Future Warfare tells a story that reaches beyond the traditional idea of warfare - a story that will take us to the uncharted reaches of outer space and into the digital realm, as the line between reality and science fiction is blurred by extraordinary developments in technology.
In the series finale, we focus on the importance of Special Operations. Modern warfare has leapt forth into the era of supercomputers, satellite surveillance, and artificial intelligence. Special Ops teams have come out of the trenches and are entering new domains of warfare. Unconventional missions are typically carried out by elite and highly skilled teams called 'Special Operations' or 'Spec-Ops'. Special Operations forces must outstep their adversaries to maximise the technological advantage. Their past was courage and stealth; their future is innovation and adaptability.
War is part of our human experience, but the way we fight it is changing.
Technology is defining the future of warfare.
It's changing the way we think about making decisions in warfare,
providing capabilities that were previously unreachable.
Lessons from the past inform the future.
At every technological leap, redraws the battle lines we once knew.
Technology was once a spear, today it is a cyber attack.
The amount of interconnected technology
has fundamentally transformed the operational environment.
Familiar domains grow increasingly complex,
and the race to dominate the ultimate high ground has begun.
In the same way we think about sea power, we need to start thinking about a strategy for space.
As machines take the reins, the speed of warfare accelerates ever faster.
Technology has always shaped war.
Evolution has always happened in war and in society.
It will continue to happen.
War has always shaped humanity.
Future warfare accumulates knowledge from past military campaigns.
We learn as much from victory as we do from loss.
We employ strategies to gain the advantage,
unconventional methods to overwhelm adversaries.
One dedicated force, steeped in mystique, has always been part of war.
Special operations, elite and unseen, their presence felt by lethal attack.
From the biblical era to the future of warfare,
the battle environment is reshaped and redefined by special operations.
Historically, you can trace special operations back to the biblical era.
Special operations historically have been seen as tactical units
and largely historically employed in support of a larger conventional campaign.
If we look at the story of Gideon in the book of Judges,
it essentially fits the definition of a special operation as we would understand it today.
Small unit missions that operate in denied territory or semi-permissive territory
or politically sensitive environments.
Gideon recruits elite force from his larger army
and they then use unconventional methods
to achieve a much bigger effect than their size would suggest possible.
Essentially frightening an enemy army into submission and to fleeing the battlefield.
A small unit with special skills able to operate in those difficult environments.
The forerunner of today's special operations forces or SOF
were units cobbled together to achieve a specific task.
Like David against Goliath, their means were often limited, their methods unconventional.
Special operations forces are those that do those jobs that don't fall comfortably
within the traditional confines of conventional warfare.
What special operations do is they go around it.
So they're also dealing with it but they're dealing with it in a different way.
They're finding weaknesses in it, they're finding vulnerabilities
and again they're going to circumvent the major forces.
Operating covertly, special operations forces through the First and Second World Wars
undertook daring raids, achieved unexpected outcomes, then disappeared into the night.
In the public consciousness, mythology surrounding them grew.
Who were these elite secret soldiers?
There is such a mystique and so many legends around special operations because of the secrecy of them
that actual accurate study of the history of special operations is absolutely key
to both understanding what they're capable of and certain pitfalls to avoid.
An iconic special operation, albeit the one that ended in defeat
for those American special forces involved, was the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993.
Part of the Somalian Civil War and the UN intervention there,
a US special forces task force was tasked with trying to capture certain key figures.
Unfortunately, this particular mission went awry.
A number of US helicopters were shot down, a number of US personnel were killed
and the force had to sort of withdraw with its casualties in some disorder back to its base.
It was immortalised in the book Black Hawk Down which was subsequently turned into a film
and the imagery of a handful of American soldiers trying to fight off
these hordes of Somali militiamen who were trying to overrun them
has become iconic in the public imagination
and has sort of been repeated in various other forms of media again and again and again.
Courage is a virtue that special operations forces carried through every era of warfare.
But in an increasingly interconnected world,
the demands placed on special operations extend beyond mere courage.
Future warfare special operations forces must outstep their adversaries
to maximise the technological advantage.
The past was courage and stealth.
The future is innovation and adaptability.
Static line parachuting from a fixed-wing aircraft
with three other dudes and a radio set behind enemy lines was a special operation in 1940.
It's not necessarily going to be a special operation in 2040.
In 2040 it might be a hacker that has embedded certain devices in their own body
that has the ability to 3D print particular kinds of activities,
that's going to act as the mobile sensor for an AI,
that's going to select the right moment to insert a special team.
What is it in the future that conventional forces are going to be challenged by
very direct approach that perhaps special operations can achieve by indirect approaches,
through creativity, through innovation.
And maybe that team will actually not be physical for most of the time,
it'll be able to go physical or virtual,
it may be operating from outside the physical terrain where its mission set is happening.
They will make their decisions not in the planning phases necessarily,
they'll plan as well as they possibly can,
but they will be able to make lots of decisions in the execution phase.
And so on a very complex battlefield SOF can be that decisive force.
I think people will still need to be killed,
and there'll still need to be physical teams on the ground,
but that may happen a lot less than we like to think.
Elite espionage agents have been part of warfare for a long time,
but it was during World War II that military commanders and politicians
really began to understand just how effective they could be.
The earliest heyday of special operations was in World War II with the
founding of the Special Operations Executive in the United Kingdom.
It was British Prime Minister Winston Churchill who formed commando units to engage in special
operations during World War II after being directly inspired
by South African commando units during the Boer War.
And Churchill had seen firsthand how these small groups of Afrikaans had been able to tie down
much larger British forces by using unconventional methods,
and that was the kind of impact he was looking for.
World War II is kind of the classic example where the Special Operations Executive
had a major role in supporting the partisan forces in Europe, also in Asia.
In 1940, the British have just seen the fall of France.
They've seen Poland overrun.
They've seen the collapse of Norway and Denmark.
They're suddenly isolated against Hitler's Germany.
By June of that same year,
Churchill's commando units were carrying out raids behind enemy lines.
It was through his support against the military traditional hierarchy that the
Special Operations Executive was formed and that it became an incredibly robust organization.
There were several key learning points that came out of the Second World War about special
operations.
The first was the need for a prepared capability.
Units did need time to train and train properly for the tasks that were being asked to accomplish
and be given the time for that.
The other was the need to make sure that special operations units were not used for tasks that
were actually better suited for conventional operations,
and that becomes a recurring theme in the later stages of the Second World War.
Special operations forces have a long history of practicing unconventional warfare.
They learn and improve upon past practice,
building foundations to inform future operations.
The sort of founding myth,
the founding event of OSS and SOE,
which is the British equivalent operating in Nazi-occupied Europe in World War II,
was a program known as the Jedburgh program.
Operation Overlord consisted of so-called Jedburgh teams,
three-man teams being dropped in into occupied territory
to conduct diversionary operations.
Operation Overlord, a codename for the Battle of Normandy,
would prove pivotal to the success of the Allied forces.
Small teams, a couple of officers, a couple of NCOs, maybe a radio operator,
parachuting in behind German lines to link up with guerrillas,
organize, train, equip them, employ them in combat against a military force,
and then transition them to regular military or disband them.
Occupied Europe had to be rid of the occupying forces,
and so there was a major conventional overarching campaign.
The example of Gideon units that are cobbled together for that task,
they do the task and then they dissipate,
and it becomes an imperative for them
to find a way to achieve these big results from small groups.
By the conclusion of World War II,
special operations forces were largely disbanded.
Their missions had been driven by the desire of Allied forces to gain strategic advantage.
The Second World War sees this explosion in special operations
as combatants look to use small groups of men to achieve these effects
at an operational or strategic level in the context of the mobilization of entire nations.
But then came the Cold War,
a heightening of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union,
driving humanity to the brink of nuclear annihilation.
Then as the Cold War increases, that capability is resurrected,
often with the same names.
So units that we're familiar with today, such as the Special Air Service,
such as the commandos, such as US Ranger units,
all have their roots in the Second World War,
but only really become a regular part of the order of battle in the 1950s and 1960s.
Special operations forces were now recognized as being a vital part of any nation's military.
Not only just in the West, but also in the communist bloc, Soviet Union and China,
start to think seriously about having a permanent capability
to be able to undertake special operations.
Every special forces unit has an inherent character,
a personality derived from their nation's specific cultural traits.
From the British commandos to Indonesian Kapasus and Russian Spetsnaz,
special operations forces might be collectively recognized for their elite skills,
but it's their individualized character that sets them apart.
Originally, there were only a few states that had units
that could really properly be called special operations forces,
but now almost everybody has them.
In Indonesia, Kapasus, the Indonesian army special forces,
they are responsible for a similar range of missions,
but unconventional warfare takes place internally as well as against external enemies.
A nation's culture and politics inform the operational style
and the tasks undertaken by special operations.
Special forces of the Soviet Union, Spetsnaz,
had a role not only on the battlefield, but also in the apparatus of state security.
In the U.S., we have Army, Marines, Navy SEALs, as they're popularly known,
and the Air Force Special Operations.
So they all have their niche special capabilities, but they operate together.
And whatever the strategic needs of war,
they're going to drive tactics, they're going to drive techniques and procedures,
and rightly and correctly need to adapt to those needs.
They are risk-takers and innovators.
Their combat style is informed as much by the culture they represent
as it is by the technology they can get their hands on.
One of the strengths of SOF, and historically we've seen with SOF,
is they are early innovators of technology.
And often being the first to get their hands on specialist war equipment,
special operations forces leverage it into a lethal combat advantage.
One example of technology advancing special operations
through the end of the Second World War and then into the Cold War
would be the growth in underwater breathing apparatus.
In World War II, the Italian Royal Navy used special units
known as Frogmen in the Battle of the Mediterranean.
In good Italian fashion, right before they infiltrated the harbor,
they surfaced and had a glass of wine and toasted their future success.
They ended up destroying two battleships, a cruiser, and I believe one other ship.
In the Vietnam War, some of the night vision technologies that were emerging,
SOF were the first to get their hands on this capability.
While night vision scopes were used in World War II,
the starlight scope allowed U.S. forces fighting in the low-lit jungles of Vietnam
to at least try and see their enemy.
Then in 1991, during the Gulf War, special operations teams inserted behind Iraqi lines
were enabled by NavStar GPS, a navigation satellite system
that fed geolocation and time information to a receiver on the ground.
In the Gulf War in 1991, only one side had GPS,
and it was a massive advantage over the Iraqi forces.
As technology continues to evolve,
so too does the way that a special operations soldier will engage with future adversaries.
What's a future special operations commander going to look like?
What's a special operator going to look like?
Mid-future is going to be redesigning special operations
so that they include some cyber, electronic warfare,
advanced signals intelligence capabilities.
The future capabilities of special operations forces are growing.
Intelligence of foreign targets will be snatched from electronic signals
via radar and weapons systems.
We're starting to see special operations forces use capabilities like cyber operations.
They're starting to get involved with shaping the information space
as a way to achieve effects without actually physically having to be on the ground.
But if it calls for being on the ground,
a special operations force is made even more capable when weapons are easily deployed.
I was out with the special forces early in the Iraq war back in 2003,
and they were pioneering use of a suitcase UAV.
It was called the Hunter.
You just opened up the suitcase, put the thing together, launched it with your arm.
Leveraging technology doesn't just give the advantage
to special operations forces on the battlefield.
It could also preserve and protect lives.
Was a big effort to develop a robotic exoskeleton called the TALOS suit,
protecting your operator out in the area where you don't have a field hospital.
Though shelved in 2019,
the DARPA-developed tactical assault light operator suit, TALOS,
was a bulletproof robotic exoskeleton which could be weaponized.
Equipped with sensors which monitored vitals,
it gave its wearer enhanced perception and strength.
Capabilities that special forces have today were science fiction back in the year 2000.
So we're seeing a sort of really significant shift in capabilities,
but it doesn't really look that different.
It's not dudes walking around in robot suits.
The U.S. Department of Defense predicts that cyborg soldiers
with enhanced combat capabilities will be operational before 2050.
And in a way that sounds scarier than it is
because so many of our capabilities are human enhancement.
A spear was a human enhancement.
It gave us a tooth that we could, you know, we could push into our enemy from a distance.
The cyborg soldier ear and eye enhancement heightens situational awareness
and boosts communication capacity.
Bodysuit sensors support muscular control.
Neural enhancement links the mind to machine.
Brain-computer interfacing transfers data between a soldier and a weapons system.
If that seems like science fiction, it's actually not,
because at least one of our adversaries has a program looking at exactly that right now.
And while the enhancement of soldiers is still a while away,
it's the proliferation of more modern technologies
that's starting to shape the battlefields of the future.
The advancements in technology, and particularly smartphone technology,
but also drones, has had a really significant impact in urban warfare.
Today, everybody has GPS.
Everybody has it on their phone.
And the proliferation of apps that enable you to do all sorts of clever things
has really flattened the technology advantage
to some important degree that state forces traditionally had over non-state actors.
Advanced GPS technology provides special operations forces
with the ability to work from remote locations.
Up close, yet from a distance, they can make contact with embedded agents,
train forces from afar, strike targets with lethal precision.
You no longer have to physically parachute into Nazi-occupied Europe
in order to make contact with people.
As long as they have sufficient trust in the force to not physically be there,
they can actually advise and assist from a distance using modern technologies.
It is not only special operations forces that launch operations
from well outside the combat zone.
Adversaries leverage GPS and secure messaging communication technology
to set their own campaigns in motion.
Much as we've become used to seeing jihadists reach into Western societies
and manipulate people to carry out attacks,
every special operations organization on the planet
could be doing that all the time in its entire area of operations now
based on the kinds of capabilities that are out there.
Technology might bridge the gap between mind and machine,
but the advantage our special operations forces once had is reduced.
As our enemy's capacity to exploit it increases along with global connectivity.
We've seen an explosion of access to Wi-Fi, satellite, internet, GPS devices.
We're looking at about 8 billion GPS-enabled devices,
and that really changes how non-state actors in particular
are able to generate levels of lethality and precision
that used to be solely the preserve of nation states.
So the sort of war impact of connectivity
has been basically a democratization of lethality,
where technology is now available for individuals and non-state groups
that you used to have to be a government in order to be able to acquire.
Greater connectivity is a byproduct of mass urbanization.
In the next 20 to 30 years,
Earth's human population will explode to close to nine and a half billion.
Special operations forces navigate a new warfare environment,
the urban jungle, a high-speed tangle of hyper-connectivity.
Geographers call it lateralization,
the tendency for things to cluster on coastlines.
Wars happen where people are,
and so as people have moved to cities, they've also moved to coasts.
So today, about 80% of people on the planet
live within about 50 miles to 80 kilometers or so of a coastline.
And as we're seeing urbanization increase,
the likelihood of wars taking place in cities is massively increasing.
Military forces have traditionally avoided fighting in cities
because cities are notoriously difficult to fight in.
When you think about urban populations,
they tend to have better connectivity and better technical skills.
There are lots of places to hide.
It slows down maneuver for maneuver forces.
Large tanks get trapped in alleyways.
When you put all of that together,
you've got a more technically literate population with better connectivity
that's able to engage in essentially software and hardware hacking
in order to generate a much greater degree of lethality
from ordinary citizens in the urban environment
than you might otherwise expect.
It's a nightmare environment for state forces,
and so non-state actors use that urban terrain
as a kind of leveling of the playing field.
Special Operations Forces once had exclusive access to high-tech toys.
Now, they are in contest with urban gorillas,
armed with inexpensive off-the-shelf gadgets.
How do we fight in these environments?
Are we going to use small drones, for example,
that can zip around and achieve the kinds of effects we want
without taking out a whole building?
Technology has been democratized.
High-density urban living.
High-speed connectivity.
Special Operations adapting its speed to a new way of warfare.
As the warfare environment changes,
the look and feel of Special Operations Forces transforms.
Modern technology brings new complications,
different ways to engage in combat.
That need for being covert was very important.
Today, that's increasingly difficult,
as you've got the rise of social media,
millions of people with cell phones.
Even inadvertent things like helmet cams and people's cell phones
that people didn't know you were taking that picture,
and then this goes around.
Every soldier on the battlefield can potentially have a strategic effect
on it, can become that next recruiting tool for al-Qaeda or for ISIS,
can prolong the war.
Never before has the minutiae of life been recorded
as comprehensively as it has in this era.
Military excursions, catastrophic blunders,
indelible images of war and chaos,
digitally rendered collateral damage shared in an instant with an upload.
Mistakes that are made on the battlefield,
they get magnified instantly,
and they can go around the world instantly.
Anything that happens that's kinetic,
if there's an explosion, if there's gunfire,
people whip out their phones and you capture the people involved.
But like the highly gadgetized urban warrior,
Special Operations Forces recognize social media can be used for good or ill.
Its effectiveness to distribute propaganda
and track military campaigns in real time is profound.
But a force once known for operating in the shadows
are now through social media at greater risk of exposure,
scrutiny and targeting.
U.S. Special Forces flew a team into Libya a couple of years ago
to support a particular faction.
They were outed within an hour by the Libyan Air Force,
which was very happy to have their allies turning up
and posted a picture of these guys on their Facebook page.
There's still something to be said for allowing that information out,
that your Special Operations Forces are active
and that can be disconcerting to the enemy.
Letting them know that you're there can be a way to signal
that this is something serious, that you're taking this seriously.
And that also provides tremendous opportunities
for the manipulation of information
and for shaping the messages around those conflicts.
There's a Russian equivalent of Facebook,
which is used by a lot of the Russian so-called volunteers
that are fighting in Ukraine for separatist groups.
And the Ukrainians and other groups have made huge strides
in identifying specific units and groups and individuals
based on social media.
Social media might be woven into our societal fabric.
But in future warfare,
where the battle domain is increasingly urbanized and highly connected,
its capacity to help or hinder special operations can be instant and extreme.
So I think we're going to increasingly see people operating in the gray zone, right?
Not fully secret, not fully covert or clandestine,
but certainly not overt,
sort of surfing with the edge of detectability in that liminal maneuver space.
While the Vietnam War was considered the first war broadcast to the world,
it was but a trickle of collective imagery,
compared to the tsunami of data
that flows across social media platforms during modern campaigns.
The Mumbai attacks give us a little glimpse of the kinds of factors
that are going to increasingly play a role in future warfare.
The Mumbai attacks of 2008,
Lashke Utoiba, theoretically a non-state actor,
was able to do an extraordinarily complex maritime sea-based infiltration
of a 10-person team into a megacity.
They were able to shut down that megacity for about 60 hours,
generate massive expense and disruption,
kill a significant number of people
by remotely controlling five two-man teams from a safe house in Pakistan,
using social media as a feedback loop to identify what was going on on the ground.
So we're talking about a non-state actor backed by a state force
using easily accessible but very connected technologies to guide their operation.
So they controlled these groups with cell phone messages,
but they figured out the effect of their own operation
by tracking Twitter, other social media and the news media.
And at one point during the siege in Mumbai,
a number of people went and hid in a particular area in one of the hotels
and began tweeting and calling their family and texting people to say where they were.
The safe house in Pakistan that was controlling the operation
picked that up, fed that information forward to the assault team in the hotel,
and they went down to that area of the hotel and got those people.
So this is an example of people using social media to generate
not a political effect but an operational command and control effect,
and we're going to see significantly more of that.
Every person with his or her cell phone
can now become a political actor of some kind across national borders.
It makes possible extremism because people who are so inclined
can meet up with each other and link up globally.
The Mumbai attacks or the things that happen in Somalia
or the attacks that we've experienced in London and all over the world,
all of that is made possible by this communications technology.
People who understand how to fight in the cyber war
or how to fight in the social media space will become increasingly appointed.
Our world is exposed more than ever before.
Military strategies and secrets uploaded and shared.
Clandestine operations live-streamed.
The ability of someone just to log on to YouTube or a similar website
and to see completely unfiltered raw footage of combat
in a way that has never been possible before,
I think has huge implications for the way militaries fight wars,
but also for the way nations and even sub-state actors
shape the messages and try and justify what they're doing in conflicts.
History was once written by the victors,
but in future warfare, special operations are fact-checked through social media.
One of the most difficult situations the special operations community is
how to not only avoid civilian casualties,
but explain civilian casualties when they occur.
An ethical line that once might have been blurred
has, through social media, been reconsidered.
Special operations forces are now better trained to understand moral complexities
to not cross that ethical combat line.
So on the one hand, you have people who say
the only ethics that special operations forces recognize is the ethics of not getting caught.
Similarly, I spoke to a retired special operations officer
who said that the ethics of special operations are to lie, rob, and kill,
which seems pretty dramatic.
Do you take responsibility when there is a mistake?
Do you allow the military justice system to work through in a public way?
Do you invite media in to see how you are conducting your operations
to try to avoid civilian casualties?
Most special operations forces in democratic countries
now undergo intensive military ethics training.
But it wasn't always this way.
Fellow citizens, last night I ordered U.S. military forces to Panama.
No president takes such action lightly.
My first time in combat was during Operation Just Cause,
which was the U.S. invasion of Panama.
And I had no training at the time in ethics.
We're going to have to think about how we constrain what we do
as we try to achieve just objectives in wars that are violent and deadly and kill people.
I had no experience with the theories of moral reasoning
that are out there and have worked out through the millennia.
So as long as there are wars, we're going to have to think about ethics.
What I did have was a two-hour ROE brief
on the day that I'm about to go into combat for my first time
about I'm not really even thinking about what this lawyer is telling me.
In lawyerese, I'm thinking about, OK, will I be courageous tonight?
Will I be a coward?
Will my men come home alive?
Will I come home alive?
As war gets more complicated, we're going to have to think harder about ethics.
But I think it's worth it.
There's a real need for special operations forces to be particularly well prepared
to face up to the ethical challenges that they will face up to.
And that requires a lot of training.
I had one master chief, his theory of training people was,
I can't simulate fear, so I'm going to simulate uncertainty.
It requires a lot of realism in their normal training,
where it's not just about being able to use their weapons in the right kind of way,
but it's about being able to use their weapons in the face of an ethical challenge.
And on every exercise, there was a good chance you were going to lose.
And there was a good chance you had to make a decision.
And a lot of those decisions were loaded and freighted with moral content.
Should I shoot now or shouldn't I?
It's important that those things are built into the cycle of training.
And that not only trains our soldiers for this idea of moral reasoning on the battlefield,
but it also introduces them to the realities of war,
which is your plan never survives first contact with the enemy.
I think it's worth it so that we ensure that we are always on the moral high ground
as we fight the wars of the future.
But is that aspiration to seek the higher moral ground,
to live and die by an ethical combat code shared by our adversaries?
Michael Ignatius, he's a Canadian scholar, politician, just smart dude.
And he introduced that idea of moral frustration.
Why do I have to follow the rules when my enemy is not following those rules?
And as I see my colleagues killed in ways that violate the warrior code,
it's so vitally important that we don't give in to those impulses.
Our adversary right now is going to take advantage of the fact that we're doing ethics training.
They're going to take advantage of our desire, our impulse to do good.
They're going to use strategies against us.
I don't think that the boundaries for ethical action change
based on what the other actor is doing.
But within the classical just war tradition,
the reason for following the rules is more internal.
We follow the rules because it makes us good moral actors.
They know that we will not shoot unarmed people.
And therefore, they will use unarmed people, maybe children,
in ways that are vitally important as reconnaissance units, as spotters,
putting us in a no-win situation.
The ethics of combat that special operations forces strive to uphold
spring from a bedrock of cultural and religious beliefs,
brought from all corners of the world
that date back to antiquity and further.
The classical just war traditions of Christianity, Islam and Hinduism
share an interest in the same sorts of questions.
We have this idea in military ethics, particularly of a triangle of responsibility.
And that is, there's responsibility to your own forces,
there's responsibility to achieve the mission,
but there's also responsibility to non-combatants or local civilians.
They're all concerned about questions of defending the basic rights of others.
So the right to territorial or political integrity,
the right for civilians not to be targeted or harmed in the midst of war.
In a special operations mission,
the same rules, I think, would apply as in another conflict.
So we would have to ask questions such as
whether or not this particular use of force is justified.
So is it furthering a just cause?
Special operations forces operate in vastly different war zones than their predecessors.
Known for their high level of adaptability,
they have had to reinvent ways of engaging in warfare.
Always seeking to leverage technology,
special operations are now plugged into urban environments.
Connected more than ever to indigenous ground forces
that can be trained, equipped with weapons, and motivated to fight for a cause.
When I think about how the future of warfare is likely to look,
some of the past events that I think about are the Battle of Mosul,
which happened in 2016-2017.
We are on the first day of what we assume will be a difficult campaign that could take some time.
We will see whether ISIL stands and fights.
We are confident no matter what, however,
that the Iraqis have the capabilities to get this job done,
and we stand ready to support them along with the rest of the coalition.
Operation Inherent Resolve was the formal name of the campaign
to oust the Islamic State from Iraq and Syria.
This is probably the least covered military campaign in recent history.
Of course, history doesn't actually repeat itself.
You never see a precisely identical example repeated in a different place.
Unlike the other two large campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan,
this was prosecuted very heavily by special operations forces.
It was not only the largest urban battle that's happened this century,
it was the largest battle of any kind since the Second World War.
They were operating under conventional headquarters,
and conventional forces were involved in certain training activities on bases,
primarily in the effort to resuscitate the Iraqi army,
which had largely disintegrated when ISIS, the Islamic State,
swept across western and northern Iraq.
And the way that that battle played out really suggests a lot.
The Battle of Mosul was a dramatic, almost finale of the counter-ISIS campaign.
The liberation of Raqqa and Syria came later.
But the pitched battle for Mosul will really go down, I think, as the pivot point of this war.
And partly it was because that was where Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,
the head of the Islamic State,
had declared the caliphate from the pulpit of the Al-Nuri Mosque in Mosul.
It was a command and control center for them.
435,000 combatants involved, 1.5 million people.
The city was thoroughly tunneled, booby-trapped, multiple perimeters.
Divided in two by a river with five bridges across it,
an old Middle Eastern city, but with a modern city built around it.
They had had four years to really dig in and build up defenses.
It was a heavily populated area.
You're behind the scenes, raising, training, organizing, sustaining a local partner.
The entire complexion of the campaign was reliant on what Iraqi units
were able to do since the coalition was in a support mode.
Or you're bringing in ethnically appropriate special operators who come from
the countries where they're operating to carry out specific intelligence
or sabotage or subversion type activities.
A dramatic moment occurred in the East Mosul part of the battle,
where two Iraqi divisions bogged down.
And particularly the 16th Army Division was not able to do its part
in advancing toward the river, which divided East and West Mosul.
And a coalition soft unit was seconded immediately to go to that division
and lead the charge in.
So the traditional mission for special forces when partnering with a proxy force
is an advise and assist mission.
They will help to train that force.
They will provide capabilities that they couldn't provide themselves,
for example, calling in airstrikes.
That kind of thing.
It was critical that the conventional army units performed their role.
And literally, thanks to Australian SOF, the East Mosul battle was won.
But it was done in the classic by, with, and through method.
It was really done with a Iraqi in front of every operation.
And this is, I think, the hallmark.
As we have moved into the 21st century, we're seeing a growing shift
towards a kind of warfare that relies heavily on what is sometimes referred to
as indigenous mass, where the boots on the ground are indigenous forces,
but they are enabled by special operations forces.
It showed that it was possible to help a country fight its own fight
and avoid this optic and reality of a U.S.-led invasion
or even a coalition intervention.
This was helping those countries reclaim their territory.
Which is much more attractive to particularly Western democracies
than putting large conventional forces in place.
That's a model of the future.
So we're reducing the numbers of operators and leveraging those local forces.
With terrorist outposts in far-flung corners of the world,
special operations forces are frequently banding together
in an effort to dismantle insurgent groups.
Africa, I think, is a model of how special operations are going to be conducted going forward.
There won't be huge numbers of deployed special operators
as there were in the Iraq Operation Inherent Resolve.
Africa is a very dynamic environment where there are lots of terrorist groups.
They form and reform.
The Sahel is a region that's perfect for a sanctuary by these groups.
In Mali, within Africa's Sahel region,
France led a five-country anti-insurgent coalition force in Operation Barkhane.
A number of coalition countries are coming in to help bolster
the effort to build local counter-terrorism forces.
So there's a constant cycle of learning on both sides,
of trying to out-think the other.
It's like any kind of evolutionary situation.
But going forward, I think we also want to think about
what's the unique comparative advantage that different nations
or different types of force have, and how do we exploit those?
As we often say, the stupid insurgents are all dead.
So those that are still here have learned and they continue to learn,
as do the special operators on the other side of the fence.
They are elite, small units of highly trained soldiers,
skilled combatants, early adopters of technology with a complex history of warfare.
And as we look to the future, we can see how they're evolving.
The first woman passed through a successfully special forces selection,
but I will be confident predicting there will be
the first Green Beret who's a female within the next year.
Becoming less bound by boots on the ground and more reliant on hyper-connectivity.
Utilizing cyber capabilities and shaping the information space
as they advance ever further into uncharted future warfare domains.
It will be a matter of 10 years till we see a reformed unit
that is going to be conducting warfare in the virtual and cognitive domain as an equal
mission to going and targeting a small group or fighting the battles they've been fighting.
Looking for opportunities to enhance and make superior their natural capabilities.
Running different potential enhancements against each other
to see which one gives people the most marginal improvement.
These are the special operations forces of future warfare.
S.O.F.T. is at home in chaos and we're at home in uncertainty.
That battlefield may continue to be more complex, but S.O.F.T. will adapt to that.
That's what S.O.F.T. does.
Bearing an historic and elite legacy with an untethered and connected future.
It's important to understand the history of special operations for the future of special operations.
History isn't predictive, but it is the best guide we have to what lies ahead.