LIVE: House Homeland Security Committee Examines Federal Efforts to Counter Agroterrorism

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The House Homeland Security Committee holds a hearing titled “Surveying the Threat of Agroterrorism, Part II: Assessing Federal Government Efforts” at 2 p.m. ET on Feb. 11.
Witnesses:
• Suzette Kelly, acting executive director, Agriculture Programs and Trade Liaison, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security
• Matt Allen, director, Office of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Agriculture
• Jeff Cooper, program manager, Probabilistic Analysis for National Threats, Hazards and Risks, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security
• Ashley Grant, senior health security and biodefense adviser, Office of Health Security, Department of Homeland Security
Without objection, the chair may declare the subcommittee in recess at any point.
The purpose of this hearing is to review federal efforts in preparing for and responding to
threats facing our nation's food and agriculture sector.
Without objection, the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Van Epps, is permitted to sit on the dais
and ask questions to the witnesses.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Good afternoon and thank you for joining this subcommittee on emergency management and technology.
Today, we have a federal panel of witnesses from the Department of Homeland Security and
the United States Department of Agriculture to discuss the federal government's efforts
to prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from acts of agroterrorism.
The subcommittee previously met on September to examine this threat, during which academic
experts outlined the risks that agroterrorism poses to our food and agriculture system and
its potential to destabilize the United States economy and agriculture supply chain.
Terrorists who target our food supply have a variety of tools and methods at their disposal.
They can directly target our agriculture by deploying chemical and biological agents.
And as our critical infrastructure becomes increasingly connected, they could also carry
out cyber attacks on technology that the farms depend on.
Our adversaries, particularly the PRC, have also exploited research security gaps to steal
the intellectual properties tied to agriculture technologies and genetically modified organisms.
This theft could cause significant economic harm and raise concerns that these technologies
could be manipulated or weaponized against U.S. crop systems.
The reality of this threat was on full display last year when the Department of Justice charged
three Chinese nationals with attempts to smuggle biological agents into the United
States, agents capable of causing severe harm to crop and livestock.
Any serious effort to prepare for these threats must begin with preventing deadly pathogens
and harmful species from entering the country through our borders and ports of entry.
I'm grateful to Customs and Border Protection work in detecting and intercepting these dangers,
but prevention cannot stop at the border.
We must also deny adversaries opportunities to position themselves inside the United States
in ways that could facilitate harm.
The PRC has acquired farmland across the United States, including land near critical infrastructure
and sensitive military installations.
This proximity creates vulnerabilities that could be exploited to surveil, disrupt, or
compromise our food and agriculture systems, undermining prevention efforts long before
threat is detected.
Addressing these risks requires strong oversight, transparency, and coordination to ensure that
our agriculture sectors do not become a staging ground for hostile activities.
And even with strong prevention measures in place, we must be prepared for the possibility
that these efforts could fail.
It is important that the stakeholders and decision makers across all levels of government
and the private sector receive adequate training to detect, report, and respond to these threats.
Equally important is robust information sharing across the national laboratories, government
partners, and industries to enable rapid and effective responses.
We saw the value of this partnership last week when law enforcement recovered and identified
biological material from a lab in Las Vegas and sent it to the National Bioforensic Analysis
Center for immediate analysis.
That rapid response capability is essential to defending our homeland against biological
threats, whether they originate from the criminal actors, terrorists, or hostile foreign adversaries.
And this is exactly the type of capability we must sustain and strengthen, which is why
I've led bipartisan efforts to improve DHS biodefense readiness and advance legislation
to counter China's efforts to undermine our homeland security.
I also applaud President Donald Trump and his administration for issuing the National
Farm Security Action Plan to enhance our nation's preparedness for these dangers.
This effort reflects the reality that the threat of agroterrorism is not just a possibility,
it is real, evolving, and demands action across the federal government.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about the steps they have taken to implement
the proposals outlined in this plan, the challenges that they face, and opportunities to enhance
collaboration amongst federal agencies.
I also welcome any suggestions on how Congress can support these efforts.
I thank our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today, and I hope their testimony
will inspire a bipartisan effort to strengthen defense against the significant threats.
I now recognize the ranking member of this subcommittee, Mr. Kennedy, for his opening
statement.
Good afternoon.
Thank you very much, Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
I want to begin by saying that I appreciate the Chairman for bringing officials from the
administration before this subcommittee.
I want to see more of these hearings with administration witnesses in the future.
I'd be remiss if I didn't acknowledge the greatest threat to our nation currently, and
with all due respect to our witnesses, it is not agroterrorism.
We're seeing a Department of Homeland Security that's killing our own citizens, terrorizing
communities, ignoring court orders, rejecting due process, and advancing an extreme immigration
enforcement agenda that's stoking fear, creating chaos, and degrading our democratic institutions.
The Trump administration is also dismantling FEMA before our eyes, refusing to distribute
critical counterterrorism grant funding, and moving forward with plans to cut half of FEMA's
workforce.
Mr. Chairman, yesterday I sent a letter to your office to formally request that this
subcommittee turns its focus to FEMA issues, including delays in preparedness and counterterrorism
grants, workforce challenges, and areas for improvement in disaster recovery.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to insert this letter into the record.
Without objection.
Thank you.
Last year I introduced a bill, H.R. 6507, the Department of Homeland Security Grants
Accountability Act, which would require increased transparency and oversight of FEMA's counterterrorism
grant programs.
I hope that's something we'll have an opportunity to discuss on this subcommittee in the coming
months.
Turning to today's hearing, I agree that our nation must strengthen its biodefense,
including better preparing for potential attacks on our agricultural systems.
This includes ensuring that we have enough agricultural specialists at our borders to
detect harmful pathogens, investing in research and development at U.S. institutions through
USDA, and strengthening our supply chains to ensure they're resilient against potential
bad actors.
But the way to do this is not by closing the Department of Homeland Security's Centers
of Excellence or freezing funding for USDA-University partnerships, including those that directly
support agrosecurity.
One of these closed Centers of Excellence directly supported agrosecurity by researching
and educating federal partners on how to detect and eliminate biological threats that cross
our borders.
In my home state of New York, the administration halted funding for Cornell University's Animal
Health Diagnostics Center, which tests livestock for diseases that could devastate agricultural
sectors and our economy.
This significantly impacts their ability to survey for high-consequence animal diseases.
All that's to say, the Chairman and I are in full agreement that we must strengthen
our nation's capabilities against threats of agroterrorism, whether they be foreign
or domestic, and I believe we do so by bolstering federal investment in resources rather than
gutting them.
This also means ensuring our customs facilitators have the resources needed to survey biological
threats.
I have four bridges in my district in western New York and to Canada.
I represent some of CBP's agricultural specialists who report to work at U.S. ports of entry
and contribute every single day to our collective biosecurity.
So I understand the importance of ensuring our nation is hardened against any biological
threats, and I appreciate the Chairman's work in this space.
I want to thank our witnesses for participating in today's hearing, and I look forward to
your testimony as we assess DHS and USDA's preparedness in keeping our communities safe.
I yield back.
Thank you, Ranking Member Kennedy.
Other members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for
the record.
I'm very pleased to have such an important panel of witnesses before us today.
Ms. Suzette Kelly is the Deputy Executive Director of Agriculture Programs and Trade
Liaison for the CBP's Office of Field Operations at DHS.
In this role, Ms. Kelly provides leadership and expertise while guiding collaboration
and partnerships to safeguard our agriculture and nation's food supply.
Mr. Matt Allen is the Director of the Office of Homeland Security for the United States
Department of Agriculture.
He has served in this capacity since 2020 and oversees department-wide efforts in radiation
safety, emergency programs, personnel and document security, national security programs
and policies, communications security, and operations sustainment.
Mr. Jeff Cooper serves as Program Manager for DHS Science and Technology Directorate's
PANTHER program.
PANTHER provides technical information on CBRN hazards to help leaders make informed
decisions on preparedness and response to weapons of mass destruction events.
Dr. Ashley Grant is the Senior Health Security and Biodefense Advisor in DHS's Office of
Health Security, which leads DHS's effort in medical, workforce health and safety and
public health.
In this role, Dr. Grant helps to mitigate the impact of biological threats.
I thank you all again for being here today.
Pursuant to the Committee's Rule 8c, I ask that the witnesses please rise and raise your
right hand.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before this Committee of Homeland
Security of the United States House of Representatives will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Thank you.
Please be seated.
Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in the affirmative.
I now recognize Mr. Kelly for five minutes to summarize her opening statement.
Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection's role in protecting the
United States from agroterrorism and biological threats.
I am honored to represent CBP's Office of Field Operations, Agriculture Programs and
Trade Liaison.
Every day, our frontline personnel work tirelessly to safeguard American agriculture, natural
resources, and our communities by preventing the introduction and spread of dangerous pests,
animal diseases, and biological agents.
Agricultural and biological materials, including animal products, genetic materials, and infectious
substances are routine imports that sustain our food supply and support scientific research
and medical advancements.
However, these imports also pose significant risks.
The accidental or deliberate introduction of a pest, pathogen, or disease could have
significant adverse effects on domestic agriculture and natural resources.
For example, CBP recently intercepted illicit shipments from the People's Republic of China
sent to U.S. researchers at academic institutions.
These shipments contained a dangerous fungal pathogen, harmful genetic materials, and E.
coli concealed to evade CBP detection and circumvent U.S. laws.
To mitigate these types of threats, CBP integrates agricultural inspection into its multi-layered
border security strategy that includes highly trained personnel, advanced targeting and
detection capabilities, and close collaboration with federal partners and industry stakeholders.
Using their scientific and law enforcement expertise, agriculture specialists work alongside
CBP officers and trade specialists to process and inspect millions of shipments and traveler
luggage at air, sea, and land ports of entry.
The work we do is vital.
In fiscal year 2025 alone, CBP agriculture specialists interdicted approximately 1.7
million prohibited plant materials, animal byproducts, and meat items.
They also intercepted more than 100,000 actionable pests identified as potentially dangerous
to U.S. agriculture.
Recognizing the complexity of agroterrorism and biological threats, CBP established the
Biological Threat Exclusion Program to strengthen our efforts and ensure a consistent approach
across the agency.
Early detection of threats is essential.
At the CBP National Targeting Center, agriculture specialists use advanced data systems to identify
high-risk travelers and shipments before they arrive at our borders.
Our specialized detection capabilities deployed to ports of entry further enhance our efforts.
For example, our agriculture K-19s screen luggage and cargo for prohibited items quickly
and effectively.
CBP is also expanding its use of mobile technology, enabling remote inspections, real-time cargo
release by enhancing efficiency and enforcement.
Collaboration is central to our approach.
CBP enforces laws on behalf of dozens of federal entities and works closely with partners such
as Department of Agriculture, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
These partnerships enable coordinated responses to emerging threats.
In closing, CBP's agricultural inspection capabilities are a critical component of our
nation's defense against agroterrorism and biological threats.
Working in coordination with our partners, we will continue to identify and intercept
these threats, protect our national and economic security, preserve our agricultural resources,
and safeguard our communities.
Thank you for your continued support of CBP's mission.
I look forward to your questions.
Thank you, Ms. Kelly.
I recognize Mr. Allen for five minutes to summarize his opening statement.
Good afternoon, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon.
I have the privilege of leading the USDA Office of Homeland Security.
The office coordinates across the department to mitigate risk, provide safeguards to USDA
personnel and information by leading government-wide initiatives and championing USDA's equities
in homeland and national security.
I very much appreciate the opportunity to discuss these important topics with you today.
As you know, agriculture contributes over $1.5 trillion to the U.S. gross domestic product
each year.
It underpins our society and is one of the most important pillars that feeds, fuels,
and clothes the entire world.
This past summer, the department launched the National Farm Security Action Plan, a
first-of-its-kind comprehensive strategy to acknowledge agriculture as a key pillar of
national security.
The plan focuses on protecting U.S. farmland from foreign adversaries, strengthening food
supply chains, ending fraud in nutrition programs, safeguarding plant and animal health, and
bolstering research security.
The National Farm Security Action Plan enables USDA to begin this critical work to address
the imperative for agriculture security in America.
The action plan serves as a launching point for USDA to work in continued unison with
government and other partners to fully integrate agriculture in a broader national security
enterprise.
Continuing the implementation of the plan in January, USDA launched a new online portal
to streamline the reporting of transactions involving U.S. agriculture land by foreign
persons under the Agriculture Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978, or FIDA.
The new online portal is a broader effort to strengthen the FIDA enforcement and protect
American farmland.
We enjoy a strong working relationship with our partners across USDA and the U.S. interagency.
With USDA's Animal, Plant, and Health Inspection Service, which is the department's lead under
the National Response Framework Emergency Support Function 11 for Safeguarding Animal
and Plant Health, provide critical connections to threat intelligence resources, which APHIS
uses to mitigate operational and strategic risk.
As the committee is likely aware, we're facing a threat of the northward creep of the New
World screwworm towards our border that poses a potential risk to livestock, industry, and
pets.
While we've not seen indications of intentional spread, there is well-recognized involvement
of cartels designated as foreign terrorist organizations and transboundary cattle smuggling
that is likely exacerbating the problem.
The ongoing security situation south of the border also complicates effective control,
pest surveillance, and places personnel responsible for addressing these pests at risk.
I present this as an example to highlight the complexity of our global connected agriculture
supply chains and emphasize risk present in this critical infrastructure sector.
OHS works hand-in-hand with both USDA agencies like APHIS and federal partners to include
the FBI and CBP to ensure that we have the best and most up-to-date information for strategic
decision-making.
As just mentioned, we collaborate with the FBI and CBP on many to identify threats of
suspected acts of aggroterrorism.
Just a few months ago, Director Kash Patel of the FBI commented on a recent Michigan
case involving foreign graduate students who enlistedly brought Fusarium, an agriculture
pathogen in the United States, as a persistent and enduring threat.
U.S. agriculture and American farmers are faced with this and many other persistent
and enduring threats.
Our department leans on our partners to assist us in investigating and remedying these issues,
and that's why I'm delighted to have our colleagues from DHS here with us today.
They have abundant authorities, resources, and personnel to assist us in detecting and
defending the most tenacious threats to U.S. agriculture, the economy, and national security.
Those situations in Michigan underscore the importance of knowing that federally funded
agricultural research and development is being done in conjunction with trusted partners.
Just this morning, USDA announced the creation of an office dedicated to enhancing research
security within USDA, continue to implement National Security Presidential Memorandum
33, and educate USDA partners on why research security matters.
It is easy to forget that the food on our plates, the clothes on our backs, the warmth
of our fires are all predicated on somewhere, somewhere transforming living or once living
things and is something that sustains us as individuals, families, communities, and a
nation.
The foundational place of agriculture in our overall well-being as American people and
perhaps more importantly, the source for might in the nation cannot be understated.
Safeguarding agriculture is something we take very seriously in this department.
Chairman Strong and Ranking Member Kennedy, distinguished members of the subcommittee,
thank you again for holding this hearing, the opportunity to testify on this important
topic.
I would also like to thank my colleagues that are joining me today, our partners in the
None of us could do this independently, so our continued cooperation and collaboration
is essential.
I look forward to answering any questions you might have.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Allen.
I now recognize Mr. Cooper for his five minutes to summarize his opening statement.
Good afternoon, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the Department of Homeland Security's
The risks to the food and agricultural sector and supply chain are varied and serious.
The nation's food and agricultural systems are designated critical infrastructure, and
the disruption, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or intentional, can result in
cascading impacts to public health, economic stability, and confidence in the government.
As global supply chains become more interconnected, they become increasingly vulnerable to biological
threats, and understanding and managing these potential risks is more important than ever.
DHS has the federal authority to assess and manage threats to critical infrastructure,
serving as a coordinator for the whole-of-government effort that includes all levels of government
and industry owners and operators.
Within DHS, the Science and Technology Directorate that supports this mission by providing technical
threat analysis, risk analysis, and decision support to inform preparedness and response
efforts across the homeland security enterprise.
Under National Security Memorandum 16, DHS was tasked with conducting risk assessments
related to threats against food and agriculture.
Working in coordination with the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Health
and Human Services and others, DHS's role is to ensure that leaders at the federal,
state, and local levels have clear, science-based understanding of the threats they face, the
potential consequences of those threats, and the tradeoffs associated with different preparedness
and response options.
S&T contributes to DHS's risk assessment mission by delivering technically defensible analysis
and user tools to help decision-makers prioritize actions and resources.
One way that S&T executes this mission is through the Probabilistic Analysis of National
Threats, Hazards, and Risks Program, or PANTHR.
PANTHR provides analytical capabilities that integrate threat information, hazard data,
and consequence modeling to support risk-informed decision-making across chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, explosive, and cyber threat areas.
These capabilities are designed to inform policy and operations, not to execute or set
them.
Rather, they help answer fundamental questions decision-makers face, including which threats
pose the greatest risk, where vulnerabilities exist, and where investments can most effectively
reduce that risk.
Risks to the food and agricultural system are complex.
They vary by agent, commodity, geography, and response capacity, and the consequences
of disruption can extend well beyond the agricultural sector.
Through PANTHR, S&T develops and applies risk and computational analytics that support
strategic, operational, and tactical planning.
These efforts help decision-makers to compare risks across various scenarios and assess
how different interventions may reduce the likelihood or consequences of those events.
Risk assessments depend on reliable data.
For many agricultural threat agents, including emerging and re-emerging diseases, experimental
data is limited or incomplete.
To address this gap, S&T also conducts the Agricultural Threat Characterization Research
Project that examines properties and impacts of biological threats relevant to agricultural,
such as high pathogenic avian influenza and African swine fever.
This research produces science-based knowledge products that inform hazard awareness, analytical
modeling, and preparedness planning.
In addition to analysis and threat characterization, S&T conducts applied research and development
to inform future capabilities and enhance agricultural biosecurity.
This includes work to improve screening and sensing technologies at ports of entry, as
well as methodologies and decision support tools for depopulation, disposal, and decontamination.
These efforts are designed to inform capability development and transition to our operational
partners, such as USDA and CBP.
S&T works closely with DHS components and interagency partners, including the Department
of Agriculture, to ensure analytical capabilities address real-world needs.
Through tailored analysis, reachback support, and scenario development, S&T provides decision
support to planning, exercises, and preparedness activities.
S&T supports USDA's National Farm Security Action Plan by providing the technical risk
assessment framework needed to inform sound policy and operational decisions.
In this way, S&T's contributions align with DHS's responsibilities under the National
Security Memorandum 16 and complement USDA's leadership on agricultural policy, compliance,
and enforcement.
The Science and Technology Directorate is committed to helping the nation understand,
discipline, and manage these risks to the food and agricultural sector through rigorous
science-based analysis and decision support.
These complex risks require disciplined coordination across federal, state, and local partners,
and with continued support from Congress, S&T will continue to provide the analytical
foundation that informs preparedness and protects the American people, our food supply, and
our economy.
Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and distinguished members of the subcommittee
it is a privilege to testify before you today.
Thank you for your support of the Science and Technology Directorate.
I look forward to your questions.
Thank you, Mr. Cooper.
I now recognize Dr. Grant for five minutes to summarize her opening statement.
Dr. Grant.
Thank you so much, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and distinguished members
of the subcommittee.
I'm honored to be here to speak today about the Department of Homeland Security's effort
to defend against agroterrorism and other biological threats.
I have spent my entire career focused on trying to make sure our nation is better prepared
for a biological incident.
As a senior health security and biodefense advisor at the Department of Homeland Security's
Office of Health Security, I am honored to share our approach to protecting America's
food and agriculture sector.
Advances in biotechnology as well as artificial intelligence have made it easier for nefarious
actors to develop and deploy biological agents that could devastate our crops, livestock,
and food production.
These threats jeopardize not only economic stability but also our national security.
At DHS, we recognize that farm security is national security along with USDA.
The Office of Health Security leads and coordinates efforts across the department to protect our
nation's food and agriculture sector from high-consequence threats.
Our mission is rooted in statutory responsibility and key directives, including securing our
Agriculture and Food Act.
We oversee activities related to the department's food defense, agriculture security, and lead
policy initiatives for preparedness, detection, and response.
Today, I will cover four areas of our work.
First, coordination and policy leadership.
The Office of Health Security works closely with DHS components, such as Customs and Border
Protection, as well as the Science and Technology Directorate.
We also coordinate with our interagency partners, such as USDA, as well as the Health and Human
Services.
Together, we ensure that DHS and the United States government efforts are unified, efficient,
and responsive to evolving threats.
Second, risk assessment and intelligence integration.
The Office of Health Security partners with DHS Science and Technology Directorate to
assess risks to our food and agriculture sector.
We integrate technical threat analysis and risk modeling with policy and operational
planning, a key element of our support to health analysts embedded in state and local
fusion centers nationwide.
These analysts gather and disseminate health security information, ensuring actionable
intelligence reaches decision makers and frontline responders.
Third, preparedness exercises and training.
The Office of Health Security designs and executes complex exercises to test and strengthen
our ability to prevent, detect, and respond to biological threats.
For example, last month, we held a complex exercise, tabletop exercise, down in El Paso,
Texas.
This exercise focused on a potential new world of schoolworm incursion in the United States
through three different mechanisms.
One, through elastic cattle trading.
Two, through our livestock and a potential human case.
This is a severe pest that can affect our economy, as well as our livestock.
The exercise brought over 250 participants from federal, state, local, county, tribal,
different agencies, and highlighted the importance of an integrated response and identified gaps
in planning and capability.
Our fourth core function is innovation and continuous improvement.
The Office of Health Security invests in data analytics and technology solutions to enhance
early warning, detection, and response.
Early detection and rapid response is critical to making sure we are prepared for threats
to our food and agriculture.
Through initiatives like the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks, we are advancing our
collaborative ability to prepare for and mitigate from emerging threats.
In conclusion, threats against our food and agriculture sector are significant and evolving.
DHS, the Office of Health Security, and our partners are committed to safeguarding the
nation's food and agriculture system through collaboration, innovation, and readiness.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
I look forward to your questions.
Thank you, Dr. Grant.
Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their five minutes of questioning.
An additional round of questioning may be called after all members have been recognized.
I now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning.
The actions of agroterrorism could become even more dangerous if they had access to
farmland near U.S. military bases.
Redstone Arsenal is in my district, and I understand firsthand the threat this could
pose to our service members and our homeland security.
This is why I'm concerned by a 2024 GAO report, which found gaps in federal reporting
requirements that could allow it to happen.
Fortunately, the Trump administration's National Farm Security Action Plan has called
for stronger USDA reporting and disclosure requirements for foreign farmland purchases
near military bases and other sensitive sites.
Mr. Allen, how is the USDA seeking to implement the National Farm Security Action Plan's
proposal to tighten these reporting requirements, and what steps has the Department taken so far?
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question and your support of this.
Right now, the Department is in the process of moving the Agriculture Foreign Investment
Disclosure Act program from the Farm Production Conservation Mission Area to my office to
have a more national security focus.
Also, as I mentioned, in January, we opened an online portal that we'll have as a database
getting us away from the 1978 paper-based process and modernize the FETA system.
We have also issued, at the end of last calendar year, an advance notice of proposed rulemaking
to update the form, the process, and the entire program to gather more pertinent information
than we have in the past and share with our partners, especially at Homeland Security,
Department of War, and Treasury, to integrate with this process.
Thank you.
Switching gears, Ms. Kelly, CBP plays an important role at our nation's borders and
ports of entry to detect and intercept harmful pathogens and biological materials from entering
our nation.
How have maligned foreign actors exploited vulnerabilities at ports of entry to introduce
threats to our nation's agriculture, and how can CBP harden its screening of these
materials?
Thank you for the question, Chairman.
What we've seen, not even specific to one particular pathway but across many of the
pathways where we are continuing to harden our processes, are these numerous artful attempts
to evade our detection capabilities.
We're seeing varying levels of concealment practices, such as utilizing public media,
comic books, to obfuscate the presence of biological materials.
We're also observing that there are attempts to transport these materials on their person
or hidden into personal items, such as bedroom slippers.
To ensure that we continue to advance our inspection capabilities, we are launching
efforts to modernize our infrastructure.
We're making strategic investments in our non-intrusive inspection technology, and we
are also working with the industry to ensure that there is sustained awareness of biological
threats and the numerous attempts by which individuals and malicious actors may attempt
to introduce these items.
Thank you.
Turning to Mr. Cooper, the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, also
known as NBAC, is a DHS science and technology-operated national laboratory.
Through its two centers, NBAC provides expertise to help DHS understand biological threats
and the capabilities of our adversaries.
As I mentioned earlier, recent news reports indicated that the unidentified biological
samples from an incident in Las Vegas were sent to the Center for Testing.
Mr. Cooper, what is the scale and scope of NBAC's cooperation with law enforcement, and
how does this partnership support DHS's mission?
Chairman, thank you for that question.
As you mentioned, S&T does own and operate the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
Center at NBAC.
The Forensic Center, however, is operated by the FBI.
I would defer to my FBI colleagues on how they are participating in the investigation
and supporting the state and locals for that.
S&T's role is to ensure the facility has the necessary capabilities in order for the
FBI to pursue its investigation.
Thank you.
My time has expired.
I now recognize the ranking member, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Kennedy, for five minutes
of questioning.
Thank you, Chairman.
Our nation's ability to recover from some of the most significant emergencies is largely
thanks to one agency, FEMA.
For example, during COVID-19, FEMA led the nation's pandemic response efforts, distributing
personal protective equipment, ventilators, and testing supplies across the country.
If a large-scale agroterrorism attack occurred, FEMA's resources and authorities would be
indispensable for minimizing human casualties and economic impacts.
However, Trump and Secretary Nome have both stated they want to completely get rid of
FEMA.
As of just days ago, there are credible reports that Secretary Nome is planning to cut FEMA's
remaining workforce in half.
So, Dr. Grant, as a senior advisor for DHS Office responsible for mitigating the impact
of biological threats, do you believe that gutting FEMA's workforce improves our nation's
ability to respond to large-scale agroterrorism attack or not?
Thank you for your question, Ranking Member Kennedy.
I believe there's an important mission of FEMA, including the different missions that
you described.
I think our office works across not only industry, but also across the department to
make sure that we're prepared as we can be for agricultural terrorism threats.
I would have to get with our FEMA representatives to talk about specific grants that you brought
up in terms of cutting, so we can take that as a get-back to answer your question about
the specific grants you're referring to.
If FEMA employees were cut in half, basically gutting the agency, do you believe that that
would have a negative impact on your ability to do your work?
Again, I'm not really sure.
So, in terms of the impact that FEMA can have, we work with them on annexes as well as other
documents, but not directly in terms of responding to different incidents like this.
Would a drastic workforce reduction at FEMA compromise the Office of Health Security's
ability to protect American people from the impacts of a biological attack?
I believe that we should take that back and get with our colleagues at DHS to look at
the complete impact that could have across our department.
Thank you.
Ms. Kelly, I represent, as I mentioned earlier, a northern border community in western New
York.
The over 200 agricultural specialists who work at our ports of entry are essential in
ensuring inbound goods crossing our northern border are free of dangerous pathogens, as
you have testified today.
What are some of the unique challenges that these agricultural specialists face at the
northern border?
Thank you.
The evolving threat landscape is, I would offer, not specific to a region or a particular
port, and that is because of the movement of trade.
The complexities of this landscape are taken into consideration, certainly the trade and
travel industry and that specific characterization of movement, but also the way in which an
agricultural threat may impact the specific sector.
As we look at a more granular level, such as the ports, then staffing levels, detection
capabilities, infrastructure, all of these varying factors may characterize the complexity
of that specific landscape.
Thank you.
I understand the CBP port of Buffalo has a biological threat operations specialist.
Will Buffalo receive a biological threat exclusion coordinator anytime soon?
Thank you for that question as well.
We're very excited about the biological threat exclusion program and really appreciate the
support of the program from Congress as well.
With regards to our staffing models, they're informed by our resource allocation and workforce
staffing models, which predict and take into consideration the type of operational needs.
Whether a particular port may have a threat exclusion coordinator or threat operations
specialist is strictly determined or the decision, I should say, is informed by our staffing
models.
Understood.
Ms. Kelly, are there gaps in current federal law that could improve biosurveillance in
our northern ports of entry?
There are certainly opportunities for the regulations to be updated to ensure that we
can continue to deliver our mission and execute in an efficient and effective manner.
Regulations that encourage accountability with regards to information sharing and collection
can certainly ensure that we continue to make robust decisions at the ports of entry.
I'm out of time, Chairman.
If I could just add, Ms. Kelly, if there are opportunities for you to inform myself and
the chairman of legislation that could, in fact, improve this biosurveillance, we are
open to that.
Thank you.
Ranking member's time has expired.
I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Van Epps, for five minutes of questioning.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important hearing, and thank you to the
witnesses for being here today.
Thank you to the Trump administration and your work to keep our country safe.
The food and agriculture sector is one of America's 16 designated critical infrastructure
sectors.
Because nearly 95 percent of U.S. farms are family-owned operations, our farmers are especially
vulnerable, and an attack can rapidly cascade from farms to processors, distributors, and
ultimately to grocery shelves nationwide.
Agroterrorism isn't just an abstract threat.
It is the deliberate introduction of plant or animal pathogens to cause economic damage,
food shortages, panic, and strategic disruption.
We know this threat is real because agriculture is biologically vulnerable.
Many high-consequence livestock diseases, such as foot-and-mouth disease, do not occur
in the United States today.
That means our herds lack natural immunity, and an outbreak could spread rapidly before
detection.
USDA has estimated that a major foot-and-mouth disease outbreak could cost the United States
tens of billions of dollars in economic losses, devastate exports, and require the mass culling
of animals to contain spread.
A pathogen does not need to be weaponized in a sophisticated lab to cause catastrophic
damage.
It only needs to be introduced into a dense livestock or processing environment.
The modern threat environment compounds this risk.
Terrorist networks, transnational criminal organizations, or state-linked actors could
attempt to smuggle pathogens through ports of entry, mail systems, research collaborations,
or contaminated feed and biological materials.
Agriculture is uniquely exposed because farms are geographically dispersed, biosecurity
practices vary, and the supply chain depends on continuous movement of animals, feed, and
products.
A coordinated biological attack on livestock or crops could simultaneously trigger food
shortages, economic shock, and strain on military logistics, particularly in districts like
mine that host Fort Campbell.
This is why the Trump administration's National Farm Security Action Plan is so important.
It recognizes that preparedness is paramount.
It requires robust biosurveillance, real-time data sharing between USDA, DHS, FBI, and state
officials, strong screening at ports of entry, laboratory capacity for rapid pathogen identification,
and joint exercises that simulate deliberate biological introduction.
If an adversary wants to undermine the United States without firing a shot, targeting our
food supply is a strategic pathway.
We cannot afford to treat that risk as secondary.
Ms. Kelly, what screening protocols are in place at ports of entry to detect intentionally
concealed livestock or crop pathogens, and how do those protocols differ from routine
inspections designed to catch accidental pests or food violations?
Thank you for the question.
Our capabilities start really at the National Targeting Center, where we are harmonizing
our law enforcement data holdings with information that is collected and or provided by our partners
at the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service.
This information is then shared with our frontline personnel to ensure that we can continue to
strike the balance between facilitating trade and enforcing import regulations in a manner
in which we can deliver meaningful consequences as well.
With regards to malicious attempts, we have varying levels of operational policies and
interagency agreements with several of our internal and external partners.
These policies are underpinned by the National Incident Management System as well as the
National Response Framework.
Thank you.
Dr. Grant, when DHS or FBI identifies credible intelligence suggesting an adversary may target
U.S. agriculture, how quickly does that information translate into heightened inspection posture
at ports of entry?
Thank you so much for that question.
We would work with our CDC colleagues through the National Targeting Center to disseminate
that information to them.
In addition, we would work with our state and locals through our health fusion centers
to disseminate that information to the localities.
So, throughout those both mechanisms, we would get that information to the people that need
it.
Great.
Thank you.
This is both for Mr. Allen and Ms. Kelly.
How are federal agencies ensuring that state agriculture departments and producers receive
timely threat intelligence without creating unnecessary alarm?
Thank you for the question, sir.
Our Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service through our National Veterinarian Office works
directly with state departments of agriculture to pass information on a regular and timely
basis.
Including just last week, we had the National State Directors of Agriculture here in D.C.
and had days of face-to-face meetings with them.
Great.
Thanks.
Mr. Chairman, I'm out of time, so I yield back.
I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for their questions.
The members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the witnesses, and
we would ask the witnesses to respond to these in writing.
Pursuant to Committee Rule 7e, the hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
