Kursk: The Tank Battle That Decided The Future Of The World

The armies facing each other in the Kursk salient in the late spring of 1943 knew the vital importance of victory in the coming battle. The halting of the Russian offensive in March had brought a lull to the southern sector of the Russian front. An area that had seen horrific and savage fighting for more than six blood-soaked months. As the German intention to attack became clear, an intense period of preparation began. For the two opposing armies. The halting of the German advances at Stalingrad seriously affected German morale. But the stunning victory in the face of defeat at Kharkov in March 1943 helped to restore faith in the task at hand. The Russians were keen to make the most of their Stalingrad victory, and were confident that they were finally starting to defeat the German forces. Their plans suffered a setback at Kharkov, and after this intensive battle, both sides drew their breath and prepared for the next phase of the struggle. The lull that descended over this region allowed the plans to be drawn up, and the preparations to begin. Neither the Russians nor the Germans had infinite resources, and it was imperative that one side or the other secured a decisive victory. Hitler and Stalin, Zhukov and Manstein knew how critical the situation was, and they began to put their plans into action. The brilliant tactician Zhukov commanded the Russians. He wasted no time in taking the measures needed to defeat the Germans. After all, he was familiar with the tactics employed by the invaders, and had been instrumental in their biggest setbacks to date. As a defensive strategy had been decided upon, the first steps were to prepare defensive positions, from which the Red Army would be able to halt and destroy the German forces. The only way that this would be possible for the overstretched Red Army of 1943 would be by enlisting the help of the civilian population. In the now secure Riga areas, the repair of installations damaged or destroyed in the towns recently recaptured began in earnest. With a focus on the need to move vast supplies, feverish work on bridges, road and rail networks was undertaken. The main rail line into Kursk, from the east, was a hive of activity. Closer to the front line, work also began on the vast defensive belts that were later to entrap the Germans. In all, the Russians prepared a total of five main defensive lines. The first two lines ran around the perimeter of the pocket, to a depth of around 10 to 12 miles, and were situated close to each other. The remaining lines were spaced apart, and ran to a depth of over 150 miles in total. Zhukov was clearly taking no chances. Within these defensive lines, construction began on individual positions that were to blunt the expected strong German armoured attacks. Hundreds of thousands of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines were sent to the area. Cheap, easy to manufacture, but highly effective, these devices were planted in huge quantities. Estimates suggest a figure of up to 5,000 mines per mile of front. Other tried and tested measures, such as anti-tank ditches and barbed wire, were also widely employed. The intention was to draw in, hold up, and then destroy the attacker. Overall, it was an excellent demonstration of what could be achieved by the effective use of the engineering skills and materials at hand. History Hit is a streaming platform that is just for history fans, with fantastic documentaries covering fascinating figures and moments in history from all over the world. From the Battle of Trafalgar and the Revolutionary Era, right through to the Second World War. If you are looking for your next military history fix, then this is the service for you. We're committed to bringing history fans award-winning documentaries and podcasts that you cannot find anywhere else. Sign up now for a free trial, and War Stories fans get 50% off their first three months. Just be sure to use the code WARSTORIES at checkout. Although the Zitadelle plan was approved in early May, the start date was continually delayed. Hitler's desire to leave no room for error saw him postpone again and again. Various factors caused these delays. One was the production of the new Panther tanks. These delays only helped the preparations of the Russian defences, that were very apparent to the German reconnaissance aircraft that flew over and photographed the area countless times. All the while, the highly efficient Lucy spy ring continued to feed the Soviets with accurate information, telling the Soviets exactly where and when the Germans would strike. The aerial phase of the coming battle was to assume an importance almost equal to the fighting on land. The number of aircraft that did battle was vast, with around 2,000 planes on the German side, lined up against almost 3,000 on the Russian. The Russian air force had improved steadily since the 1941 German invasion, and they were, by this stage of the war, a well-equipped and well-organized force. They had also managed to gain a vital numerical superiority over the Luftwaffe. In the run-up to the battle, the Luftwaffe flew many aerial missions. During June, they destroyed over 300 Russian planes by various means. Their aim was to secure the Aurel sector. As the battle got underway, the Luftwaffe became heavily involved. On the 9th of July, the 1st Air Division actually attacked an armored Russian spearhead near the main Aurel to Bryansk railway, and they managed to blunt this potentially dangerous development. When they flew away at the end of the day, hundreds of Soviet tanks lay shattered or in flames. In the south also, the Luftwaffe assisted in the advance of the panzer forces, helping to avoid catastrophe on more than one occasion. For Kursk, four main Russian air armies were available. The 16th Air Army was responsible for the northern sector of the pocket, and the 2nd Air Army provided cover in the south. Nearby was the 17th Air Army, with the 15th Air Army situated further back. The number of planes available to the Russians was evenly split three ways. Approximately 1,000 bombers, 1,000 ground attack, and 1,000 fighter planes were available for the coming clash. Facing the Russian pilots were two German air groups. Luftflotte 6 was situated with Model's forces of Army Group Center in the north, whilst Luftflotte 4 was placed near Hoth's 4th Army in the south. The disposition of the German air groups in this area produced a ratio of two bombers, and one fighter. Like all parts of the German armed services, the Luftwaffe had suffered massive losses over the previous two years. The numerical superiority enjoyed by the Russians also severely hampered German attempts to retain control. Underneath their protective air umbrellas, the soldiers and tank crews on the ground busied themselves with their preparation. Zhukov poured huge amounts of men and materials into the area, and great emphasis was placed on the use of artillery. No fewer than 20,000 artillery pieces would be used during this coming battle. Like mines, artillery pieces were easier and cheaper to manufacture than tanks. The numbers of Russian soldiers sent into the Kursk salient area exceeded 1.3 million. In the north of the salient was the Central Front, under the command of General Rokossovsky. In the south was the Voronezh Front, commanded by General Vatutin. In reserve, behind the salient, was the Steppe Front, under the control of General Konev. The bulk of the Soviet armor was placed incorrectly in the northern sector of the salient, as the Russians felt this area would receive the hardest blow. This would cause problems for Zhukov in the early stages of the battle. Some 900,000 German soldiers were committed to the Battle of Kursk. Not only were they outnumbered from the outset, they also bore the burden of having to take the offensive. The German forces were positioned under the personal supervision of Hitler. From the Army Group Center, the 9th Army in the north, under Field Marshal Model, had five corps to call upon. In the sector of Army Group South was General Hoth's 4th Panzer Army. To Hoth's right were Army Detachment Kempf. The deposition of the new panzers reflected the emphasis of the south in the German attack plan. Around 90 Tigers and just over a hundred of the new Panther tanks were to be found in this region. This was by far the biggest gathering of the new generation of German tanks, and much was expected of them. The plan of attack was simple. It was to smash through the Russian defenses and meet behind Kursk. But one important factor was missing. An effective reserve force. This was no longer possible for the Germans at this stage in the war. Although the Russians were receiving intelligence information from the Lucy spy ring, this was at a higher level and did not give enough detail on the front line changes that occurred. The sheer sizes of the opposing armies involved made it impossible to conceal them effectively. The increasing aerial armada was put to good use, as extensive reconnaissance from the air was carried out. The Germans actually commented that they had photographed every piece of the intended battlefield area in the run-up to the start date. The main defensive measures used by the Russians could be seen from the air, but the more detailed gun emplacements were still expertly hidden. A number of dummy positions were constructed as a time-tested means of fooling the enemy. German confidence was running high and nothing they saw altered their decision to attack. The Russians also used information gathered from captured prisoners. Special raids were carried out in order to snatch prisoners for this purpose. The Germans too used this type of information gathering. Before any major operation, the radio traffic passing among the enemy units increased dramatically, with specially trained troops intercepting it. It is impossible to know fully the intentions of the enemy, but through the use of these various methods, a clearer picture of their plans can be determined. By the 5th of July 1943, everything was in place. The vast quantities of men, tanks, ammunition, guns and planes were in their positions. Every person from the infantry right up to army group commanders was in a state of anticipation and excitement. The reliable information provided to the Soviet sources revealed the date and the time of the German attack, which was further confirmed by captured German prisoners. Zhukov therefore planned a huge pre-emptive artillery strike against the German positions. The aim was to catch the Germans as they began to assemble, and thus deliver a severe psychological blow to the enemy, even before a shot had been fired. In the central front area, the Russian artillery opened up and for almost an hour, hundreds of guns fired towards the suspected enemy emplacements. In the north, Modell's forces quickly recovered from the Russian barrage and began to reply with their own artillery attack. And over the northern part of the Kursk salient, the noises, flashes of light, death and destruction reached a ferocious intensity. The actual losses suffered by both sides were not as high as expected. The difficulty was that the artillery strike on the enemy was made during the hours of darkness and positions were not known in detail. The effects of the strike could not be seen from the ground, nor more importantly from the air, which meant that correction action could not be taken. Zhukov had taken a gamble by ordering the artillery strike, and it was soon discovered that the results fell short of expectations. As this duel between the two sides continued, elements of Luftflotte 6 arrived to begin ferocious attacks on suspected Russian positions. Amid the thunder of exploding shells, the German infantry and panzers moved out against the enemy lines. Almost immediately, Modell's troops ran into the well-prepared Russian killing zones. The snail-like pace of the German attack helped the Russians to inflict losses on the Germans with ease. Modell was fast discovering that the Russian forces presented a virtual brick wall in the path of his advance. He urged his troops forward to try and discover a weak point in the Russian lines. The German plan had given the main Orel-to-Kursk railway as the advance line, and the town of Ponyri as the first major objective. But this was changed as the strength of the defences became clear, and the main emphasis of the attack was shifted towards Olkhovatka, further west. The first day's fighting had achieved an advance of only six miles. The push towards Olkhovatka continued on the second day of battle. The enemy defences near Ponyri on the left flank were too strong for the Germans to achieve a breakthrough, and Modell had to push on in any direction possible. Russian reserves had been moved towards this area during the night of the 5th of July, and they began to commit themselves to the battle on the 6th. As daylight broke over this northern area, both sides locked together in a bitter struggle to gain their separate objectives. The Tiger tanks of the 505th Schwerer Abteilung were fully committed to the battle by the anxious Germans. They slammed into the Soviet defences and the increasing number of Soviet forces moving into the area, but made limited headway, as the defensive measures employed by Rosakovsky had been well planned. They had to cope with the infantry's T-34s, anti-tank guns, and anti-tank rifles. Slowly, the Tiger tank losses mounted, reducing their effectiveness and, more importantly, their influence on the battle. Russian aircraft had also begun to make their presence felt by attacking German targets. German and Russian pilots duelled for control of the skies over the northern sector. The Soviet defensive wall in the northern part of the salient slowed Modell's advance to a mere crawl. These delays kept his forces contained within a relatively small area, thus helping the Russians to plan effective countermeasures. But the Russians did not have it all their own way. The Germans fought well. Luftflotte 6 flew countless sorties over the northern part of the battlefield and helped to inflict losses on the ever-increasing number of Russian forces moving into the area. The German troops on the ground moved slowly towards Olkhovatka, as the forces of Rokossovsky rushed forward to intercept them. Modell's forces managed to take control of Ponry on the left flank and also the town of Teploy on the right flank. These advances represented the furthest points reached in the northern sector by the forces of Modell's Ninth Army. The Russian defences, in weight of numbers, presented Modell with a barrier that he failed to penetrate. It was now apparent that the forces available to Modell were insufficient to smash through the Russian lines. The new Ferdinands had also proved inadequate during the fight. A design flaw had failed to fit the new heavy tank destroyers with any close-support machine guns. As they became separated from the supporting infantry and bogged down in the Russian defences, enemy troops were able to close right up alongside them and easily disable them. The Tigers were also not suited to close-quarter fighting, where their superior guns could not be used effectively. Ferocious battles raged over the area as both sides sought an advantage, but none was gained. The area descended into stalemate over the next few days. The total distance covered by Modell's Ninth Army in the northern sector of the Kursk salient during Zitadell was around 12 miles. The capture of Kursk, if achieved, would not be sufficient to defeat the Russian forces in this area. Modell's forces were contained in an area that was around 40 miles short of their target. If Kursk were to fall to Hoth's men, a gap of this size would allow the Russians to pour reinforcements into the salient at their will. Powerless to influence the battle any further, Modell contented himself with holding on to the areas already captured. The German forces in the north had been stalled, but the real focus of this most historic of battles was in the south. In the southern sector, Hoth's Fourth Army enjoyed the largest concentration of tanks under the control of the best divisions in the German order of battle. The 4th of July, 1943, saw a different start for Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army. Hoth decided to jump ahead of the planned start date of the attack. Aircraft from Luftflotte 4 began the attack on the enemy-held positions, followed by a German artillery barrage. As this barrage lifted, the infantry and tanks moved forward to engage the enemy, and throughout the day, the front line was pushed back in favour of the Germans. The fighting was heavy, and in some areas, the objectives given were not taken until the hours of darkness. This was the first in a series of setbacks for the Russians in the south. These setbacks accumulated steadily over the next few days. The 5th of July began with the 4th Panzer Army in control of the vital high ground. Hoth was keen to get things moving, and he began the next stage of his plan. He ordered a change to the planned route of advance so that the main advance would be moving more to the left. This change was not apparent to Vertutin or Stavka, as Hoth had made his decision without consulting higher command, and therefore Lucie did not pick it up. The German artillery in the southern region was therefore able to deliver its attack first. As this was happening, the Russian air force was on its way to attack the German airfields. But the Germans detected their approach and quickly sent their own planes to intercept. An intensive air battle ensued over the southern part of the salient as the German fighters tore into the Russian formations. At the end of the engagement, the Luftwaffe of Luftflotte 4 was in control of the air. Against this backdrop, the panzers moved forward. The removal of the aerial threat and the fact that the Russian ground units were expecting a different focus of attack allowed the German tanks to smash through the defensive positions. The Russians realized that they were wrong in their estimates of the disposition of the enemy armored foundations, and that they were about to bear the brunt of the strong enemy forces lined up in front of them. The Germans were using a new tactic based on the new heavy tanks, which was known as a panzer keel or armored wedge. This tactic placed the heavier Tigers at the tip of the wedge with the Panthers forming the outer edges. The weaker Panzer IVs and Panzer IIIs were placed in the center of the wedge. The Russians were not prepared for the rate of the German advances. Their defensive positions did inflict losses on the Germans and they held fast in many areas. By the end of the first day, some of the 4th Panzer Army had advanced up to 15 miles. This was more than Model's forces managed in eight days. It could have been much further, but late changes of orders meant that insufficient time had been left for mine clearance. An enraged General Guderian watched as many of his priceless German Tigers were needlessly destroyed by mines. By the end of the third day's fighting, the Germans had made an advance of around 20 miles. This was beginning to cause concern for the Russians. So much that they ordered the 5th Guards Tank Army and other reserves to be moved from the step front and into the area of Prokhorovka. The main defensive sector for the Russians was the town of Oboyan, 35 miles south of Kursk. The Russians had placed strong forces in this area as they were aware of the importance of holding this town. This was the left flank of Hoth's attack plan. The strength of the defences around this area became clear to the Germans and Hoth decided to switch the emphasis of his attacks to the east. The Sel River, which runs between Oboyan and Prokhorovka, became the focus for the SS-Turkenkopf Division. The SS-Liebstandarte Division would take the centre and the SS-Division Das Reich would hold the right flank. By the time they got to Prokhorovka, the Russians had already placed their reserves. The ferociousness of the preceding day's fighting was about to be dwarfed in scale and intensity. The right flank of the German advance in the south consisted of Army Detachment Kempf. To start with, they would advance directly east, below the town of Belgorod. They would then change direction and advance north to link with the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. The first obstacle for Kempf's men was the Donets River, which ran through Belgorod and along the front of the planned route of advance. Kempf's men fought well and by the end of the first day, they had crossed the river and set up a defensive horseshoe position. Their advance continued over the next few days, despite increasing resistance. Hoth's plan envisaged a link-up between his men and Kempf's men around Prokhorovka, a move that would have put the Germans in a very strong position. The drawback to this plan was that by the 11th of July, Kempf's forces were situated roughly 12 miles south of the intended target. They still had a lot of ground to cover and the possibility loomed that they would be unable to resist the struggle towards Prokhorovka. The upper reaches of the Donets River also stretched towards Prokhorovka, which meant that Kempf's men would have to force a crossing of this river a second time. The task ahead of them was difficult, but this did not prevent them from continuing with their attempts. As the decisive battle raged around Prokhorovka on the 12th of July, Kempf's men were positioned about 10 miles short of this objective. They did not actually link up with the 2nd SS Panzer Corps until three days later. This was too late to assist in the decisive battle and too late to change Hitler's decision regarding the future course of this engagement. The two armies were now on a direct collision course. The Russians knew of the armor-led force bearing down on them and were ready to meet and destroy the threat. The Germans, however, were not aware of the strong enemy concentration of tanks that was facing them. The Russians had managed to place around 850 of their tanks in the surrounding area. The Germans had around 300 usable tanks advancing directly in the battle zone with a further 230 fighting to their left. Hoth felt that he had inflicted serious losses on the Russians and was expecting a quick victory that would open the way for a rapid advance. The Russians knew it was vital to hold on and moved their important reserves from Konev's area to Prokhorovka. The dawn of the 12th of July would see an unprecedented clash of tanks that would decide the outcome of the whole campaign. Before the tanks played their part, the customary aerial attacks began and the German planes swooped in on enemy positions. The next stage was an artillery attack delivered by the Russians towards the German lines. And while the shells rained down, the Russian tanks broke out of their positions. This move coincided with the start of the German tank advance. Neither side would have foreseen or planned what occurred next. The two tank advances smashed into each other head on. From this point onwards, all control of the battle disappeared and total confusion set in. The planes and artillery that would have usually joined in the battle were rendered impotent as the close proximity of the machines and the swirling dust clouds made it impossible to tell friend or foe apart. Rather than risk destroying their own machines, the air forces of both sides were left with no option other than to let the tanks get on with the battle. The German Tigers and Panthers could not make effective use of their long-range guns and to their horror, they discovered that the Russian tanks were able to penetrate their armour at this short range. Another tactic employed by the numerically superior Russians was to drive straight into the German tanks and ram them, completely destroying both machines and their occupants. The Soviets knew that their tanks could always be replaced, but for the Germans, at the limit of their capability, each Tiger lost was lost forever. As the Germans desperately sought a line of advance through the storm, the failure of Kemp's forces to reach the battle area was having deadly consequences for them. The battle ebbed and flowed all day with no decisive outcome. At some stages during the day, the Germans did appear to be on the verge of a breakthrough, but the Russians sent new reserves into the line and succeeded in holding the Germans. As darkness fell, the battlefield grew quiet. Both sides were exhausted and made the most of the enforced lull. No time was wasted, however, on preparing to resume the next day. The short climax to the Kursk offensive resulted in the end of Germany's successes in the east. The 12-hour battle had drawn in and chewed up the best divisions that Hitler possessed. Tanks and men had been lost at a steady rate since the start of the offensive, and by the time they reached Prokhorovka, they were in no fit state to sustain a heavy attack. The Germans had maintained fairly constant numbers of tanks in the field through the skill of the tank repair shops, but the size of the enemy forces facing them and their lack of a reserve prevented any further advances. The Russians had lost over 400 tanks in the battle thus far and were themselves left in a vulnerable position by the end of the day. They expected the Germans to begin the following day with a sizable attack. During the night of July the 12th, the Russians and Germans recovered what vehicles they could from the battlefield and readied them for use again. The 13th, however, would not see the Germans resume their attempts to advance. It would actually see a direct Führer order calling off the Zitadell offensive. The order to call off the attacks surprised von Manstein as he could sense the cracks beginning to appear in the Russian defences. One of the main reasons for the postponement of Zitadell had nothing to do with the Russian front. It was the recent Allied invasion of Sicily which took place on the 10th of July. Hitler, who was always conscious of the changing political situation, could see the dangers that this development presented. He simply needed to pull troops out of the line and send them to meet this new threat. One of the formations ordered out was the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. The moves did not begin straight away, however, and when they did, only some divisions were moved. This new development meant that Hitler was faced with the one situation he had tried to avoid from the moment his troops had crossed the Polish border in 1939. A war on two fronts. From this point onwards, the war would not be fought on Hitler's terms, but on the terms of his enemies, who were growing stronger with each passing day. From now on, they decided where the next battle would be fought. This left Hitler powerless to do anything but move his decreasing forces to meet each new threat. On the 13th of July, the Russians began their probing attacks in the sector north of Orel. By this stage, Model's forces had created their own bulge that was flanked on both sides by strong Russian formations. These probing attacks gained momentum, and by the 16th of July had turned into an all-out counter-offensive. The Germans had not prepared any defensive positions in these areas and could not hold the Russian attacks. The Russians were fighting over familiar ground and had the benefit of being able to use their arrested formations from the Bryansk and Western fronts. They steadily pushed Model's 9th Army back in the north to the Hagen defensive line. By the end of the first week in August 1943, the town of Orel was back in Russian hands. Around this time, the counter-offensive in the southern area was gaining momentum and also regaining lost ground at a steady pace. By the end of August, Kharkov would come under Russian control for the final time. The Russian advances, although steady, were not easy. The Germans defended resolutely and exacted a heavy toll on the advancing enemy troops. The Russians, however, could replace their losses and relentlessly pushed ahead. They had scented victory, and the ultimate defeat of the enemy was becoming an ever-increasing possibility. One of the main purposes of the Zitadelle offensive was to straighten the line for the Germans and free up much-needed troops for the Allied invasion expected in the near future. By the end of August 1943, the front line had been straightened. The only problem for Hitler was that it was 100 miles in favour of Stalin's troops. Further key divisions had been taken out of the area in an attempt to deal with the situations developing elsewhere. The Russian front had become little more than a holding action, where each new threat had to be countered in the best way possible. The rotten edifice that Hitler spoke of in his planning of Barbarossa was a fantasy. The reality was a strong and determined country that would swallow millions of his troops in the titanic battles that raged from June 1941 to May 1945. Battles that ended at the very doors of Hitler's bunker in Berlin. Hitler had placed everything on one last throw of the dice. The gamble would ultimately mean the end for his beloved fatherland and divide the rest of Europe for 45 years.