世界航海/海軍歷史 原汁生肉 Frigates vs a Ship of the Line - An Indefatigable Contest
王者风范
22粉絲
3 次觀看·2025年8月9日
Hello everybody, welcome to another Wednesday video.
Just a quick preamble this time.
The normal plan subject for this Wednesday's video unfortunately didn't happen.
And that's because over the weekend, I ended up getting the first shot of the COVID vaccine.
Now, you might be wondering, hang on, Drac, you're not in the target demographics at the moment for the UK government.
Well, that's true.
However, Mrs. Drac is, because of her pre-existing health condition.
And since we live in the same household and I took her to the vaccine center, their attitude was effectively,
Well, we might as well get you with a needle as well while you're here.
This obviously is a good thing, except for the fact that apparently this thing knocks you for absolute six for quite a while.
So instead of having the weekend to finish up and record and then a little bit more time to edit, render and check everything,
I basically have just been flat out the entire, well, several past few several days.
And so today instead, as with the video quite a while ago on the last hand of the revenge,
I'm instead going to bring to you a reading from the book Against the Odds, Battles at Sea 1591-1949 by Alexander McKee,
which is a rather nice summary of various battles that occur where there's a very unexpected outcome
because the battle is weighted very heavily against one side, except it goes in their favor.
So with all that said, let us look into today's incident.
This is the fight between HMS Indefatigable and HMS Amazon and the French ship of the line, Douat Delhomme.
And for reference, Indefatigable is a Rase frigate, Amazon is a much smaller frigate and Douat Delhomme, as I said, is a full-on ship of the line.
So how on earth did they win? Let's find out.
After the revolution in France, the aggressive policy of the Directorate, as the government was then known, had been astoundingly successful in Europe.
The policy of l'attaquer, l'attaquer et toujours l'attaquer, aided by much superior manpower,
had increased the influence of France.
As one result, first Holland and then Spain declared war on Britain.
Their fleets, combined with that of France, completely outnumbered the British Royal Navy
and made the landing of troops on British soil a practical proposition.
The French planned accordingly.
In 1796, the French General Roche met the Irish representatives Arthur O'Connor and Lord Edward Fitzgerald in Switzerland.
A major landing in Ireland was contemplated, using 25,000 French soldiers.
The Irish told the French that 15,000 would be sufficient.
For the moment they landed, a quarter of a million armed Irishmen would join them in the struggle against the English.
The French, who had not engaged in Irish diplomacy before, were carried away by the prospect put before them
and expanded their invasion plan to include India,
although further thought convinced them that only the conquest of Ireland was practical in a single campaign.
The final plan was technically good, unlike, say, the Spanish Armada in 1588
or the not-too-serious German Operation Sea Lion of 1940.
Three different places inside Bantry Bay on the west coast of Ireland were chosen,
to fit different wind conditions,
and even if conditions were impossible there, the mouth of the River Shannon offered an alternative.
The extreme southwest coast of Ireland was also the right place for a French beachhead,
politically and militarily.
It assumed there would be little opposition from the British Navy.
A more questionable assumption was that December and January were favourable months for launching a seaborne campaign,
particularly on the southwest-facing bays and estuaries,
when southwesterly gales could be expected,
although tactical surprise might be gained thereby.
Armies are exposed to weather, but not half so much as fleets.
The base for the invasion was Brest,
and the French naval base in Brittany in the northwest corner of the Cherbourg Peninsula,
south of Devon and Cornwall,
and offering a convenient passage to the southwest coast of Ireland.
But by the 15th of December of the invasion year, 1796,
only two of the three French warship squadrons had assembled at Brest.
The third squadron under Villeneuve, the future loser of Trafalgar, had not yet arrived.
Even so, the French fleet numbered 17 ships of the line,
13 frigates, 6 corvettes, 7 transports and an ammunition frigate.
These carried 18,000 soldiers of the land army,
together with their guns, horses and stores.
The British fleet had gone into Portsmouth for the winter,
leaving a squadron of 13 ships of the line and a few frigates to lie off Brest.
The line ships remained safely, in view of the onshore gales,
some 40 miles out to sea,
but the British frigates kept stationed so close into Brest
that the French were deceived into thinking
that the ships of the line were only just over the horizon,
in sight from their tops.
Fearing that their fleet could be destroyed in detail
if it emerged in line through the main channels,
the French decided to come out via a dangerous and little-used channel.
Then the weather blew up and made that route impossibly risky,
and they changed their minds.
To signal the alteration of plan,
a corvette was stationed to fire guns, rockets and blue lights
along the correct course.
However, a British frigate charged right in
amongst the main body of the French
and began to fire rockets, guns and blue lights.
This confused the French so much
that their ship of the line C800 went aground
and, as a distress signal,
also fired guns, rockets and blue lights.
The line ship was lost
with more than half of the 1,300 men on board,
and the emerging French fleet was scattered into small squadrons,
each inferior in force to the united British squadron
waiting over the horizon.
The French navy and army commanders,
who had embarked together in a fast frigate,
were not in contact with any part of their force,
which was now technically leaderless.
The British squadron did sight a French force,
but it was Villeneuve arriving late and he escaped.
In a storm-weather pursuit,
the British suffered gale damage and were scattered.
At the end of December,
the British admiral had only six of his ships in company
when he returned to Portsmouth,
the main British base on the south coast.
Notwithstanding these misadventures,
the main body of the French invasion fleet
made their emergency rendezvous off Ireland,
with only one ship of the line
and three frigates missing,
apart from the wrecked C800 lost at breast.
But in one of the missing frigates
were the navy and army commanders of the force.
The officers next in line to them,
in seniority, took over.
They were Admiral Bouvet and General Grouchy,
who later helped Napoleon to lose Waterloo.
They decided to carry out the landings as planned.
That winter was the coldest in living memory,
and the weather at sea was wild.
On Christmas Day,
while the British were trying to get
their main battle fleet out of Spithead,
its anchorage off Portsmouth,
the French were trying to disembark their soldiers,
guns and stores in Bantry Bay.
The weather their only opponent.
It was impossible.
After days of trying to invade,
all they achieved was the loss of some ships
and damage to others from running aground
or colliding with each other.
Eventually, they gave up trying
and the force returned to France,
in small groups or individually.
One of the last to leave,
on the 7th of January 1797,
was the new 74-gun ship of the line,
Doats de l'Homme,
commanded by an experienced and senior officer,
Commodore Jean-Baptiste Lacrosse,
with General Jean-Joseph Humbert
commanding the 749 soldiers aboard.
In addition,
there were 639 French crew
and 105 prisoners from captured British ships,
including two women and six children.
On the 13th of January,
the ship was overtaken by foul weather
blowing out of the Atlantic.
While heading for Belle Isle,
on the coast of Brittany,
where there were a number of secure bases.
Through the rain,
driving over a sullen sea,
Lacrosse sighted two large ships.
He did not know they were French
and was glad to lose sight of them,
in case they were part of
the British blockading squadron.
Two hours later,
with the rising note of the coming storm
beginning to howl through the rigging
and set the blocks rattling,
backing south-west
as indication of worse to come,
two more ships were sighted,
this time ahead,
between the lone ship
and the land Lacrosse was making for.
The larger of these two looming ships
was the indefatigable,
a former 64-gun ship of the line,
cut down to 44 guns
on a single main deck
to turn her into a powerful frigate,
and commanded by Sir Edward Pellew.
It was Pellew in this frigate
which had caused the mayhem at Brest
in December,
and which had resulted in the wreck of
Sedouissant.
He was now back on his blockade station.
Some eight miles astern of him
was the 36-gun frigate Amazon
under Captain Robert Reynolds.
Almost at once,
the situation changed.
Frigates were too lightly built
to take on a ship of the line.
Indeed,
they were forbidden from engaging them.
If any captain did so,
and lost,
as he was virtually bound to do,
the verdict of his inevitable court-martial
would ruin him.
War is a business,
like any other.
But now,
with the gale making
all the ships plunge heavily,
and the squalls gusting aloft,
the topmasts of both the fore-
and mainmasts of the Douate de L'Homme
were carried away,
leaving a chaos of canvas,
cordage and broken spars on deck
and hanging over the side.
The mainsails were still drawing.
What was affected chiefly
was the manoeuvring power
of the anyway clumsy ship of the line.
This was decisive for La Crosse.
Once he had the wreckage cleared away,
he steered east,
before the wind,
for the safety of the Brittany bases.
Pellew,
the best frigate captain of the age,
weighed the chances.
The ship of the line
had three times his firepower,
and her heaviest guns
were the big 32-pounders
mounted on her lower deck.
In addition,
for every seaman aboard,
there must be at least one soldier.
In men,
he must be outnumbered five to one.
On the other hand,
ships of the line
carried their main armament
lower down than a frigate.
In this sea,
the working of the battleship's
largest guns would be hampered.
She would have to keep her ports closed
until it was time to fire,
and then be very careful
to choose the right moment,
or risk having her
whole lower gun deck swamped.
The gunpowder cartridges
would be soaked,
the flints useless.
For a gun battle at a distance,
her complement of soldiers
would be a disadvantage,
as her decks
must be uncomfortably crowded.
His own crew
were battle-experienced,
used to working
and fighting together
as a superb team.
By the time
Pellew had come
within range of the battleship,
it was about 5.30 p.m.,
almost completely dark
on a winter's afternoon,
heavy with rain,
and bitingly cold in the wind.
The seas were surging and vicious.
Under top sails
only for better control,
Pellew took the indefatigable
across the almost defenceless stern
of the Doab de l'Homme
and fired his guns into her
as they bore.
Then he drew ahead
in an attempt to repeat
this raking manoeuvre
on the battleship's
equally ill-armed bow.
But La Crosse foiled him
and got off a dangerous broadside,
backed up by the pepper-pot fire
of the French soldiers' muskets.
The French commodore
then tried to run
alongside the frigate and board,
but Pellew evaded that manoeuvre.
The Amazon, under Reynolds,
came into action
at about 6.45 p.m.,
when it was fully dark.
She had been eight miles astern
when Pellew opened fire
and since then,
with much sail set,
had been steering on the gun flashes.
Reynolds closed astern
of the French battleship,
fired a broadside into her quarter,
and attempted to turn
and rake the Frenchman's stern
with the loaded battery
on the other side.
La Crosse tricked both his enemies,
manoeuvring the frigates
to his weather side,
the highest side
of the healing ship of the line.
Now he could open
his lower deck ports
and run out the heavy 32-pounders.
No frigate could stand much of this,
and Pellew drew ahead
out of the arc of fire
to repair rigging
and bring up more ready-to-use
ammunition from the hold.
Reynolds could not have remained even
if he wanted to.
He had a lot of sail on
in order to come up,
and could not take in canvas
while his crews
were busy at the guns.
In the ship of the line, however,
there had been a bad accident.
A 24-pounder gun had burst,
possibly a wave
had stopped up its muzzle
at the moment of firing.
Apart from casualties
due to the explosion
and flying fragments
from the gun deck,
all the other gun crews
would become wary
in case the same thing
happened to their own pieces.
At 8.30 p.m.,
the two British frigates
came in again to the attack.
They had to keep clear
of the battleship's broadsides,
or as much as they could.
The batteries of 32-pounders
on the lower gun deck
and the 24-pounders
on the upper gun deck
could smash them,
particularly the lighter
36-gun Amazon.
So they tried to keep
on either side
of the bluff bows
of the Doigt d'Olonne.
For his part,
the French commander,
by yawing from side to side,
endeavoured to bring
at least some of his guns to bear,
and with luck
be able to close and board.
But the British captains
were alert to that
and did not give him
the chance he wanted.
The ships were heeled over
away from the direction
of the rising storm,
steadier than a modern
powered vessel would be,
but the lower parts
of their heeled decks
were awash.
The gun crews,
sometimes wading
waist-deep in water.
How they kept the ammunition
and ignition dry
is a wonder,
or how they served
their guns at all.
Normally in a gale,
one wants at least one hand,
sometimes two,
for oneself,
and another,
if there's one left over,
for the job
that one has to do.
Otherwise,
one can be hurled
the length or breadth
of the deck,
with subsequent damage.
It is possible
to be wedged into a corner
and holding on with both hands
and still be hurled
loose down to the deck.
The weight of the guns
was between two
and three tonnes apiece.
They were placed
on carriages
with four small wheels
which served to slow recoil,
and were controlled
by a system of ropes
and pulleys
attached to ring bolts
let into heavy frames
in the side of the ship,
and finally,
braked at the end
of their recoil
by a breaching rope
also fixed to ring bolts
in the ship's side.
The gun was fired
when, as close to the port
as it would go,
the recoil
taking the piece inboard
where the bore
could be cleaned
of any burning fragments
of the charge
by ramming a sponge
down the muzzle
and turning it
several times.
At every third shot,
it had to be
additionally cleaned
using a kind of screw
known as a worm.
To insert
a fresh charge of gunpowder
into smouldering fragments
of the last cartridge
was not wise.
After the new cartridge
had been inserted
and rammed down
the barrel
to the far end
so that it lay
under the vent
of the hull,
the shot was then
rammed down
on top of it
and secured
with a wad
of old rope
or similar material.
Using the tackle,
the gun was then
rolled back to the port
and aimed
using a wedge
to alter elevation
and a spike
to train it round.
This neat description
must now be translated
into a heeled,
heaving deck
swept by water
rising and falling
with the waves.
If the guns being fired
were on the low side
of the ship,
then they would have
to be hauled uphill
after firing
by use of the ropes
and pulleys
and plenty of muscle.
If on the high side,
then they would have
to be hauled uphill
into firing position,
but their recoil
could be augmented
by the heel
and the impact
of the waves.
In the indefatigable,
sometimes the controlling
ropes broke
and had to be renewed,
and in several cases
the recoil
was so violent
that the ring bolts
were pulled bodily
out of the side
of the ship.
Conditions in all three
vessels engaged
did not differ.
It was the same for all,
except that the ship
of the line's guns
were heavier.
When the Frenchman's
lower deck ports
were briefly opened
to fire the 32-pounders,
the main deck
became a river
which the scuppers
could not immediately
dispose of,
and water poured down
on the unfortunate
British prisoners,
men, women
and children alike,
where they were penned
below the waterline
in the cable tier,
unaware of how
the battle went.
Amid the flat thunder
of the guns
ran the rippling
musket fire
of the French soldiers,
who had similar tasks
of sponging out
their pieces
and equally tricky
techniques of loading,
and as a musket
is a two-handed weapon,
they had in addition
the problems
of how to wedge
themselves in place
in order to
get off a shot.
In these conditions
the battle went on
hour after hour,
in numbing cold
and mind-dazing noise
and continual
uneven motion.
At about 10.30
the effects
of the frigate's fire
were seen to be
taking effect.
The mizzenmast
of the Dock de Lom
was visibly tottering.
La Crosse
did not wait
for it to fall,
but limited the damage
it would have caused
by ordering it cut away
so that it would fall clear.
But in addition
to square sails,
the main fore
and aft sail
of the ship of the line
was rigged
on this mast.
Its loss
made the 74-gun ship
hard to handle.
The British frigates
now took station
on her quarters,
close to her
vulnerable stern
and the command post
on the poop deck,
one on each side.
At about midnight
there was a sign
that the battleship
was in trouble.
Instead of firing
round shot,
she began to fire
shell,
that is,
hollow cannonballs
containing an explosive charge
detonated by burning fuse,
literally shells.
She had exhausted
her supply of solid shot,
which is the best projectile
for penetrating hulls.
She had lost
103 men killed
and 150 wounded.
The Amazon
had lost most
of her mizzenmast.
Only a stump
was standing,
and so her manoeuvrability
was also impaired.
Besides that,
her main and foremasts
and their yards
had been badly damaged
and her rigging
had been repaired
so often
that there was no spare
cordage left.
There was three feet
of water in the hull,
but her casualties
were only three killed
and 15 wounded.
The indefatigable
had all her masts standing,
although damaged,
and four feet
of water in the hull.
Her casualties
totaled 19 wounded,
no one being killed.
But the Frenchmen,
despite their fearful casualties,
were still working their guns
and the British were replying.
The flash of gunfire
still rent the blackness
of the night
under the racing clouds
which hid the moon.
At 4.30 in the morning
of the next day,
14th of January,
the storm stripped the clouds away
and the moon
shone out over the tumultuous sea
stained with foam.
Lieutenant George Bell,
stationed on the fo'c'sle
of the indefatigable,
ran after report,
land to the north-east
closer than two miles,
and a rage of breakers
in front of that unknown coast.
Before he could make his report,
the officers on the poop
had seen it too.
This was a danger
more deadly
than the Droit de l'Homme
and threatened all ships,
but not equally.
Pellew gave three orders
in succession.
Signal to Amazon,
crippled by the loss
of her mizzenmast,
you are standing into danger.
To the gunnery lieutenants,
cease fire,
and to the sailing master,
turn away to seaward
across the wind.
The last order
was the tricky one.
For a sailing ship
to turn across the wind
is difficult.
If too much canvas is carried,
she may be dismastered
and must then drive ashore.
If too little,
she will not turn all the way,
but will stall and broach
amongst the waves.
Difficult in normal circumstances,
but with torn canvas,
cut rigging,
damaged mast and yards,
how much would the frigate take?
The indefatigable swung around,
and at the moment of the stall
hung for a moment,
and then followed through
until her sails filled
on the other tack,
and she could steer off
from the peril of the coast.
Pellew had judged it precisely.
The Amazon,
lacking the steering sail
which had been shot away
with the mizzenmast,
could not repeat Pellew's manoeuvre,
and there was no room for her
to wear around with the storm.
Before 5 a.m.,
she was ashore.
Six men,
who stole a small boat
for their escape,
were drowned.
The rest,
including all the wounded,
were got to land on rafts
made up on the spot.
The rafts,
much safer than a boat
in breaking seas,
were simply drifted onto the beach
by the wind and the waves.
The duat de l'homme
was less fortunate.
She had already lost her mizzenmast.
When La Crosse tried
to turn her up into the wind,
both her foremast
and her bowsprit carried away.
Only her mainmast
with the main sail was left.
La Crosse ordered the anchors dropped,
but they simply bounced
across the sandy seabed
without holding.
She struck on an inshore sandbank,
was carried further in
by the breakers,
and struck again,
losing her mainmast.
Still, the storm
and the raging sea
had not finished with her.
She was forced further inshore,
struck another bank,
swung broadside
to the comas racing in,
then fell over on her beam ends,
with the sea bursting
right over her great hull.
At this point,
discipline seemed to break down.
The officers and men
who had fought so valiantly
for many hours
now looked only to themselves.
Or so it is said.
I doubt that the critics
fully realised their situation.
The ship was not upright,
with a deck to stand on.
She was right over on her side
and half full of water.
True, the shore
was only a few hundred yards away,
but struggling through
pounding surf and giant waves
is not easy for comparatively
puny creatures like men.
A sea like that
in the shallows
has awe-inspiring power.
Swimming is of little use.
You'd be underwater
most of the time.
All that could be done
would be to cling on
to some fitting
inside the hull,
or stand on top
if you weren't swept away
by the rearing comas
and wait for low tide.
It is extremely difficult
for the average author
and the average reader
to think themselves
inside a ship of the line
of nearly two hundred years ago
which has healed
near ninety degrees
from the vertical.
The only existing examples
are wrecks.
I'm thinking
especially of another
French battleship,
the fifty-four gun
Hazardier, built in 1688.
The Droite d'Olonne,
as the 74,
was built in 1794,
which was wrecked
in a gale
on the coast of Sussex
in 1706,
having been captured
three years earlier.
She struck in shallow water,
going over on her beam ends,
in very similar circumstances
and on an almost identical coast.
Her guns,
some of them still
on their gun carriages,
are there today,
lying against the frames
on her port side.
Excavating those decks
and those guns
makes plain the predicament
faced by the crew
of Le Clois's command.
All honour to them
that they got up
their prisoners from below,
even when overwhelmed
by disaster.
At this moment,
no one knew where they were,
possibly an island
off the coast of Brittany,
perhaps even Brittany itself.
The crew of the Indefatigable,
having clawed off a lee shore,
found themselves
again facing breakers ahead,
and having made
another emergency turn,
discovered yet more breakers
lay in their path.
They were trapped in the darkness
inside some vast bay.
About 6.30,
with the coming of first light,
they could see breakers
hurling themselves
masthead high into the air.
Their course to clear them
and to avoid the perils
of the shore they'd left behind them
meant wearisome beating up
against the gale,
four more terrible hours
of sea-soaked toil
for the exhausted men.
By now,
the wrecks already ashore
were visible,
the Amazon,
and two miles to the south of her,
the huge whale-bulk
of the French ship of the line
lying on her side,
swept by the breakers.
They were caught
in the great bay of Ordien,
and the foam-spouting rocks
ahead of them
were the Penmarks,
a reef of dire repute.
To the watchers on the shore,
it seemed that the British frigate
was doomed to perish
on the Penmarks,
but Pellew had fought his way clear
to open sea by eleven that morning.
Reynolds,
as we have seen,
rafted all his men ashore,
bar the six men
who, without orders,
had unwisely stolen a boat
and drowned themselves.
In the Douat de l'Homme,
two-thirds of the seamen and soldiers
were supposed to have perished,
but modern research in France
scales down this tragedy.
The best figures
as few such figures
can be wholly accurate,
even in modern times,
give the total in her as 1,293,
including British prisoners,
and more than 600
as the number of dead.
The French general on board,
Jean-Joseph Humbert,
was one of the survivors.
He was to return to Ireland
the following year, 1798,
with another invasion fleet,
this time in command of the whole force.
As this amounted
to just over a thousand men,
its main significance
was as a prop
to the rising of the United Irishmen
in County Mayo.
Humbert,
who had started in life
as a dealer in goat and rabbit skins
at Lyon,
had risen through the revolution,
winning fame under General Hirsch
and the Vendee,
where the rebels were French.
In Ireland,
commanding French troops
and Irish rebels,
he inflicted on British soil
at Castle Bar
a resounding defeat
on the British army.
But it was only a diversion
intended to embarrass the English.
On his return from Italy
in December 1797,
the new French star,
General Bonaparte,
had been appointed
commander-in-chief
of the grandly named
Army of England.
With 35,000 fighting men
in 130 transports,
escorted by 13 ships of the line
and 42 smaller warships,
in the early summer of 1798,
the Army of England set sail
for Egypt.
The man of destiny
had decided that England
was not an attractive
or possible target.
The remains of the Doats de l'Homme
and the British Amazon
lie buried still
in the sand of Odien Bay.
Some interesting recoveries,
including the ship's bell,
have been made
from the Doats de l'Homme
as tokens
of that appalling tragedy.
And so there we have it.
A brief recounting
of the fight
between the indefatigable
and Amazon
against the Doats de l'Homme.
It's a surprisingly nuanced
and intricate battle
that went on for a very long time
and was basically fought
between two very experienced
commanders
who knew exactly
what they wanted to do.
As events would pan out,
Pellew had the advantage
of his ships
just being somewhat better equipped
to deal with a fight
in that kind of weather.
And as a result,
well, whilst he lost the Amazon,
he did get his own ship
out of there
and he caused the loss
of a French third-rate ship
of the line.
But as the book notes,
the French fought valiantly
with great skill
and even when their ship
was over on its side
and everybody was rightly panicking,
they still showed
a great deal of honour
in making sure that
even as discipline
began to break down,
they freed the prisoners
who were below decks,
which you can some thought
have forgiven them
for forgetting
in the midst
of all the chaos and carnage.
Pellew, of course,
would go on
to further great success
in his ship,
whose overall career
we've summarised
in another video.
That's it for this video.
Thanks for watching.
If you have a comment
or suggestion
for a ship to review,
let us know
in the comments below.
Don't forget to comment
on the pinned post
for dry-doc questions.
