Tensions across the Taiwan Strait are rising fast — from dangerous air encounters to massive naval deployments. Is Beijing edging toward war, or trying to scare its rivals into backing down? In this episode, we examine why a Taiwan war has become a survival dilemma for Xi Jinping himself. From regime legitimacy and economic collapse to internal power struggles inside the PLA, this isn’t just about nationalism. It’s about whether war could save the CCP — or destroy it.
All right. Recently, tensions in the
Pacific have been rising fast, and a big
reason is the PLA's increasingly
provocative behavior. In October, a
Chinese military jet released flares
dangerously close to an Australian
surveillance aircraft over the South
China Sea. And then in November, Beijing
suddenly deployed massive numbers of
naval and coast guard vessels across
East Asian waters. At one point, more
than 100 ships. And just about a week
ago, Chinese military aircraft locked
fire control radar onto Japanese
fighters near the Mako Strait,
triggering a strong protest from Tokyo.
So, is Beijing deliberately provoking
war? There is a debate about Beijing's
intention. We first examine the
arguments for and against war. Uh, on
one side, there are at least six reasons
why Beijing is increasingly inclined
toward military operations.
First, regime legitimacy for the Chinese
Communist Party. The ambition to seize
Taiwan is not new. It's a foundational
goal dating back to the very birth of
the PRC. Taiwan's very existence
challenges the CCP's legitimacy because
the PRC is only 76 years old and the
ROC, the PE the Republic of China um is
113 years old. If anything, historically
speaking, the ROC is more qualified to
call itself the motherland. Um, so as
long as Taiwan and the ROC continue to
exist, the CCP's claim to rule all of
China remains incomplete and therefore
vulnerable. And that's why every CCP
leader, past and present, has treated
taking Taiwan as an ext existential
requirement. But under Xiinping
especially over the past couple of years
this goal has taken on a new urgency. So
that bring us to the second reason which
is it's a survival strategy. So war for
Xiinping is a possible solution to the
regime's ex existential crisis. China's
economy is deteriorating at a speed and
scale that the regime can no longer
fully control. under the trade war and
and rapidly worsening international
environment, China has been forced into
the so-called internal circulation, not
by choice. And in this suffocating
economic climate, Xiinping is running
out of options.
So, one of the last remaining tools is
war. War creates an external enemy. It
redirects public anger. It shifts blame
for economic collapse. And war allows
the regime to declare emergency powers
and manufacture political unity. Uh the
risk of starting war is also enormous
but so is the temptation. The third is
Taiwan is the price Beijing cannot
resist. Taiwan is wealthy. This year
Taiwan's exports to the US are expected
to reach $150 billion
um with a record $112 billion trade
surplus. That's mindboggling. Taiwan's
per capita GDP stands at $84,000,
higher than Japan and South Korea,
trading only Singapore and Qatar in
Asia. So, put simply, Taiwan has money
and Beijing desperately needs money.
Taiwan also has technology, right? TSMC
alone controls nearly 90% of the world's
advanced chip manufacturing. So,
Taiwan's IT sector sits at the heart of
global supply chains. And Taiwan has
talent. Decades of investment in
engineering and scientific education
have produced the highly skilled
workforce
um in Taiwan. That's exactly the kind of
talent that the CCP lacks and urgently
wants. Um so money, technology, and
talent, these three factors alone
already give Beijing the incentive to
take an enormous gamble. And then
there's an even more strategic
calculation. That's the control of the
Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan Strait is one
of the most important international
waterways in the world. If the CCP takes
Taiwan, the strait effectively becomes a
Chinese controlled inland area. Uh for
Japan and South Korea, these economies
depend heavily on this maritime lifeline
and that would mean their economic
arteries fought directly under Beijing's
control. Once the CCP occupies Taiwan
and breaks through the first island
chain, it gains the ability to act as a
regional bully across the Western
Pacific. This of course is precisely
what the US cannot and will not allow.
Let's talk about the other school. They
argue that Xiinping will not actually
start a war because it's simply too
risky. They give five reasons. First,
taking on an alliance led by Japan and
the United States gives the CCP a low
chance or no chance of victory. Xiinping
is widely believed to be extremely risk
averse and reluctant to gamble
everything and a failed military
operation in the Taiwan Strait can
topple the regime. And the second reason
is intense internal power struggles
between Xiinping and Jang Yosia has
hollowed out the chain of command in the
military. Many senior commanders across
services and theater commands are
missing under investigation or removed
and their positions remain unfilled.
There's a broken chain of command in the
PLA right now making war extremely
difficult. And the third is that the PLA
has not fought a real war in decades.
After years of corruption and brutal
political purges, morale right now is
very low. Many in the service are war
averse. And Xiinping certainly feels
fears losing control once combat begins,
including the possibility of mutiny. And
the fourth reason is war would
inevitably empower the military and its
top commander who at the moment is not
Xiinping himself but his rival Jang Yua.
So despite their life and death
political struggle, Jon has gone along
with she's war rhetoric because war
preparation brings him more resources
and strengthens the military. So both
men understand this. A real war would
tilt the internal power balance toward
General Jang. Fifth, and this is a major
reason, CCP elites have enormous wealth
parked overseas, particularly in the
United States and its ally countries. A
Taiwan war would trigger severe
international sanctions, meaning frozen
or confiscated assets in the West. These
people form uh a fierce anti-war force
within the CCP and they will do what
they can to stop Xiinping. So for all
these reasons, starting a war is an
extraordinarily difficult decision for
Xiinping. But here's the scary part. I
think whether she starts a war may not
be a fully rational decision decision at
all. It could be sudden, emotional. It
could be reactive or accidental
depending on how the front people on the
front line react to each other or react
to CCP's provocations.
Um, and that unpredictability is what
makes this situation dangerous. So, when
we step back and look at everything
together, a very uncomfortable picture
emerges. This isn't just about
nationalism or Taiwan, and it's not just
about military capability. It's about
regime survival and Xiinping holding on
to power. So from legitimacy to internal
power struggles to economic collapse,
war increasingly looks from Beijing's
perspective less like madness and more
like a calculated option. But on the
other hand, the forces within the CCP
opposing the war are also quite uh
formidable. They include the military,
the red elite families and many ordinary
people. So I think that decision to
attack can seriously backfire if they
aren't careful. So whether Xiinping
ultimately pulls the trigger or not may
come down to timing, emotion, uh or
internal shocks rather than a careful
calculation. Um, so that certainly is
exactly what should worry people uh
watching the Taiwan Strait