Beidaihe Bombshell: Will Xi Survive? Zhang Youxia’s 82nd Army Turns It into a Fortress

Although state media reports that top leaders in Beijing have entered a working vacation mode, public opinion has long believed that behind those seaside strolls and tea time chats lie the highest level secrets of Zhongnanhai. Du Wen, former Executive Director of the Legal Counsel Office of the Government of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, revealed that he had received reliable information. The core topic of this year's Beidaihe Conference is to finalize part of the list of Politburo Standing Committee members and Central Committee members for the 21st Party Congress. In other words, this is the moment when it will be decided whether Xi Jinping will stay on or step down at the 21st Congress, while also mapping out the political direction and governing style of China in the years ahead. Therefore, according to him, from now until mid-August is the critical window period. Based on recent developments, we already have some clues to predict which path China's political landscape might take. Please stay tuned. And if you find this video helpful, don't forget to like and subscribe so you won't miss our upcoming content. Thank you. First signal, Kai changes his tone. Kai Qi is regarded as Xi Jinping's closest confidant, almost like a chief steward within the inner court. His public statements often reflect, at least in part, the extent of Xi's power. According to Chinese state media, on August 3, 2025, Kai Qi, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and secretary of the CCP Secretariat, traveled to Beidai to visit experts vacationing there. However, compared with two years ago, Xinhua's 2025 coverage reveals a striking shift in Kai Qi's remarks at this year's Beidaihe gathering. In its 2023 report, Kai Qi declared that since the 18th Party Congress, Xi Jinping had issued a series of important instructions and major arrangements on talent development, and he praised Xi for leading talent work in the new era to achieve historic accomplishments and bring In 2024, Kai Qi said only that Xi had issued a series of important instructions, omitting phrases such as major arrangements, historic accomplishments, and historic transformations. By 2025, Kai Qi made no mention of Xi Jinping at all. Instead, he stressed that the Party Central Committee attaches great importance to talent work and is implementing the strategy of strengthening the country through talent, with none of the personal praise for Xi that had characterized previous years. In the political context of the CCP, this kind of rhetorical downgrading borders on monstrous betrayal and is almost certainly not an act Kai Qi would take on his own initiative. It is a clear signal that the center of power is undergoing a major shift. Second signal, the most unusual August 1st in the history of China's military. In May and July of this year, Xi Jinping visited Henan and Shaanxi. But unusually, he did not visit any military barracks. In the past, whenever Xi toured a locality, he would make a point of stopping by a barracks, holding a rifle, and posing for photos, a symbolic message to political rivals, I hold the gun. The August 1st banquet of the Central Military Commission, CMC, also showed major irregularities. Xi Jinping, Zhang Yuxia, and He Weidong were all absent. The event was presided over by Defense Minister Dong Jun. Of the CMC members, only Liu Zhenli and Zhang Shengmin attended. All the generals were present, yet the true core of command was collectively missing. Xinhua News Agency did not publish a single report on any promotions. From the era of Zhang Zemin and Hu Jintao to the early years of Xi Jinping's rule, the conferring of the rank of general on August 1st had been a well-established tradition, especially striking now, given the recent wave of purges within the military. Since taking power, Xi has appointed a total of 79 generals, at least 10 of whom have been investigated or removed. Another 12, though not officially declared to have fallen, are believed to be under investigation or have disappeared. In total, at least 22 generals appointed by Xi have run into trouble—more than 20 percent, an alarmingly high proportion. According to commentator Chen Pocong, Xi's failure to promote a single general in such a situation is highly unusual. He suggests three possible explanations. First, Xi may no longer have the same freedom to appoint senior officers as before. Since last year's third plenum, there has been a tendency within the party to strengthen collective leadership, including within the CMC. Zhang Youxia, Zhang Shengmin, and Liu Zhenli belong to the same faction, while Xi is in a weaker position. If Xi proposes a candidate, the other three may not agree. If they propose one, Xi may refuse. The result is deadlock. No one gets promoted. Second, Xi may have lost the political standing to confer generalship at all. The appointment of generals must be approved collectively by the CMC, and critics could say, for years, the officers you've promoted have been problematic. What right do you have to appoint more? This would indicate a decline in Xi's control over the military. Third, there may be a last-minute conferral before the September 3rd military parade. Xi might appoint one or several generals at the 11th hour, but such moves would almost certainly trigger disputes within the CMC. Third signal, Liu He reappears? On August 1st, the U.S.-China Business Council, SCBC, announced on its official WeChat account that its board delegation had completed a two-day visit to Beijing on July 30th. What stood out was the quiet reappearance of former Vice Premier Liu He, who hosted the American Business Lobbying Delegation and arranged their meetings with Notably, Premier Li Cheng was absent. After U.S. President Donald Trump launched a trade war against China during his first term, Liu He served as China's chief negotiator in the U.S.-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue, securing the Phase 1 trade agreement between the two countries. But since retiring in 2023, his public appearances have been rare, making this return all the more surprising. Commentator Jiang Feng argues that this move by the U.S. amounts to a vote of no confidence in Li Cheng's leadership, and that Liu He's re-emergence is a political statement from the Huwen faction, an end to wolf-warrior diplomacy and a return to institutionalized engagement. Fourth signal, has the 82nd Group Army moved into Beijing? According to political commentator Jiang Feng, in the month leading up to the Beidahe conference, under orders from Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Jiang Yuxia, the 82nd Group Army quietly carried out two maneuvers. First, in early July, a unit from the Group Army in Baoding moved into Beijing to take part in security arrangements for the Central Urban Work Conference. Second, in late July, another unit was deployed to Beidahe to provide full security for the resort area where senior leaders were staying. These actions cannot be independently verified, as the CCP's military operations are always shrouded in secrecy and never reported in the media. The 82nd Group Army, formerly the famous 38th Corps, is part of the Central Theater Command and operates under the dual authority of the Beijing military region and the army, enjoying particularly close ties with Jiang Yuxia. If Jiang ordered the 82nd to It would not be surprising. At a time when rival factions are meeting to hammer out a final agreement, he would need gun barrels under absolute loyalty to guarantee the desired outcome. As is well known, even though Jiang Yuxia holds the gun, he understands that as long as Xi Jinping retains his three titles—party general secretary, state president, and CMC chairman—Jiang will never feel truly secure. He is no naive player. Even if all senior generals answer to him, he does not control the Central Propaganda Apparatus or the State Council. Where does the military's budget come from? Jiang knows that while the military holds the guns, without legitimate backing from the civilian leadership, it's like holding an unloaded weapon. Conversely, the civilian factions cannot act politically without military support. According to Jiang Feng, Zhongnanhai is currently split into at least four factions. The Red Mao faction, Xi's remaining loyalists plus part of the Jiang faction. The reformist faction, represented by Wen Jiabao and Wang Yang. The party preservation faction, led by Hu Jintao, seeking to maintain the status quo. The military faction, represented by Jiang Yuxia and Liu Yuan. The military faction's core demand is simple. Xi Jinping must leave completely, eliminating any future threat. The foundation for their self-preservation and absolute security. But among the civilian factions, while all want Xi gone, there is fierce disagreement over who should take power and which path to follow. Should Wang Yang take the helm and pursue political reform, or Xu Chunhua take over and maintain the status quo? This division has created the current highly dangerous, terrible balance. Jiang Yuxia, despite holding military power, does not dare flip the table because he lacks unanimous backing from the civilian side. Meanwhile, the civilian factions rely on Jiang's gun barrels to contain Xi's remaining forces. Each side restrains the other, and no one can dominate outright. However, this terrible balance cannot last. The Fourth Plenum will be the final battlefield to determine victory or defeat. If it fails to produce a power reorganization plan acceptable to all factions, the Red Ship will meet its destined end. The eye of the storm is already open, and the protests in Jiangyu were the last straw. The public cannot endure another shock. Further repression will only trigger fiercer resistance. Fifth signal, the Jiangyu protest shakes Beidaihe. For the global reintegration faction of party elders, this was a political catastrophe beyond control. Their entire political capital, staked on restoring ties with the West, has gone up in smoke. The Americans will ask, is this the China you want to bring back? While they have been working to project an image of a Beijing willing to talk and open its doors, Xi Jinping's use of pig transport trucks to deal with citizens in the streets of Jiangdu landed like a thunderous slap in the face. The party elders understand there is no turning back. As long as Xi Jinping remains in power, and as long as his supreme logic of repression dominates, global reintegration will remain an international joke. If this course is not stopped, they themselves risk being dragged into the abyss by the system's own zealotry. On the morning of August 7, outside the War of Resistance Victory Memorial Hall in Kunming, Yunnan, a bespectacled young man held up a white banner reading, Xi Jinping resigns. Many tourists gathered around to take photos. Soon after, a security worker with a red armband arrived on an electric scooter, stopped in front of the young man, and, instead of intervening, appeared to use his phone to report to superiors. On August 6 in Shanghai, a man rode an electric scooter with a cargo box attached to the back, bearing the words, civil rights, people's livelihood, nation. Just six simple characters, but everyone could see this man had awakened. This is the collective eruption of social contradictions that have built up over many years. From the Mao Zedong era to the 13 years of extremism under the current top leadership, pent-up anger has reached the breaking point. The people's hatred for the Chinese Communist Party is not tied to any single policy, but to the entirety of its operational methods from the very beginning. The global reintegration faction knows better than anyone. If they do not take over now and make changes, it will soon be too late. According to Du Wen's assessment, Xi Jinping will not relinquish power, nor will he step down or take a partial retirement at the 21st Party Congress. The main reason? Xi has persecuted too many people, with his hands stained in the blood of the Party's elite. To give up power would be to give up any chance of survival. If there is any change in this trajectory, it could only be due to Xi's health or some unforeseen, extraordinary event. Commentator Du Zheng, citing a well-connected friend in Beijing familiar with elite politics, says Xi is a seasoned power player who never concedes easily. One possible bargaining option with his political rivals would be to step down as general secretary while retaining real power, similar to the arrangement Deng Xiaoping once had. In 1985, during the fourth plenum of the 12th Central Committee, Hu Yaobang held the title of general secretary, but real authority rested with Deng Xiaoping, who served as chairman of the Central Military Commission. However, the Beijing source notes that if Xi were to keep only the position of CMC chairman, his real power would be limited because he lacks Deng's stature. Even if Xi were to take one step back, Zhang Yuxia, already 75 years old, might step back with him in a kind of shared political exit. The successor would likely still be Zhang's man, because Xi has lost his entire power base in the military, with all of his loyalists purged. The source also adds that the large-scale military parade in Beijing this September is essentially a show for foreign audiences, carrying no real implication that Xi still firmly commands the military. Meanwhile, China's current economic situation bears many similarities to the Soviet Union before its collapse. In 2025, Chinese society has entered a state of sparks flying in all directions, increasingly out of control. From financial fraud, unpaid wages, and school violence to food safety crises, judicial injustice, and breakdowns in the health care and insurance systems, social incidents have surged sharply compared to 2024. Wherever a spark falls, unrest could erupt, potentially becoming the trigger for nationwide turmoil. And such unrest is almost certain to escalate and accelerate. So as for the outcome, I think you can already imagine it. Share your thoughts in the comments below. Thank you, and see you next time.