. He was also previously a
senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, leading studies for the
Department of War on emerging technologies. Before that, Mr. Clark served in the U.S. Navy,
including as special assistant to the chief of naval operations and in strategic planning roles,
with experience as both an officer and submariner. Ms. Marisol Maddox is a senior Arctic fellow at
the Institute of Arctic Studies at Dartmouth College, where her work focuses on geopolitics
in the Arctic. Through her research, Ms. Maddox assessed how emerging threats and strategic
competition in the Arctic intersect with national and international security. Previously, she taught
Arctic security at institutions such as the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies and was
an adjunct professor at Syracuse University's Maxwell School. I would like to thank all of the
witnesses for being here today. Pursuant to Committee Rule 8C, I ask that the witnesses
please rise and raise their right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony that you will
give before the Committee on Homeland Security of the United States House of Representatives
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered the affirmative. Thank you so much,
and please be seated. I now recognize Ms. Conley for five minutes to summarize her opening statements.
Chairman Jimenez, Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member McIver, thank you. This was very worth
the wait, so we appreciate your time. Thank you for convening this hearing. Despite the many
serious and pressing priorities this committee currently addresses, however, if we do not
maintain a sustained focus on strengthening America's Arctic security, we will have failed
in our duty to protect the United States. I would just like to offer three observations,
and I look forward to your questions and comments. First, I believe it's extremely important to
acknowledge a significant shift in policy by the United States. The United States has moved away
from its post-Cold War concept of a circumpolar Arctic that is a separate and distant region
where long-term security challenges and new economic opportunities are managed
cheaply and from a distance, and we have recentered that, the Arctic region,
within homeland defense and as part of an integrated defense strategy of the Western
Hemisphere. The ongoing modernization of our Arctic-based missile defense architecture,
as well as developing a persistent presence in the maritime Arctic with overdue investments in
our icebreaker fleet, are critical components of this shift. In response, our Arctic allies
have also shifted their policies to one of homeland security. Canada has committed 29 billion
U.S. dollars to substantially increase its military force presence across the Canadian Arctic. The
Kingdom of Denmark has committed over six billion dollars in two new agreements to improve Arctic
security in Greenland, and after much delay, NATO has now embraced a more active deterrence and
defense role in the Arctic. It is an important first step, but I also want to acknowledge this
shift came at a cost of the loss of trust between our NATO allies. But the response of our NATO
allies is important, as the U.S. will be unable to secure and defend the homeland effectively
from the North without the strong cooperation and integration and coordination with our Arctic
allies. The Arctic, the ice pack, the new allied defense procurement model to help us develop those
Arctic security colors, is really a leadership model to rapidly develop interoperable platforms
to strengthen allied defense and deterrence. And this is why I believe that we need to create an
allied Arctic shield, working closely together with our six NATO Arctic allies and those who
wish to be a part of that shield. We do this because Russia and China are advancing their
interest in the Arctic, and your opening statements framed this perfectly. I'm particularly
concerned about China's scientific and economic activity that's focusing on the future biodiversity
and fishing opportunities of the central Arctic Ocean, the testing of future shipping routes in
the high sea area, and seabed mining. And we need to make sure we have a persistent presence to
ensure that that in no way hinders freedom of navigation for the United States. Combined,
Russia and China are certainly solidifying their military, their joint military operations,
specifically in the Pacific Arctic. We've seen that increase over the last several years.
Just as of August 2025, there were five joint maritime patrols between Russia and China.
They've had a joint bomber patrol entering the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone in 2024.
It was the first time that both aircrafts were detected simultaneously in our ADIZ.
So the challenge is great. We have a new approach. And now it's time to shift our policy
and rethink our organizational structure. U.S. Arctic policy as homeland defense requires
a very different, a high-level and purpose-driven strategic coordination effort at the highest
levels of government, the Department of Homeland Security, the Pentagon, the Interior,
the Energy Departments, as well as the state of Alaska. The private sector also must be
meaningfully engaged to develop dual-use infrastructure and build greater resiliency
to Russian and Chinese military and hybrid tactics. This new coordination effort will
likely require new command and control arrangements for the U.S. military,
as well as new lines of civilian authority. For example, this new, wonderful icebreaker fleet
must be integrated into an overarching new national defense strategy. It is critical
that America's Arctic science agenda is fully integrated into this national strategy,
as science is the underlying foundation for all future activities in the Arctic,
particularly the seafloor and the high seas area. With this new policy approach,
with an Arctic allied shield, and a new organizational structure, I believe the
United States will be well prepared to enhance Arctic security. Thank you.
Thank you, Ms. Conley. And I recognize Mr. Clark for five minutes to summarize his opening statement.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Jimenez, Chairman Pfluger, and Ranking Member McIver,
thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today. You've all laid out the challenges that
we face, I think, very effectively. And Heather did a great job of identifying kind of the
strategic overview of where we stand with regard to Arctic security. After having served in the
military for 25 years, I can tell you, we went 20 years by developing new roadmaps and strategies
and plans for the Arctic, and never really translated any of those into improved Arctic
security. Now we see how much more important the Arctic is becoming because climate change is
making it more available. Our adversaries are beginning to operate there much more consistently
than they have in the past, and obviously commerce is taking off in the Arctic region. So we need to
pay attention to it. We need to start translating our aspirations into something real on the ground
and in the air. And I'm going to identify three major areas where we need to improve our efforts
with regard to Arctic security. So the first is air and missile defense. Since the Cold War,
we've been trying to protect the homeland from ballistic missile threats emanating from Russia,
Soviet Union before that, and then now China, as well as North Korea. But we really have only
focused on the ballistic missile threat. Our new Golden Dome that we're developing to try to
protect the homeland is still primarily focused on that ballistic missile threat. But as we look
at what's happening right now in Iran, what's happening in Ukraine, drones are now the newest
air threat that we're going to face. And drones can be deployed from uncrewed vessels of their
own or they can be deployed from civilian vessels that merge into the background traffic. We could
find ourselves facing significant air and missile threats via the Arctic that have nothing to do
with ballistic missiles and at a scale that our existing defenses would not be able to handle.
We could easily find ourselves overwhelmed and surprised by what an adversary, whether it's a
non-state actor or an actor like Russia or China, might be able to do using drone technology and
uncrewed system technology via the Arctic. Plugging these holes in the Golden Dome will
require a different set of surveillance mechanisms and targeting mechanisms,
and also interdiction methods, which might involve more consistent presence with
our own uncrewed systems up in the Arctic region to complement our existing radars.
The other thing, the second area I want to talk about is undersea. You've all mentioned
the threat to undersea infrastructure that's posed in the Arctic. We depend on the Arctic
to run communications between here and Asia or Europe. We also depend on the GI-UK gap or
Greenland-Iceland-UK gap as the main choke point between our North Atlantic waters and Russia.
Today, Russia has been mapping the undersea infrastructure along the GI-UK gap and has
been looking for our undersea sonar arrays, looking for undersea cables. We surmise they
probably have the ability to break some of those or interdict them and even destroy them
when necessary in conflict, leaving us potentially unable to communicate with Europe and also unable
to find their submarines at the kind of scale we need to successfully defend the homeland.
Having the ability to both augment that capability and then respond to the undersea threat that
China and Russia might pose in the Arctic will involve new investments in uncrewed systems to
augment our existing submarine force. The third area I'll note is presence,
an Arctic presence. Since my time in the Navy, we treated the Arctic as kind of flyover country,
right? So stuff would fly at us from the Arctic. We might fly over the Arctic to the other guy,
but nobody really lived there. Well, now there's a lot of people operating there full time. We need
to think about having Arctic presence in the same way that we maintain presence in other areas of
the homeland. The investment in icebreakers is a great way to start, but if you want to buy 17
icebreakers and give those to the Coast Guard, you need the people to crew them, the investment
and the maintenance to keep them up, and the infrastructure to have them somewhere close to
the Arctic to deploy. That infrastructure investment will be sizable and could also
redound to the benefit of our other military forces, especially if we use more uncrewed
systems in the Arctic. Making that investment, though, will be a consistent level of spending
that has to happen each year rather than a one-time infusion of cash like we had with
reconciliation. So keeping that investment up will be necessary for us to be able to treat
the Arctic as a destination in the future rather than a flyover country. So I think these three
areas are ones we need to focus on as we think about how to make changes to improve our Arctic
security, and I'm looking forward to the discussion and your questions. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Walker, and I recognize Ms. Maddox with five minutes to summarize her opening
statements. Thank you, Chairman Jimenez, Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member McIver,
distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you so much for the opportunity to testify before
you today. My name is Marisol Maddox, and I'm a senior Arctic fellow at the Institute of Arctic
Studies at Dartmouth. Today I am testifying in my personal professional capacity, and the views
expressed are my own. The three pillars I will speak about today provide an overview of the
strategic environment. This includes Russia and China's Arctic activities and interests,
why the alliance is our strategic advantage, and why environmental change matters for security.
Despite the massive expenditure of missiles used in the war against Ukraine,
experts estimate in early 2026 that Russia's stockpile includes about three times as many
cruise ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles as they had at the beginning of 2022, and that
their military will likely reconstitute once the war is over, particularly if the war against
Ukraine does not end in a just way. Russia is likely to expand their aggression in the Arctic
and beyond, especially if the U.S. commitment to Article 5 is at all in doubt. China has invested
in Arctic-capable platforms to gain domain awareness, operational capability, and to
position themselves as an indispensable provider of key data to understanding changes in the fastest
warming region on Earth. China is interested in the Arctic as it relates to the larger vision
they hold for themselves as a great power, including as an arena for power projection.
It is important for the U.S. to meet presence with presence, so it is really encouraging to
see the U.S. Coast Guard as the U.S. primary surface presence in the region finally receive
an historic level of appropriations. Now it will be important for Congress to have tight oversight
to keep the service on time and on budget, and to ensure that Coast Guard has the necessary pipeline
of expertise and staffing. Programs like Evergreen are also important to resource as
they play important roles in developing robust strategic foresight amidst significant environmental
change. The Department of Defense's 2024 Arctic Strategy update identified a significant increase
in collaboration between China and Russia, and that trend has only continued. However,
this relationship is at its heart a transactional one, and it doesn't have the longevity of a true
alliance. NATO is the greatest strategic enabler of U.S. interests in the Arctic region.
One of the biggest challenges in the Arctic is the pursuit of all-domain awareness,
from space to the seabed, so as to detect, track, and defend against any threats. The
complexity of this task requires allied cooperation, from innovation to leveraging
strategic geography. In 2024, for instance, Space Norway's Arctic Satellite Broadband Mission
marked the first time an Allied space vehicle hosted an operational U.S. military payload.
This allows us to fill a gap in vital, secure communication capabilities for Arctic operations
until a more advanced platform can come online in the early 2030s. The U.S. does not need to
acquire new territory in the Arctic in order to implement the Golden Dome or any type of
highly coordinated continental defense architecture. Language from the U.S. indicating a desire to
acquire an ally against their will, such as the repeated statements about buying Greenland or
making Canada the 51st state, is counterproductive and harmful. Our competitors benefit when trust
between America and her allies erodes, and it is damage not easily repaired. At Munich's Security
Conference, China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointedly stated, China will be a reliable force
for stability. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used the rationale given for a U.S.
acquisition of Greenland to justify the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Forums like the Arctic
Council are crucializing stabilizing forces in the Arctic region, as well as platforms for
demonstrating interagency leadership by the U.S. government. Geopolitical and security dynamics can
change, but geography doesn't, and the Arctic remains a region strongly characterized by
transboundary challenges and opportunities. The growing risk of wildland fire in the Arctic puts
our assets, personnel, and readiness at risk. Permafrost underlines 15 percent of the Northern
Hemisphere and increasingly is thawing. In a 2023 report to Congress, Pacific Space Base in Greenland
was identified as having moderate to considerable levels of risk because it is entirely underlaid
by permafrost. Growing powers such as India point to Arctic climate change as an acute security
threat because of how it affects their monsoon precipitation and therefore their economic and
food security. Our planet is composed of complex systems, so systems-level analysis is necessary to
understand the consequential systems at play when referencing significant environmental change.
For this reason, I recommend referencing the Planetary Boundaries Framework to appreciate
the complexity of changes underway. Lastly, robust international cooperation on scientific
research and the incorporation of different types of knowledge systems are essential for
understanding these changes so as to mitigate risk and eliminate blind spots. The complexity
of the threat environment requires unprecedented levels of cooperation for successful risk
mitigation and opportunity realization. I look forward to answering your questions.
Thank you, Ms. Maddox. I now recognize myself for five minutes for questioning.
Ms. Conley, you stated that Canada recently stated that they're going to increase their
defense spending or spending in that region by, was it $29 billion? Yes, sir. When did they make
that statement? This statement was this year. It's a combined of two significant packages,
in part modernization of NORAD, as well as an enhanced Arctic security package to create for
forward operating locations, northern operational support hubs, as well as the continued satellite
Arctic patrol vessels and assorted packages. You said Denmark also put an additional $5 billion?
Yes, $6 billion. Two packages. Is that for Greenland?
It is primarily, yes, for Greenland. It is sensors,
patrol vessels, additional presence to strengthen Danish Arctic command.
And this was done after President Trump said that he would like to acquire Greenland and after he
said about the 51st state of Canada, is that what happened? It was certainly motivated by President
Trump's comments, but I will say senior leadership of both governments have also been clear to say
they were behind. They needed to do this. This was long overdue. So it was a motivating factor.
And it's also the acknowledgement by both countries that they have to protect their sovereignty and
their territorial integrity in the Arctic. Correct. And do you think that maybe that's
exactly what President Trump wanted them to do, come to that conclusion? Would they have come to
that conclusion on their own? I don't believe we would have seen
the substantial investments without the president's comments. That's the upside.
It's a different security relationship moving forward. And we'll have to reckon with that.
Well, the different security relationship is actually that Denmark and Canada are putting
more of the bill, which I think is exactly what the president wanted to happen. And also to
acknowledge the fact that there is a problem up there and that they needed to invest more in
becoming partners. And so look, the president has an interesting way of trying to push our allies
into doing what he thinks they should be doing. And I don't think there's any threat to the
alliance, to be honest with you. It's just his way of getting them to do things that they should
have been doing all along. And so, Mr. Clark, do you agree with that assessment?
That they're doing things they should have been doing all along? Absolutely.
The U.S. is obviously behind in its investment in the Arctic, and our allies were even further
behind, arguably, in their investment. And this is sort of them trying to catch up.
And the same thing happens with the war in Ukraine. The president, by saying that they
needed to spend more, is that Europe needs to spend more in its defense because they have a
bear in their backyard. And while we may still be there, and we will be there, and we will answer
the call, they also need to shoulder a little bit more of the burden of defending their homeland
from Russia. And Russia needs to understand that it's not just the United States that they're
going to be facing. They're going to be facing a much more potent Germany, a much more potent Poland,
a much more potent France. All of them will be much more potent. And then the United States
will always be there. It is the greatest alliance, and it's the one that keeps the world safe.
But they needed to step up. And so, yeah, some people may not agree with the way it's done.
And some people go, oh, God. But at the end, we actually got the world is a safer place
because they are making those investments. And I doubt those investments would have been made
by saying, gee, please, could you do this? Because we've been asking them to do that
for a long time, and they haven't done that for a long time. Now, going to, we've had issues with
the procurement and the design and the construction of our icebreaker. So I don't know which one of
you would answer this question. If you have the answer, where are we on the design and construction
of our new heavy icebreaker? So the polar security cutter program,
which was the first out of the gate, had significant issues with the initial builders
of VT Halter down in Pascagoula. They were way behind on the design. They were having difficulty
starting at the manufacturing process. They ended up getting bought out by another shipbuilder,
Bollinger, who now owns the company, is now restructuring the program with the Coast Guard.
So it's getting back on track, but it's years behind now as a result of
poor decisions made early on with regard to how you're going to manage the program.
They started to do construction before they completed the design. All practices that we
kind of know from history are bad things to do when you're trying to start a shipbuilding program.
In fact, it should have already been launched. Yes.
And it's not even, the drawing is not even completed, right?
Correct. It's not under construction yet. Detailed design, right. Detailed design
is not complete. Yeah. I think we need to look at that entire program. Anyway,
my five minutes are up and I recognize a ranking member for five minutes of questioning.
Thank you. There has been, first of all, thank each of you for your testimony and your expertise.
It's truly appreciated. And I just want to thank you again for your patience,
because I know what that's like waiting around for us to vote. There has been growing discussion
about how the United States engages with key partners in the region, including Denmark and
Greenland, and whether certain approaches may be creating friction at a time when cooperation is
increasingly important. Ms. Maddox, if you can elaborate a little bit what you talked about in
your statement, how critical are alliances to achieving U.S. objectives in the Arctic?
The alliance is our critical strategic enabler for being able to realize U.S. interests in the
and we have different defense cooperation agreements that allow us to pre-position
assets to be able to exercise so that we can regain our war fighting capabilities for the
Arctic to not just survive, where you hear about the operators in the region, they talk about
the environment is the number one enemy trying to kill you. You need to have that ability to
survive. And then to be able to be a capable war fighter amidst all of that is no easy task.
So our allies are critical in teaching us that. And I would just say that there are ways that we
can be very clear that there are certain things that need to change, but in a way that's rooted
in respectful cooperation that has characterized the alliance, and that does not in any way
threaten their sovereignty. Because what happens there is it erodes trust, which is really at the
heart of, you know, is the U.S. a credible ally? And if that's not perceived to be so,
it emboldens Russia. And that, you know, leads to a whole slew of other issues.
Yeah, I would agree. In your opinion, how has the Trump administration's actions,
the way they do things in statements with respect to Greenland alone impacted those alliances?
So, again, I think that the language that we've seen has really demonstrated a high
level of personalization. So when President Trump has said things like he would psychologically
feel better about owning Greenland, you know, the letter that he sent to the Norwegian prime
minister saying that because he didn't get the Nobel Peace Prize, that there's not a value
in him being peaceful, so he's going to pursue an acquisition of Greenland one way or another,
you know, after, you know, the Venezuela invasion and saying that he doesn't need international law,
he's only kind of constrained by his own morality and that he wants to own Greenland.
So these repeated statements make the Greenlanders think it sounds like he wants us and he is the
commander in chief. And, you know, for a small nation that is rising in strategic importance,
you know, where we've had such a great relationship, it's really harmful the approach
because they fear us now and they look at our presence where they used to see it as positive.
It's seen with the same level of skepticism as Chinese offers of presence. And that's not good
for being able to pursue the opportunities that we want. Yeah. Thank you so much for that. Ms.
Conley, if trust among our partners is weakened, does that make it more difficult for the United
States to effectively lead in the Arctic? So I think we have some repairing to be done.
And I'll just take the relationship with the Kingdom of Denmark. But I think we are in a much
better place post the crisis over Greenland. We have strong agreements, the 1951 U.S. Kingdom
of Denmark Defense Agreement testimony earlier this week by the commander of NORTHCOM suggests
we are now thinking about opening new military bases on Greenland. This is how partners work.
There is a strong relationship with our military, our intelligence sharing. We need that political,
that top level political dialogue to support and nurture that. But I think we're repairing
it. And to Chairman Jimenez's question, look, we're rebalancing this relationship.
It is painful to rebalance a relationship that has been out of balance for two decades.
Europe is having some painful decisions. And I think President Trump just discovered that
you don't have our allies there at the beginning of an operation. It's harder to fit them in
afterwards. We're learning to rebalance this critical relationship. So we keep it on repair.
Our Arctic allies understand the critical nature of Arctic security. We have to be there together.
And we have to create the mechanisms to make sure the U.S. is at the center of it,
not having our Arctic allies coordinate outside of us. And that's what we have to focus on.
Thank you so much for each of you, your expertise. And with that, I yield back.
Thank the ranking member. I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crain.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you guys for coming today. Ms. Conley, you talked in your
opening statement about eroded trust with our allies in NATO. Can you unpack that a little bit
for the committee? Yes, Congressman. So the question of many of our NATO allies regarding
the President's comments about Canada and Greenland, would the United States respect
the sovereignty of our NATO allies? They interpreted the President's comments as
calling that into question. And our NATO allies began to respond to protect that sovereignty.
I believe the worst of this crisis is over. We need to begin to repair and rebuild that trust.
We have a ways to go. And it's also a new relationship moving forward. The old NATO is
gone. The new NATO is arriving. And I think this is new security that the substantial Arctic
security packages that both governments of Canada and Denmark have responded. That's where we build
the future and hopefully put this crisis behind us and build that future. I do find it interesting,
ma'am, when I listened to your response to my question that you only covered
one side of that trust issue. Do you know how many countries within NATO
were paying the 2% benchmark of defense spending before the war in Ukraine?
Yes, sir. Before, well, 2014, before the Wales Declaration was pledged,
there were only seven NATO members that were paying a 2%.
Out of how many countries?
Well, in 2014, that would have been before some of those 26. Yes, thank you.
But here's the good news, Congressman. Today, NATO released their annual report.
You now have NATO members at 2%.
Yeah, I understand that, ma'am. I understand that. They have started spending more now with
the war in Ukraine. And I think that's a great thing. And I think part of that has to do with
what we were talking about earlier and the language and rhetoric that came from the president.
Because as Mr. Jimenez pointed out, hey, please pay the 2% that you're required to pay
for our agreement. And they hadn't done it for a long time. So clearly what the president was doing
in his first term and even now has had some effect. I know the war has had some effect.
But I think it's interesting when you testify before this Congress and this committee that
you point out both sides of it. Because I can tell you right now that a lot of my constituents
that I represent up here and a lot of Americans I talk to, they do feel like NATO is a paper tiger.
And they feel like NATO often, many of the countries in NATO, ride the curtails of the
United States and hope the United States is going to come and bail them out. And that's
why they don't pay their fair share in defense per the agreement. Do you think that's fair, ma'am?
I think that's certainly a fair public perception. I think what's vital, though, for the American
people to understand, a new NATO with our allies increasing their defense spending and making a
contribution keeps the United States safer. It's not a one-way street. It is a two-way street.
And I wish more American people understood the value of that alliance. But your points are
absolutely correct that they have underspent. It has taken threats of sovereignty to get them
moving in the right direction. That's not what we want to see. But let's hope we are in a better
place because allies are important. We understand the costs. When we go in it by ourselves,
we can do it. We have massive strength. But we are better and stronger with overwhelming force
with as many partners on our side. That's the vision we'd like to see.
Thank you, Ms. Conley. Ms. Maddox, in your opening testimony, you talked about,
as we're talking about the Arctic, the importance for environmental change. Can
you unpack that a little bit for us? A lot of times when people talk about Arctic
change, they really reference the Arctic ice cap shrinking and thinning, facilitating new maritime
routes. But it's much more complex than that. Like I said, 15 percent of the northern hemisphere is
underlaid by permafrost that is thawing. This is about 60 percent of Russia, 80 percent of Alaska,
40 percent of Canada. So we're having lots of infrastructure that's being impacted, runways,
roads. So the maintenance that goes into infrastructure in the Arctic where there's
permafrost involved adds to the enormous costs of maintaining it. But we're also seeing things like,
you know, we had billions of snow crabs that died off the coast of Alaska because of a marine heat
wave that gutted the industry and collapsed it. So in terms of being able to understand the
changes that are occurring, and how do we understand looking ahead to advise industry on
what should they be investing in, what are the economic opportunities, and where should they not
be putting investment. So both from the economic security side, the food security side, we have
harmful algae blooms that are activating in the warmer water at higher latitudes.
So this is compromising, again, the fisheries from a subsistence as well as an economic
harvesting perspective. And then the wildland fire, as these fires are becoming more intense
because there's prolonged droughts and then more extreme temperatures, and there's actually more
lightning occurring in the Arctic. So this is creating the conditions for these extreme fires
that pose an acute threat to human health, but also to our military infrastructure. There's
questions about how sensors and military infrastructure is impacted by prolonged
smoke exposure. So there's knowledge gaps here. And there are solutions as well, but we need to
draw from different types of knowledge. Thank you. And I'd like to get to those
solutions at some point. I have run out of time for my questioning. So thank you. And I yield back.
I want to thank the gentleman from Arizona. Now I recognize the gentleman from New Jersey,
Ms. Poe. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Jimenez and
Ranking Member McIver for calling this hearing. And thank you to the witnesses that are here today.
The Arctic region is of great consequence to both America's national security and our domestic
interests. And while we have maintained a presence in the region for nearly 150 years,
today we face a new challenge from both China as well as Russia, as well as from actor-less
threats like climate change. And you were just speaking about that, Ms. Baddock. Russia controls
over 50% of the Arctic Ocean coastline and has the largest fleet of icebreakers in the world.
Meanwhile, China is aggressively expanding its presence in the region with its Polar
Silk Road initiative and collaborating more closely with Russia than ever before.
The United States must work with our allies to combat these threats. But instead, we are
actually straining our relationships. Our degraded relationship undermines joint planning,
information sharing, and cooperation at a critical point. For example, the Trump
administration's repeated threats towards the Greenland has badly damaged our relationship
with Denmark and Europe and has long been critical to Arctic cooperation.
For months, the president has publicly stated his intent to annex Greenland by force. He has
threatened tariffs on our European allies. And in January, Trump stated that the only constraint in
his power is, quote, own morality. Ms. Baddock, if the United States uses economic and military
coercion to achieve our goals in the Arctic, how do you think China and Russia will act towards us
and other smaller nations in the region? And is coercion the best way to achieve our aim in the
region? Thank you for the question. I think Russia and China are looking at what the U.S. is doing
and trying to kind of figure out because there is a certain level of unpredictability associated with
the strategy that President Trump employs. But there's also it's kind of a figuring out, you
know, how do you have that balance of effective deterrence and effective signaling, right? And
there are concerns about the ability, especially as China's seeking to become a nuclear peer of
the United States and Russia, how does that signaling work out and how do we prevent
unintentional escalation or misinterpretation? But like I said in my initial remarks,
we've seen that China has really been quiet, fairly quiet when seeing how the U.S. is speaking
about Greenland, kind of within the context of the idea that you don't interrupt your adversary
when they're making a mistake. And then with Russia, you know, having Sergey Lavrov
specifically, you know, pointing to the language that the U.S. uses to justify Greenland annexation
to justify their annexation of Crimea. So it's about that whole spheres of influence
approach. And, you know, might makes right. And, you know, the ways that if the U.S. is not
abiding by the rules based order, doesn't signal or demonstrate a regard for international law,
there's some challenges. And I know that my time is running out very quickly. I do want to put on
the record and perhaps if we can get some response and if not through the chair, I'd like to perhaps
be able to get those answers, you know, in writing. One of the two questions, the other
two questions I wanted to talk about was in fact some of what has occurred with the reduction in
NOAA workforce and the proposed budget cuts. How is it affecting America's ability to address the
impact on climate change and develop strategies in the Arctic? The other question is, is it
important for the Coast Guard to maintain an understanding of climate change to comprehend
the ice coverage and sea level in the Arctic? And I know that many of you are well versed in that
area and certainly can help to respond to those questions. I have like six minutes, right? Oh,
actually, it looks like I've ran out of time. But please, if you would, through the chair,
Mr. Chairman, I would love for the opportunity to get those responses through you, sir. And I yield
back. I want to thank the gentlelady from New Jersey. Without objection, if you could respond
to those questions in writing, we would appreciate it. Members of the committee may have some
additional questions for the witnesses, and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these in
writing. Pursuant to Committee Rule 7E, the hearing record will be held open for 10 days
without objection. This committee stands adjourned.
