How Tough Are They? The True Size of Russian Defenses in Ukraine - 3D DOCUMENTARY

With the pressures of a Ukrainian offensive and internal unrest gaining steam, Russia's defenses may be all that stand in the way of a complete unraveling of one of the greatest geopolitical events of our era. In their hands rests the fate of the front line, of the war, of Putin, and perhaps the entire Russian Federation. Therefore, Russia's defenses in Ukraine are well worth studying. Since the end of 2022, Russian troops have been digging in. The Ukrainian countryside has become scarred with hundreds of miles of trenches, lines of concrete dragon's teeth, and acres of minefields. These now pose a significant impediment to Ukraine's long-awaited counteroffensive. From the comfort of our homes, it can be difficult to properly understand the realities on the ground. So today, let us explore the historical context for these fortifications and bring to life the true size of Russian defenses in Ukraine. 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Around 9,000 armored vehicles had been wrecked, and around 100,000 men were dead or wounded. Among the hardest hit were the elite troops best equipped for modern combat. For example, up to half of Russia's airborne troops were gone. Shrinking stockpiles, industrial bottlenecks, logistical failures, outright corruption, and internal squabbles meant sufficient amounts of ammunition and other vital supplies weren't reaching the front. To make matters worse, Ukrainian counterattacks in the fall had unexpectedly routed the Russian right and left flanks at Kharkiv and Kherson. So, Russian forces did what exposed, exhausted armies have done historically. They started digging in. From October of 2022 to the present, Russians have built a vast network of field fortifications in occupied Ukraine and along the Russo-Ukrainian border. In some places, these fortifications mark the frontlines. But in most places, these defenses are kilometers behind the active front. In either case, these defenses allow Russia to contest a Ukrainian mechanized offensive with fewer, lower-quality troops. But how have these Russian defenses stacked up against the greatest defensive lines of history, and have they repeated the same mistakes which doomed many of them? Historical Examples When making historical analogies, we have to pick the right points of comparison. Broadly speaking, the most infamous defensive lines in history have been either pre-war border fortresses or wartime field fortifications. In origin, form, and purpose, Russian defenses in Ukraine are not like the WWII-era French Maginot Line or the Greek Metaxas Line. First, these historic lines were primarily built to defend pre-war borders, not secure wartime conquests. Second, these lines were built around large, multi-story fortresses armed with heavy artillery batteries. The largest fort on the Maginot Line could fire four metric tons of shells in a single minute. And to build the 5,500 bunkers and pillboxes of the Maginot Line, the French poured 1.5 million cubic meters of concrete, enough to build over 31 Empire State buildings. By contrast, the Russians have not built these kinds of concrete battleships in Ukraine. Third, these lines had exposed flanks that attackers historically exploited. In April of 1941, the Metaxas Line on the Greek-Bulgarian border was outflanked by an attack through Yugoslavia, and the strongest point of the Maginot Line was infamously bypassed by a German attack through the Ardennes in May 1940. By contrast, Russian defenses are anchored by the Belarusian border in the north and the Black Sea in the south. In theory, an attacker might be able to outflank these, but such conditions do not currently exist. Thus, in the present day, there is no easy flank for the Ukrainians to turn. That all being said, there are some similarities. For instance, segments of Russian lines do resemble portions of one border megaproject, Germany's Westwall, better known as the Siegfried Line. Both use similar belts of minefields, ditches, and concrete anti-tank obstacles. Although nominally built as a border defense, the Westwall was still a part of Germany's offensive strategy in the late 1930s, freeing up troops once needed for border defense duty for offensive action. Russia's current lines likely serve a similar strategic purpose. In design and function, current Russian defenses are really field fortifications, more similar to the Hindenburg Line of WWI or Rommel's Devil's Garden of the North African Campaign. For context, let us briefly examine both of these. In the latter half of WWI, Germany was on the defensive on the Western Front. Under growing pressure, the newly appointed German Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, would order the construction of a series of defensive lines. British troops would nickname these the Hindenburg Line. Built around the concept of defense in depth, they used deep belts of wire to stop infantry, primitive minefields to stop tanks, and strongholds with concrete pillboxes to stop bullets and artillery shells. Any breakthrough would be met with an immediate counterattack of German reserves. Jumping forward about 25 years, both sides of the North African Campaign and WWII built and fought over literal lines in the sand. Perhaps the most fiercely contested were the Devil's Gardens in El Alamein. With his army literally out of gas, Afrika Korps commander Erwin Rommel had to halt his offensive in July 1942 and dig in. When Bernard Montgomery's 8th Army attacked in October, they would face a network of mutually supporting strongpoints, guarded by integrated anti-tank guns like the infamous 88, which were in turn surrounded by nearly half a million landmines that gave the Devil's Gardens their name. Behind the lines, German and Italian tanks waited, ready to counterattack. These and other historic field fortifications share critical similarities with Russian defenses. First, these defenses secured gains made by an invading army, allowing them to take an operational pause to gather strength and supplies before launching further offensives. Second, with strong defenses, fewer troops could hold a given piece of ground, allowing commanders to build larger reserves for decisive counterattacks or future offensives. Third, these defensive lines used obstacles like barbed wire and anti-tank ditches to slow and disrupt attacking enemy forces. Fourth, most of the frontline defenders occupied entrenched strongpoints, preferably high ground, in villages, or near critical transit routes. When possible, these strongpoints were linked by trenches. And finally, these defenses also relied on counterattacks by mobile reserves to enemy footholds and breakthroughs. With this context in mind, let's now take a closer look at our current example, Russia's defenses. Russia has built defenses along the length of the territory it occupies in Ukraine, as well as along a roughly 400-mile-long strip of the Russo-Ukrainian border. But the most extensive defenses are on the nearly 250-mile front, anchored by the Dnieper River and the Russia-Ukraine border. Without natural obstacles like major rivers, Russian commanders have opted to shore up their lines using man-made obstacles and entrenchments. Although described as a line, Russian defenses in Ukraine are not an extended line of linked trenches, like something from the Western Front of World War I. Behind the actual frontlines, Russian commanders have laid down defensive clusters that control towns, block key roads, and secure bridges. Russian defenses are also multilayered. Some areas are defended by multiple defensive lines, and key roads are blocked by successive strongpoints. Ukrainian forces will therefore have to breach and break through multiple Russian lines as they push deeper into Russian-occupied territory. Let's take a closer look at how these defenses have been laid out. Now we should note that there is no such thing as a typical Russian defensive position in Ukraine. Differences in terrain and strategic priorities mean some areas are more heavily fortified than others. Different groups, including the Russian military, PMCs, and local authorities have also built defenses, to varying degrees of success. However, given the sheer scale of the frontlines, some indicative battlefields do exist. For our purposes, we have chosen a section of the line about 18 kilometers east of Bakhmut, near the village of Vyskirva, which has many of the features seen in Russian fortifications in the region. Like many Russian defenses in Ukraine, it controls a road Ukrainian forces might advance down. Now on a map like this, it can be somewhat deceptive to think that just a few dots indicate an area which is thinly defended. This is not the case. But to understand the reality of the situation on the ground, let us render the battlefield in its true size. This is what Russian defenses in Ukraine really look like. Our rendered battlefield is about five square kilometers or three square miles. In pre-war settings, someone could make the crossing by car in just about three minutes whilst following rural speed limits, while a bicyclist could make the crossing in about 15 minutes and a pedestrian could make the crossing in about 60 minutes. While at war, however, an attacker could take weeks if not months or even years to make the crossing with progress measured in mere meters. But to understand why, we can now explain how the Russians have fortified their position. Defenses in this sector are laid out with rows of obstacles blocking movement down roads and across fields towards dug-in fighting positions. The outer layer consists of various anti-tank features including hedgehogs, dragon's teeth, and large ditches. Interspersed between these are invisible minefields which together form a formidable thicket of obstacles for would-be attackers. Let us now inspect each of these in turn. In the outermost layer, you can see two bands of concrete dragon's teeth. These simple anti-tank obstacles are laid out in long lines of two or more rows that can run for miles across open terrain. On the World War II era Siegfried Line, these obstacles were cast in place by laborers with concrete molds. The Russians have opted for a faster technique. Hundreds of thousands of prefabricated pieces have been ordered from factories in Belarus, Russia, and occupied Ukraine. These pieces are then trucked into place and dropped off by trucks with cranes. While this technique allows defenses to be rapidly installed, it has some serious trade-offs. First, it means that the dragon's teeth have to be built relatively lightly. Some may even be hollow. Subcontracting also seems to have led to uneven quality control. For instance, despite allegedly being built of high-grade concrete, some are already falling apart. Furthermore, unlike the partially buried Siegfried Line teeth, the Russian obstacles have been placed on the surface, and their convenient lifting eyes can make it fairly easy for Ukrainian attackers to simply drag them out of the way. Yet so long as they are not displaced, vehicles will nonetheless still struggle to pass them. Another location where anti-tank obstacles may be easy to remove are along the roads where steel hedgehogs have typically been placed. However, this is intentional, as the Russians do still plan on using these highways for their own movements, and as such have opted for more maneuverable pieces. Yet with that being said, we should not discount the idea that such hedgehogs can still pose quite the impediment to vehicles in the thick of combat. The next layer of anti-tank defenses are a series of ditches, which in this case are offset about 100 meters from the prior layers of manufactured traps. These holes in the ground are each about three to four meters wide and one to two meters deep. Primitive yet effective, they will prove sufficient to stop, or at least slow, tracked and wheeled vehicles. In order to quickly dig these large ditches, the Russians have turned to specialized earth movers like the MDK-3. This model is a combat engineering vehicle developed by the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Operating in reverse, it excavates large amounts of materials at an average of 50 to 100 meters per hour, depending on soil conditions. Returning to our five kilometer wide battlefield, we might estimate that a single crew operating at about 100 meters per hour, eight hours a day, would take roughly one to two weeks to complete the excavations in the sector. Though of course, some additional time is needed for refueling, maintenance, and other unforeseen delays. Yet given that the Russians have had months to prepare, it is no surprise that they have so widely adopted this simple but effective form of defensive earthwork. Yet at this point, you might be thinking that these defenses seem annoying, but not necessarily deadly. Indeed, on their own, such obstacles could easily be neutralized by combat engineers and specialized vehicles. To prevent this, Russian forces have laid vast fields of mines in the open space around their obstacle belts, creating an unseen threat to For our simulation, we have only been able to represent a few possible locations. In reality, they could be just about anywhere. It is these invisible killers which are likely to take a heavy toll on Ukrainians who are not able to detect, avoid, or destroy them upon the advance. Sadly, the same can be said of all those who return to this battlefield long after the war has ended. But mine and anti-tank features alone will not be able to stop a determined offensive. As the military maxim goes, an obstacle isn't an obstacle unless it's defended. To this end, and to their credit, the Russians have generally tried to build an integrated defense which places the obstacles we have reviewed at a logical distance from their manned frontline positions, which in this case is a series of infantry trenches and vehicle revetments. Regarding their placement, it seems that these have been located along a ridge line with high ground advantages over the fields ahead. The outermost anti-tank obstacles are about 500 meters ahead of the entrenched defensive positions. This puts them well within the effective range of light machine guns and RPGs. The last anti-tank ditch is about 300 meters away and is thus within range of assault rifles and 40mm grenade launchers. Without proper support, Ukrainian dismounts trying to breach the obstacles could find themselves pinned down by withering fire. Once more, we should note that Russian trenches are not long, unbroken lines that go on for miles. Rather, they tend to be platoon or company-sized strongpoints that overlook or directly control critical terrain. In this section of the line, Russian engineers have dug a company-sized position on a piece of high ground that commands the road. Most of the strongpoint is composed of simple trenches, deep enough for a man to stand in without being exposed. Some trenches have been dug by hand, but the rapid construction of these trenches is mostly owed to specialized digging machines like the BTM-3. Also dating back to the Cold War era, it is a rather robust machine capable of excavating around 800 meters of man-sized trench in one hour. Once the bulk of the earth has been removed, additional work can be done to improve the functionality of the trench section. This includes adding structural elements to prevent erosion, planking to mitigate mud and improve movement in wet conditions, sandbags for added protection, carve-outs for observation or firing positions, ladders and step boxes for popping out over the lip, and more. Overall, these simple, open-top trenches are effective force multipliers which provide good protection from direct fire weapons like rifles. However, they are vulnerable to indirect fire from mortars and artillery. Their impact, though, has been somewhat mitigated by the practice of adopting zigzag pattern trenches which can help block lateral explosions and direct fire weaponry. However, during heavy bombardments, each seven-man squad has a dugout within which they may seek shelter. These are often deeper, more fortified positions which can also double as places to rest, eat, and sleep while on the front. As such, soldiers will often personalize them to meet their needs. Given enough time, these dugouts can almost start to feel like home. Zooming back out of this position, we can see that our defenders here appear to be tasked with covering about 800 meters of the line. This can be a tall order for a Russian company to hold, after wartime reorganization, full-strength Russian motor rifle companies only have about 75 men, and few formations currently are at full strength. This makes the firepower of supporting tanks and the company's own vehicles even more important. To this end, just as the strength of the infantry has been improved using trenches, such vehicles have also seen their effectiveness increased by the creation of revetments. These are holes dug into the ground which allow vehicles to fire from hull-down positions, presenting a much smaller target to Ukrainian attackers. Zooming back out once more, we can see how this Russian company does not stand alone. Besides it are several other positions which cover their flanks. To the rear are additional positions for HQ and reserve units, and atop a nearby hill are additional emplacements dating back to before the war which have a commanding view of this battlefield. From here, spotting and fire support can be provided. Beyond this simulated area are even more layers of defenses with mechanized reserves, backed by artillery, ready to pounce on any Ukrainians attempting to break through. I'll let all this soak in, as the scope of modern warfare can often be difficult to grasp in our minds. Returning to our strategic view, we are now reminded that everything we have just described is represented by a few symbols on a map. As we continue to zoom out, you can now hopefully grasp the sheer scope of Russia's defenses, not just in the region, but across the entire warfront. Without a doubt, taking on these fortifications is an uphill fight. This is something which those tasked with planning out, and certainly carrying out, the offensive are well aware of, but which many of us at home fail to grasp as we scroll through the headlines, wondering what is taking the offensive so long. In this episode, I hope you have provided a grounded, true-size view of what the Ukrainians are actually facing in this war. But the task is not impossible. Many, even more formidable defenses have been overcome in the past. So join us next time as we prepare to explore how victory can be achieved. If you enjoyed this content, please consider supporting us on Patreon, where we post downloads of all our art, share script previews, and run polls for new content. A big thanks to the current patrons for funding the channel, and to the researchers, writers, and artists for making this episode possible. Be sure to like and subscribe for more content, and check out these other, related episodes. See you in the next one.