Repo Fails Skyrocketing!! Is Something Big Happening?

Profit Playbook
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21 Video Views·Dec 28, 2025
Repo fails, a measure of collateral flow throughout the entire financial system, soared to more than $300 billion as of the middle of December. It was the highest for any non-quarter end week going back to June 2023. At the same time, borrowing from the Fed’s repo facility is way up again as investors refuse to buy the spin from private credit that their portfolios are just fine and from central bankers who say the same thing about the economy.
Repo fails, a measure of collateral flow throughout the entire system.
They soar to more than $300 billion as of the middle of December,
the highest for any non-quarter-end week, going all the way back to June of 2023.
At the same time, borrowing from the Fed's repo facilities up sharply again today.
As investors and money market participants, dealers,
they continue to refuse to buy the spin from private credit providers
that everything is just fine in their portfolios,
and the spin from central bankers that everything is just fine in the real economy.
Now, business development corporations,
which are the publicly traded versions of private credit shadow banks,
they continue to struggle, and it's no wonder why,
especially given everything we're going to go over here.
Despite all the reassurances from all the right people,
always saying exactly the right things,
the actual information that we get, what little there is,
but there's more that kind of leaks up towards us,
it refuses and refutes the spin.
The Wall Street Journal, for example, just published another article this week,
further exposing the cracks that are plaguing private credit,
this time from a big name fund that hasn't received
nearly as much attention as it really deserves.
And this isn't a first brands loser either.
Instead, its numbers are increasingly alarming,
which is why the stock price of the specific BDC is down by 33%.
And no, it's not just Blue Owl.
The industry is doing its best to make it sound like
these are all one-offs and lone wolves, plural,
but somehow we keep finding these packs of lone wolves all over the area.
Then, of course, the consequences in the liquidity system
that go along right with it.
Again, even the stock market,
which always stands ready to buy basically anything and everything,
this time wants nothing to do with the credit cycle.
And if stock market and stock market investors are in avoidance mode,
it really isn't that hard to think the same thing's going on in dealers
where it comes to the flow of cash and especially collateral.
So before we dive back into shadow banking and the credit cycle,
let's go over the systemic conditions in the monetary world
as we head into the final week of the year.
Now, that's already a tight spot on the calendar anyway,
this time between Christmas and January 2nd
when the world starts to open back up.
But as far as collateral flow goes,
there are a couple of warning signs have grown even louder here in December.
The first is repo fails.
And the other one is the high level of treasury securities
that are being held in money dealer inventories.
But for fails, let's start there.
During the week of December 10th,
the latest data the Fed's given us,
combined repo fails were $304.2 billion.
That was up from the $242.7 billion the week before
and the highest total since the final week in September this year.
In fact, the $304 billion was the most for any week outside of a quarter year end,
going all the way back to early June of 2023,
right when the debt ceiling was depriving the system of badly needed treasury bills.
Now, repo fails can indicate a couple of possible problems.
One, the one that comes to most people in the mainstream's mind,
it might be related to dealers and the like shorting specific securities,
especially treasury securities,
when they think rates are going to go higher.
So when something triggers a short covering,
there just happens to be not enough of those exact instruments
which causes fails to ripple across the repo market.
But there's no indication that that's going on here.
Shorts in the treasury market, interest rates going up,
that's not what's happening.
Instead, it's far more likely fails are piling up
as dealers tighten up the terms that they're willing to lend collateral on.
And we can see that how repo fails have been rising since the beginning of August.
Remember the first week in August?
The aftermath of the July payroll report and the first mainstream source
which confirmed flat beverage and jobs, therefore the wider economy.
There were $133 billion in fails the final week in July,
which immediately shot up for no other reason
to just about $200 billion that fateful early week in August.
Since then, fails have been an upward trend, not in a straight line,
but as close as one you're ever going to see for something like repo fails.
But more to the point,
they've remained elevated when compared to the months before the beginning of August
and now have bumped up again during the first two weeks in December,
showing that tightness and collateral not only remains a serious issue,
it has accelerated even before we get to the end of the year.
Now, if you want to know why collateral flow
is such an important part of the monetary system,
we've got a couple of recent videos in our Eurodollar University members section,
which goes over the why collateral became such an essential ingredient
to the global monetary system, the Eurodollar system, not dollar,
and also why it needs to constantly flow.
Therefore, we're always monitoring flow characteristics.
It's continuously borrowed and lent,
building collateral chains all over the money marketplace.
And the short answer for here and our purposes today
is that there aren't nearly enough high-quality assets like U.S. Treasury.
And I know that sounds silly given how broke the U.S. government is
and how many tens of trillions in treasuries the Treasury Department has issued,
but the plain truth is given the size of the monetary and financial system,
there just aren't enough treasuries available
which meet the requirements for the Eurodollar.
Again, if you really want to understand what those are,
check out Eurodollar University's members section.
There's a ton of stuff there,
not just about collateral and dealer functions,
and I'm having an after-Christmas sale on memberships and boards,
including the DDA package, which also includes the memberships.
Right now, check it out.
There's a link in the description to the Christmas sale.
There's also a ton more video content explaining all the ins and outs,
the history, the background, the intricacies of the Eurodollar system.
So what happens is, for whatever reason,
dealers become a little more reluctant to lend treasury collateral
that then leads to a possible cascade of fails like we're seeing here.
If it was just one or two dealers, then other dealers would step in.
You wouldn't notice the system would continue operating like it was before.
But systemically, when dealers overall grow cautious,
there's no way to cure these fails
before it leads to this cascading effect when we see repo fails surge.
As FRBNY itself says,
reported fails numbers sometimes can reach elevated levels
due to so-called daisy chains and round robins,
which if you want to know what those are,
check out Eurodollar University's member videos,
in which an initial delivery failure causes a chain of subsequent fails
as the party expecting to receive the security in the initial transaction
fails to deliver to its counterpart in the second transaction,
and so on and so on.
Again, if there are other dealers
who aren't operating with the same balance sheet constraints,
then the fail gets cured relatively easily, quickly.
The fails don't stack up and pile up.
They don't cascade.
It's only when the dealer network itself begins to pull back systemically
that it can get this far.
So let's go back to FRBNY.
Once a significant volume of fails occurs,
lenders of collateral sometimes withhold collateral
because they are concerned that existing fails
diminish the likelihood of collateral being returned to them.
Such withholding can be self-fulfilling
because withholding scarce collateral
can increase the incidence of fails in and of itself.
That's the cascade.
And that gets us into the next data,
which corroborates what we're seeing in fails,
and that's treasury holdings by primary dealers.
Now, we have to keep in mind repo fails tend to be fickle.
They're not always consistent.
But usually when you do see a sharp rise in fails,
a cascade in fails,
there's likely to be an increase in holdings of U.S. treasury coupons
as well as bills as dealers anticipate.
They anticipate difficulties in collateral.
And since we are getting all this smoke from liquidity markets
and signals from the credit markets where we do have information,
this is going to be one of the central focuses
for Eurodollar University Live this coming February,
President's Day weekend.
We're going to have presentations from Mike Green and Hugh Hendry,
George Gammon, Steve Van Meter, Brent Johnson,
talking about where we are in the cycle,
and also presentations about what you can do about it,
including distressed credit,
which is one of the great opportunities
in something like a downturn in the credit cycle.
Not only that, we're going to talk about what are the greatest dangers
or the greatest danger that we all face,
and it's not the collapsing dollar,
which isn't collapsing, unfortunately.
It's not even the credit market cycles,
nor the danger flat beverage in the real economy.
It's something that is bubbling up and popping up in way too many places.
We're going to talk about that at Eurodollar University Live
and focus a lot on that as well.
There's a link in the description.
If you are a serious investor,
you want to get in a room with these people,
these experts and have really good conversations
about the biggest topics that we face,
here's your chance to do so.
So there's a link in the description of this video to book your call,
to participate here.
Eurodollar University Live, President's Day weekend, February 2026.
Not only is it going to be huge,
it's also going to be really important.
So what we see is that dealers specifically choose to hold more coupons
and even bills at times when they believe collateral conditions
might become increasingly difficult.
One, they do this defensively, as FRBNY was alluding to,
withholding collateral, not wanting to see a fail-to-return,
which raises the cost of undertaking these dealer activities
and a lot more dealer activities beside.
So if dealers believe collateral conditions are going to worsen
in the days or really weeks ahead,
they'll start holding more collateral themselves as a precaution.
But they will also intentionally stock up on treasury assets
intending to take advantage of those same problems,
whether they lead to fails or not,
because they are dealers and that's basically their business.
If collateral flow slows down
and collateral becomes relatively more scarce,
that means the price to rent increasingly scarce collateral will go up.
So if you've already stocked up
on the best quality collateral ahead of time,
you stand to make some additional profit.
That's the dealer model, the dealer business model.
So whether defensive or proactive business choice,
dealers hold more treasury assets
when they think collateral will be an issue for them
and for the entire system.
Sure enough, they went nuts adding treasury coupons,
that's notes and bonds,
late last year during the Eurodollar shortage,
which sent the dollar exchange value soaring.
From the end of November right into the end of February,
dealer holdings absolutely surged,
anticipating pretty much everything that we saw by March and April.
From there, they slacked off, but only a tiny bit,
which was enough that the dollar's exchange value
came down off its April highs,
which led to that whole sell America nonsense.
But dealers were back along with the dollar
against most currencies by summer,
in particular, late July.
From then on, with flat beverage showing up in more data,
dealers were piling up a few more tens of billions
in treasury coupons so that by the week of Thanksgiving,
they were holding a new record high amount.
And then they've been likely using them
the first couple of weeks in December,
as we see repo fails jumping,
which corroborates why they were so concerned in the first place.
And they've also been stacking up treasury bills too.
Now, this is another one of those behaviors
that when you see it happen,
you should probably take note.
When their total position of bills
gets to be around 80 billion or so,
that's when things tend to happen,
not always,
but like just before the bank crisis in 2023 is an example,
or the carry trade blow up in July and August of 2024,
we see dealers piling up treasury bills in advance of them.
We saw it last November, December,
and again in the middle of February,
preceding the market mess and liquidations that then followed.
Now, dealers ran off their bills until early August,
again, the slackening in the euro dollar tightening after April.
But since then, since around the middle of August,
they've been rebuilding their inventories of treasury bills
at the same time they're building up their stockpiles of treasury coupons.
And the total of bills climb back above 80 billion again,
the week of Thanksgiving,
and they're still above 66 billion as of the middle of December,
consistent with what we see in coupons,
as well as repo fails.
So basically, a lot of indirect confirmation
that collateral flow is under some constant
and maybe even accelerating strain.
We can also see that from the borrowing and activity
at the Federal Reserve's repo facility,
though this is not specifically related to collateral,
more along the lines of general tightness across the monetary system.
But when you stop and think about it, you understand how this works.
If there's a disruption in collateral flow,
by definition, given the modern euro dollar mechanics,
there's going to be disruption and tightness
in cash flowing through the system as well.
It just goes back to how important collateral is
to this modern global reserve currency.
It's almost a binary relationship, especially post-2008.
When collateral doesn't move, cash is not likely to move either.
So there was a burst of borrowing from the Fed on December 15th,
which is a seasonal bottleneck.
It's the fourth quarter counterpart to September 15th
on the wholesale money market calendar.
And what the Fed reported for December 15th
was a pretty substantial 16.8 billion borrowed from its repo window
after seeing almost nothing since around December 2nd.
And that, by the way, that's the same pattern,
or at least a similar enough pattern to what happened in 2019.
It's the volatility in either the market,
where we're talking about the repo rate,
or here in the use of the Fed's repo facility lending.
It can go days without anything happening,
and then suddenly a sharp increase like on the 15th
or earlier today.
Now, the morning auction from the Fed here on Friday, December 26th,
took in 17.25 billion in bids, mostly on MBS collaterals.
The system moves into the tighter seasonal window,
the end of year window,
between the 15th and the final day of 2025.
And this is happening, keep in mind,
despite the FOMC having ended QT earlier this month
and also restarting, not QE, QE a couple of weeks ago,
focused on buying treasury bills,
which may be playing a role in the collateral side,
but we're not going to get into that here.
And by the way, with that,
the overall level of bank reserves has risen to 2.96 trillion
as of last week,
which is the highest for the Fed's bank reserves
since the middle of October.
And yet, the Fed is still lending out of its repo facility
at these high levels.
That's because demand for the Fed's window
and demand for funding overall
is not about QT, QE, or bank reserves.
It's general tightness that's being driven
by growing concerns about credit markets
and the macro economy,
despite what the GDP estimates might've shown
as I went over in my last video.
No one is buying the GDP figures,
nor are dealers lending cash or collateral
as if they think that those GDP figures
represent the real economy and its future potential.
With all that in mind, the primary focus,
the primary specific focus of all these concerns,
flat beverage in the real economy,
but private credit, shadow banking,
whatever you want to call it,
lending to and from non-depository financial institutions
as the Federal Reserve says,
that's where a lot of this risk aversion is coming from.
And as we know, it's just basic common sense.
It makes sense,
given what we know private credit providers
were doing up until more recently
and how they were doing it
given the real economy they thought was there
actually wasn't there the entire time
in the, as Gunlock said,
the garbage lending that took place during that period.
Now we've covered a bunch of times
the past several months,
how one of the biggest problems
relates to the lack of information.
As the name private credit implies,
providers really don't have to disclose all that much
and they sure don't.
Instead, what they have done
is continue to claim their portfolios are just fine.
They're awesome.
They are rock solid.
And any concerns are only about one-offs
like Tricolor, First Brands, Primalend, Bridgevoice
and all the other lone wolves that don't seem too lonely.
At this point,
we shouldn't expect them to do or say anything else.
We know they're lying.
Common sense says they're going to continue to do it.
I mean, this is why Jamie Dimon said cockroaches
and Jeff Gunlock, as I just said,
called it garbage lending.
We all know generally what's going on,
even if shadow bankers themselves
refuse to give us any specifics.
In fact, the fact that they won't open their books
is itself a key tell.
I keep saying this all goes away tomorrow
if they just disclose everything.
Prove us wrong.
Put up or shut up.
But we know they aren't going to put up.
So they actually can't shut up either.
Now we've talked enough about Blue Owl Saga
because it was the most prominent
and noticeable example.
However, they aren't the only one.
You look around at the publicly traded
private credit funds like Blue Owls,
what are called Business Development Corporations,
or BDCs.
What you find is that even the stock market is saying,
I don't believe you.
Private credit providers to a man
claim their funds are fundamentally solid.
And even stock market investors
who are preconditioned to buy that kind of propaganda
are refusing in this case.
Blue Owls BDC, for example, is tanking.
And Blue Owl, the overall asset manager,
the stock there, that's down big too.
And there are tons of others examples
who've seen their prices being cut substantially.
And one of those belongs to a name brand, KKR.
KKR is a well-known Wall Street asset manager.
And of course, it has private credit funds,
including the one that's being publicly traded.
And it too is down big, roughly 33%.
And the Wall Street Journal reported
this past week on Monday, quote,
most worrying, analysts said,
is that KKR's bad loans included
its largest single holding,
a $350 million investment in the janitorial company,
Kellermeyer Bergensen Services,
that accounted for more than 2% of the fund's assets.
That's a bad loan now?
Bad credits push KKR's non-performing loan ratio
to around 5% in September,
from 3.5% in January,
according to research done by Raymond James.
There might be more problems under the hood.
14.4% of the fund's income derives from loans
that pay interest, quote, in kind,
rather than in cash,
a sign that its borrowers are struggling
to keep current on their obligations.
And I've talked to you also many times before
about these selective defaults.
Now, there are legitimate reasons for selective defaults,
as with anything.
However, in times like this,
the tactics like PIK, payment in kind,
could instead be used to obscure bad loans
and hide the true state of private credit portfolios.
That seems to be why stock investors
are selling KKR, Blue Isle, and all the other ones,
even though they keep hearing from these companies
that everything is just fine,
including KKR's management says
there's nothing to see here too.
Going back to the Wall Street Journal article,
quote, there has been a significant amount of attention
to certain specific defaults in the broader marketplace,
according to Daniel Pietrzak,
the chief investment officer of KKR's BDC,
who told investors on an earnings call in November.
We believe those are not private credit matters.
And of course, lone wolves,
very specific situations, and names.
Not only that, the journal also throws in their article
that they think that lower interest rates
are one reason for at least part of the sell-off in BDCs.
Yeah, no.
Take a look at when the sell-off
in KKR's BDC specifically really started.
Sure enough, like repo fails,
like dealer holdings of treasuries,
right at the end of July heading into early August.
Hell of a coincidence, don't you think?
And even if you take the Wall Street Journal's
point at face value,
that lower interest rates are somehow the reason
for the BDC sell-off, or at least part of the reason,
why were interest rates, treasury yields in particular,
going lower in early August to begin with?
The aftermath of the payroll report.
Lower growth and inflation expectations.
Rising demand for safety and liquidity.
It all fits together
when you actually look at the big picture.
Any way you want to slice it,
the macroeconomic downturn in labor
is connected to growing problems
and even stock market pricing with BDCs
and private credit overall.
Not only do we have more smoke
to contribute to the billows
that are already been visible
coming out of the credit markets,
there are the liquidity consequences,
collateral consequences
that are likewise getting to be
too much to simply ignore.
Repo fails at 300 billion for the first time
out of a quarter end since June of 2023.
Dealers piling up treasury inventories.
The stock market not buying BDC shadow bankers spin.
Credit cycle cracks that are opening wider
as more information about shadow banking
continues to bubble up from the inside.
And behind it all,
the ongoing confirmation of flat beverage
because what everything here is really reacting to
are the potential consequences to an economy
where incomes are being cut back
and jobs are confirmed as being lost.
Not only those bad for workers
and therefore consumer borrowers,
they don't see anything good
about these small and mid-sized businesses
that are the focus of all this
private credit lending either.
If they have to cut back on worker incomes
and start laying off some of their employees,
it's not a good situation for these companies,
these businesses.
Now the narrative was
that since the economy didn't crash
in May after March and April,
then everything must be just fine.
Maybe that supported the entire stock market for a time,
but it wasn't nearly enough for the monetary system
and it sure didn't apply to the credit market cycle.
So as the fall turns to winter
and we say goodbye to 2025 and hello to 2026,
the smoke coming from the credit markets
and the monetary system,
that continues to get thicker and stronger,
not the economy and the markets.
Now this isn't to say that we're done with Blue Owl.
In fact, we've got more news
and more important news for Blue Owl and Oracle
that I went over in the video link below.
As always, thank you very much for joining me.
Join me in February, President's Day weekend,
Uridalu University Live,
link in the description for that,
along with our Christmas sale.
Huge thanks to Uridalu University members and subscribers
and until next time, take care.
