Xi’s Secret ‘Private Army’ Collapses! Zhang Youxia Shatters Every Counteroffensive?

Zhongnanhai is shaking. After the fourth plenary session, a series of signs suggest that severe turmoil is unfolding within the top ranks of the Chinese Communist Party. Military heavyweights who were once pillars of power have suddenly fallen from grace, while newly promoted figures have disappeared without explanation. Then came a shocking revelation from Professor Kai Xia, a former lecturer at the Central Party School, which set off waves of speculation. The long-hidden secrets of power are beginning to surface. Beneath the calm exterior, China appears to be entering its most significant power reshuffle since the era of Deng Xiaoping, one in which Xi Jinping may no longer be the player holding the cards, but rather the final piece on the chessboard of his own making. On October 25, Professor Kai Xia, a former lecturer at the Chinese Communist Party's Central Party School, made a stunning revelation. She disclosed that Miao Hua, former director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, and He Weidong, former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, had secretly established a private armed force in Langfang, Hebei province. This force reportedly operates completely outside the existing theater commands and military regions of the CCP and is independent of the regular army structure. Officially, it is described as a deputy division-level unit, but its weaponry and military resources are said to rival those of a deputy corps-level formation. In other words, it is a low-ranking but heavily armed model. Even more unusual is its command chain. The unit does not report through any formal PLA command structure but instead takes direct orders from Miao Hua and He Weidong. No other military body has the authority to mobilize or interfere with it. For this reason, the existence of this force has been kept under strict secrecy. However, given Professor Cai Xia's long experience within the CCP system and her extensive high-level connections, she is said to have access to credible insider information. She revealed that she had known about this matter for some time but had never made it public. Multiple independent sources had confirmed to her that Miao Hua and He Weidong had indeed built a private military force in Longfang, supposedly on behalf of Xi Jinping, to control or maintain power in his name. This development is believed to have begun in 2024 after Xi Jinping reportedly lost his grip on power. Before that, there had been no sign of such a force. When Xi no longer controlled the regular military command system, Zhang Yuxia assumed full operational authority over the army. In that context, Xi's two loyalists, Miao Hua and He Weidong, devised a plan to secretly cultivate a private armed force for Xi with a clear objective to prepare for a counterattack and, when the moment was right, to march into Beijing and overthrow Zhang Yuxia. In essence, Miao Hua and He Weidong created a personal army for Xi Jinping, operating completely outside the formal military hierarchy. The reason they chose Longfang in Hebei province as the base was its proximity to Beijing, which allowed for rapid mobilization in an emergency, both to protect Xi Jinping and to carry out covert military operations if necessary. Some commentators believe that although this force operates independently in practice, it remains camouflaged within the official military command structure. In other words, its existence is concealed by being embedded within a legitimate unit. Specifically, the force is said to be hidden under the name of the Information Support Troops, a unit with a technical function that serves as a legal cover for Xi Jinping's private army. The Information Support Troops fall under the General Staff Department of the Central Military Commission and maintain close ties with the CCP's Military Intelligence Agency, which was previously overseen by Miao Hua in his role as head of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission. Thanks to the covert nature and concealment capabilities of the intelligence system, this secret force can use the Information Support Troops as its outward disguise, while the CCP's Military Intelligence Agency serves as its executor and direct operator. All of the force's activities bypass the formal military hierarchy and are commanded entirely through military intelligence channels. On the surface, the force appears to be established and run through official military procedures with orders that seem legitimate. In reality, however, it answers only to Miao Hua, as the entire chain of command is controlled by the military intelligence network under his authority. Globally, intelligence agencies in any country wield power and capabilities far beyond the public's imagination, and the CCP's Military Intelligence Service is no exception. With access to top-secret and highly sensitive information, such agencies can use that intelligence to manipulate or threaten other powerful figures. For this reason, intelligence is always the area that rulers seek to control most tightly. Conversely, if a leader loses control of the intelligence apparatus, they can easily become a victim of it. During Miao Hua's tenure, the CCP's Military Intelligence Service reportedly operated with a high degree of independence, secrecy, and autonomy, enough to directly coordinate Xi Jinping's private armed force through covert channels. With the CCP's October 17 announcement that nine generals from Xi's faction had fallen, observers believe that the fate of this secret army is now equally grim. That explains why Professor Caixia chose to reveal the matter only now. Had she spoken earlier, the risks would have been enormous. Her decision to go public at this moment suggests that deep and possibly earth-shaking shifts have occurred within the CCP's top ranks. The fact that Jiang Yuxia was able to officially announce the names of the nine fallen generals aligned with Xi, and that, during the fourth plenary session, eight of them were formally stripped of their central committee titles and expelled from the party, all point to the same conclusion. Xi Jinping has completely lost his ability to fight back. His power base has been dismantled, leaving him with no room for counteraction. So does Xi Jinping still hold real power after the fourth plenary session? Xinhua News Agency still publishes large photos of him. His slogans still echo everywhere. But as commentator Li Dayu noted, don't be fooled by appearances. The more you look at the surface, the more deceived you become. Everyone wants Xi to keep carrying the burden. No one is willing to inherit the mess he's left behind. But finding a successor is not easy. Another possible reason is that, due to certain complications in power arrangements and internal control within the CCP, they have not yet been able to make any official announcement. Can Xi Jinping still turn the tide? The chances are very slim. Jiang Yuxia controls the regular army, and the Central Guard Bureau, responsible for protecting top leaders, is now also under his influence, since its chief, Zhou Hongxu, is Jiang's ally. Overthrowing Jiang would be extremely difficult. Moreover, Jiang Yuxia is a battle-hardened soldier with real combat experience. He comes from a long line of military men. His father, Jiang Zongxun, was a general in the PLA, and he grew up in a military and aerospace environment, essentially as a career soldier. His entire family belongs to the military elite. As such, Jiang deeply understands how to control the armed forces, how to outmaneuver rivals, and how to handle any secret forces loyal to Xi. Anyone else might already have been defeated by now, but Jiang remains firmly in command. Xi has virtually no path to reverse the situation. Adding to this, commentator Li Dayu revealed that former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xu Qiliang, personally led an armed team to arrest Jiang Yuxia, but was shot dead on the spot. Officially, Xu's death was attributed to a sudden heart attack. Yet this explanation raises many doubts. Xu was only in his early 70s, relatively young by CCP leadership standards, and given his rank, had access to the best possible medical care. It's implausible that he would be left without a medical team or emergency treatment nearby. He was known to jog regularly, always accompanied by guards and medical staff. How could such a person simply drop dead from a heart attack without help? Furthermore, as a former Air Force officer, Xu was in excellent physical condition. Air Force personnel must meet extremely high health standards. His chances of sudden cardiac death were exceedingly low. The far more likely scenario, according to Li Dayu, is that Xu was killed during a failed counter-strike. He took up his weapon, led a squad to capture Jiang Yuxia, and was gunned down. Since July of last year, anyone who has tried to fight back has reportedly been eliminated by Jiang. The situation is reminiscent of Hua Guofeng's downfall. Hua once held the top three positions in China, General Secretary, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and President, seemingly concentrating all power in his hands. In reality, however, true power rested with Deng Xiaoping. Within two years, Hua was quietly persuaded to step aside. When Mao Zedong famously said, I'm at ease when my comrades handle things. Some later joked that it should have been, when my comrades handle things, I'm finished, mocking not Hua personally, but the inherent instability of the CCP's political system. Today, Xi Jinping appears to be walking the same path as Hua Guofeng, gradually being sidelined from power. According to Li Dayu, Xi actually lost real authority long ago. What we're seeing now is merely a slow public acknowledgement of that fact. Xi is reluctant to let the truth show, so he continues to act. Even at the fourth plenary session. In substance, has he introduced any new policies? Have any of his close allies been promoted? It's been over a year, and the answer is no. Once, Xi wielded immense authority. He promoted generals every few days, appointed loyalists at will, and unleashed wolf warrior diplomats to roar at the United States. But now, for over a year, there has been complete silence. No appointments, no promotions, no visible moves at all. In fact, there are now many unusual signs within the top ranks of the Chinese Communist Party, CCP. Two points in particular stand out. First, after the conclusion of the CCP's fourth plenary session on October 23rd, China held a major military parade. Strangely, however, the parade's chief commander was not the Central Theater Command's commander, Wang Qian, as tradition dictates. Instead, the role was filled by a relatively unknown figure, the commander of the Central Theater Air Force. Yet Wang Qian himself was present at the plenary session, indicating that he had not been disciplined or purged. This suggests that Wang Qian may have refused to lead the parade as an act of defiance toward Xi Jinping. A military parade is typically a key display of the supreme leader's authority, so the absence of the usual commanding officer was a highly unusual signal. In other words, while everything appeared normal on the surface, it actually reflected deep divisions within the upper echelons of power. Second, on the same day, October 23rd, Jiang Shengmin was appointed vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, replacing He Weidong, who had recently fallen. However, just one day later, on October 24th, when the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection held a meeting, Jiang Shengmin was absent, and there were no military representatives present at all. State broadcaster CCTV aired footage confirming this. Observers see two possible explanations. One, after his appointment as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, Jiang Shengmin may have stepped down from his previous role as secretary of the Military Discipline Inspection Commission, which would explain his absence. Two, alternatively, fierce internal power struggles may have prevented him from appearing publicly. Another example of instability at the top was the funeral of physicist Yang Zhenning, which also displayed several irregularities. All these signs suggest that, even after the fourth plenary session, the CCP's leadership remains in a state of serious turbulence. Furthermore, Jiang Shengmin's promotion without being admitted to the Politburo has also raised suspicions. However, this may not be as puzzling as it seems. It was likely a military decision made independently of the party's central process. At present, the military appears to be operating outside the CCP Central Committee's usual procedures. Normally, such replacements and promotions would only be formalized at the party's 21st National Congress, at which point he could officially enter the Politburo. What do you think of these revelations? Leave your thoughts in the comments below. Thank you, and see you next time.