CHINA COMPETITION- Mr. Robert Daly

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
3 followers
Feb 26, 2026
27th Parliamentary Intelligence- Security Forum
Washington, D.C🇺🇸- December 4-5, 2024
-Mr. Robert Daly
Director of the Wilson Center's Kissinger Institute on China and the United States
Thank you.
I know it's at the end of a long two days.
This is a panel on the nature of competition with China.
And I would posit that the heart of the competition with China
is, as has been suggested earlier,
about shaping global order.
About what sorts of values, what sorts of systems
are going to underlie the international institutions.
The standards, can't overemphasize that one enough.
And the various regimes, the ways
that we communicate with each other.
World order.
And I want to talk about China and world order.
Its vision for world order, and then a quick critique of it.
Before that, I want to give a Chinese point of view.
You've been hearing China characterized a good deal
today, and I spend a lot of time in China.
I was just there for a month.
I've lived there for 12 years.
And I'm envisioning all of my friends
and my non-friends in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
heads exploding as they listen to all of this.
And I'd like to give a partial explanation for the way
they would see things.
I think it's important that we understand that.
That we understand that China, despite all
of the very negative and almost entirely true things
you've heard about China today, China actually
has its own virtue narrative.
Its legitimacy derives from a virtue narrative,
which is ancient, and which they see
continuing to the present day.
And when you ask China what it wants,
and I'm taking this from several conversations
that Foreign Minister Wang Yi has had,
including with the Deputy Secretary of State,
China begins by talking about its rights.
And this is an interesting, I think, illegitimate discourse.
China says, first, that it has a right to sovereignty,
including a right to decide its own mode of governance.
Now, there's a question here about the agent of decision,
but leave that aside for a minute.
China says we have a right to sovereignty and a right
to make up our own mind.
We have a right to development.
We have a right to human flourishing.
And China, no matter how it is governed,
must import large amounts of energy, raw materials,
and food.
It must have access to foreign markets.
It must participate in global debates and global ideas.
We have a right to development.
We have a right to take responsibility
for our own security.
We have a right to security, especially
in the Indo-Pacific region.
And we have a right, one fifth of humankind,
the second wealthiest country, to participate
in shaping global order.
This is what China would say.
This is what they do say.
And I think that, so far, that is natural.
China says, furthermore, what we are doing,
you accuse us of wanting to dominate the world.
We, China, are doing what any country would do.
Most notably, we are doing what you, the United States,
has done.
We want to translate wealth into influence, wealth into power.
Any country that gets wealthy wants
to push its defensive perimeters outward.
America, they would say, you have
pushed your defensive perimeters so far outward
that they comprise the entire globe.
Any country would want to try to influence
the global environment in which it operates.
Now, I would say that all of this is true,
and again, theoretically, unobjectionable.
But the question is, how does China
want to shape that global environment?
China, like any other country, wants
a global order or global environment
whose principles of governance mimic, as closely as possible,
their domestic principles of governance
to maximize their own scope for action.
This is what they're looking for.
This is the question.
What kind of order does China want?
The American, at that point, Anglo-American poet P.S.
Eliot, at the beginning of World War II,
angered a lot of his English friends by saying,
you know, it's really not who wins, it's what wins.
What is it that China wants?
Well, I think we can know what China wants
by looking at its actions internationally
and also by looking at its domestic governance.
And internationally, we see China engaged,
well, first we should acknowledge
China is the world's biggest trading nation
and largest lending nation, and is providing
a lot of resources with a mixed record,
but is providing resources all over the world
and has helped other nations to flourish.
This has to be acknowledged.
Many mistakes, there's a very mixed record
with the Belt and Road Initiative,
but they're out there.
My friend Jorge Jaime, who was the Chilean ambassador
to Beijing, who, he and I disagree about many things
regarding China, he says, look,
they built the Santiago subway.
They did it, not you, them.
And many, many countries point to more and more
of these loans or trading benefits that China has provided.
So that must be acknowledged.
In addition to that, we see a massive military buildup
that includes nukes.
We're going for at least parity with us,
and then we have to assume they'll exceed that.
Cyber weapons, outer space weapons,
they're leading in hypersonic, so a major buildup there.
We see increasing provocations and attacks
on the Philippines and Vietnam,
other countries whose sovereignty is disrespected,
especially in the Western Pacific.
We see international economic coercion of Japan,
of the Philippines, of Korea, of Canada, of Australia,
of Lithuania, of Norway, the list goes on and on.
And we see China pushing for increased secrecy,
top-down modes of governance in international organizations
like the UN and others.
Domestically, what do we see?
Again, it must be acknowledged that we have seen
the greatest increase in human material wellbeing
in human history, 850 million people out of poverty,
a tremendous accomplishment,
and the foundation of a lot of China's virtual areas.
We do see that.
It must be acknowledged.
I can't speak to that when I'm gonna run.
What else do we see?
We see the building of the world's first surveillance state,
a move from gradually opening up authoritarianism
toward a form of techno-totalitarianism.
We see the suppression of any kind of dissent,
the suppression of minority peoples,
and we were talking about lawfare,
essentially a country that is building up a body of law
which is used to simply carry out the dicta
of the Chinese Communist Party.
We see an entirely undemocratic system in China
which must operate in secret.
And we see in China now a vision
of what China wants for global order.
What does China want for the Chinese people?
What does the Communist Party want for the Chinese people?
It wants them to be wealthy.
It wants them to be healthy, warm, well-housed.
It wants them to be technologically enabled.
It wants them to be relatively integrated internationally.
It wants them to be fashionable.
It wants them to be drivers of global taste.
It wants them to be well-educated.
It wants them to be entertained.
And it wants them to be genuinely satisfied,
genuinely happy, under the unquestioned yoke
of an all-controlling and eternal party.
That's the Chinese proposition.
We are homo economicus.
We are to be satisfied only with these material goods,
abundant material goods.
The basic idea is to lap off the top
of Maslow's hierarchy of needs.
This is China's offer.
So what are we to do in other countries around the world
when China does offer a lot of these major goods?
How are we to understand and interact
with this very difficult nation
which claims not to interfere
in other countries' internal affairs?
Isn't true, but it's a loud claim.
Which claims never to have invaded another country.
Again, not true, but they're nonetheless adamant
on this point.
Which claims to not want to export its ideology.
This is sort of true, right?
This is not the common turn under the Soviet Union.
China, in my view, and there'd be disagreement on this,
China's goal of its diplomacy
is to build deference through dependence.
Leverage its wealth to get more power.
But it's deference not dominance.
I hear a lot of my friends in Washington
saying China wants to rule the world.
No, they don't.
China doesn't care enough about the non-Chinese world
to want to rule it or to take on its problems.
It's very much for China.
Think of it as the world's largest self-licking ice cream.
So it wants to get all of the goods that it needs.
And if you provide those and you're a theocracy
or a democracy or a Buddhist kingdom,
China's really not concerned with that.
But there's a catch.
China wants what it wants from other countries.
Without obstacle and without objection.
These are always the terms of the Communist Party.
Without obstacle and without objection.
And that means that if another country,
if China sees it as benefiting
from its economic relationship with China,
then if that country wants to continue to benefit
and it has a free press, it must silence it,
at least with reference to China.
And if it has a vibrant civil society,
it must swelch it, at least with reference to China.
And this, the no obstacles, no objections clause,
becomes the second order export of an ideology,
of ideas about the relationship
between peoples and the state.
So in conclusion, China is a very frustrated superpower,
in some ways a fragile superpower,
which is still trying to figure out
how to wield its leverage.
Xi Jinping says that under his leadership,
China's moving toward center stage in world affairs.
That's true in many, many ways.
That's why we're here, that's what we're talking about.
China's problem is that China didn't build the stage.
The stage pre-existing, China's mounting of it.
And the global order that we have had since World War II
is broadly, not inconsistently, but broadly democratic.
Ideas are presented openly, debated openly,
refined openly, voted on openly.
This is all anathema to Chinese Communist Party government.
This can't be tolerated.
This is why China very rarely proposes any rules
in the form of a rule.
China says it doesn't want to overthrow the global order,
it wants to improve it.
But when you say, okay, well, what do you want?
Give us a rule in the form of a rule
that can be debated, that applies to everybody,
that's legitimate, China generally has nothing to say.
It doesn't propose rules, it creates conditions.
The signature move of China.
How do we deal with that?
Especially when China is building
the Santiago metro station and ports
and providing real goods to countries in the region very badly.
I would just, obviously it's a complicated subject,
but I would end exactly where you ended.
It's all about transparency.
This needs to be, our diplomacy needs to be
about transparency.
No more secret PRI memoranda, no secret base.
I think it's our single biggest tool, weapon against China
is an insistence on transparency.
But we have to also acknowledge that many other nations
see themselves getting benefits from China.
And merely saying, China bad, China bad, China bad,
if we don't provide options for infrastructure.
Five and a half years since we put Huawei on the internet,
major move, good move.
We didn't have a competitor to Huawei then,
we don't have one now.
And so we need to step up our game as well.
I'll stop there.
