How the Tomahawk Missile Shocked the World in the Gulf War

Defense Systems Archive
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3 Video Views·Mar 16, 2026
During the First Gulf War, coalition forces unleashed a massive assaults on Iraqi forces. At the heart of these attacks was a new weapon....the Tomahawk Missile. But why were these new weapons so effective against the enemy?
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In the early morning hours of 17th January 1991,
coalition air forces unleashed a massive air assault on Iraqi forces
in both Iraq and Kuwait.
The magnitude of the coalition air offensive
dealt a crushing blow to Iraq's air defence network.
And soon, allied aircraft roamed at will in the skies over the conflict zone.
Coalition forces deployed an entire air superiority package
that included a variety of weapons with specific mission goals.
Some of these weapons had never been used in actual combat.
A perfect example was the Tomahawk cruise missile.
333 cruise missiles were launched during the war
against heavily defended targets such as air defence headquarters,
key radar facilities, major communication centres.
Good evening.
You've had a busy evening, I'll hold it for you.
We've had a very busy evening.
As a matter of fact, it's not over yet.
This is the opening round of the war.
The Tomahawk strikes will continue for another at least 36 hours
in conjunction with the airstrikes that are taking place over Iraq right now.
I can report to you that the airstrikes have started.
The Tomahawks have already started to impact in the Baghdad area
and there are engagements, fighter engagements,
happening over land at this point.
We are following the course of all that as we are remaining vigilant
as we steam to our next Tomahawk launch point.
A cruise missile is a 1,000-pound warhead on an unmanned aircraft
shot from just about all the various surface ships and submarines
that the Navy's got.
And it's done exceptionally well in the first week.
I think that they said there was approximately 500 cruise missiles
in the theater on 56 ships and so forth.
I think they would have shot about a third of those in the first week.
About 150 have managed to go off.
The Tomahawk is a terrific weapon for this kind of warfare,
particularly this kind of warfare.
It's a significant development to the Navy.
It may not sound that original,
but it is a significant development to the Navy.
In previous years, the Navy had, in a tactical sense,
one, perhaps two ways of striking at an enemy.
One is the carrier-based attack systems, A6, A7 in those days, FAA.
And we had big guns, 16-inch guns off the battleship,
which proved effective in Vietnam,
but against a more capable or more distant enemy were useless.
Therefore, the Navy was then, had but a single attack,
a method of attacking, taking the fight to the enemy.
The surface forces and the submarines never played in the conventional sense.
All they were there was to defend the carrier,
and that was not to the liking of many of the Naval officers.
The Tomahawk system, particularly Tomahawk with its long range,
gives the Navy ships and submarines a chance to participate
and take the fight to the enemy.
It was important in this war that Tomahawk worked,
and the initial indications are that it's worked exceptionally well.
During the initial stage of the fight,
the Tomahawk uses radar terrain comparison guidance,
codenamed TERCOM.
In the final phase of the attack,
the computer switches on its digital scene mapping system,
which compares a digital photo of the target,
stored in its memory, with the actual scene below.
This provides pinpoint precision.
Modern air campaigns take place in successive phases,
with clear objectives in each phase.
The Gulf War was no exception.
One of the initial aims of Operation Desert Storm
was the suppression of Iraqi air defenses.
This means the elimination of anti-aircraft missile and gun sites,
the radars that direct them,
and the command and control centers that coordinate them.
An air defense network is like a web,
running from a central headquarters to local stations,
then to the radar posts,
which detect the aircraft and guide the missiles,
and finally to the missiles and guns themselves.
The air defense suppression campaign
began with the destruction of the command centers,
which coordinated the Iraqi air defense network,
after which radar sites
and eventually the missiles themselves were targeted.
The first wave of the night attack was spearheaded by the F-117 black jet,
since it is virtually invisible to Iraqi radars.
So what it is, is a very highly developed pinpoint strike airplane.
It is never going to be a mass bomber.
In other words, you can't hang enough on it to make it drop 20 bombs.
But it will drop one or two in a very tiny spot.
And therefore, it will probably only be used to hit a pinpoint target,
something that's very badly needed, maybe like a control bunker.
There was one very classic shot where an F-117 during the war last week
dropped a bomb through an air shaft hole,
and the debris came out the front door.
That is exactly what the 117 does well.
This is another air defense sector over in the western part of Iraq.
It's already been struck by a 117.
This is a team effort.
The second aircraft comes through,
and this part of the building here provides some structural weakness
that will be exploited in this attack,
and the bomb will hit in this area here.
And this is my counterpart's headquarters in Baghdad.
This is the headquarters of the Air Force.
And keep your eye on all sides of the building
as the airplane overflies the building
and drops the bomb down through the center of the building.
On the heels of the F-117s were the Air Force's F-4G Wild Weasels,
which attacked critical Iraqi radar sites with HAM anti-radar missiles.
Its job is basically to soak up the air defense.
It goes in first and goes out last,
and the Wild Weasel missions on this war are four hours plus.
That's a long time for a fighter.
Normally it's an hour, hour and a half that most guys are flying.
So he goes in, he sees when the radar comes up,
he goes down there with an anti-radiation missile that homes on radar,
and he gets those guys to fire at him,
or at least to keep the radar on.
So he can in turn destroy the radar-guided AAA,
the radar-guided SAMs, radar sites, the air defense radar sites.
Whatever it is, it's going to be a threat to the strike force coming behind it.
The Wild Weasels were remarkably successful in their mission,
making the skies safe for other coalition aircraft.
We were shooting the SAMs who were trying to shoot at the guys
who were doing what they were doing downtown.
The SAM missile sites in town?
Around the perimeter of the town.
Around the perimeter of Baghdad?
That's correct.
And tell me again about the resistance that you ran into?
Lots of ground fire, lots of AAA, that's anti-aircraft artillery.
And like I say, I think there was one SAM fired that I saw,
but it was so far away and up through the smoke and haze,
it was hard to make it out.
So nothing came close to you?
No, but that's the beauty of the system.
We can stay far enough away that that's not going to be a problem for us,
from the SAMs anyway.
The bullets are the ones that scare me.
U.S. military planners believed that air superiority had to be won
for the air and ground campaigns to succeed.
The first phase of the air superiority battle was fought by fighter aircraft
like this F-15 Eagle of the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing.
The fighters flew combat air patrols, nicknamed CAPs,
to protect Wild Weasels and attack planes from Iraqi fighters.
The U.S. Air Force's F-15s were joined in their mission
by Saudi F-15s, British Tornadoes, and U.S. Navy F-14 Tomcats.
Their potential opposition was the more than 400 Iraqi fighters,
including sophisticated Soviet-built MiG-29 Fulcrums
and French-built Mirage F-1s.
Iraqi air forces never challenged coalition forces for control of the skies.
Captain Steve Tate was involved in one of the first dogfights of the war
in the early morning hours of the 17th of January.
We took a four-ship F-15s up on the first wave that went up to Baghdad area
last night, took off at 1.30.
We were basically supporting a SEAD package of a bunch of Wild Weasels
and a bunch of F-15Es and just an assortment of other airplanes,
EF-111s and F-111s that were going up to the southeast portion of Baghdad.
Basically what our job was to go up there and remove all the air-to-air threats for them.
The mission lasted about four hours.
We started an engagement.
I got the contact that AWACS calls out as a hostile chasing my number three man,
and at about the same time I'm turning back around towards the east.
When I turn back around, I get a contact on a contact that isn't squawking our IFS,
so when I lock this guy up, I can tell that he's not a friendly airplane.
Come to find out that it's an F-1.
He's at about 8,000 feet headed west towards Baghdad,
towards my number three and four men also, and we EID him as hostile.
About 12 miles, I take a Fox-1, a radar missile.
Everything's looking good.
Thinking about taking another Fox-1, but no kind of interference or anything like that,
so I just let one Fox-1 go, and about four miles in front of me I get a huge fireball.
When he blew up, I could see a piece of the airplane blowing up.
Obviously it was at night.
I couldn't see if a parachute or anything like that.
It was a huge fireball.
I don't anticipate anybody getting out of that.
The only Iraqi fighters to appear in significant numbers
were the MiG-29 Fulcrum and the Mirage F-1.
The Iraqis put up very little resistance during the air campaign,
and in total 35 Iraqi fighters were shot down during the conflict.
There were no Allied losses as a result of air-to-air combat.
Well, so far it's been a big surprise that the Iraqi Air Force has not done anything, basically.
They've come up to be shot down.
Apparently most of the aircraft are underground,
and at the first week of the war we're hearing things from the military briefers
that 80% of the aircraft are still intact in hardened shelters.
Therefore, it's been a non-player, and the dogfights have been fairly straightforward.
Go to the 6 o'clock and shoot them down.
The only double kill of the war has been a Saudi pilot who caught two F-1s with Exocet.
He apparently had no trouble in downing them both.
This is what the Saudi F-15 pilot saw through his gun sight during the dogfight.
The stunning victory of coalition forces in the Gulf War
was made possible by effective strategy and weapons technology.
The objective of the war was not to take over Iraq,
but to liberate Kuwait and weaken Saddam Hussein's military power.
Desert Victory examines the weapons and strategy of Operation Desert Storm
and their implications for future warfare.
The lessons learned in Operation Desert Storm may not apply to the next war.
Modern armed conflict is simply too complex to be reduced to a list of lessons.
Many factors contributed to the coalition's victory over Iraqi forces in the Kuwaiti theater.
Saddam Hussein decided to deploy his troops in a defensive posture
in the face of the massive coalition build-up,
which, prior to the beginning of the Allied operations,
totaled nearly a million troops representing more than a dozen countries.
Saddam's decision to stand by and allow the coalition to gather strength was disastrous.
The negative impact of his decision on Iraqi forces in Kuwait
was compounded by the geography in which the fight took place.
Faced with a war in a terrain which provided no place to hide,
Iraqi forces in the battle area were destined to be defeated.
Terrain was an obvious advantage to coalition forces.
The flat, featureless desert with its wide temperature swings between day and night
was the ideal battlefield for the application of smart weapons.
Even dug-in troops and weapons proved easy to spot
with the new array of technology employed by coalition forces.
Desert wars, again, in this century, especially during World War II,
and the Arab-Israeli wars, and the Gulf War,
are capable of being gotten over with very quickly.
Because you're in a desert, there's no place to hide.
So everybody can see what everybody's got.
You can go in there, you can get right down to the business of destruction
and reach a very rapid conclusion.
The problem is a lot of our future wars, say in Korea or the Balkans,
will have plenty of places for the other guys to hide.
And this will make things, you know, stretch out.
The Gulf War was a very specific kind of war.
And a war that's outside of the desert is going to be different
in terms of how long it's going to last and how many friendly casualties it's going to take.
For example, I've spoken to A-10 pilots who have flown in the Gulf War
and then were either before or after stationed in Korea.
And they say point blank, they say it's a whole different ballgame.
What I could do in the Gulf, I couldn't do in Korea,
and Korea's very similar to the Balkans.
I'd be at much more risk, and I'd be taking out a lot fewer enemy vehicles and troops.
And it's not just the A-10 pilots, you know, any aircraft,
whether they be helicopters or F-15s.
The objectives of the campaign, dictated by political necessity,
also determined how the war was fought.
Despite the massive amount of firepower used by coalition forces in the Gulf,
the conflict was very much restricted.
The limited nature of the objectives of the war has allowed Saddam Hussein
to continue to rule Iraq and defy international efforts to monitor his regime.
This reality has unfairly led to a misappreciation
of the victory attained by coalition forces.
Although Iraqi President Saddam Hussein
was verbally attacked by politicians around the world,
it was the military objectives, primarily the liberation of Kuwait,
that provided an accurate benchmark of just how far
the governments of the coalition were willing to go.
U.S. strategy in the Middle East has long been committed to balance of power.
In principle, no country in the region should become so weak
that it is unable to defend itself.
At the same time, no regime in the Gulf should become so powerful
that it would dominate the region.
This helps explain coalition strategy,
which was to leave a fair portion of Iraq's military infrastructure in place.
The composition of the coalition itself
helped dictate the nature and objectives of the war.
We had a coalition, and the coalition contained Arab states.
The Arab states had a veto on the objectives of the campaign,
and the Arabs did not want to conquer another Arab state,
in this case, Iraq.
They simply wanted to liberate Kuwait.
The other problem was, as I explained right at the end of the war,
was that when you're out in the desert, it's a glorious victory.
You go up into the Tigris-Euphrates Valley,
where all the Iraqis live, it's Vietnam again.
So it would have been politically unacceptable
both for our Arab allies and for the American electorate
to go to Baghdad and personally arrest Saddam Hussein.
While terrain and objectives were important to the coalition's victory,
the quality and quantity of weapons deployed in support of Operation Desert Storm
proved to be too much for Iraq's military capabilities.
Nowhere was this more evident than in the battle for air superiority.
After months of preparation,
the massive coalition air assault began on 17 January 1991.
Over 2,000 sorties, or missions,
were flown against Iraqi targets on the first night.
By the end of the war, over 100,000 sorties had been flown.
Perhaps the most familiar images of the war
were the black-and-white videos of smart bombs
striking their targets with pinpoint precision.
But these images represented only the final product of a strike package
that had taken the Air Force decades to construct.
The integrated force package was intended to overcome air defenses
and establish air superiority
while keeping the loss of planes and pilots to the very minimum.
Coalition planners expected the Iraqis to vigorously resist an air assault.
The U.S. Air Force and Navy had learned at great cost in Vietnam
that modern air defense systems, such as missiles and radar-directed guns,
would take a lethal toll on attacking aircraft.
It was the experiences of the Vietnam War
that led the U.S. Air Forces to devote considerable attention
to new methods to overcome enemy air defenses.
The reason we were successful in Desert Storm as well as we were
is because we suppressed the enemy air defenses right off the bat.
First order of business.
And we did it through a whole variety of means,
from bombing airfields to taking down telephone buildings
to knocking out radar sites to shooting down mirages in the air.
That is going to be vital to any campaign we do
where the enemy has an air force or an air defense system.
And I don't know of a country in the world
that hasn't invested heavily in those kinds of capabilities.
The first step in the air war was to take away the enemy's eyes.
If the enemy's radar could be blinded,
his air defenses would be rendered ineffective.
In Vietnam, as well as in the Gulf War,
the traditional methods were twofold.
Radars were destroyed by radiation-seeking missiles.
This was the job of the F-4G Wild Weasel.
Wild weasels located the radars on their sensors
and attacked them with harm anti-radar missiles.
The second traditional method was electronic jamming.
This was the job of the EF-111 Raven.
The Ravens flew over the combat area
and jammed the enemy radars with their powerful electronic systems.
The Iraqi air defense network was basically defeated in the first 24 hours.
After that, it was reduced to a residual level of effectiveness,
and while it required sorties, aircraft to be directed against it,
for the remainder of the war,
it was really not going to be a factor in the ultimate outcome.
It looked much more to a ground threat rather than a sophisticated air threat.
Another reason the Iraqi air defense collapsed
was the sheer size and sophistication of the effort put against it.
Electronic warfare was used against Iraqi air defenses
to a degree never seen before in any conflict.
Much more of it, much more sophisticated than had been seen in Vietnam,
than had been seen in earlier wars in the Middle East.
The air campaign over Iraq marked the first serious combat debut of stealth aircraft.
The F-117 Stealth Fighter embodied an entirely novel approach
to the problem of overcoming air defenses.
The shape and construction of the aircraft
prevented Iraqi radar from seeing it except at extremely close ranges.
Armed with precision-guided bombs,
the Stealth Strike Fighter played a disproportionate role in the initial attacks.
Although the stealth squadrons constituted only 2.5% of the attack force,
they were responsible for attacking 31% of the targets on the first day
when air defenses were heaviest.
I don't think there's any doubt that stealth has revolutionized air warfare,
and we saw that with the 117.
It was kind of interesting.
There were all these detractors against the 117,
even some of them in the air force during the 70s and 80s,
and obviously after it was well known we had this capability.
It's interesting to know that we never had a single stealth aircraft
hit by ground fire or any kind of enemy defenses.
And they flew the toughest missions.
They were the ones that we sent to Baghdad night after night after night.
So it gives you tremendous advantage.
By the end of the war, F-117s had flown over 3,000 sorties
and delivered 2,000 tons of bombs,
a small but important portion of the total number of bombs dropped in the conflict.
One-third of all smart munitions used during the war were delivered by F-117s.
But stealth involved more than defeating the enemy by near invisibility.
It also meant the economy of combining the capabilities of many aircraft into one.
While serving as a strike fighter,
the F-117 does not require the assistance of electronic warfare aircraft
like the Wild Weasel or the Raven.
For example, a strike on an Iraqi nuclear reactor near Baghdad
by 16 conventional F-16 strike fighters
required a further 40 support aircraft and was not entirely successful.
A follow-on strike by eight F-117s was entirely successful
and required the support of only two refueling tankers.
Over 80% of all bombs dropped by F-117s during the conflict destroyed their targets.
Stealth aircraft, although more costly to purchase than conventional strike aircraft,
demonstrate a significant advantage in the overall cost of a strike force.
These experiences are shaping current notions of future combat aircraft.
New generations of future American combat aircraft,
such as the F-22 Lightning II fighter,
the Comanche Scout helicopter,
and the B-2 Spirit bomber,
are all based around stealth concepts
pioneered by the F-117 stealth strike fighter.
If one image of the Gulf War predominates,
it is the precision-guided munition flying unerringly to its target.
Ironically, the weapon that was at the center of this image,
the laser-guided bomb,
was not as new a weapon as most people thought.
What was new was the more important role it played in the air campaign.
I don't really know why people were shocked by laser-guided bombs
since laser-guided bombs were invented during the Vietnam War,
were used with great success and with good publicity at that time.
For example, I think there was a famous bridge that was taken down by laser-guided bombs.
Laser-guided bombs were also used in the raid on Tripoli in 86.
Again, with a lot of publicity.
I believe they were also used in the attacks on the Iranians in 87.
Again, with publicity.
The surprise was that there weren't that many of them
because a laser-guided attack almost inevitably generates a video.
Most of what you saw in the way of videos were laser-guided attacks.
And I think that many people had never seen that kind of video before.
However, the bomb itself isn't all that different
than the product that you would have seen, say, in 1970.
It's a very simple device, very effective.
About 9% of the bombs used were laser-guided bombs
or other forms of precision munitions.
Such weapons, while costly to develop and manufacture,
are more valuable than conventional bombs
since they require fewer combat missions to accomplish an objective.
Typically, the precision-guided bombs struck their targets 90% of the time,
while conventional bombs seldom hit more than 25% of their targets.
The attack on a pinpoint target such as a bridge
would take dozens of missions using unguided bombs
before the bridge would be destroyed.
With precision-guided bombs,
a few missions would accomplish the same task.
And fewer missions means that fewer aircraft and crews
are lost to enemy air defenses.
With its air defense system largely destroyed
and coalition air forces swarming over the conflict zone,
the Iraqi Air Force had little choice than to avoid air combat
and instead protect their aircraft.
The dogfighting that did occur was entirely one-sided.
Iraqi fighters did not manage to down a single coalition aircraft,
while coalition fighters shot down 35 Iraqi warplanes.
The Iraqi Air Force, which seemed so imposing on paper,
proved almost entirely incapable of putting up any serious resistance.
Unable to challenge the Allies in the air,
the Iraqi Air Force commanders sought to protect their aircraft
by hiding them in concrete reinforced hangars.
But the Allied air forces, with strategic targets largely eliminated,
soon began attacking the hardened shelters.
Of the 594 Iraqi aircraft shelters identified at the outset of the war,
375 were destroyed.
In desperation to save what was left of its air force,
over 100 Iraqi planes fled to Iran.
Iran has refused to give them back,
declaring them reparations for the Iran-Iraq war.
Although not destroyed, those Iraqi aircraft that flew to Iran
were effectively put out of action.
With Iraq's air defenses incapacitated and its air force decimated,
coalition air forces turned their attention to Iraqi ground units
in and near Kuwait.
Coalition ground forces swung into action.
Under the cover of air superiority,
coalition forces moved into their starting positions,
stretching westward along the Iraqi-Saudi border.
The Iraqi forces, without air reconnaissance or accurate intelligence,
were unaware of the coalition's buildup west of Kuwait.
Feigning a frontal attack and threatening an amphibious assault,
coalition forces were able to use their advantages in mobility
to outflank Iraqi units.
When the ground offensive began,
Iraqi units in Kuwait could not respond
to the coalition's blitzkrieg-style assault into Iraq from the west.
The left hook executed by coalition forces from the western deserts of Iraq
could not have worked were it not for the superior performance
of the coalition ground arsenal.
The reliability of vehicles such as the M1A1 Abrams tank
and the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle
made it possible for coalition forces to fight a war of maneuver.
The 24th Mechanized Infantry Division
set a record for the fastest advance on the battlefield,
moving 220 miles in four days,
an average of 55 miles a day.
The M1 Abrams tank, long derided in the press prior to the war as unreliable,
confounded its critics.
Iraq's tank force, consisting primarily of T-50 series and T-72 Soviet-designed tanks,
could not match up with the more versatile and lethal M1A1 tank.
The M1A1 tank's superior range and firepower
allowed coalition ground forces to destroy many Iraqi tanks
while safely out of the range of Iraqi armor.
While its speed and durability gave coalition forces a decided edge in mobility.
Even the U.S. Marine Corps, which deployed the older M60 main battle tank,
proved extremely capable against Iraqi armor.
And, in perhaps the most evenly matched tank battle of the war,
four Qatari AMX-30s engaged five Iraqi T-55Ms during the battle for Khafji.
When the smoke settled, four of the Iraqi tanks were destroyed and the fifth abandoned.
Thanks to air superiority, ground vehicles such as the Bradley fighting vehicle,
described before the war as a death trap due to its high profile and light armor,
demonstrated the value of its mobility and heavy firepower.
Another weapon that received critical attention before the war was the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter.
Its superb performance in Desert Storm raises questions not about its capability,
but rather about the importance of helicopters in future land wars.
During Desert Storm, helicopters played a fundamentally different role
from those in previous armed conflicts.
In Korea and Vietnam, helicopters were used primarily to transport troops.
In the Gulf War, this transport role remained important,
but the helicopter's special ability to provide fast, mobile firepower for the ground forces became very evident.
The Apache attack helicopter destroyed nearly a thousand Iraqi armored vehicles,
making it the single most deadly anti-armor weapon of the war.
The Apache, and its Marine and Army counterparts such as the Cobra,
can locate and identify pinpoint targets such as tanks with greater ease than fast jets can.
In spite of their capabilities, the growing importance of attack helicopters in land warfare is not widely recognized,
although some observers have been paying it special attention.
A former Soviet Army study concluded that the attack helicopters in the U.S. Army Division
increased the combat capability of the unit by more than 50%.
The Gulf War was certainly the most effective scenario you could imagine for the attack helicopter.
The attack helicopter was, in many ways, the star of the ground war.
It first had the advantages of terrain.
There was obviously no triple canopy jungle in the desert.
There was very little place for its targets to hide or for threats to hide.
They couldn't see all the threats.
The helicopters could also operate by day or night, which they could not do in Vietnam or the earlier Middle East wars.
And, in fact, most of the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps' most effective work was done at night.
The air threat was less.
There were no fixed-wing aircraft to come and chase the American helicopters away.
The Iraqi ground-based air defenses were largely defeated after the first day,
so they could not have a great threat to the helicopters.
So this was very much the helicopter's war.
I don't know if they would do as well at lower-intensity conflict in worse terrain or higher-intensity conflict in Europe.
However, it does show the attack helicopter is here to stay.
And while it is vulnerable, it is perhaps no more vulnerable than any other system on the modern battlefield,
where really anything that can be seen can be killed.
The Iraqi military units in Kuwait were crushed within a matter of days.
Images of hundreds of burned-out vehicles littering the highway leading to Iraq provided partial evidence of the rout in the desert.
The Iraqi commanders, who surrendered to coalition forces,
were surprised to learn that over 60,000 Iraqi prisoners had been taken in the blitzkrieg operation.
It is easy to get the impression that modern warfare is nothing more than a technological contest between machines.
Yet these machines are merely tools in the hands of the soldiers, young men, and increasingly young women.
There was no better example of this than in the desert tank battle.
The Allied tanks did have a decided technological edge over the Iraqi opponents,
but the difference in technology was not great enough to explain the desert tank battles
in which the Iraqis lost hundreds of tanks and the Allied units lost none.
The Gulf War demonstrated that the human factor is as important as weapon quality.
The one-sided nature of all of the ground war, especially the tank battle,
was much more than just the superiority of Allied tanks over the Soviet-designed tanks used by the Iraqis.
Yes, the U.S. M1A1 Abrams, the British Chieftain, French AMX 30 were indeed superior to the P-72s,
which had most of the press, or the P-55s, which were the bulk of the Iraqi army, both older Soviet design.
But more important than this technical superiority was tactics, cohesion, gunnery.
In all of these, the Allies were greatly superior, and we have seen in the past
times when one side has such a lopsided advantage over its opponent, you can have similar results.
In some tank battles in the opening days of the Russian front of the Second World War,
in some of the battles in the 1967 Middle East war, you saw similar one-sided results
when one side was prepared, one side was trained, one side were basically cohesive units,
and the other side were just a bunch of guys in tanks who maybe knew how to drive their vehicle or fire their guns,
but hadn't trained to fight in combined armed teams, combined armed combat,
in the very harsh realities of modern warfare.
The experiences of Vietnam led the U.S. military establishment to conclude
that the training offered American soldiers and pilots was not realistic enough.
This led to such legendary training programs as the Top Gun School for Navy Fighter Pilots,
and Red Flag for the Air Force.
Far less well-known, but equally important to the victory in the Gulf War,
was the Army's National Training Center in the deserts of Southern California.
The rise of effective training in the West,
especially things such as the U.S. Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin in California,
or the U.S. Air Force's Red Flag and Green Flag exercises at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada,
were vital in making the victory in the Gulf happen.
This was realistic training of a type we didn't see before other wars.
We didn't see before Vietnam, certainly didn't see before the Second World War.
The U.S. and its allies were willing to invest money in trying to make the exercises
as much like real war as they can, to try and duplicate the conditions.
Now, no exercise obviously can do this.
At Fort Irwin, the fact that people don't bleed real blood puts limitations on what you can do.
However, in duplicating the confusion, what caused what's called the friction of the battlefield,
the confusion, when if not people's lives, at least their careers are on the line,
these were very important.
And one of the comments you heard from many U.S. officers after the ground war finished was,
it wasn't as rough as the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, thank goodness.
The Gulf War was won not only in the pristine aerospace plants of General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas,
but in the classrooms and briefing halls of military bases unknown to most Americans.
The 1980s were a time of great intellectual ferment in the United States Armed Forces,
an institution not often acknowledged for its intellectual prowess.
At first, the burning question was, why did the United States lose in Vietnam?
The lessons of this search sharpened the appetite of many professional officers.
Enthusiasm for the study of the art of war came to be expected of ambitious combat leaders.
The Gulf War was won as much by the product of these studies as by any weapon.
It's very difficult to disentangle whether you win a war because of your strengths or your adversary's weaknesses.
I think, however, one thing is quite evident,
and that is that the way this war was fought was very distinctive.
The people who were responsible for planning it on the coalition side
were very much aware of their strengths and their weaknesses, as well as their adversary's strengths.
And what it looks like our commanders did a good job of was exploiting the coalition strengths,
minimizing the coalition weaknesses,
minimizing the significance of the Iraqi strengths,
and exploiting to the maximum the Iraqi weaknesses.
That's a style of war fighting which has not typically been an American style,
to focus your campaign specifically on the adversary.
But it's something that was done in this case to a telling effect.
The high-tech weapons used by the coalition forces were only as good as the soldiers trained to use them.
Thanks to decades of training, the troops required to man the vast number of weapon systems deployed during the conflict
were well suited to their task.
With the relationship between men and arms in sync,
the only factor left to consider was the manner in which such lethal force would be used
toward the operation's objective to liberate Kuwait.
Realizing it could not win in open confrontation with coalition forces,
Iraq was forced to explore other means.
With no viable alternatives, Iraq tried to widen the war
by using scuds to attack targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Iraq hoped that Israel's participation would weaken the coalition
by causing a split between Arab and non-Arab member states participating in the coalition.
The only usable weapon in Iraq's arsenal capable of drawing Israel into the war
and inflicting any substantial damage to targets beyond Iraq and Kuwait
was the scud ballistic missile.
Scud missiles in the western desert of Iraq specifically targeted Israeli cities.
Although extremely inaccurate, the scud proved the ideal terror weapon,
having caused extreme international concern.
The scud in the greater scheme of things did not have that much of an impact
in terms of the kind of destruction that they caused.
But they were the only weapon the Iraqis had that were accomplishing anything.
So that when you compare their scud force to their air force or even their whole army,
they did a lot more with the scud than they did with anything else.
And that, in part, I think explains why they kept working on it.
More than that, however, the missile force had a political impact
which was far more important than whatever operational military implications the attacks might have had.
If the Iraqis, for example, were going to drag Israel into the war,
it was going to be through a missile attack.
It was the only way they could hit Israel.
And they came very close to succeeding on that.
If there hadn't been some prompt counter moves by the U.S. and its allies,
it's very possible that we would have had that problem.
And that might have completely changed the character of the war and of the post-war situation.
The Iraqis had not counted on the effectiveness of the Patriot missile.
Never before in combat had ballistic missiles been shot down.
Since the war, there has been some criticism that Patriots did not shoot down every scud at which they fired.
Yet few missiles of any type, anti-aircraft, anti-tank, or anti-ship,
have had as successful an engagement record as the Patriot did during the Gulf War.
Mission forces fought the war within the context of the air-land battle doctrine.
Air-land battle doctrine is an old concept wrapped in a new name.
It is the combination of land and air forces operating together to ensure victory.
The three-dimensional nature of the coalition's approach to war fighting
was enhanced by a complex network of air and space-based reconnaissance platforms.
This decided advantage provided critical information to coalition forces in the Kuwaiti territory.
The battle zone was layered with intelligence collection systems.
In space, systems such as the DSP satellite looked at traces of scud missile launchers.
Closer to the earth, the TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flew overhead,
taking precise photographs of the battle area and monitoring Iraqi communications.
Navy submarines also patrolled offshore, picking up Iraqi radio transmissions,
while the larger AWACS and JSTARS radar aircraft scanned behind battle lines with their radars,
seeing nearly everything that moved.
The JSTARS enhanced the link in cooperative operations between the land and air forces.
The primary role of JSTARS is to provide surveillance of enemy ground targets beyond the line of battle,
and it does that superbly.
It provides very important information to the Army commander,
and it tells him what's happening behind the lines,
and it also, to us in the Air Force, is a prime targeting system.
So we use JSTARS in the air-to-ground role just like we use AWACS in the air-to-air role.
Once the air war was won,
coalition aircraft turned their attention to Iraqi troop targets to assist ground forces.
In the end, 20% of all sorties flown during the war targeted Iraqi troops in the field.
Within days, the Allied air forces could roam at will over Iraq,
with opposition confined to low-altitude, uncoordinated anti-aircraft fire.
This meant that the Allied air forces could also be used in the tactical role,
attacking Iraqi troop concentrations, tanks, and artillery in the forward battle area.
And it wasn't only the high-tech aircraft that did so well.
Air Force planners expecting to fight against Soviet air defenses in Central Europe
had disparaged aircraft such as the A-10 Warthog, the AC-130 Spectre,
and other slow aircraft as unsurvivable over the modern battlefield.
But against an opponent like Iraq, unable to maintain a shield of air defense over its forces,
these aircraft proved remarkably suitable for the close-attack role.
The Gulf War was a reminder of the crucial link between air combat and land warfare.
Coalition planners went to great effort to eliminate potential problems
that might occur between the Air Force and ground units.
The problem is knowing what the ground commander is trying to do
and how we integrate air to best support his aims and intentions.
And that means that the command and control is the key to close air support.
And that means having a forward air controller, an Air Force guy who can advise the ground commander
on what air can do and what its limitations are.
And then also can provide the directions to the pilot
to make sure he puts the bomb on the right target at the right time.
Now we did this in this war.
We had over 2,000 people, air force people, on the ground with each of the army units.
And I'm talking U.S. Army, I'm talking Egyptian, Syrian, French.
All the forces except the British forces had American forward air controllers with them.
The joint operation of land and air forces worked remarkably well.
And the traditional line between air and ground forces
was increasingly blurred by such weapons as the helicopter.
Helicopters provided quick, mobile firepower to ground units
and destroyed over 800 tanks and numerous other targets during the war.
Target destroyed.
Give us another one, we'll go to the left of it.
Yeah, good shooting, babe.
Target destroyed.
And roger, send in a missile now.
Roger, on target.
One more, please.
One of the driving forces behind the combined land and air force approach
was the idea of using maximum force to attain victory
while seeking to minimize casualties to one's own troops.
The Gulf War provided the perfect example of this practice.
The army forces that went around the flank,
they basically let the tanks lead and not the infantry.
And whenever they did encounter resistance,
even though the tanks were in the lead,
they would pull back and call in the helicopters and the airplanes and the artillery
and basically use those to obliterate resistance as much as possible.
The tanks did fight, you know, we did take infantry casualties,
but they were kept to an absolute minimum
because the doctrine dictated that everything be channeled
towards the objective of minimizing American casualties.
The Navy also participated in the air-land battle approach to war fighting
by using naval aviation to strike Iraqi targets from carriers in the area.
It also had great success with the Tomahawk cruise missile.
Such unmanned systems as the Tomahawk
allowed coalition forces to reach targets otherwise considered too dangerous.
A Tomahawk makes a tremendous difference
because you can fly Tomahawk in where you would worry about a pilot's survival.
Also, because Tomahawk's precision doesn't depend upon
being able to see the target terribly well,
Tomahawk was used in bad weather
when the airplanes would not have passed the field
missing the target altogether.
Now, Tomahawk doesn't deliver a very large warhead,
but those two capabilities make that warhead very valuable
as a force multiplier.
It's very dangerous to think of Tomahawk as an alternative to airplanes.
It's only about a 1,000-pound warhead,
but Tomahawk buys you the ability to hit some key targets
like air defense radars, air defense centers,
after which the airplanes can deliver a much larger load.
And I think that's exactly what we did.
Iraq's use of Scuds in an effort to widen the war
and split the coalition was primarily a defensive strategy.
Iraq hoped to break up the coalition
before it could direct its wrath on Iraqi targets in Kuwait.
Just over 100 Scuds were fired during the entire war.
This strategy did not work for two reasons.
Coalition air forces, special operations teams,
and Patriot anti-missile batteries
minimized the Scud threat before it could be effective.
Also, the coalition's mobile strategy and ground units
moved so fast with such tremendous kill power
that Iraq did not have time to wait for its Scud threat to become effective.
In the final analysis,
it is unlikely that U.S. forces will be presented with another Gulf War scenario.
The crushing victory of coalition forces will, if anything,
act as a deterrent to other rogue states
considering a confrontation under similar conditions.
It is unlikely that any future adversary
would give the U.S. and its allies
the opportunity to fully prepare its forces for battle
in such ideal terrain.
Iraq was defeated so quickly because they thought we wouldn't fight.
It was their fault.
They basically stuck an army out in the desert
without air superiority.
It didn't take a rocket scientist,
or even somebody who flunked history,
to realize that that was a surefire prescription for defeat.
We were fighting a military campaign.
Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis were fighting a political and immediate campaign.
They lost.
