The First Populist: The Defiant Life of Andrew Jackson

Andrew Jackson
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So I'm David Brown, and I'm going to talk about Andrew Jackson and the American populist
tradition. I'd like to thank the National Archives for sponsoring this. They've got a
terrific series, and what a great opportunity to talk about American history. And I'd also
like to thank you for tuning in, YouTubing, and viewing. So what I want to do is begin
by talking a little bit about Andrew Jackson and approaches to him, how people have,
generations have come to recognize, interpret, and reinterpret Jackson over a period of time.
So I'll begin, I suppose, at the beginning, which is when Jackson became a public commodity
in the American consciousness. And this would be in 1815 with the Battle of New Orleans. Of course,
this came a little bit after the Peace Treaty to end the War of 1812 had been signed.
But of course, Americans didn't know that at the time. So they took Jackson's victory
as some terrific signal victory. It demonstrated the capacity of the United States to survive
in a world that was not filled with republics, but rather with empires and kings and queens.
So Jackson's popularity, it begins there. I should say, however, that not everybody was so
thrilled about this. So John Quincy Adams, who was very excited about Jackson's victory in 1815,
he came back years later to look upon that and see that it was a victory that had multiple
meanings. And as he would say it, not all of them particularly positive. So here's a quote
from John Quincy Adams, some years after the Battle of New Orleans. He calls Jackson's success
a victory more complete over the people of the United States than the soldiers of Great Britain.
And so there, Quincy Adams is focusing a little bit upon Jackson as a populist. Jackson,
who would rise to the presidency, would defeat John Quincy Adams for that position in the 1828
election. And how did this come about? And for Quincy Adams, it wasn't because Jackson was a
brilliant administrator or particularly capable statesman. It's simply because of the shock of
his mass popularity. So this interpretation, Jackson is here, that's always going to be there.
It's always going to be the leitmotif of his popularity and of his legacy,
particularly in the 19th century. But there are other aspects as well. So I'll fast forward a
little bit to the idea of Jackson's being a nationalist. And this was really a feature
of his actions in the 1830s, during his first term as President of the United States,
with the nullification crisis. This was a situation in which the state of South Carolina
was not eager to continue paying a federal tariff. They argued that the federal tariff,
it was unconstitutional, and that it aided Northern manufacturing, not Southern cotton,
Southern production. And so they said that they would refuse at a period of time to pay this
tariff. Jackson moved against South Carolina. Jackson had a carrot and a stick approach.
The carrot was the promise of a reduced tariff over time. And the stick is what became known as
the force bill, in which Jackson said that he would, if necessary, bring the army and enforce
South Carolina to comply with federal law, to comply with the constitution.
Jackson wrote this at the time about the force bill. I'm confidently advised that the nullifiers
of the South seeking to nullify federal law have corrupted both the naval officers and those of
the army in Charleston, that the nullifiers are determined to push matters to extremities.
And so with this force bill, Jackson has isolated South Carolina and he has convinced South Carolina
that it must accede, it must comply with federal law, whether they agree with that law or not.
Jackson said that secession was not an option. Jackson said that he did not recognize secession,
that it would destroy the country. So Andrew Jackson, who is not a particular favorite of
people like John Quincy Adams, as I mentioned earlier, or really New England, went on a
goodwill tour of New England after the nullification crisis was put to a peaceful end. He did so
because he said that he wanted to see all the states. It would not be the first presidential
tour. Monroe had taken one, Washington had taken one, but Jackson felt comfortable now
with the reputation of a nationalist, of going up to New England and going with the reputation,
not just of being a hero, but someone who had protected, if you want to put it that way,
Northern industry by recognizing the legality of the tariff. I should add that Abraham Lincoln
was quite willing to use this exercise to further his own notions of what the American Republic
should be like. And so in his first inaugural, which took place in March of 1861, at that point
in time, I believe Southern states had already seceded from the Union. And Lincoln, in effect,
refers to Jackson. He says, you know, we cannot recognize secession. I do not recognize this,
that secession is not constitutional and it is not legal. And he falls back upon something that's
not new, but in effect, a presidential position that had already been advanced by Andrew Jackson.
So in effect, Jackson is both the hero and the nationalist. Now, if we fast forward to the 1930s,
Jackson becomes also, of all things, he becomes a new dealer. And this has to do with the bank war.
So in the 1830s, Jackson had moved against the Second National Bank of the United States,
which he insisted was unconstitutional and played favorites, helped to advance the fortunes
of some American citizens. But most, those who were taxed to pay for the Second National Bank
could probably not be able to ever get a loan from that bank. The bank was not a mom-and-pop bank.
It was for large-scale infrastructure, those looking to build roads, industry,
catamized transportation networks, and so on. And so Jackson says that this is something that's
not provided for explicitly in the constitution. And when this bank of the United States comes up
for recharter, he vetoes it. So in the 1930s, a century later, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., a young
historian who is living through the New Deal, he meditates about this experience. And he thinks
about Jackson in the 1830s. And he writes a Pulitzer Prize-winning book, came out in 1945,
The Age of Jackson. And he said, in effect, that the circumstances a century apart were very close
to one another, that we had an iconic president in the 1830s, Jackson, an iconic president in the
1930s, FDR. Both were concerned about economic unfairness and unjustness in the country.
And he argued that Jackson had struck against the National Bank in the name of the producers of the
country, the working people. And he said, in effect, FDR had done the same thing. There's also
the irony that Jackson was not a, quote-unquote, humble man. He was part of the Tennessee
scoiarchy, the quasi-aristocracy. And of course, FDR came from a Dougal-Patrician Dutch family.
So it was said of FDR that he was an enemy of his class by passing these bills, getting these
bills passed in the New Deal, which in effect, you know, raised taxes on wealthy people.
So Arthur Schlesinger Jr., in writing about the age of Jackson, was in some ways writing really
about the age of the New Deal and employing Jackson as a symbol of that age. So whether
it was Lincoln with Jackson the Nationalist or FDR and Schlesinger seeing Jackson as a kind of
proto-New Dealer, Jackson has been used by various constituencies for various reasons,
typically grounded in some historical accuracy, but not always as clean and precise as we might
expect. So by the late 20th century, by the 1960s, Jackson's reputation is evolving. It's
changing again. And in the day of the long civil rights movements, Jackson's reputation takes a
distinct downturn. He's not alone. Thomas Jefferson has experienced this as well. What we focus on
in this iteration is Jackson, the slave owner. Jackson owned three plantations in three states,
held at the time of his death, 150 enslaved men, women, and children. And we also focus on
Indian removal. Indian removal is a process that really preceded Jackson and it extended beyond
Jackson's presidency as well. But Jackson becomes, in the late 20th century, I think really
the strongest symbol of it because he is so closely correlated to the Indian removal program
of the 1830s. And I think that that's largely accurate. Jackson is the chief architect of what
becomes the Trail of Tears trauma. I believe other presidents would have enacted perhaps similar
legislation or proposed it if they could have. And if they believed that the country possessed
the power to carry it through, that power was not in effect until the 1830s.
This is controversial, not just today, but in its own time. And we should keep that in mind.
When the House of Representatives passed through the bill supporting removal,
it was, I believe, 102 in favor, 97 opposed. So just a handful of votes made the difference.
This legislation did not give the federal government the power to remove the Native
Americans. It gave the government the power to propose treaties and to
buy up properties and then place those Native American peoples willing to uproot into the West.
In other words, to trade territory in the East for territory in the West. This is pretty much
how Jackson sold the program, that it would be voluntary. However, it really was obviously
much different than that. So here's Jackson on how he is selling Indian removal. He says before
Congress, this emigration should be voluntary for it would be as cruel as unjust to compel
the Aborigines to abandon the graves of their fathers and seek a home in a distant land,
which obviously is what comes to pass. To promote it, to help get the bill pushed through,
the language was voluntarism and not force. But of course, we know that that turned out much,
much differently. So in advocating Indian removal and focusing also on Jackson's role
as a part of the plantocracy, that is the planter class elite, Jackson's reputation has gone from
the 1930s as Jackson the New Dealer to Jackson the Advocate of Southern Interests. The two,
slavery and Indian removal, they do link together. They do cohere in that what we see with Indian
removal is the banishment of roughly 60,000 self-governing Native peoples. And they're being
removed from a territory, which was largely free labor, free soil, and taken across the Mississippi
River. They will be replaced in large part by a planter elite. This will become a considerably
proficient area of cotton cultivation, so much so that it goes by the name of the Cotton Belt
or the Black Belt, a region that really helps to define the economic livelihood and the contours,
not just of millions of people, but also of an entire region. This would be the Deep South.
And it's not, when secession comes in 1860 and 1861, it's not really the South that secedes
because there are border states that remain in the Union. And there are four southern states
which wait until after violence has occurred. That is after Fort Sumter has been fired upon
before those states will join the Confederacy. The states that get in first are those deep
southern states, and those are some of the prime areas where Indian removal took place.
So Hero, Nationalist, New Dealer, and Southern, these have all been Jackson's identities.
What I do in the book that I wrote, the biography, is look at Jackson as a populist. So
Jackson's somebody with many identities, and I think there's certainly room in there
to fit populist. And populism, I think it's something that Jackson obviously doesn't invent.
He embodies it for a period of time in American history, but there's a long history of it. So
first of all, I guess I should define what I mean by populism or populist tradition. And
it's, to my mind, a reaction to elites. These elites could be political elites,
cultural elites, or economic elites. It's the notion that the people have some type of
rights, an inherent notion of what should happen, that they, by dint of being presumably the
majority, they should have the great say in what a republic, what a democracy does.
So the difference between, I think, Jackson and those people who came before is that Jackson
is pushed by a culture that is moving increasingly in the direction away from
deference and towards democracy. So to give you a quick sense of that transition,
I'll read you a quote. This comes from Philip Hone. Hone was no Jacksonian. He did not like
Andrew Jackson. He was first a Federalist and then a Whig in his politics. And he was,
for a period of time, the mayor of New York City. And so he's reflecting upon Jackson's popularity.
Jackson took a goodwill tour, and New York went crazy for Andrew Jackson. And Hone is watching
this, and he's thinking about it. And he writes this, the President, referring to Jackson,
is certainly the most popular man we have ever known. Washington was not so much. His acts were
popular because all descriptions of men were ready to acknowledge him as the father of his country.
But he was superior to the homage of the populace, too dignified, too grave for the liking. And men
could not approach him with familiarity. Here, referring to Jackson, is a man that suits them
exactly. In other words, Jackson had that gift. He was the national hero. He looked resplendent
in a uniform, on a white horse. There was a quality about him, though, that was approachable
to people. He was not the distant Washington. He was not the abstract Jefferson. He was someone
who perhaps spoke like the common people. He was someone who perhaps had the same sympathies
as the common people. And so he is embraced as one of their own, someone who has been elevated
by dint of a prolific public career and is a national hero, but yet is reachable,
understands the needs of the people. That gets, in some sense, I think, to the secret of Jackson's
popularity. There are other reasons as well, of course. So let me put Jackson in some type
of an historical line here. And let me begin by saying just a few words about Shays' Rebellion.
So this occurred in the 1780s, actually just a few months before the Constitutional Convention
in Philadelphia. I would call this a populist uprising. It was regional. It was farmers in
Western Massachusetts being opposed to, critical of the mercantile class, the banking class,
the political class in Eastern Massachusetts. The state had a significant post-Revolutionary
War debt and it was looking to pay down that debt. The taxes fell disproportionately high
on people in the West. These farmers were losing their homes, they were losing their lands,
they were losing their barns, and they protested. They rebelled. Daniel Shays was an American
revolutionary officer and he will become, in some sense, the leader of this rebel army,
which reached upwards of about 2,000 soldiers and was defeated, scattered at the Battle of
Springfield, moving towards an arsenal at Springfield and put down by an army composed
largely of privateers, paid for by wealthy people in Massachusetts and in other New England states,
because one could not at that time call in the federal army. And the Massachusetts
militia was a little bit uncertain because much of the militia was in the West and was supporting
rebellion. And so what we have here is an East-West debtor versus creditor,
farmers versus bankers and merchants struggle. And we'll see this throughout American history.
And what makes it, I think, a candidate for populism is the idea that the people are
struggling, that the people have been kind of cornered economically and politically by elites,
and they're simply seeking justice. I would put Jackson and the Jackson era after that.
This is what used to be called, I think, not so much these days as the age of the common man.
The age of the common man, I think that in some sense, it works from the standpoint that
what it succeeds is a dynastic form of politics. Let's see, Jackson's the seventh president
and five of the previous presidents were from Virginia. Ergo, the title, the Virginia dynasty.
The notion that only a certain kind of educated elite personality could be a president of the
United States. The two presidents before Jackson who weren't from Virginia were from Massachusetts.
Of course, Adams one and Adams two. And they represented in some sense,
those certainly private citizens, but they were elite personages. They were educated,
they were professionals, they were national heroes. And Andrew Jackson sort of embodied
something a little bit different. The quotation from Hone, I think taps into that a bit.
And also, we should mention that Jackson will be the first president not to come from Virginia,
not to come from Massachusetts, but he will represent the West. And so it's the replacement
of dynastic politics with Virginians to presumably a more open and democratic system
of electing our national leaders. So if we follow this populist line along, I'd next go to the 1890s
and look at the populist party. This was a strong party in the South and in the West,
particularly the Plains States. And not unlike Shays' rebellion, this was very much an East-West
affair. And it was not only Shays' rebellion, it was also about money, financial resources.
This was after the Civil War and money was scarce and farmers in the South and in the Plains States
wanted there to be an expansion of the money supply. There were gold strikes, excuse me,
silver strikes in the West, and they made the argument that by inflating the economy,
moving away from the gold standard to a bimetal gold and silver economy, it would help debtors
get out of their debt. There was opposition to this on Wall Street, in the Midwest, and on the
East Coast. Populism found its champion in William Jennings Bryan. Jennings Bryan was a Democrat,
but he was embraced by populists. And he ran for the presidency three times, never won a single
race. But in 1896, he took a higher percentage of the popular votes than Grover Cleveland had
four years earlier, when Grover Cleveland won the presidency. Bryan said at a convention,
that in part here, referring to this urban agrarian split in America,
you come, referring to the urban centers, you come to us and you tell us that the great cities
are in favor of the gold standard. We reply that the great cities rest upon our broad and fertile
prairies. Burn down your cities and leave our farms and your cities will spring up as if by magic,
but destroy our farms and grass will grow in the streets of every city in the country.
So in the gold versus silver crusade of the late 19th century, this was populism
revising an old animosity, a regional animosity between debtors and creditors, financial elites,
and those who view themselves as producers who are on the short end of the economic stick.
So a couple of more examples here. In the 1980s, we have Reaganism. And this was about,
among other things, the idea that the American economy was being strangled with excessive
regulation that come out of the New Deal system. And Reagan famously said in 1981 at his first
inaugural, government is not the solution to our problem. Government is the problem. From time to
time, we've been tempted to believe that society has become too complex to be managed by self-rule,
that government by an elite group is superior to government for, by, and of the people.
There's a bit of a populistic tone or ring to that sentiment. It's the idea that intellectuals,
FDR's brain trust, for example, John F. Kennedy's the best and the brightest. They think that they
know too much, but, but the common people, they can, they can govern themselves. They know what's
best. I would say most recently, we've seen examples on both the political left and the
political right of populism. For example, Bernie Sanders from time to time, he sounds to me very
much like William Jennings, Brian, in his opposition, his criticism to the financial
nexus that we have in the country, the top end of that nexus, I should say. So in 2019,
Sanders said, there'll be no real change in this country unless we have the courage to take on
Wall Street, which is essentially what Brian was saying in the 1890s.
On the political right, Donald Trump, also in 2019, making an appeal to white working class
constituencies, said in Grand Rapids, Michigan, they say, they're the elites, but we got more
money. We got more brains. We got more, better houses and apartments. You're the elites. We're
the elites. In other words, you know, sort of, you know, framing America in a kind of a, of an
us versus them scenario. It could be debtors and creditors. It could be the best and the brightest
versus the common man. But it's the idea of a popular control and will popular control win out
or will elites dominate the country? That's the line that I see Andrew Jackson belonging in.
He belongs in other lines as well. He's one of a few chief executives to have been a general
and been president. He of course is one of several two term Democrats to be president.
But in other ways, you know, he's a bit of a singular character.
More ecumenically, though, he does stand, I think, in this line of populist leaders.
So at this point, I should probably say a few words about what makes Jackson
a populist. So I'll begin with 1819. Jackson is affected, like many Americans were,
by a financial downturn that year. It was called the Panic of 1819. Panic, today we would consider
that a polite euphemism for perhaps deep recession or even depression. What's occurring in 1819
is really going on in other parts of the world, not just the United States. There is a general
global readjustment to markets after the Napoleonic conflicts. And so this will take
some time to work its way through. There were, however, problems in America that were specific
to America. Western lands were opening up and there was probably excessive
speculations in Western lands. In other words, people were looking to buy up the lands,
not just to go there and live, but to buy up thousands and thousands of acres and speculate,
hope to sell it for more than what you purchased it for. So this creates a bubble, a land bubble.
Pushing this bubble on is also the fact that you have the issuance of paper money in pretty large
quantities, unrestrained for the most part. You have mom and pop banks that make their profits
by doing this. And you had very little oversight from the Second National Bank of the United
States. The Second National Bank had gone into existence in 1816. And this really three years
later was its first big chore, its first big crisis. And it really didn't do a very good job.
At a time when it probably should have been working to limit the amount of paper money going
into the economy, it didn't do that. It allowed the bubble to keep growing. When this bubble
bursts, there was no soft landing. There was a very hard landing, in part, because the bank
begins to curtail loans. And this is going to contract the money supply. One critic of the bank's
actions at this time said, well, the bank was saved, but the people were essentially destroyed.
Obviously, a sardonic comment, tongue in cheek, but wicked. And it got to the truth of things.
And so the panic of 1819, it creates a situation where Andrew Jackson will, in the future, look
at the Second National Bank with a very critical eye. It wasn't the only reason why he decided to
move against the bank, but it probably played some role in his animosity towards the institution.
And also, more broadly speaking, we've been talking about regionalism here. Not unlike
Shays' Rebellion, this panic of 1819, while it was fairly widespread, it did tend to create
difficulties in the West, where there was far less infrastructure and less financial resources.
And so this would be a Western audience that would look at the panic of 1819 and see it as
parts, perhaps, of an Eastern system that was aimed against it. I think a second component
of Jackson's populism is the fact that it was a Westerner. He wasn't born in the West. He was born
probably in South Carolina, certainly in the Waxhaw region, the border between North and South
Carolina. But he will, as a young man, make his way West. I mentioned Ronald Reagan a couple of
minutes ago. Reagan was born in the Midwest, and Reagan goes to California. And when Reagan has
his political career as governor and then later president, it's during a period in which
Midwesterners were not being elected to the presidency, but Sunbelters were. I think between
1964 with Johnson up to the second Bush in 2004, with his re-election, I think every chief
executive elected was from a Sunbelt state, be it Georgia, Arkansas, California, Florida, Texas.
I mention that because regionalism plays a role here. It plays a role with Andrew Jackson.
Reagan symbolizes, in some sense, a larger cultural movement, economic movement,
and therefore political movement to the Sunbelt. Jackson will represent a movement
out of the East and into the West, which will really take hold after the Civil War when most
of our presidents will be Midwesterners. But Jackson will become the first chief executive
to really make his career West of the Appalachians. Between 1803 and 1821,
there were eight states brought into the Union. Every one of them, except in Maine, was a Southern
or a Western state. That's an electorate in the South and West that will go for Jackson.
Jackson could have been a great hero and run for the presidency in 1804 or 1812, and he probably
would not have won. That Western constituency wasn't there, but it is there in 1828.
So, Jackson doesn't run for the presidency first in 1828. He runs for the presidency in 1824 for
the first time, and I think that that also is something that makes him really a populist
candidate. The 1824 election was an interesting election in that nobody really said that they
belonged to political parties. They were all sort of conceiving of themselves as a generic
Jeffersonian candidate. The idea of parties seemed to have dissipated, if not died off,
with the collapse of the Federalist Party after the War of 1812. So, what you have in 1824,
really, it's a politics of region. You have John Quincy Adams from New England. You have
William Crawford from Georgia in the Deep South. You have Henry Clay in Kentucky, a Southern state,
but also a Western state. One of Clay's nicknames was Harry of the West. And then you have Jackson,
not unlike Clay, a Southerner, but also a Westerner, all nominally Jeffersonians.
Four major candidates, that means that no one is likely to win a majority of the Electoral College,
which the Constitution tells us is what a candidate needs to win, which is precisely
what happens. Jackson won a plurality of the votes in the Electoral College and the popular vote,
but he did not win a majority. The election goes to the House of Representatives.
Jacksonians say that they have a moral right to this office, but the people have spoken,
and the election, in fact, goes to John Quincy Adams. So, this becomes the rallying cry of
Jacksonian populism. The people spoke, but the election was stolen from the people
by a corrupt cabal of Eastern financial and political interests.
When Jackson does become president in 1829, one can make the argument that he does operate
as a populist. Definitely so, if we think of populism in the 1820s and 1830s as being
anti-establishment in its orientation. Anti-establishment in regard to seeing
what transpired in 1824, 1825, and regarding Eastern politics and Eastern financial elites
as being corrupt. And there needs to be a destabilization of the process. There needs
to be a new political class that comes before this populistic political class.
So, when I say that Jackson was, in some sense, an anti-establishment politician,
what I mean is that he, among other things, he used the veto power more than any other
chief executive before him. In fact, Jackson was the seventh president. You take the other six
and they did not use the veto combined as many times as did Jackson. Jackson used the veto a
total of 12 times. Nobody would reach that figure again until Andrew Johnson in the
early 1860s. Of course, he exceeded it quite a bit. I think the record is FDR had over 600 vetoes.
At this point in our history, we're back down to lower numbers. Bush too, and Obama, I believe,
both had 12 presidential vetoes like Jackson. Trump had 10. At this point in his presidency,
just about halfway through this term, I don't think Joe Biden has any presidential vetoes.
12, that was considered a pretty high number in Jackson's day. And this was seen as some
type of emblem that Jackson was in disagreement with establishment institutions like, for example,
national banks, which he would veto out of existence. There's also Jackson
and his relationship with his cabinet. There was a tremendous amount of churn in Jackson's cabinet.
There were four secretaries of state. There were five secretaries of the treasury.
There was just a lot of turnover. Jackson preferred to go to his informal cabinet,
which was known colloquially as his kitchen cabinet. This was also a cabinet, informal or not,
of shifting personalities. And it caught the eye of critics. So Jackson, he vetoes the second
national bank in the United States. It's understood that his kitchen cabinet was largely in favor of
and one commentator at the time wrote this, the language of the veto message in relation to the
bank United States is disgraceful to the president and humiliating to every American. It smells of
the kitchen. What the commentator probably doesn't recognize though, is that most Americans
probably didn't have partners. So this wasn't a partner politics of Jefferson, right? This wasn't
Monticello. This wasn't Washington's place at Mount Vernon, but most Americans did have
kitchens. They know what kitchens were. They spent a lot of time in their kitchens. And
if Jackson has a kitchen cabinet, that must mean that Jackson is in touch with the American people
in a way that parlor politicians were not. I mentioned this bank war. I should also say a
little bit about Jackson's efforts to destroy the bank. This wasn't just the veto power,
but this was Jackson's determination to keep the bank from entering the political process
once the veto had been levied. The veto came down in 1832. The bank's charter didn't actually
extinguish, expire until 1836. Jackson wanted to ensure that the bank didn't have resources
that it could, for example, use to purchase the votes of politicians or newspaper editors to get
a favorable reversal of the veto, to have Congress on board and override that veto.
So what Jackson did was he began to not remove bank deposits. That's sometimes what it's called
the removal policy, but rather just not put government money into the national banking
system. And every month when the government's bills came due, he would take the money out of
the national bank. And so money would be going out, but money would not be going in.
The problem with this is that the bank had a contract with the federal government. The bank
was supposed to receive this money. So Jackson said, I don't want that to happen. And Jackson
sought out banks that could take in this money. They were known as pet banks, derogatory term.
Jackson went to his secretary of the treasury, Lewis MacLean, and said, I would like to follow
this program. MacLean said, I can't do this. It's against the law. We have a contract with
this national bank. They are due this money. Jackson, like MacLean, gently nudged MacLean
into another position. MacLean was replaced by another secretary of the treasury, a man by the
name of DeWayne. DeWayne refused to do what Jackson asked, and he was fired. It was Roger
Taney, the author, primarily author, of Jackson's bank veto message, who in fact was brought in
as a term letter appointment to head the treasury, acting director, and to get it through.
And that's what Taney does. This was so controversial that the Senate, lacking the
power to initiate an impeachment trial process, in fact censured Jackson. Jackson remains to this
day the only president in our history to receive a Senate from the US Senate. I should also mention
that Jackson is probably one of only two people in this country to have inspired
political parties to rise up in opposition to them. I think the first is Alexander Hamilton,
whose financial programs in the early 1790s were deemed to be so controversial, first by Madison,
then by Jefferson, and then by the New Yorkers, who they allied with, that they created the
Democratic-Republican party, generically later known as the Jeffersonian party. So Jeffersonian
democracy versus Hamiltonian federalism. Jackson, his opposition is going to be the Whig party.
The Whigs take their name from English politics, the Whigs being the liberal party there in
oversight of the aristocracy, the crown. So American Whigs were careful in calling themselves Whigs
because they want to accent the notion that Andrew Jackson was in fact operating as a king.
He was King Andrew I. And so they will create a party, it'll become a national party,
and they will operate for a period of roughly about 20 years in opposition first to Jackson
and then to his successors. They weren't a terribly successful political party,
but they did manage to win a few congressional majorities and two presidential elections.
The irony here is that it begins as an anti-Jackson party, but the two chief executives
who were elected were, in some sense, pocket Jacksons. What I mean by that is the Whigs
learned that they had to play a populistic game if they wanted to get the presidential
candidates elected. So the two Whigs who did become president, William Henry Harrison
and Zachary Taylor, they were both, like Jackson, military heroes. Harrison, the war of 1812,
and Taylor, the Mexican-American War in the 1840s. And so even when Whiggery is trying to
distance itself from, disassociate itself from what Jackson populism stands for, they still
realize that in 19th century America, one must play the political game.
I'd also note that Jackson had other forms of opposition which were unique to him and unique
to that time. So Jackson, for example, in 1833, as chief executive, he suffered an assault. His
nose was grabbed and we think bloodied. Jackson was on his way to Furtick, Maryland. There was
a ceremony there honoring George Washington's wife, Martha Washington. Jackson was going to be there
and he was on a boat and a man came up to Jackson. Jackson was sitting and the man
began to take his glove off. Jackson thrust his hand out and said, no need to take off your glove,
thinking the man was going to shake his hand and the man grabbed and tweaked his nose.
He got away too. There wasn't a lot of security at that time. John Quincy Adams reflected upon
having read about it in the newspaper and he wrote, a president of the United States
pulled by the nose is a new incident in the history of this country. As he himself has
confidence personal violence against members of Congress, Jackson will not meet with much sympathy.
So John Quincy Adams, dry, briny, no false statements coming from his perspective and
point of view, was very interested in the notion that Jackson, who was a great hater and who could
inspire great hate in others, was now seeing, in some sense, the effect of that in a very personal
way. So less than two years later, in early 1835, Jackson was also the first chief executive
to be targeted for assassination. This came from a house painter in Washington, D.C.,
English-born and a gentleman suffering from mental instability. Jackson is leaving a funeral
in the Capitol building. The man comes out and pulls a gun on him, but it won't fire correctly,
has a second pistol and fires, but there's a misfire with that as well.
The guns were later tested and they worked, but they didn't work at that moment. So Jackson is
able to evade assassination. It did seem to contemporaries though, at the time, that there
was some morbid fittingness in Jackson being the only chief executive to be targeted for assassination
because his presidency was, in fact, so disruptive. It was so anti-establishment
and it put people, not necessarily supporters, but it put many people on edge. They wondered
about the future of the country. They wondered about there being future Jacksons to follow this
Andrew Jackson. Let me give one more example of Jackson being an anti-establishment figure.
When he enters the presidency, he calls for reform, his word, reform. What he meant by that
was that there must be rotation of office. One could take the high road, Jackson does in his
inaugural address and says that this is the people's government and every American should
have the opportunity to serve their government, that no one should look at government work as
something that they should do for their career. They should want to serve and then leave.
But it was also reflecting upon his bitter defeat in the 1824 election and the notion that it was a
corrupt financial and political bureaucracy that cheated the people from their champion in 1824.
Therefore, he would see that there was rotation, that the people who would be in office would not
be these encrusted political elites, but they would be people who presumably would be more
loyal to, as he would say, the people, but Jackson being the symbol of the people,
that they would also be loyal to Jackson. So on the high end, he would portray rotation of office
as merely political reform. To his critics and his political opponents, they would look at
rotation of office as being nothing more than an opportunity for Jackson to, in fact,
build up his party and to put people loyal to him in office.
Jackson's immediate, I should say, not immediate, but one of Jackson's predecessors in the presidency,
James Monroe, had worked carefully with Jackson in the 18-teens, in the early 1820s,
when Jackson was in the military and when Jackson was briefly governor of the territory of Florida.
They got to know each other fairly well. It was largely an epistolary relationship.
They wrote letters to each other. And so they knew each other and they felt comfortable with each
other. And when Jackson begins to announce this policy of reform and removal, Monroe took it a
message and it makes the suggestion that there's been corruption in government. And for eight
years, I was the head of that government and I didn't see this corruption that you referred to.
In fact, Monroe says, certain individuals such as you, Andrew Jackson, did quite well under
my administration. And so Monroe wants to have his voice on record here. He wants to
clear his administration of any wrongdoing. And he believed that Jackson had perhaps gone a little
bit too far in making the arguments, at least the suggestion, that previous presidential
administrations had been partisan and therefore, to an extent, corrupt.
Well, where does that leave us with Jackson today? In my book, I refer to Jackson,
at least in presidential politics, as the first populist. We've seen iterations of populism
since then, including American presidential politics. And we've had these discussions
probably off and on for the last four or five or six years. Where it leaves us with Andrew Jackson
is an interesting question. What do we think about populism? That's a way of asking,
what do we think about Andrew Jackson? One way to approach this is to look at polls,
presidential polls, to be sure, sometimes imprecise, if not dubious science.
There's always the top three, Lincoln and then Washington and FDR, not always in that order.
And then there are some culprits at the very bottom. James Buchanan seems to always be last
or pretty close to last. And then there are people like Andrew Jackson, who are particularly
interesting because they fluctuate. Sometimes they're higher and sometimes they're lower.
And the question is, does that say more about them, their presidencies, or about us and
contemporary culture? So looking at a recent Siena poll, presidential poll,
Jackson docked in at 23. And I think Biden is 46. So Jackson is pretty much right in the middle.
That raises the question, what do we mean in these presidential polls? And I'm not sure if
it's something that we've ever really clarified. Do we mean popularity or do we mean consequence?
Because if it's popularity, then one can see Jackson's popularity has declined over the last
30, 40 years or so. On the other hand, if we're talking about consequence,
it would seem like Jackson must rank higher than 23rd, where he sits between
William McKinley and Jimmy Carter, because the presidency was consequential under him.
Indian removal was consequential. The bank war, nullification, these were consequential.
Jackson's populism as a symbol for common man democracy, that was consequential.
Consequence and popularity, these are different things. And so when we think about Jackson,
we consider his presidency, we consider where we place him in our history. We need to be very
precise about what we're talking about and how we want to approach him. In this book,
I approach Jackson as a populist. So with that, I'll close. I'll thank once more
you for viewing and for the National Archives for putting on
such a great series of books and authors. Thank you very much.
