Trade-Based Money Laundering- Mr. Tom Cardamone

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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Mar 4, 2026
23rd Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
Washington, D.C🇺🇸- December 6-7, 2022
-Mr. Tom Cardamone
Director of Global Financial Integrity (GFI)
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Good morning.
I want to thank Congressman Pittenger and Senator Cassidy and their staffs for
putting on this conference and for the invitation to be with you today.
As we've heard, trade-based money laundering is a seemingly intractable problem.
Illicit money is easy to convert into everyday products,
such as televisions, clothing, and other goods
that do not raise suspicions from border protection or customs authorities.
Two years ago, Global Financial Integrity did an in-depth study of financial crime in Latin America and the Caribbean.
We interviewed 250 subject matter experts, and
we found that trade-based money laundering was one of the top three concerns they had in the financial crime area.
So this is certainly an area of concern, not only in Latin America and the Caribbean, but across the globe.
What I want to talk to you about today is the role that international trade and
global commercial shipping industry plays in the moving, hiding, and
laundering of illicit money.
I'm going to give you a few statistics, hopefully not too many, and
talk about actionable steps that can be taken by the international community.
Essentially, a plan of action that countries around the world and
multilateral institutions can implement to try to attack this problem.
Speak to any economist at any development agency, and you'll hear a common refrain,
which is that global trade is the lifeblood of developing country economies,
of any economy, essentially, and it's absolutely correct.
Without global trade, its annual trade in goods is about $22 trillion a year.
Without that interaction of goods, economies would collapse.
But global trade can also help launder the proceeds and deliver all manner of illicit goods or
legitimate goods that were obtained illegally, and in that case, we're thinking about illegal fishing,
illegal mining, timber extraction, and any developing country
that relies on income from those industries
is certainly undermined, their economies are undermined when those goods are stolen and sold illegally.
Now, for some numbers.
Each year, the value gap in international trade, trade misinvoicing,
this is when the value on goods invoices
is misrepresented to evade taxes, to evade customs duties, is $800 billion a year.
This is easy to do.
There is no information that goes from an exporting customs department to an importing customs department.
There's this gap.
There's this sort of black box of information that makes this a very simple process to do.
The annual value of illicit trade is close to $2 trillion a year.
This includes not only things you would think of immediately, narcotics,
weapons, and other things that are illegal, but the legal goods as well.
Counterfeit manufacturing of all types of products, handbags, sunglasses, medicines.
So that whole range of products is $2 trillion a year.
And the IMF estimates that annual money laundering is somewhere between $1.6 and $4 trillion a year.
It's a big gap, understandably, as it is difficult to account for.
But trade-based money laundering is a major component of that.
This is also a sort of pernicious problem,
since there are no data to suggest that these figures have peaked.
And they certainly have not reduced in any identifiable way.
So it's important to note that while 90% of global trade is delivered by ship,
30% of the global commercial shipping fleet,
some 29,000 tankers, container ships, cargo ships,
fishing vessels, fly flags of convenience.
These are countries that provide flags to commercial ships.
You do not have to be a resident of that particular country.
They tend to provide low tax, low regulation, but
also opacity and ownership.
So if any ship is connected to any illicit activity, the actual flesh and
blood person who owns that company, who controls the activities of that ship, is completely unknown.
Recently, GFI did a research project to see if we could connect ships,
flying flags of convenience, to the interdiction of illicit trade in the United States.
Of the 170 cases we could find, only 28 of those reported by law enforcement
connected a particular ship to a particular interdiction.
So while this is a very small data set, we did find that half of them, half of those 28, were flying flags of convenience.
So we have approached Customs and
Border Protection, with the help of Senator Cassidy's staff,
to try to get some additional information to see if we can put some real solid
analysis on the figures to see just how often flags of convenience
are associated with illegal trade and potentially trade-based money laundering.
The global shipping industry is so opaque that it was completely exempted from
the OECD's 15% minimum global tax agreement of about a year ago.
And that was because the OECD said it was too difficult to determine where shipping companies were actually located.
So what we're facing is a convergence of several different factors.
Massive amounts of illicit trade, opacity in
a large amount of commercial ship ownership,
a lack of trade data exchanged between customs authorities from country to country.
While at the same time there are 5,000 free trade zones around the world,
with another 1,000 on the drawing boards.
Many of these are operated with very little transparency or accountability.
And they can be places to launder funds or tranship illicit cargo with absolutely no oversight.
In addition, ship's crews can turn off their global positioning systems
in order to go dark and evade sanctions of all types.
Think of North Korea, Iran, Russia.
The way these countries get around global sanctions with their trade is because
ships can actually go dark simply by flipping a switch.
So this has led to, essentially, a global trading system that is opaque in many areas and
which facilitates all types of illicit activity.
As a result, transnational organized crime organizations,
non-state actors, drug cartels, and terrorist groups can use the international
trading system for illicit purposes, essentially with impunity.
The current response to this problem has been one of dedication and hard work, but
law enforcement is being overwhelmed by the sheer volume of illicit trade.
The effort to interdict this trade is not being done at a scale that will dissuade,
deter, or disrupt criminal organizations from using this international
trading system to launder money and move illicit proceeds, which leads to
the following recommendations that I provide for your assessment.
First would be a global beneficial ownership registry specifically for commercial shipping.
As you may know, 100 plus countries have said that they will
implement a beneficial ownership registry for companies operating in their countries.
This is a tremendous show of political will over the last five years or
so to try to get at anonymous shell companies that launder funds of all types.
We believe that a separate registry should be just for global shipping,
regardless of any country registry that may be in place or soon will be implemented.
This is a way to highlight the individuals that own companies involved in global shipping.
Second would be the use of blockchain technology in all ports
as a way to automatically and securely transfer trade information from an exporting country to an importing country.
By having that information, the importing customs department can easily identify
when the value on import invoices has been manipulated
in a way that would likely move money illicitly in or out of the country.
A global law enforcement database, perhaps operated by Interpol,
that would be a free exchange of information among law enforcement on trade-based money laundering cases.
And a renewed push for acceptance of the WTO's
Kyoto Convention on Free Trade Zones, which essentially says
the local customs department of the country where the zone is located should have complete,
full access to that zone, and there should be no opacity whatsoever and full accountability of what happens there.
What must be, if a customs department cannot identify who actually owns the ship,
they'll probably have great difficulty to understand what's on the ship.
And knowing what's on the ship is critically important for port security, for national security.
Not only can those goods be illicit, they can actually be deadly.
What must be kept in mind is that transnational organized crime is a global business, so
this is going to require a multilateral approach, a global approach of leaders from around the world.
Senator Cassidy is a leader here on trade-based money laundering, and
I hope some of you can take up this issue in your countries as well.
Thanks very much.
