Adversarial Foreign Investments- Mr Joseph Humire

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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Mar 5, 2026
23rd Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
Washington, D.C🇺🇸- December 6-7, 2022
-Mr. Joseph Humire
Executive Director, Center for a Secure Free Society
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Okay, good afternoon. I'd be remiss if I didn't begin my remarks by thanking Congressman Pittenger.
It's been a privilege and an honor to be with the Parliamentary Intelligence Security Forum since
2016, and many familiar faces I see in the audience, many friends now that I can call
after all the different forums we've been from Latin America to Europe to here in Washington,
so it's very good, and thank you to all of you for coming, some of you from very far places.
By way of introduction for those that I haven't had the privilege to meet yet, my name is Joseph
Humeyer, and I'm the Executive Director of a national security think tank here in Washington,
D.C. called the Center for a Secure Free Society. At our think tank, what we do is we focus on a
part of the world that most of Washington doesn't pay a lot of attention to. I know the forum does,
but most of Washington doesn't pay a lot of attention to Latin America,
so what I'm going to talk to you about today is a little bit about what's going on in Latin America
in terms of foreign investments, particularly with China, and I won't just limit it to investments
because the twin brother of investment, foreign investment, is international trade. You know,
trade moves goods, investment helps produce the goods, so I think that that's in the combination
that I'd like to talk to you, but maybe just a little bit of words on Latin America before we
begin just for those that are less familiar with the region. Latin America is a region, it's not a
homogenous region. It has 33 countries, including in the Caribbean, very diverse, but it's a region
that's very new to democracy. Many countries just gained their independence no more than 200 years
ago, and for those that did get their independence, many just got out of dictatorships in the 20th
century. Some is late in the late 20th century, so it's very new to the democratic experiment.
It's also a region that is struggling with many structural challenges, both economics
and the rule of law. It's a region that I would argue perhaps is among the most hardest hit
after the COVID-19 pandemic. GDPs on average dropped between eight to nine percent region-wide,
so I give you that context just to understand the vulnerabilities that Latin America has
for things like adversarial foreign investments, and as you could tell by the title of the
presentation, I'm going to talk to you today about what China has been doing in Latin America. Next
story of China in Latin America is a story of malign intent, but U.S. neglect. So I repeat that
U.S. neglect. We have neglected the region, and we've had some specific results. We should go
back to 2004 when the former president, then president Hu Jintao from China, visited Latin
America, made a very bold promise. He said that he was, China was going to invest a hundred billion
dollars by 2010. That caught a lot of Latin America's attention. He was not wrong. If we
look at the data from 2000 to 2010, China was a negligible economic partner in Latin America at
the beginning of the century. By 2010, if you combine foreign direct investment and trade,
China had soured to 180 billion dollars in Latin America, had become the top trade partner of eight
of the 33 sovereign nation states in the region, and four of the 12 in South America. If we fast
forward 10 years later, in 2020, that trade and investment has grown to 450 billion dollars, which
is right around where it sits today, and has now become the top trade partner of 14 of the 33
sovereign nation states, about half of the region, and almost all of South America. Nine of the 12
sovereign nation states in South America prefer to trade with China over the United States, and
this is in the Western Hemisphere. This is not Asian, this is not the Indo-Pacific, it's not the
Middle East, it's not the other side of the Far East. This, it's important to understand how this
happened, and this is where I talk about the neglect, and I'm going to share with you a story
that was shared to me. I had a conversation recently with the former president of the
Inter-American Development Bank, and so for those that are unfamiliar with the bank, it's the largest
multilateral lending institution to Latin America. The United States, in fact, is the largest
shareholder of the bank. It's approximately about 30 percent shareholder of the Inter-American
Development Bank. The most recent president, until a few weeks ago, maybe a month ago,
was an American, and for the first time an American was in the 63-year history, was in
charge of the bank, and I had a very interesting conversation. It's actually available on a podcast
if you want to listen to it on our website, and he told me something that was very telling. I'm
going to share it to you because I think it's going to, it's applicable to a lot of your
countries, and particularly those of you that are engaging in multilateral development.
Back in 2008, the Inter-American Development Bank was exposed to subprimes. If you remember,
the global financial crisis was catalyzed by the U.S. housing crisis that happened here
in the United States, and because the bank had specific deals, particularly with Nationwide
and other banks, they got exposed to these subprimes. The bank at the time wasn't managed
the best, and so they were in red. They were basically bankrupt to the tune of half a billion
dollars, so the bank was in the red for half a billion dollars. Naturally, they went to the
United States to capitalize the bank, you know, to give it a capital increase. The United States
had other priorities. You remember 2008 was a very difficult year economically for the United States,
so we decided not to capitalize the bank, and this opened a golden opportunity for China.
Coincidentally, at the same time, the breakup of Yugoslavia opened up 0.004 percent of the shares
of the bank, which was just enough for China to become a very minority shareholder of the
Inter-American Development Bank, but for the first time in, at the time, 50-year history
of the Inter-American Development Bank, China paid what is called an admission fee.
This had never happened in the history of the bank. Of the 48 members, and when I say members,
they're sovereign nations, country members of the bank, nobody had paid an admission fee,
so they paid an admission fee in 2008, and you can guess what the amount was,
about half a billion dollars. So the amount of money that China had paid, and this is what the
former president told me as what he would call an institutional kickback to essentially co-opt a
major multilateral institution, especially for lending and loans in Latin America,
to be able to operate in conjunction with China throughout the years, subsequent years,
post this deal. What did they do with part of that money? Part of that money, they created what's
called a special operations fund, where they would provide soft loans, the bank, the Inter-American
Development Bank, to countries that are today some of the most authoritarian countries in Latin
America, I'm referring specifically to Bolivia, to Nicaragua, even to Haiti, that would match
what the Chinese Development Bank was exporting, import bank was doing in those same countries.
So it's not an exaggeration to say that the story of China's economic influence in Latin America
was co-financed by the United States. That's what I mean by neglect. Many of the infrastructure
projects, today we hear a lot about infrastructure projects in Latin America, ports, and we're going
to talk about that in a second, but many of that, it was done in conjunction with the Inter-American
Development Bank, as well as China. But here's the thing, it's an incorrect perception to think that
China's foreign investment or their trade is solely economic in nature. And we're going to
talk about that in a second, but China blends what's called in the world of defense, dual use
commerce. Things that can be used commercially, has a commercial application, but has a dual use
in the military domain, as a military application as well. Let me show you a little snapshot of what
it looks like in Latin America. China's infrastructure in Latin America, they have
investments all over, in all kinds of projects, from mining, to extraction, to water, but what I
want to point your attention to is particularly the investments that they've done in ports,
and in satellite tracking stations. In terms of ports, China has more than 40 port infrastructure
projects in Latin America, and I could go, what you're seeing on the screen doesn't show you all
40, it would literally fill up, there were not enough room on the screen to be able to fill it
all up, but I show you some of the most strategic of many of the state-owned enterprises that China
has used to be able to invest into these infrastructure projects, but many of these
companies, if you go to the corporate registries, have a mirroring corporate registry with other
elements that are tied to the Chinese military, specifically the PLA. I'm going to give you an
example of one. One of the biggest port infrastructure projects that China has is in
the country of Peru. It's a mega port project in Chiang Kai-Peru, which is about 75-80 kilometers
north of the capital city of Lima. It's considered to be one of the largest ports, it's not online
yet, but when it does, it'll be one of the largest ports in the region that would be able to house
about 6 million tons of cargo, and will be able to bring what they call a triple E class of cargo
ships, some of the biggest cargo ships that exist. The initial investment of 1.3 billion in 2019
kicked this project off, and they gave it a capital increase to 3.6, if I'm not mistaken,
to a level to get it finished by 2024. The majority shareholder of the Chiang Kai port project
is what the Italian defense minister, Minister Mauro, just talked about,
Costco Shipping. Costco Shipping Ports, a subsidiary of China Ocean Shipping Company, Costco,
is also known for regularly providing the PLA's Navy logistical support for many of their training
and humanitarian support operations, particularly non-combatant evacuation operations.
That picture you're seeing on the screen of the cargo ship, I don't know if you can see it very
big, that's not a Chiang Kai, that's not in Peru. That is a picture of a Costco ship that's loading
amphibious tanks as part of what they call an amphibious invasion drill that they're holding
on the South China Sea that's meant to invade most likely Taiwan. So Costco Shipping has been
demonstrated. This particular ship, the Bang Chui Dao, is a ship that's particularly used for these
type of military, civil military operations, and this is the Chinese shipping company that's now
owning a significant port on the Pacific of Latin America. The other part, the other half of the
critical infrastructure that I want to point to you where Chinese investment has a dual-use
application is satellite ground stations. I know we're going to have a panel after lunch about
space, and I think they're going to delve much more into this in greater detail, but in general,
and I'm not a space expert, but from what I understand, ground stations are very important
in the military world for something called space situational awareness. Basically the thousands of
satellites that are orbiting Earth, it allows you to be able to have an understanding of where
they're positioned, what kind of information is being transmitted, and allow you to be able to
engage in all kinds of space warfare, space being the fifth domain of war, and this is very critical
in today's information dominant warfare environment. This is why China throughout the last 20 years
has gone from 55 to 50 successful orbital launches with its space program.
Well, one of the space projects, now let me say this carefully, China, what they say they do with
their space projects in Latin America, the satellite ground stations, is they don't say
has any military applications. They say that it's to explore the far side of the moon for deep space
exploration, right? So that's the official explanation from China, and that's how they've
sold these to the host nation countries that house these ground stations. In fact, the one I want to
talk to you about, the one that's located in Argentina, is actually called, in Spanish it's
called the Espacio Alejano ground station, which stands for deep space station. This space station
was leased by the Argentine government back in 2012 for 500 acres of land. So the investment
came through the land, literally the physical land, in a part of Argentina called Nauquen. It's
in the southern part of the country, very beautiful part of Argentina in the Patagonia,
and so China acquired 500 acres of land, and they built this satellite tracking station,
and in two years later, in 2014, they ratified it through the Argentine Congress. That created
a debate, because people in the Argentine Congress wanted to know what is this space station
actually going to do? There wasn't a lot of transparency with the station,
so that prompted many inquiries from the Congress that were not fulfilled by the government at the
time. But the government in Argentina changed hands in the year 2015, and the previous government,
now this is the government of President Mauricio Macri, they wanted to review a lot of the deals
that they had with China. One of the campaign promises of President Macri had been to look
to diversify Argentina's trade with their top trade partner with China, and they wanted to
engage with more of the international community. So the Chinese, I'm sorry, the Argentine foreign
ministry in 2015 and 2016 did a review of all their bilateral projects and contracts with China,
and something very interesting came of this, which included this satellite facility. They wanted to
know about it. When they had their conversation with their counterparts in the Chinese foreign
ministry, they said we'd like to learn a little bit more about this deep space exploration project
you have in our country. We want to know, essentially they're asking for a little more
transparency to understand what's actually being done in the facility, because the way the contract
was written, the facility was managed by a company that was owned by the PLA, a company called CLTC.
The Chinese foreign ministry very diplomatically said we're happy to renegotiate, we're happy to
relook, we're happy to re-examine all the contracts including the satellite tracking facility,
but please examine your contract. They told the Argentines please examine your contract.
When the Argentine foreign ministry examined their contract with the space station, they found
something called a cross-default clause. It's very important for all you that are signing deals with
China, because the cross-default clause stipulates that the failure to complete one project will
trigger a mechanism to accelerate all the loan payments for all the projects you have with China.
It would actually reduce the grace periods that China has given on any kind of loans that
they've given to your country. Argentina was not in an economic position to renegotiate
all of its infrastructure projects. Some are very key to their commerce, like the Belgrano Cargas
Railway project, which is also financed by China. So essentially they got hoodwinked.
Argentina got hoodwinked to getting stuck with a military space station. By the way, CLTC, the
company that owns the space station in Neuquen, Argentina, is run by a division of the PLA called
the Strategic Support Force. This is a military installation inside Argentina that the Argentines
have no control over. So let me give you some key takeaways. I know my time is ending.
You know, back before, and actually I studied economics as my degree, and when I studied
economics there was a saying from one of the basic classical liberal philosophers, Frederic
Bastiat, that would say, when goods don't cross borders, armies will. But I think China found a
workaround to that. To have goods and armies mixed together in a strategy that they call
military-civil fusion. It's very important that you understand that term. It's not like
civil-military relations. We purposely put the civil first. But the PLA has a strategy called
military-civil fusion that according to their documents, and I'm going to read from one of
their documents, is a state-led, state-directed program and plan to leverage all levers of state,
military, and commercial power to strengthen and support the armed wing of the Communist
Party of China, the People's Liberation Army. So my message to all of you that are coming from
different corners of the world, especially for those that are from Latin America, but for
anywhere, especially in the global south, is that China is essentially going to try to use investment,
use trade, to hoodwink your country like they've done to Argentina, like they're potentially doing
to Peru, to bring you into a geopolitical conflict that's not yours. When China decides to act
on Taiwan, they're expecting the global south to go with them. But not because the global south
wants the political will to get involved in a conflict of that nature, but because they're
indebted and by extension belong to the People's Republic of China. Thank you very much and I look
forward to the questions.
