An American .30-06 MG-42, and GPMGs After WWII

Battlefield Firearms
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6 Video Views·Dec 3, 2025
In this video, we explore one of the most unusual post-war weapons experiments: the American attempt to adapt the German MG-42 to fire .30-06 Springfield, designated the T24. We break down why the project ultimately failed, what challenges the U.S. faced in turning the MG-42 into an American general-purpose machine gun, and how these lessons shaped post-war weapons development.
We’ll also look at why it took so long for the FN MAG—now one of the world’s most successful GPMGs—to be fully developed and adopted, and how post-WWII engineering, doctrine, and battlefield needs influenced its final form.
A deep dive into the transitional era of machine-gun history, bridging WWII innovations and the modern GPMG era.
Hi guys, thanks for tuning in to another video on ForgottenWeapons.com.
I'm Ian McCollum, and today we are going to talk briefly about
the United States' attempt to convert the MG 42 into .30-06 calibre,
as well as kind of what happened to the MG 42 after World War Two.
Why wasn't it more widely used by the Allies?
When we look at the MG 42 today, it typically has this reputation
as being one of the best machine guns of World War Two.
It was one of the first guns, well, after the MG 34, but in German service
it really kind of was the leading edge of the general-purpose,
or universal, machine gun concept actually put into practical service.
And ... both the 34 and the MG 42 served the German military very well during World War Two,
so it's a valid question, like why didn't the US put any real work into trying to duplicate that gun?
So, first off, of course, the US did make an attempt to re-engineer the gun to .30-06.
This is the T-24, and ... this didn't happen right at the beginning of the war.
It took a little bit of time before the US had actually captured some examples of the MG 42
to get an idea for what it was, to have a basis for redesigning or re-engineering it.
In 1943 there was a contract given to the Saginaw ... Steering Gear Division of GM
to re-engineer the MG 42 and produce two examples in .30-06 calibre for testing.
Now it's important, I think, to put this in a little bit of chronological context,
because at this point converting the MG 42 was not a huge priority for Saginaw.
They ... had been building a lot of Browning machine guns, 1919s in particular.
And when they got this contract to do the R&D work for the 42,
they had also just gotten a big contract to take on production of the M1 carbine.
So they had a lot going on, and they had a couple of these big projects that were well proven,
they knew they were going to make money, they could handle them.
And then someone also tosses onto their plate this experimental thing,
like, yeah, maybe we want to try out this.
So I think they actually subcontracted a lot of the engineering work,
the drafting and designing, to some other firms.
Ultimately they did produce the two requested guns, and it was something like a $24,000 contract.
So these are expensive guns to convert.
And convert is what they did.
Both of the Saginaw produced guns had mostly German parts, they still had German receivers.
The barrels of course were new, some of the feed components had been changed up to accommodate .30-06.
The buttstocks were new, interestingly, and actually a little bit shorter.
They took off the original sights, they replaced the sights on one of the guns with BAR sights
just so they could do some accuracy testing.
But by January of 1944 the two guns were delivered to Springfield for testing,
and in February of 1944 they were actually tested.
And the testing did not go well.
... Like the common view of this among people who are familiar with the T24,
if you don't know anything else you know that like they made the ejection port too small
because they didn't change it ... from 8mm Mauser length to .30-06 length,
and how could they be so stupid?
It's really not that simple.
They did extend the ejection port, however the ejection port on the MG42 isn't exactly huge to begin with.
And because they did stick with original German receivers,
there was only so much larger that they could make it.
So the guns did mostly function.
What Springfield found in testing is that they were actually pretty decent in two and three round bursts,
but they started having a lot of problems in longer sustained fire.
And specifically it was primarily failures to eject.
I've seen some speculation among knowledgeable folks
that part of this problem was actually cases coming out of the gun,
hitting the trigger guard and bouncing back in just slightly, and getting caught in the ejection port.
That's possible, obviously I haven't done any actual shooting with a T-24
because only two of them exist, so I can't say for sure.
But I do actually have the complete text of the ... trials report available on ForgottenWeapons.com.
So if you want to read through it and see exactly what every malfunction was,
I have a link to that PDF in the description text below.
Ultimately the final part of the test that the guns got to was an endurance trial.
It was supposed to be 10,000 rounds.
I should point out, by the way, only one of the two guns got to that point.
The headspace on the Number 2 gun that they got was wildly excessive.
Like someone screwed up something, and that should have been caught
before the gun was delivered to Springfield, but it wasn't.
And they ended up using the Number 2 gun basically as a source of spare parts
to keep the Number 1 gun running through the test.
In the endurance trials the gun got through just over 1,500 rounds fired,
which is OK, not bad, except that it had 51 malfunctions in the process,
which is OK, pretty bad.
So that puts us into like the spring of 1944.
At this point the war is going very well for the United States.
It doesn't look like we're actually going to lose the war with Germany.
There's not necessarily a lot of desire for a new machine gun.
In retrospect we look at this and we say,
oh, this universal general purpose machine gun concept was brilliant,
and clearly the way of the future.
But during World War Two the US wasn't using it,
and had set up all of its organisational doctrines
around the semi-automatic rifle that we had,
and the Browning light and heavy machine guns.
Remember in World War Two and into Korea,
the US is still using Browning 1917A1 water-cooled heavy machine guns
for the equivalent role that the Germans put the MG42 or 34 on a Lafette mount for.
So the US has all of the elements that it thinks are necessary.
The US also specifically thinks that the rate of fire on the MG42 is stupid,
that it's way too high.
The Browning rate of fire was about 600 rounds a minute.
When these two Saginaw .30-06 calibre T24s were built,
one of the considerations was that they needed to have a lower rate of fire.
So the goal was actually 350 rounds a minute,
down from the 1,200 to 1,500 that the MG42 was getting.
They didn't quite get that.
The production guns actually had a rate of fire about 600,
which was about the same as the Brownings.
And this also was probably something that contributed
to the unreliability of these conversions.
They had a much heavier bolt,
and ... there hadn't been any iterative testing.
They only built two guns.
To get a conversion like this working well generally requires several iterations
and, you know, a bunch of different test examples.
They put together their best effort, best kind of low effort,
effort to redesign the gun, new calibre, reduce the rate of fire.
It's not surprising that it had problems.
What really was the reason that the 42 wasn't further worked on in US services
didn't seem to be a whole lot of need for it.
The US Army considered the Brownings to be more reliable guns.
They preferred the rate of fire.
They had the gun already in production.
And objectively looking at the war, they're like,
why should we adopt the guns that the losing side is using?
Because it doesn't seem to be hurting us at this point.
Alright, now let's talk about what happened after World War Two.
So in the wake of the war, of course, there would be a bunch of small arms development and R&D
based on what are the lessons that we learned from this big war?
How do we apply them to a new generation of small arms?
However, this would not happen immediately.
Some of the R&D would start happening immediately,
but the incentive to actually start re-arming,
re-equipping military forces on a large scale didn't exist in the late 40s.
There was a ton of war material already out there.
It didn't look like it was going to be in imminent need.
Just, you know what, we've spent enough money, let's like rebuild all the countries,
rebuild people's economies,
rather than immediately go out and try and replace all our small arms.
So the US would stick with the Browning machine guns and the BAR.
Through the Korean War, all of those were in service.
And the Brownings in particular were very much liked in service in Korea.
There still didn't seem to be, within US Army doctrine,
a real need for a new general purpose style of machine gun.
Ultimately that would come.
1954 is when the US Army formally started looking for a GPMG,
and what they would adopt would be the M60.
Now the M60 of course had been in development for a while,
and it was fundamentally in the action of the FG-42
combined with the feed system of the MG-42.
So we do see some use of elements of the MG-42 in post-war American small arms.
Now if we look at other countries, we're going to see the British
went and started investigating the Taden gun,
which was going to be in .280 calibre,
and it was going to be the light machine gun counterpart to the EM-2 rifle.
And that was effectively a belt-fed Bren gun.
That would get scrapped when the EM-2 got scrapped.
They didn't think it would be effective to convert it to 7.62 NATO.
Which brings me to 7.62 NATO,
which for a lot of the Western powers was kind of a big hang-up.
Once you see that the NATO organization is developing
and wants to have small arms standardization,
it doesn't make a lot of sense to go and spend a lot of money
adopting something that might very well get changed
within just a couple years if NATO decides to adopt something different.
So I think we see a bit of stagnation,
or a bit of hesitation, on small arms development
while waiting for at least NATO calibre decisions,
what would ultimately become the 7.62mm NATO.
There are a couple of countries that went ahead and continued,
well, a lot of course, continued to use existing World War Two hardware.
There are a few that took that and converted it to other cartridges,
Scandinavia in particular.
Norway converted MG-34s to .30-06.
Norway actually looked at converting MG-42s to ... .30-06 shortly after the war.
They did actually order a couple thousand barrels,
but there appears to have been a miscommunication
within the Norwegian military community.
They actually ended up selling off their stock of MG-42s,
and then ordering conversion barrels,
and then ultimately they would convert the MG-42 barrels
into .30-06 calibre MG-34 barrels.
Long story, but the Norwegians kind of bypassed converting the .42 for that reason.
The Finns actually looked at converting the MG-42 into 7.62x54 rimmed,
and they did this during World War Two.
They were actually testing that conversion in 1943,
and for them it worked really well, as one kind of might expect that it could.
The big challenge in that was developing a push-through belt for the .54 rimmed cartridge,
which Arne Olahti, brother of Aimo Olahti, successfully pulled off.
And the Finns were ready to adopt that.
They wanted to buy a couple thousand MG-42 receivers from the Germans to build the guns on.
This was now, by this time 1944, Germany rejected that request,
probably because while they were producing a lot of .42s,
they wanted to keep them all for themselves.
So that conversion never ended up happening, but it could have.
There are a couple of these MG-42 conversions that
not quite the right place at the right time, but otherwise had potential.
A little bit of a funny anecdote, the German Bundeswehr retained the MG-42
and then went to purchase new ones from Rheinmetall in the 50s after the war,
once they were allowed to start rearming.
Interestingly, Rheinmetall, like Grossfuss, the guy who had originally gotten,
like the designer of the MG-42, came to Rheinmetall and basically said,
hey, you're building guns on my patent, you owe me a royalty.
And Rheinmetall went back to him and went, what are you talking about?
Like this gun was developed by the Wehrmacht, ... they did all the development,
it's ... we don't owe you a royalty, the Wehrmacht took care of all that.
And Grossfuss came back and went, well, well, so you're basically just saying
that the Bundeswehr is the modern incarnation of the Wehrmacht, right?
And the Bundeswehr went, hmm, here are your royalties, ... let's not talk about that.
So the Germans would continue to use the MG-42, and then the MG-3 which came ... well
after the war, after NATO had adopted the 7.62 NATO cartridge.
If we look at the French, a country that wasn't, as it turned out,
going to be all that interested or concerned about NATO standardisation,
they also tested the MG-42. And when the French went to develop a new
general purpose machine gun after the war, and they had better reason to do so quickly than
most of the other countries, because as of World War Two the French were still using
the Hotchkiss 1914 as their heavy gun. That was well and truly obsolete by that point,
it was still using the 8mm Lebel cartridge, which ... they really just needed to get rid
of that thing after World War Two. So they examined the MG-42s.
Once they started a machine gun trial, one of the guns that was presented
was basically a French version of the MG-42. Ultimately they didn't take that,
they went with a ... retarded blowback, or delayed blowback gun instead, made by Châtellerault.
Which, however, used the MG-42 feed system and also the MG-42 trigger mechanism.
So we do see the MG-42's influence ... continuing to see use in France.
And then of course probably the elephant in the room is the FN MAG,
which is the gun that much of NATO did end up adopting. So where did the MAG come from?
Well, mechanically speaking the FN MAG is basically an upside down BAR that is
belt-fed instead of magazine-fed. There had been a lot of experiments with producing a
belt-fed version of the BAR. The US started experimenting with that as early as 1933.
None of the guns were quite all that reliable, not quite successful. They kept iterating them,
and in fact the US was experimenting with that right up through the middle of World War Two
before they finally gave up on it and said, look, we've spent a lot of time, we've done a lot of
iterations on this design, and we just can't quite get it to the point where it's reliable,
and actually better than our Browning light and heavy machine guns. So we'll just, OK,
fine, forget about it. In 1944 the US stopped working on that project.
After the war it would come back. The Swedes, who of course had a licence to build the BAR,
the Swedes started experimenting with a belt-fed version of the BAR, because they thought that
would be a really good weapon for them. They were unable to get it to work reliably,
and they went to FN in the 1950s to say, hey, ... you're the people who know about the BAR,
you know, we bought our licence from you, you make these, you've been working on them for decades,
would you be interested in doing a belt-fed version of the BAR for us? And FN looked at that
project and said, well, yes, yes, I think we can do that. And so FN took the project on,
and ... that gun was designed by, basically, Dudion Saussure's protégé, the guy who took over from
him. And it was introduced in 1957, and FN managed to make that thing very reliable and very
successful. And we would see that gun finally get adopted by, really, by a lot of the smaller
countries. So a lot of the big countries, the major military powers, would go other directions.
The US went to the M60, the Germans kept the MG42, the Austrians would keep the MG42,
the Italians would keep the MG42, the French developed the AA-52 on their own.
The British are a little bit of an outlier here in that ... they actually were testing
... they wanted to test the MG42. They found that British proof loads were a bit stronger than
German proof loads, and they had some issues with kabooms before they even had a chance to test the
guns. And then ... they also had their own version of a belt-fed Bren that was looking decent.
But they kind of put that all on hold, pending NATO cartridge adoption. And then when they finally
did start testing guns, they had access to ... FN mags, and the FN mag ended up winning their trial.
So the British would adopt that. The Russians of course are on a different cartridge system,
so they're not really part of this question. But they would adopt the PK in 1961, which is
the same concept as the MG42 in a universal machine gun. So ultimately what I'm kind of
rambling around saying is that the universal machine gun concept would ultimately be seen as
the modern next step in small arms development and, you know, small unit organisation.
But there would be a window of ... 10 to 15 years before it would actually happen.
And that comes from the economic cost of World War Two, delaying any sort of real adoption of
new firearms, along with the development of NATO and its standardisation, ... incentivising people
to wait, figure out what the standard is going to be, and then start adopting, then figure out
what gun you're going to use. And just the development cycle of firearms. 10 years is
kind of a good rule of thumb to actually develop a fully functional new military small arm.
If you look at the development cycle of rifles, machine guns, submachine, maybe a little less on
the submachine guns, but rifles and machine guns, if it takes a lot less than 10 years, chances are
the gun's going to have some problems once it actually comes into service. If we look at the AK,
you know, ... the AKM isn't around until the mid-50s, despite being in development from
the late 40s. About 10 years there ... well, the M60 takes about 10 years, the M14 takes about 10 years.
The FN FAL is introduced in the early 50s, but its development begins
1944-1945, with some of the FN developmental work being done in Britain. So it's not surprising to me
that since it wasn't decided to adopt just a simple conversion of the MG42, any new gun is going to
take, call it, 10 years before it's really effective and in a position to be adopted on a wide scale.
So, that has been a little bit rambly, I think, but hopefully there's some interesting information
in there for you guys. Hopefully you enjoyed watching. Thank you, and we'll be back tomorrow
with another Forgotten Weapon.
