Repo Market Stress Is Back And Bigger Than You Think

Financial Freedom
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While Blue Owl's blow-up exploded the private credit mess back into the mainstream with our
first confirmation of stage two behavior, there has been stress in the monetary system leading up
to it, including this past week a surge in borrowing at the Fed's repo facility, a whopping
30 billion dollars otherwise seemingly out of nowhere. But it wasn't out of nowhere and that's
not even the biggest part of this. Wait till you see what's going on with primary dealers and their
surge, absolute surge, in treasury holdings. If you recall the repo market was a mess and a big
one late last year though especially in December. It got to be disruptive enough the disorderly
conditions caused the Fed to restart its not QE QE. The FOMC directed the open market desk to
begin buying treasury bills again and if you weren't paying close attention that seemed to
be the entire end of it. Nope, not by a long shot. Even after the Fed came crawling back to balance
sheet expansion there have been consistent signs of building stresses even before we got to this
week. While repo fails may have tailed off in January thanks largely to the U.S. treasury,
not bank reserves, primary dealers they didn't see any reason to change their inventory strategy. Oh
no, dealers have been piling and I mean piling up holdings of coupons. A massive truly massive 28%
increase in treasury note and bond inventories since early December when the repo situation
really started to go awry. And as of the latest data for the previous week, meaning for February
11th, the week before Blue Owl and the repo borrowing from the Fed, dealer holdings had
surged to well above 400 billion for the first time ever. So dealers clearly think something's
got to give where it comes to money and collateral and really those are two sides of the same coin,
pun intended. Is it the further implications and consequences of private credit shifting into
stage two? Very likely. I mean after all, the FOMC, the FOMC in the meeting minutes that were
just released this past week, they're now talking about the risk of private credit. So Blue Owl is
just a reminder up front about what's been taking place in the back where primary dealers have been
loading up on the defensive. Now if you haven't seen the latest from our favorite Blue Hooter,
I did a 45-minute live video on Thursday going over the details and really the more important
implications. The short version is this, Blue Owl is being forced to sell some assets or in other
words, our first documented instance of stage two behavior. Now stage one, that's when the bubble
starts to reverse, money begins to flow out, but it's largely balanced by a combination of
still incoming investor inflows and some bank credit lines, though mostly the latter.
And Blue Owl made a splash earlier this year when it showed it had 2.4 billion in liquidity margin,
hoping to reassure investors the company's funds were solid enough to withstand basically anything.
And that almost certainly came from bank financing of some kind, but now the company announced it's
forced to sell assets, which indicates either that money's already been used up or the banks,
maybe they took it back or whatever the case. The banks don't appear to be offering the Owl
any more financing, which would also be consistent with stage two. And the difference
between stage one and stage two is when the outflows from these funds or even from banks,
in this case, the funds are shadow banks, the outflows are no longer matched by inflow. So
new investors dry up, more old investors ask for their money, and banks aren't as willing to step
up with the last minute funding. That seems to be Blue Owl this past week with its asset sale
as confirming stage two behavior, not stage two itself, but stage two behavior. The first time
we've seen that, plus the implication of banks being less willing as a possible further stage
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and now let's get back to it. And in the lead up to this week, there had been some developments on
the systemic side of things. You know, repo markets, wholesale flow, collateral constraint,
therefore cash constraint and tightening, suggesting that this isn't just coming someplace
out of the blue. Now it's not specifically related to Blue Owl or necessarily private credit, but
there were signs of growing concerns about, you know, macro, liquidity, the usual big picture stuff
that we focus on from the money dealer perspective. And one series that we watch rather closely
is the primary dealer, primary holdings of U.S. Treasury notes and bonds. And the reason we monitor
dealer holdings is that those tell us a lot about what dealers are thinking and more than what
they're thinking, what they're actually doing. We got to remember, dealers have a wealth of inside
information that we could only dream of getting access to. Not just about conditions in various
markets, you know, client flows, customer needs, changes in money behavior, changes in client flows
and customer needs. So in response to all that information, plus their own intelligence and needs,
these banks will load up on treasury assets when they perceive tougher conditions ahead, and that's
putting it kindly. It's specifically related to collateral, though not entirely. The dealers are
taking positions in collateral based on specific monetary views, as well as taking into account the
bigger picture background. They want to own more treasury assets for themselves. It's a defensive
posture. And if you think collateral flow is going to be constrained, you don't want to be subject to
the downside of being on the wrong side of diminished collateral flow. So buy the coupons
and get them in your inventory so you don't have to depend upon a constrained market for top quality
instruments, because the downside consequences can be expensive. Most of the time, though, for these
dealers, it's about taking advantage of the rest of the market, thinking that they're going to be
on the wrong side of the collateral difficulties. If flow does get constrained, market participants
are more likely to pay for the best quality collateral. So if you've already got it in your
inventory, then you can take advantage of that growing desperation by charging higher prices to
rent the treasury assets that you've already bought and owned. Either way, when we see dealers load up
on their inventories, it tells us the dealers are thinking monetary difficulties up ahead. And the
more they load up on inventories, just do the math here. Now I should point out, mainstream academia
and mainstream opinion on this subject likes to link dealer holdings to treasury rejection,
that nonsense. The argument from Zoltan and others, you know, the dealers are getting stuck
holding treasuries that they can't sell to the rest of the marketplace, especially as the government
keeps issuing more of them, the broker Uncle Sam gets. I mean, that part is true. Uncle Sam is the
most broke institution human beings have ever conceived of. However, this is all demonstrable
nonsense. It's totally false. Just look at treasury prices. There's absolutely nothing
to suggest that dealers are getting stuck with these bonds and these notes. If they didn't want
them, they could very easily sell the bonds and the notes into the marketplace. That means
rising dealer holdings are about market perceptions of money coming from all of
these other considerations, including blue owl and everything related to the to the owl.
But as I said in the intro, dealer holdings more recently have utterly exploded here. They were
already high to begin with, but this is something else. The last big surge was, not surprisingly,
back in November, December 2024, with the deflationary outbreak at that time, the tariff
chaos, if you will. From the end of October 24, all the way through February 2025, primary dealer
coupon holdings exploded by 75 percent, soaring from 181 billion to a then record high of 317
billion. And given what followed in terms of market disruption, disorder, general deflation,
all the big D's, you can see why dealers were piling up their inventories. They saw it coming,
even if they didn't know exactly what it would end up being. So inventories kept on rising,
though, after March and April, throughout the middle part of last year. Well, everyone kept
saying things were improving. Tariffs were the only problem. The economy would pick up second
half rebound. Primary dealers weren't seeing it. And as more confirmation of first flat beverage
and then cockroaches showed up starting around October, there was another big time pickup in
dealer holdings. But it really I mean, he really got going. No surprise. In early December,
from 313 billion in early November, surging by the middle of December, holdings kept hitting new high
after new high after new high. There were 356 billion by the week of Christmas, 372 billion by
mid-January. Even those I'll get to, the repo market seemed like it calmed down quite a lot
after December. But even if it did seem calmer in early January, dealers were only thinking it would
be a short run reprieve. The final week in January got to 388 billion, then 397 billion to start of
February before the latest number that we have, mid-February, the week prior to Blue Owl and the
repo borrowing from the Fed, which I'll get to in a second, 413 billion. Given that the yield curve
is bull steepening the entire time, it's pretty clear dealers are looking for more trouble and
collateral, therefore money. Big time trouble and collateral, therefore money. And so, of course,
during the final months of last year, starting around October, we also saw that kind of volatility
and disruption on the cash side. Things like repo rates, SOFR, as well as suddenly lots of
borrowing and activity from the Fed's repo facility. The repo market wasn't circulating cash like it had
been, leaving cash borrowers to have to go to the Fed for short-term funding. And this showed up in
as early as September, but October, as we remember, it really started to make an impact. So both SOFR
volatility and borrowing at the Fed's repo window, it all culminated in some big time messes at the
year end. Even after the FOMC terminated QT and had restarted not QE, just like we thought they would,
there was still a lot of that same volatility and disruption. Remember, there was the mid-December
surge in borrowing, almost 17 billion from the Fed. It came back on Boxing Day at 17 billion, another
17 billion, almost 26 billion December 29th. And finally, the big one, the last day of 2025,
74.6 billion borrowed from the Fed's repo facility. And there was a little bit more, almost 23 billion
on January 2nd. But from there on, the Fed's window went silent. Over the next six, seven weeks, there
was basically nothing. The busiest day was 100 million dollars, a million, 100 million, not
billion, 100 million. And that was on January 13th. So to most people, it seemed like the Fed had been
geniuses. They did it with their well-timed restart to not QE and therefore higher level of bank reserves.
Obviously though, as we just went over, primary dealers weren't among that group thinking that
way. Not at all. And keep in mind, always keep in mind, cash and collateral go together when we're
talking about circulation. In repo and just wholesale markets in general, including derivatives,
cash can't move unless collateral does. So if we're seeing dealers defensive on collateral,
if they're right, that will also mean tighter conditions on the cash side as well.
Like I said, always keep that in mind. Money flow is like a binary. It takes both and both of them
have to be moving for circulation to happen, money circulation to happen. So while everyone was pumped
about Jay Powell supposedly solving repo, everyone except the money dealers who actually deal in repo.
It seemed like a shock when on this past Tuesday, suddenly 30 billion in borrowers showed up the
Fed's window. We went from nothing, complete silent, the most hundred million to seemingly
out of the blue, a whopping 30 billion, 30 and a half billion to be precise. And we also saw the
attendance SOFR, the SOFR rate suddenly jumped to just below the Fed's upper bound for Fed funds,
just like it was December all over again. Only this time, an otherwise seemingly nondescript week in
the middle of February. Now, obviously, we can't link those directly to Blue Owl, the repo borrowing,
the soaring dealer holdings. Those are systemic indications. But what they indicate is systemic
tightening again, which dealers were prepping for the entire time in between, which could be
consistent with the stage two behavior we saw this past week. Maybe banks really are getting cold feet
about standing behind private credit. Once again, seeing negative developments either inside the
shadows or as they occasionally trickle out. It is one hell of a coincidence, don't you think?
Dealers getting hugely defensive the entire time since December, and suddenly it spills out all
over again, the same type of visible repo mess, then Blue Owl goes credit crisis stage two, and
all of it in a matter of just a couple of days. See, the thing is, even the FOMC is talking about
this private credit mess and the dangers, the possible consequences and implications from it.
And the minutes that were just released this past week as well for the January FOMC meeting,
they talked about in several cases. So it's in the public minutes, which means it was purposely put
in the public minutes. So the public would know officials are thinking there's something to talk
about. Now, there were a couple of reference to private credit, which by itself, not a huge deal,
but it also wasn't nothing. And I wrote about this in our deep dive analysis, by the way,
the day before Blue Owl broke. So I'll just give you one example from the minutes to show you
how even the empty suits are discussing the downside possibilities of something. When even
the FOMC is taking these risks seriously enough, they print it, the only thing they can print,
in their official documents. So it's not nothing here. Quote, several participants highlighted
vulnerabilities associated with the private credit sector and its provision of credit to
riskier borrowers, including risks related to interconnections with other types of non-bank
financial institutions, such as insurance companies, and get this at the end, and banks
exposure to this sector. And that last part just might, it just might explain what just happened
this past week. Now, one thing that we haven't touched on yet, repo fails, because that's a big
part of what happened in December. But repo fails, they tend to be fickle and intermittent. And
that's the case again here. While repo fails were big in December, they went very quiet like the
rest of the marketplace seemed to be in January, though we have seen a pickup here end of January
heading into February. It's nothing like December, of course, that part of collateral flow did get
pretty quiet in January. And if you remember, repo fails, we talked about at the time, they
exploded in mid-December shooting up to a whopping $573 billion combined the week of December 17th,
having been more than $300 billion the week before then. The same two weeks in December is when
primary dealers really began to stock up on their collateral inventories. From then though, fails,
as they often do, backed right off, less than $200 billion the final week of 2025, and down to just
$157 billion by the middle of January. But since then, there's been a small yet noticeable rebound
in fails getting back to $220 billion thereabouts here in February. Now, there's a couple reasons
for that quiet part, 1st January itself. We saw the same thing happen last year, meaning early 2025,
where fails were around $400 billion to close out 2024, they dropped to seemingly nothing just a
couple of weeks later, even less than we saw this year in early 2025. By mid-February last year,
even as things were starting to hit the fan all over the place, repo fails were down around $124
billion, which goes to show repo fails are just one of those things, quite a lot of inconsistency
to go with what we hope are occasional signals. Now, another reason why fails have backed off in
2026 and why they gotten so high late in 2025, you know, the $573 billion, that's the Treasury
Department. The government had been pulling back on bill sales, guess when? Late November and the
first couple of weeks into December, basically pouring gasoline on the collateral scarcity fire.
From regular weekly issuance of $110 billion at the four-week maturity, which is the best of the
best collateral, that got down to just $80 billion by that messy mid-December week. And then Treasury
started selling more of these four-week Treasury bills in January, getting them back up to $105
billion, where they've been weekly ever since then. Either way, again, money dealers aren't all that
sanguine about collateral money, and a lot more here in February, and we're starting to see that
show up in more and more places, including potentially repo fails and even the FOMC's
meeting minutes. So the question to ask, now that we've seen Blue Owl and the sudden burst of
activity in the Fed's repo window, why weren't dealers whittling down their holdings? Because
they do that when they're more optimistic. After all, everybody says 2026 is a booming economy,
we're going to see everything turn around. Private credit's just a one-off. We've got everything
moving in the right direction. Except for money dealers themselves are saying we see the exact
opposite. I mean, after all, the Fed's QE is supposedly working brilliantly. The money printing
liquidity is back, baby! Except the volatility remains. See, that's the thing. It's not about
rates moving in one direction or another. For monetary conditions, it's about the tendency to
experience disruption, illiquidity, and then maybe worse from there. Everything seems just fine,
four frequent examples that tell you it's not fine. And we still see the signs. Hell,
dealers definitely still see the signs, and then some. What we didn't really have until this week
was some specific event in the marketplace to very publicly link everything back together,
like we had at the end of last year. So of course it was Blue Owl who gave that to us.
And while we can't say with any degree of certainty that's why we see Fed repo borrowing
exploding or dealer holdings, dealers are doing what they're doing because they're looking ahead
at a bad economy in more stage two behavior. That $413 billion pile of treasury coupons sitting in
primary dealer inventories, it's not sitting there because dealers are thinking this is all a big
nothing, that private credit is never going to get past stage one, or that really was never in
stage one to begin with, and it won't mean anything in the future. That's not why they're sitting
there. Or that in the U.S. economy, the hiring recession, as even Walmart is calling it, will
turn out to be all just a false alarm. That $413 billion, that spike in treasury dealer holdings,
is dealers saying we don't like what's going on, and Blue Owl, our favorite blue hooter,
reminded us this week one big reason why. It wasn't just the asset sales from Blue Owl,
there were a couple of big developments that went along with it, including the gating off of one of
their funds, which potentially has the greater significance moving into stage two. I went over
all those details on the live stream, the replay of which you can see in the video link below.
As always, thank you very much for joining me. Huge thank you,
URUtah University members and subscribers, and until next time, take care.
