ADVERSARIAL FOREIGN INVESTMENTS- Hon. Brent McIntosh

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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Apr 15, 2026
18th Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum Panama City, Panama 🇵🇦 June 29- 30, 2021
-Hon. Brent McIntosh
Former Under Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury
Video Link:
He engaged in that civious process of the Furman Bill. I can tell you he gave
exceptional leadership to it. During 2020 he coordinated several
initiatives to alleviate the COVID-19 pandemic's
economic consequences. Mr. McIntosh served from 2017 to
2019 as Treasury's General Counsel, leading the department's approximately
2,000 lawyers in spearheading its regulatory
reform efforts. Before joining Treasury, Mr. McIntosh
was a partner in the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell
and co-headed the firm's cybersecurity practice.
Mr. McIntosh served as a lawyer in the White House
from 2006 until 2009. Before that he was a Deputy Assistant
Attorney General at the United States Justice Department.
He studied at the University of Michigan, the London School of Economics,
and Yale Law School. Mr. Brent McIntosh, thank you sir
for your service to our country and for being with us today
and I'm sure folks will continue to come in.
Thanks. A sincere thank you to you, Congressman,
for organizing this terrific event and for including me in it.
I appreciate and I think we should all appreciate the work you do
to bring together a lot of parliamentarians from like-minded
countries to work on national security issues of
common concern and work toward common solutions to those
issues. I also appreciate the thoughtful insights from
the speakers yesterday and today. Really insightful, thoughtful conversation here
and I want to thank as well our Panamanian hosts for their
great hospitality in the face of real challenges having us here.
We have exciting weather outside. I'm hopeful that the
the weather will cooperate and I'll get thunderclaps and lightning on the key
points in my remarks but if not and if that tree should come through
this window I hope someone will warn me of it.
I'm going to talk today about adversarial foreign investment which is
investment in our countries that is not merely commercial
but that will have national security effects for our countries
posing challenges to the national security of our countries.
There are innumerable forms that adversarial foreign investment can take.
It can be the acquisition of technologies with military or
intelligence uses. It can be the acquisition of critical
infrastructure such as power grids or parts of power grids,
medical systems that if misused could hobble our
countries. It can be the acquisition of data
centers that house sensitive personal data about our citizens
or even members of our military. It could be the acquisition of
sensitive personal data itself. It could be the acquisition of
private educational institutions thus granting control over the curriculum of
those institutions. It could be the acquisition of real
estate near our military installations from which
to conduct surveillance of the activities conducted there.
The scope and variety of potential adversarial foreign investment is really
limited only by the economic activities our countries undertake
as well as acquiring companies and acquiring countries'
imaginations. In the United States the primary mechanism
through which we police adversarial foreign investment into the United States
is the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States which we call
CFIUS. CFIUS is an interagency committee of
the executive branch in the United States.
It's chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury who for the past four years was
my boss and it reports ultimately to the
President of the United States. CFIUS runs a process of screening inbound
corporate transactions, deals, to isolate and identify
ill-intentioned foreign investment or investment that would
harm our national security. The CFIUS process ultimately can result in the
blocking of those transactions, can direct that transactions not occur.
The United States has been using the CFIUS process to
screen for adversarial foreign investment for four decades.
So at this point we have extensive experience both with the successes
of that process as well as its shortcomings. Prior to leaving
government service, as the Congressman mentioned,
I spent a great deal of time working on CFIUS first as the General Counsel to
the Chair of the Committee, the Treasury Secretary, then later as the
Undersecretary who had responsibility for the Committee's work. So in light of
that background I thought it worthwhile to share some
thoughts on the state of adversarial foreign investment
and on the strengths and weaknesses of our investment process in hopes that
we can share lessons learned that can benefit all of our countries,
both best practices that can be adopted as well as shortcomings to be avoided.
So let me start by saying that during the prior administration our CFIUS
process was improved dramatically. It emerged as a more robust, muscular
and rigorous screening process that was due in no small part to the
foresight and proactive leadership of our host today, Congressman Pittenger,
who played a critical role in passing reform legislation
that I'll discuss later. I'm going to start by laying out
the nature of the threat and then some contours of
the process we use for weeding out adversarial foreign investment,
and then I'll turn to the reforms we recently adopted for that process
and then describe some of what I see as the challenges for the future of that
process. The nature of the threat. Foreign direct
investment plays a massive role in the global economy.
In the United States, for example, to use a pre-pandemic baseline,
in 2018 we had 4.3 trillion dollars, trillion with a T,
in foreign direct investment, and the pace of foreign investment is only
increasing. The United Nations estimates that
foreign investment around the world would increase 10 or 15 percent
this year and 20 to 30 percent next year.
So policing foreign investment poses a number of
difficult challenges for all of our countries. In the United States,
on principle and by tradition, we maintain an open investment
climate, an open investment climate for foreign direct investment.
That openness in the foreign capital it attracts, combined with the dynamism of
the American economy, to make the United States an
exceptionally attractive destination for capital flows. It's the
largest economy in the world and deeply interconnected with other countries
which makes it difficult for any one government agency to stay on top of all
transactions coming into the United States.
The United States is also home to a great number of innovative companies,
including cutting-edge technology companies that develop products
whose ultimate uses may be unclear or indeterminate at the time
of a particular transaction, making it difficult to determine
what is and what is not sensitive technology.
Finally, the United States is founded on constitutional principles that
activities, whether economic or otherwise, are presumptively allowed,
presumptively permitted, unless they are affirmatively barred by
the legislature. And the legislature goes through the
appropriate proceedings to bar them. Even then, there are constitutional
freedoms that the government can't abridge. All this makes the threat
environment for adversarial foreign investment a very challenging one
and the reality we see with regard to foreign investment reflects
those circumstances. Over the past decades, and especially the past
decade, we have seen increased interest in acquiring American
companies, technologies, data, in situations where the transfer of
those companies or data or technologies would pose a threat to the
United States' national security. And that activity has spanned many
different sectors. There are obvious ones, technologies that have
military uses and cutting-edge computing technologies, artificial
intelligence, robotics, telecommunications equipment, providers of
critical infrastructure. But it's critical to recognize that there are
also any number of other sectors where the threat may be less obvious,
but it's just as real. For example, social media companies that collect
data on Americans, including members of our military, companies that
run private schools, producers of goods that, while low-tech, are
nonetheless single-source inputs into critical military technologies.
I would say that for those of you who are interested in thinking about
the range of threats that adversarial foreign investment can pose, the
CFIUS team at the Treasury produces every year an annual report which
categorizes a number of the different sectors from which these threats
can emerge, and I would commend it to you. It's available. It's sent to
Congress and available publicly on the Treasury website. It's
eye-opening, the range of potential threats. Just as there are many
different sectors from which adversarial foreign investment can emerge,
it's also true that threats can originate from many different countries,
not just obvious adversaries. To be sure, and this will be no surprise, a
substantial fraction of the CFIUS transactions we review that have been
drawn public attention in recent years have originated from China. That's
consistent with overall investment trends in recent years. The most
prevalent country from which CFIUS transactions emanate, problematic or
not, has been China. For example, in the period 2017 to 2019, nearly 700
transactions were reviewed by CFIUS. 140 of those were Chinese-originated,
which is about 20%. No other country accounted for more than 100. But it's
important to note that according to our CFIUS review, not every Chinese
transaction is problematic, and not every problematic transaction is
Chinese. On the contrary, we see threats emerging from many different
countries. The diversity of different threat vectors teaches us that all
transactions must be evaluated individually, carefully, on a deal-by-deal
basis. Exacerbating the difficulty of doing that review, we have to recognize
that it's often difficult to determine the nationality of the acquirer. It's
often difficult to determine the ultimate ownership behind a foreign
acquirer. Who's really behind an entity that's incorporated in Jersey or the
Cayman Islands? Does a complex corporate structure, for example, hide ownership
interests that don't show up in the org chart or control that doesn't show up in
the org chart? Is an acquirer a private company or a state-owned enterprise? And
in many countries, notably China again, the line between a private company and a
state-owned enterprise has a tendency to blur. It's often difficult to
determine which is which, and at times, even what are called private companies
are subject to comprehensive government control. Sometimes, that's by law, as
with the national security laws in China that require cooperation with the
government and the provision of data to the government, no questions asked. At
other times, it's merely a matter of custom or pressure or unequal political
influence, as, for example, Ant Financial recently found out, and that was all
over the news. In response to this reality, the United States CFIUS process
is intended to vindicate a pair of objectives that are mutually
interdependent. First, protection of the national security of the United States.
Second, maintenance of the outstanding open investment environment that we
prize so much. I say that these objectives are mutually interdependent
because, in practice, they're necessary to one another, not intention, as some
might think. Only with vigilant screening of foreign direct investment can we
afford the open investment climate, the open investment environment, that is an
engine of growth for our country. On the other hand, American economic strength
underpins American national security, so we pursue these twin goals through an
investment review process that's chaired by the Treasury Department and
incorporates input from more than a dozen federal agencies. That allows us to
bring to bear expertise that ranges from financial to industry-specific to the
highly classified intelligence inputs that are provided in our reviews. These
reviews are all transaction-specific. They're all about a single transaction
that's been notified to us as potentially problematic. They are not
blanket prohibitions on particular sectors or particular countries. We
review them one by one. These reviews are based only on national security, not
economic or other policy interests. The review process involves all these
agencies getting together with parts of the intelligence community to evaluate
the possibility that there is a threat in a particular transaction. Even where
that review identifies a potential threat, CFIUS will move to block a
transaction only if the attendant threat cannot be mitigated through a binding
agreement that the government strikes and signs with the parties to the
transaction. So for example, in 2019 there were 231 transactions investigated by
CFIUS. Only one was blocked, but 28 or more than 10% were allowed to proceed
after the committee reached an agreement with the parties to mitigate
outstanding national security concerns. The mitigation we reach with parties can
take a number of different forms. For example, it can be ensuring that only
authorized persons at the companies have access to certain sensitive technologies.
It can be the establishment of a binding agreement governing contracts to provide
goods or services to the United States government, what we call a supply
assurance agreement to ensure that we do not have an interrupted supply of those
goods from a particular company. It could be prohibiting the transfer of certain
technologies or intellectual property, or it can in cases be the carving out of
certain assets of the targeted company for divestiture so that they are not
transferred to the acquiring company. These measures are crafted on a
transaction-specific basis to mitigate the particular harms that a transaction
poses. They are tailored to the harm posed by that transaction. CFIUS has a
monitoring capacity that allows the team to ensure that all of the mitigation
measures we put in place are scrupulously adhered to. With all that said, the vast
majority of the transactions we review are not problematic, and they are
approved quickly by the committee. Those that present continuing threats that the
parties cannot or will not mitigate through agreement with the government
are referred to the President of the United States, who may block their
consummation. Each transaction is different, and each implicates the interests
and expertise of different agencies within our executive branch, all of whom are
around the table for these discussions. On deals involving technologies with
military uses, for example, the Department of Defense may be a critical player in
discussions. On deals involving critical infrastructure, the Department of Homeland
Security may play a central role. On deals involving pharmaceutical or chemical
manufacturing or medical device production, the key agencies might be the
Department of Commerce or Agriculture or even the Department of Health and Human
Services, which is not normally a member of the committee, but we can bring into
the committee's considerations where the expertise of a particular agency is
necessary. All of these agencies have CFIUS units embedded in them, some of them
larger than others. Treasury's is by far the largest because of the chairmanship
of the committee, but they each have an expertise within them, resident within
them, to review particular transactions that are of interest to them. Thus, the
CFIUS process is flexible enough to bring a wide variety of investment targets
within its remit, in each case bring relevant experience to bear on those
transactions. Now, we all know that committees by their nature are unwieldy
and can be quite slow, much slower often than a single actor, but using a
committee in the United States is how we ensure that the relevant experts are at
the table for each of these transaction reviews. We recognize that that has the
potential to make the review process long, and so in an effort to discipline
ourselves, we have a series of deadlines to ensure we accomplish timely action in
reviewing these transactions. Each transaction review starts with a notice
from the parties that they are about to conduct a transaction. The CFIUS team
then has 45 days to investigate, to review whether the transaction needs
further investigation. If it does, then there's a 45-day investigation period
during which there's intensive interaction with the parties to get the
information necessary to determine whether there is a national security
threat, and after that pair of 45-day periods, if the CFIUS committee
determines that there is a threat that justifies taking a transaction to the
president and mitigation cannot be achieved, the president then has 15 days
in which to act to block the transaction or not do so. We think these deadlines
strike a reasonable balance between moving quickly in a way that's
commercially viable and nonetheless doing a thorough and thoughtful review
of the national security aspects of a particular transaction and poses. We
always strive to act within these deadlines. There are times when a
particularly complex transaction will require extensions, but it is always our
goal to act within the deadlines. One of the lessons of modern policymaking is, of
course, that no tool is perfect forever, and we must always be aware of the way
in which the problems we are attempting to solve adapt to the measures that we
have put in place to solve them or evade those measures. Investment screening in
this regard is no different. Decades of experience with CFIUS have given
American policymakers a clear view of which investments have adapted to
evade CFIUS effects and the areas in which CFIUS could or should be amended
or improved. As a result, the most expansive reforms in CFIUS's four-decade
history were enacted in August of 2008 in the Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act, which we affectionately call FIRMA, and Congressman
Pittenger was a key architect of this work. These reforms were fully in place
as of February of last year, 2020, when the extensive regulatory revisions we
had to put in place to make the law effective were finally in
place. With FIRMA, Congress expanded our investment security screening
authorities to better address national security concerns arising from
transaction forms that were previously outside our jurisdiction. In particular,
CFIUS had previously reviewed only transactions that conferred control of
the target company. We found that some investors were structuring transactions
that didn't confer control, but did confer the sort of rights that posed
exactly the same national security concerns as a control transaction would
have, but managed to skirt CFIUS's jurisdictional boundaries. For example, a
transaction might be structured so the investment didn't confer control of the
target company, but did give the investing company access to or control
over critical technologies that the target company manufactures. With FIRMA,
we closed that loophole in very sensitive areas. We can now review
certain non-controlling transactions that would provide a foreign acquirer
rights, access, or involvement in a U.S. business involved in critical
technologies, critical infrastructure, or sensitive personal data of American
citizens. Additionally, Congress closed the loophole in CFIUS's jurisdiction by
permitting review of certain transactions involving real estate that was
proximate to military institutions, so we're no longer allowing our adversaries
to buy purchase from which to spy on our military. At the same time CFIUS's
jurisdiction was expanded, it gained greater resources and staff to
proactively identify transactions that might be subject to CFIUS, but where the
parties did not notify us of the existence of the transaction, which was
always a concern of ours that we wouldn't be notified of a transaction,
we'd learn of it only after the damage had already been done. And we developed a
process for short-form filings to allow, to expedite the process for certain
forms of transactions. So expanded jurisdiction, expanded surveillance
authorities, and more robust processes, all of which required substantial
expansion of the staff and resources we dedicate to CFIUS, and we implemented
that expansion over a two-year period after the passage of the reform
legislation during a time of intense programmatic activity for the CFIUS team.
We couldn't stop and do the reforms while not approving transactions, so at
the same time we had an increased pace of transaction, we were
implementing the reforms. My friend and former colleague Tommy Fetto recently
provided some data on CFIUS's functioning in a Wall Street Journal
column. Between the passage of FIRRMA and the end of the Trump administration,
CFIUS reviewed transactions valued at more than $400 billion. In 2019, we
reviewed five times as many transactions as CFIUS had reviewed in 2009, so a
massive increase in just 10 years. More transactions were blocked in the
past four years than had been blocked in the entire history of the committee,
still not a large number, but a meaningful change in the posture of the
committee. So we're proud of the health and the strength and the vigor of our
investment security screening regime. It's as effective and well-resourced as
it's ever been, but that said, we'd be foolish to think that our work is done. I
want to identify at least two significant challenges that we confront.
First is international coordination. In an interconnected world where data and
technologies are often shared among like-minded countries, we can't afford
weak links in our screening process in any country. That's why after the reform
legislation was passed, our Treasury team consulted with scores of foreign
partners to assist them in establishing and maintaining their own rigorous
investment screening regimes, and we're seeing real improvements in a number of
countries. Our Treasury team could be counted on to provide unvarnished advice
to our foreign partners from our four decades of experience on both best
practices to be adopted and stumbles to be avoided. As the digitization of the
economy accelerates, as information becomes even more central to our
economic success, and as cross-border data flows multiply, it'll be all the
more important for like-minded countries with market economies and open
investment environments to coordinate closely on investment screening. We'll be
sharing lessons learned and best practices, but we also need to work on a
more tactical level to identify trends and patterns and novel threats in
cross-border investment activity. International coordination on investment
security is as active and dynamic as it's ever been, but we must nonetheless
redouble our efforts to ensure bad actors can't exploit any lack of
coordination. So for those of you who are interested in this topic, I would urge
you to contact the team currently at the US Treasury if you have questions or
thoughts or want to talk through some of these issues. Second and greater
challenge we face in this space is the evolving threat environment. In that
regard, there are two different forces at work. One is a change in our
adversaries' tactics. The other is a change in their goals. Regarding tactics, start
with the premise that our investment security screening regime is very
effective at what it does, which is to say it's very effective at deal-by-deal
transaction analysis for transactions that fall within its jurisdiction. It's
good at finding irremediable threats from particular transactions, but that
means that CFIUS jurisdiction is defined by the transactions it reviews, not
necessarily by the threats it's designed to thwart. So the more effective our
screening mechanism is, the more effective it is at finding and rooting
out those problematic transactions, the more incentive our adversaries have to
achieve their goals through means that fall outside CFIUS's jurisdiction. For
example, I'm confident that CFIUS would look poorly on a transaction in which a
Chinese acquirer acquired an American company that held massive quantities of
sensitive personal data about Americans. But what about a Chinese company that
built an app that was downloaded off the app store in your phone in your country
and collected that data without acquisition of an American company? That
sounds familiar to all of us, and that's not necessarily a transaction that falls
within CFIUS's jurisdiction. Similarly, the Chinese company could buy access to
that data without ever conducting a corporate control or non-control
transaction. Similarly, one could assume that CFIUS would disfavor a transaction
in which an acquirer from a hostile power acquired a particularly sensitive
technology through acquisition of an American company, but if they merely
licensed that technology or found other ways to get access to it, that may not be
a transaction within our investment security mechanism's jurisdiction. You
could spin out limitless hypotheticals of this sort. Each one presents a threat,
and in each instance, our adversaries have every incentive to structure those
transactions in ways that evade our screening mechanism's jurisdiction.
That's their tactics. Now let's talk about their goals. Keep in mind that the
digital transformation I referenced earlier and the ease of collecting and
exporting data as described in the hypothetical I just referenced is changing
the nature of our economies quite thoroughly. Many of the national security
threats of today don't require ownership of U.S. companies or U.S.-developed
technologies, companies or technologies developed in your countries. They don't
require physical presence in the United States or like-minded countries. They
don't require traditional debt or equity investments in American companies or
companies from your countries. They don't require transactions that are structured
in ways that trip the jurisdictional tripwire we use for investment screening.
These rising threats don't require ownership of sensitive data or
technologies. They merely require access to sensitive data and technologies. And
compounding this complexity, there is no international agreed framework for data
governance. My friend Dan Price, who's known to many of you, has argued that we
need an international body to coordinate international standards for data
governance, much as the Financial Stability Board does coordination for
financial stability measures. But for the foreseeable future, there will be no
international agreement on that topic. So that state of affairs leaves the
possession of much sensitive data to the whims of commercial actors, as long as
they structure their acquisition of that data in a way that doesn't trip our
jurisdictional tripwire for investment screening and avoids certain export
control regimes. To address these sorts of adversarial tactics and this sort of
evolving digitized vulnerability, it's vital to recognize that our investment
screening process is just one part of an integrated suite of tools of economic
statecraft, all of which serve to protect our national security and secure our
foreign policy objectives. This suite includes CFIUS and other investment
screening mechanisms that countries deploy, but it also includes sanctions
and AML and CFT, as we've been discussing at this conference, export
controls, blacklisting, entity listings, etc. And while our investment screening
mechanism is as strong and effective now as it's ever been, neither investment
screening nor any other tool of economic statecraft is infinitely flexible. Where
the threat of adversarial foreign investment comes in a form that doesn't
fit easily into our investment screening mechanism, it's prudent to look for other
means by which to combat that harm, such as the use of export controls and entity
listings. Even considering the full suite of tools of economic statecraft at our
disposal, there are inevitably threats that fall beyond the jurisdiction or
capability of those tools, as we've traditionally understood them. So strong
as they are, our current set of tools does not address the full panoply of
threats that might be grouped under the rubric adversarial foreign investment.
That means that at times we must stretch our authorities to reach novel threats, so
long as we do so within the bounds of the law. At other times we must seek
modifications of our current authorities to reach new threats, as the
prior U.S. administration did in seeking reforms to CFIUS's jurisdiction and
procedures to make them more fit for purpose. And even then, at times we'll
inevitably find threats that are not well addressed by our current suite of
tools. They call for creative thinking about new tools to develop, enact into
law, and deploy, bring to bear, to secure ourselves against adversarial foreign
investments and other threats. To make these sorts of analyses, we need clear
thinking, we need gap analysis to determine, to map our authorities against
the threats they're designed to thwart, and figure out where our current tools
are less effective than we would like them to be, and work to remedy those gaps.
In making that determination, the real challenge is striking the right balance
to preserve both an open investment environment and our nation's national
security, our respective nation's national security. We need a rigorous
approach to that gap analysis to determine what tools to deploy. At the
same time, we need to respect and maintain the open investment
environments that power economic growth in each of our countries. Striking that
balance will require prudence, vigilance, and creative thinking, and it will also
require the international collaboration that events such as this one represent.
Thanks very much. Muchas gracias.
