What is Truth?

Truth exists
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If I had to name the single most frustrating aspect of modern popular debate,
it would definitely have to be the openly adversarial nature on which it all appears to
operate. Rather than work together on building a better understanding of our world, we instead
seem to be more focused on scoring philosophical points against the opposition. Oftentimes,
this might even be by design, like in a courtroom setting where both advocates must dogmatically
argue on behalf of their client's best interests. The rest of the time, however, it seems to just
happen spontaneously, as if no one really knows what the rules are when engaging in this process.
That's why so much philosophical debate in our world feels a lot like trying to play a game of
chess against an opponent who thinks that this is supposed to be checkers.
Without some formal agreement over what truth is and how to recognize truth when we see it,
then there's simply no way to productively engage with opposing points of view.
To me, this presents a very strong incentive to just sit down and summarily examine the question
of what is truth. Because in the context of philosophical and mathematical logic,
there are actually very well-established answers to this question. It's just that you wouldn't
really know about it because no one ever seems capable of spelling them all out within a single
comprehensive reference. That's why I feel personally motivated to present my findings
on this issue. It's a perfect opportunity to explicitly lay the foundations of basic epistemology
for everyone to see, such that we can finally begin to hold each other accountable to a more
rigorous set of philosophical rules. To begin, it's important to understand
that anytime we talk about a thing like truth, we are not talking about some intrinsic,
metaphysical quality of reality itself. Technically, what we're really talking about
is a property of propositions. That is to say, propositions can either be true or they can be
false, but there is no such thing as raw essence of truth interwoven into the fabric of space and
time. Speaking more formally, a truth value is classically defined as a member of a binary set
that contains the elements true and false. The purpose of this set is to serve as a kind of
marker for linguistic propositions in order to help us measure their epistemic correctness.
What exactly that means is open to some interpretation, but we can give it a rigorous
definition through a mechanism known as a truth assignment. Speaking formally again,
a truth assignment is defined as a mapping function between the set of simple linguistic
propositions and the set of binary truth values. If that sounds a bit technical at first, then just
think of it like this. Imagine me writing down a simple proposition on a post-it note and placing
it in front of you. In your left hand is a giant rubber stamp that says true, while in your right
hand is another giant rubber stamp that says false. Your job is to decide which label deserves
to be stamped on this note. So ask yourself, how do you go about doing that? Do you just arbitrarily
stamp things randomly, or do you apply some set of rules that give your labels a more significant
meaning? Whatever answer you give to this question is effectively your truth assignment function.
It's an algorithm that takes simple linguistic propositions as an input and then determines a
binary truth value as the output. Now let's take it one step further. Suppose you've stamped a
dozen or so of these post-it notes with truth values when suddenly you feel like connecting
them together into more complex arrangements. For example, maybe you think that two true
propositions connected left to right should also be stamped with a value of true, or maybe you
think two false propositions connected top to bottom should always be false. Maybe you think
propositions stamped with true on the top should all be stamped with false on the bottom and vice
versa. These are all perfectly valid operations and represent the role of logical connectives
contained within the scope of propositional logic. We like using logical connectives because they
allow us to literally connect propositions together, thereby creating more interesting
propositional formulas. Notice also how there's nothing physically forcing us to stick with only
a binary set of truth values. For example, maybe you think truth would make way more sense if we
used a ternary set of values rather than a binary. It's a perfectly valid conception that's even used
in practice today by scientists, engineers, and mathematicians. Some systems of logic will even
treat truth as a continuum value rather than a discrete set, and again find use in modern
scientific applications. There is no objectively right or wrong answer except for the collective
say-so of human philosophers in our ultimate quest for a meaningful conception of truth.
This is all pretty standard material so far, and can readily be verified in most relevant
textbooks on the subject. However, something you generally won't find is an official stance over
the precise nature of an ideal truth assignment. It's as if we're all experts at manipulating truth
values once we have them, but nobody knows how to go about assigning those actual truth values in
the first place. That's a real shame, too, because this issue represents the heart of what an idea
like truth is supposed to philosophically encapsulate. At best, we only seem to have
this vague notion that truth should, in some way or another, represent a kind of correspondence
between the set of linguistic propositions and the factual state of affairs in objective reality.
True propositions are those which effectively describe the real world as it really is,
while false propositions do not. This is a fairly common epistemic concept that philosophers have
aptly named the correspondence theory of truth, and at first glance it does seem to be a pretty
intuitive definition. Unfortunately, there's also a glaring hole in this idea that needs to be
addressed. Namely, what exactly is this correspondence thing you speak of, and how
do I recognize it when I see it? For example, consider a simple linguistic proposition like
the moon is round. Is that true or is that false? Because according to correspondence theory, the
best that we can say is that if the moon is round, then it is true that the moon is round. Since
that's obviously just a vapid tautology, correspondence theory of truth hasn't really
told me anything about how to assign truth to propositions. But let's take it even further.
What if I stand outside one evening and simply look at the moon directly with my own eyes? That
way, if I see a generally roundish object, then I can legitimately say that the moon is round, right?
Well, no. For example, what if there is some kind of optical illusion brought on by the atmosphere
that makes squarish things simply appear round? Or what if I'm just looking at a giant photograph
of the moon, or maybe some elaborate hologram? Maybe it's all just an hallucination brought on
by drugs, or perhaps a really vivid lucid dream. Maybe I'm being tricked by a magical demon,
or maybe I'm really just a brain in a vat plugged into some kind of matrix simulation.
I simply do not know. And what's more, I can't know. No amount of reason or evidence can ever
allow me to perfectly determine objective reality as it really is. Correspondence theory of truth
is therefore useless because it offers no way to differentiate between all of these competing
scenarios. So if we're ever going to make any progress in building a viable epistemology,
then we need to operate under the basic constraints that nature has given us.
This is a fundamental philosophical concept known as the egocentric position, or equivalently,
the problem of external world skepticism. And all it says is that for whatever sensory perception
you may be experiencing at any given moment, there are limitless ad hoc explanations for
what might be causing it. Remember that I'm just a sentient agent trapped within my immediate mental
awareness. It's not like I can just crawl out of that awareness and directly perceive reality as
it really is. And even if I could, how exactly would I correspond linguistic propositions to
those objective states? What are the rules I have to follow, and how do I apply them?
We simply cannot ignore the fundamental barriers that exist between reality, our perceptions of
reality, and then our linguistic frameworks for describing reality. This is the part where many
philosophers really begin to butt heads with each other, but there are at least a few general
principles that most people do tend to agree on. For example, one theory of truth that has great
utility is known as the principle of mental incorrigibility, or simply empiricism. All this
says is that any honest statement of immediate sensory perception is automatically a true
proposition. For example, consider a simple proposition like, I feel pain in my left foot.
Even if it turns out to be a complete illusion, like maybe an amputee with a bad case of phantom
limb syndrome, I still cannot deny the fact that I am definitely experiencing a distinct sensory
perception that is unique from many others. It therefore seems perfectly reasonable to just
acknowledge our perceptual data for what it is, designate those experiences with linguistic markers,
and then assign a basic truth value to such propositions accordingly. Another popular system
for assigning truth to propositions is called the axiomatic approach, or for the sake of this
discussion, rationalism. Basically, all this system says is that certain obvious propositions called
axioms deserve a specific truth value by rote fiat. For example, take the reflexive law of equality,
A equals A. No one derived this proposition from any prior logical framework, nor was it empirically
discovered hiding under some rock. It was just asserted outright as true because mathematicians
needed a concept of equality from which to build a working system of algebra. Once we finally settle
on an agreeable set of axioms, it then becomes possible to generate new true propositions out of
the old ones by exercising what are called rules of inference. For example, one classic rule of
inference is the transitive law of equality. If A equals B and B equals C, then A equals C. Again,
no one derived this rule from any deeper foundations, nor was it empirically discovered.
It was just asserted outright as a thing we're allowed to do with the concept of numerical
equality while still maintaining truth. Any new propositions generated in such a fashion are then
called theorems and represent the core driver behind all propositional and mathematical logic.
This might feel like strangely circular reasoning at first glance, and in all fairness, it kind of
is. However, contrary to popular misconceptions, axiomatic systems like math and logic make no
effort to describe any objective sense of mind-independent reality. Rather, a far better
way to think of such systems is as a kind of highly formalized language. Good axiomatic assertions are
therefore not really circular so much as they are definitional. That's why all logical and
mathematical theorems are said to be analytic in nature. Such truths are ultimately derived
entirely from the raw meaning that we impose on the terms themselves and not from any direct
connection they may have to the external world. One could even argue that this makes analytic
propositions a kind of formal extension on the incorrigible since anyone is internally free to
define their own personal vocabulary however they like. But what about the so-called synthetic
propositions that actually do attempt to describe objective reality? That is to say, the world out
there beyond purely mental processes. For example, consider a proposition like
all bachelors are bald or maybe all dogs live on earth. How do I assign truth to propositions in
this category? Again, it's not like I can just pop open a can of reality and directly observe the
facts of the matter beyond my senses, nor can I logically derive their truth from any assigned
meaning to the words themselves. So what do we do? This is the part where things can get very
confusing, partly because there are so many oddball truth assignments to choose from and no
real official answers to turn to. For example, suppose we decide to assign truth to propositions
that merely reinforce our sense of personal identity or social status. Let's call this
egotistical validation. Granted, it might not be a very good system, but it's still a perfectly
valid function that operates under well-defined rules. Maybe you've even encountered this system
yourself, like in religious or political discussions where personal emotions tend to run
very high. Another interesting class of synthetic truth assignment is called Biblical Inerrancy and
simply says that no true proposition can ever contradict the records contained within the
Holy Christian Bible. It's actually a fairly common truth assignment typically emerging
from religious fundamentalist organizations. Truth, in their view, is basically whatever the Bible
says it is. So while it again may be tempting to criticize the implicit goals contained within
such a definition, it is hard to ignore the clear, meaningful distinction it represents.
But let's face facts. Those truth assignments are obviously arbitrary and completely unsatisfying
because they make no effort to philosophically connect our beliefs with some objective sense
of mind-independent reality. Unless we can find a way to overcome the egocentric position imposed
on us by nature, then no system of truth assignment will ever have any meaningful sense of
merit. That's why so much of the philosophical debate in our world appears to be so pointless.
Most truth assignment functions utilized in practice are either needlessly arbitrary,
brazenly self-serving, or deliberately obtuse. To address this problem, I find that it helps to step
and ask ourselves a fundamental question about truth that surprisingly few philosophers ever
seem to ask. Namely, why is it so goddamned important to believe in as many true propositions
as possible while simultaneously rejecting as many of the false? What difference does it make
at the end of the day? For instance, consider a possible world where everything I believe
about the universe just so happens to be categorically false. However, every single time
I make a decision based off those beliefs, the consequences are maximally predictable and
desirable for me anyway. Likewise, any time I commit a single true belief to action, the outcome
is never predictable or desirable for me at all. Now, let's ask ourselves, given such a world,
is it even meaningful to call any of my beliefs false? And if so, why would I ever want to believe
anything that was true? I could spend my entire life being completely wrong about absolutely
everything and actually be better off for it. This simple thought experiment represents the
core principle behind a system of truth assignment generally known as pragmatism. All this system has
to say is that the only meaningful reason why anyone would ever bother believing anything at
all is so that we can eventually use that information as a guide for our actions. Decisions
based on true beliefs will therefore manifest themselves in the form of controlled, predictable
experiences, while decisions based on false beliefs will eventually fail in that goal. Any
beliefs that refuse to drive any actions whatsoever, even in principle, are thus effectively
reduced to useless rhetorical gibberish. To illustrate how this system might work in practice,
simply imagine yourself standing at a busy intersection when suddenly you decide that
you'd like to walk across to the other side. Sure, you can axiomatically declare premises
and logically deduce conclusions all you want, but sooner or later you're going to have to
translate that information into a real, committed action. So while you may think you're being very
clever with all your intellectual presumptions and sophisticated rhetoric, I have yet to encounter
a single philosopher who could successfully argue with a speeding bus. Everyone, everywhere, is
therefore universally bound to the same pragmatic process in their daily epistemology. We collect
empirical data, we formulate it as a rationally descriptive model of objective reality, we
exercise decisions accordingly, and then we empirically observe the outcome. If our understanding
of traffic behavior is indeed true, then we can expect to safely cross the street without incident.
However, if our model contains flaws or inconsistencies, then it's only a matter of time
before we eventually find ourselves getting plowed by oncoming traffic. This is what makes
pragmatism the only epistemology with any viable sense of connection to the external world beyond
our senses. Because even if my entire reality is little more than a glorified matrix simulation or
demon spawn hallucination, then even that reality is still objectively real and apparently operating
in accordance with causally predictive patterns. So if, on the off chance that my actions have any
influence on the outcome of future events, then I can use those outcomes to gain real information
about the rules governing my reality. Beliefs drive actions, actions have consequences, and
consequences are objective. We can give this process a nice technical sounding name like maybe
Pragmatic Empirical Rationalism, but really it's all just a glorified way of saying science.
Because really that's all science fundamentally boils down to. A formalized system of gathering
empirical data, expressing it within a rational predictive framework, and then testing those
predictions against quantifiable actions and consequences. We like basing our beliefs on
scientific methods because it ultimately allows us to make real decisions in the real world
with real empirical consequences. Mental incorrigibility and axiomatic formalism are not
mere ends unto themselves, but essential tools for the greater purpose of pragmatically navigating
the world. Notice also how the pragmatic framework implicitly captures many other familiar principles
of both science and scientific method. For example, consider the principle of fallibilism,
which simply states that no synthetic propositional model can ever be assigned a
value of true with any kind of perfect universal certainty. At best, we only know what to expect
from such models if and when we ever happen to find them. Consequently, all knowledge claims
about objective reality must always remain open to possible revision when faced with the prospect
of newer and better information. Likewise, the principle of falsifiability states that we can
indeed be perfectly confident when assigning certain models a value of false. That's because
the very definition of a false propositional model is one whose empirical predictions fail
to come to pass. We can even use pragmatism to quantify the principle of Occam's razor.
Given two propositional models that happen to make perfectly equivalent predictions,
then the model containing fewer assumptions is automatically preferable. After all, if both
models are empirically equivalent either way, then you might as well just go with the one that
takes less work to think about. But hey, maybe that's being too presumptuous. Maybe you think
pragmatism is a terrible principle of truth assignment and that we should all replace it
with some higher form of understanding. But let's be clear about what that entails. Without some
ultimately pragmatic purpose by which to measure our beliefs, then they're effectively disconnected
from any empirically predictive decision we could ever hope to make. I could therefore
openly concede every last proposition you have to say about reality, and literally nothing in my
life would ever have to change as a result. That's why no one cares how many angels can
dance on the head of a pin. Any answer we give is necessarily going to be trivial and vacuous.
We do, however, care a great deal about what medicines work best for treating
cancer and why. That's because any decisions we might hope to make on the subject are
necessarily dependent on the final answers we give. So unless your truth assignment can somehow
facilitate my desire to solve actual problems and reliably predict the outcomes of my actions,
then by definition and admission, it is irrelevant and worthless. Pragmatic
scientific method therefore is the ultimate measure of all philosophical truth.
