Has the Iranian Threat Been Neutralized? | Michael Doran

And for the first time in history, Israel and the United States have taken military action together. This is totally new. To understand Middle East dynamics, I always count on Michael Duran, director of the Middle East Center at the Hudson Institute. We sat down to discuss what has now been dubbed the 12-day war and how Middle East political realities have been transformed. One of the most amazing things about the Israeli attacks is that they totally took the Iranians by surprise. The scientists were in their beds. Commanders got together thinking they were safe. That is uh just remarkable. How did the strikes on Iran changed the geopolitical landscape? Was World War II ever a real possibility? And has the threat of a nuclear Iran been neutralized for good? And there's still a little lingering doubt that maybe some of the enriched uranium was squirreled away by the Iranians in some other secret site. So, we have to wait and determine. This is American Thought Leaders and I'm Ya Kellik. Mike Duran, such a pleasure to have you back on American thought leaders. Great to be here. So, let's discuss what has actually happened in the Middle East since this as what's been dubbed now the 12-day war. Clearly, the political reality has been resh reshaped substantially. So, uh Iran has been taken down two or three notches. I mean, if you just go back to to uh you know, 20 months ago when Hamas attacked Israel and the next day Hezbollah, Iran's proxy opened up on the Israelis. A few weeks after that, the Houthis opened up on the Israelis. You know, if I had told you then that uh that within two years, less than two years, Israel was going to have an unimpeded air bridge to Iran, was going to control the Iranian airspace and was going to take out 30 top uh military officers in the Iranian regime and nine or 10 uh nuclear scientists, you you'd tell me I was I was crazy. Uh but Israel did do that and and and by the time they did it, Hezbollah couldn't uh attack. One of the things that we all felt um back in October of 2023 is that Israel um couldn't afford to escalate against Iran because Hezbollah, which had 150,000 rockets and missiles, would open up on Israel. and those rockets and missiles like we're seeing the Iran they they basically everything that Iran has his or had um and so we assumed that Hezbollah's missiles could could penetrate Israeli defenses and they would be blanketing Tel Aviv with uh with missile fire. But the the Israelis very deafly were able to decapitate Hamas first, then turn their uh turn their ar their sights on Hezbollah and they were able to neutralize Hezbollah before it could open up um with uh all guns against the Israelis. Once they took out Hezbollah, then they were able to go and and and take care of the uh Iranians. And so Iran was never able to um to carry out a full front, you know, a a a total campaign against Israel with all elements of its resistance axis uh operating uh um operating all out at the same time. So uh almost miraculously, Israel now has a victory at least as great as the victory it had in 1967 in the Six-Day War. Why do you say almost miraculous? Uh just because um I don't think anyone could have imagined this out. Israel was laid so low and taken by surprise on October 8th and the IDF which you think of as being an you know extremely um extremely adept force, modern force was nowhere to be seen October 7th and uh and and you wondered maybe it's not as good as as we thought it was. But it turns out that the two wars it was prepared to fight wasn't prepared to fight the war with Gaza, but it was very much prepared to fight the war against Hezbollah and the war against uh uh against uh Iran. So we have first we have this war against Hamas, then we have the neutralizing of the Hezbollah's missile systems, right? We have um and then we have, you know, the clearing of the um Iran Iranian um air defenses. Yeah. Um, and then there's also what happened in Syria. That's another piece. Oh, I left that out. Yeah. The falling of the fall of Bashar al-Assad as well. Yeah. That's huge. And and which also made possible um the the land the airbridge to to Iran because as long as uh the Russians and the Iranians were in Syria and the Assad regime, it was be a lot harder for the Israelis to overfly Syria and go to Iran. Of course, they could do it. Um but it would have taken uh extra resources and you never know what the Russians would have done who uh uh in terms of helping to give the Iranians early warning. One of the most amazing things about the uh the Israeli attack against the Iranians is that they totally took the Iranians by surprise. The scientists were in their beds, commanders got all got together thinking they were safe. That is uh just remarkable. No one else can do this kind of thing. It's not the United States can't do this. I mean, it takes such penetration of the uh of the system to lay this kind of lay the groundwork for these operations. I I think um that Donald Trump and uh and Prime Minister Netanyahu were were loosely coordinated throughout all of this. I don't think it was all meticulously choreographed. And um when the Israelis went against the Iranians, um my interpretation, I could be wrong, we'll find out over time, but my my interpretation is that Trump gave them a yellow light. The Israelis, he he had promised them that that he wanted to try to uh get a diplomatic answer to the Iranian nuclear program, and he had promised them that he he'd only take 60 days. The 60 days came and went and and Prime Minister Netanyahu said, "We have to go against the Iranians now. This is our window of opportunity." And so Trump gave them a yellow light. They executed flawlessly. And they were so successful that Trump himself wanted to be associated with it. Then I think if they had not been so successful in this unbelievably well-coordinated uh attack, then Trump might have thought twice about getting the United States involved. There's a lot of discussion right now about the reality of the nuclear program in Iran, right? So everything from it's completely decimated, it's over, it doesn't exist to, you know, it was all moved away just in time, right? From what you understand at this moment, what is the reality of that? So from what I understand, the reality is that there was enormous damage done to it. But we don't know that it was totally destroyed in every respect and I don't think we can know for for sure until the three major nuclear sites in Iran that's Isvahan, Fordo and and Natans are investigated and some of these like Natans especially and um Fordo uh have deep underground facilities and there's still a little lingering doubt that maybe some of the enri enriched uranium uh was was squirreled away by the Iranians in some other secret site before uh Isvahan and and and and Fordo were attacked. Um so we have to say in I think um to be very very judicious that right now Iran is an u is a nuclear power of indeterminate status. So we have to wait and determine. I think it's very obvious that this um early DIA report that came out and said that it was only, you know, set back months and not and and not years is nonsense. There was very severe damage done to these to to these sites. It troubles me though to see how politicized it got immediately because the the the anti-Trump uh um elements wanted to deny this success to him and the anti-Netanyahu elements wanted to deni deny success to Netanyahu. They ran with this story which said that very little damage was done and then the the Trump administration to protect itself came back and said no no no an enormous you know it was completely obliterated. Well, the answer may be slightly, you know, a a little bit more toward almost completely obliterated. We have to wait. We have to wait and and find out. I I think this is a question that can be objectively answered. There's an objective answer to this question and we have the tools eventually. It may take weeks or months to to figure it out. We have the tools to know for sure. So, everybody should just back off a little bit, cool down and and wait and find out. You know, my my producer and I were discussing earlier that one of the things that isn't as well known is that uh the nuc Iranian nuclear program is has a modular nature. It was designed this way to make it easier to not have it all be obliterated and of course it's been you know in in development forever. I mean for for many decades. I it gives me great pleasure to think that how successful the Israelis were and together with us there were some 18 different sites Uh the the the four that mattered the most were were ARK, the plutonium reactor. Uh Foro, the deep underground bunker under the under the mountain, Natans, which is the the sort of the the the the major enrichment facility, this the the the hub of the whole uh of the whole whole system, and Isvahan, which was where the the conversion facility. Those are the the the four most important ones. But there were there were some 14 more. Uh, and I thought it was almost impossible for the Israelis to hit all of them. And I'm glad I was wrong about that. Bottom line is it's the program has been degraded dramatically. Basically, dramatically. And I it won't surprise me if the Trump administration is 100% correct that it has been totally obliterated. It's just that this at this point we can't we can't know that. Uh we can't know that for sure. But we have also sent a a signal. We've broken a number of taboss uh or I don't know red lines that we imposed on our on oursel. We we have once again made the Iranian nuclear program completely illegitimate. We've shown that we will take military action to uh to in uh to m to make sure that they never have a bomb. And for the first time, Yan, in in history, Israel and the United States have taken military action together. This is totally new. There's always been a taboo in American national security culture of working together militarily with the Israelis. There was some sense that that would taint us in the eyes of our um Arab and Muslim allies. And Trump has a totally different approach. I mean, he's really saying association with Israeli military power enhances the power of the United States. I think that's a beautiful thing. Mike, we're going to take a quick break right now and folks, we're going to be right back. And we're back with Mike Duran, director of the Middle East Center at the Hudson Institute. Well, so that brings up a a bunch of thoughts I have. Again, I'm thinking back to your remarkable article, the Kings Foils uh um looking at this whole situation. Um, of course, a huge player in all of in the region is Turkey, and Turkey is no friend to Israel. I mean, and and I know just from, you know, many things I've read of yours and many discussions that we've had that you you view uh Turkey US alignment alliance is actually a very valuable thing, right? Um at the same time, as you just said, you view the Israeli uh American alliance as a very valuable thing. But what happened just now, isn't Turkey getting awfully worried all of a sudden? What I think it's I think it's complex. I mean, think about it this way. President Erdogan gave a speech recently in which he attacked Israel in the harshest terms and he also announced that he was giving orders to develop the the missile capabilities of the Turkish military. Uh presumably so that they can penetrate Israeli defenses. At the same time however uh he or his government gave uh advice to Ahmed Ashara the lead new leader in Damascus who is who is uh where uh Turkeykey's the dominant power not to get in the way of the Israelis as they make their way to Iran. And I think we the United States our B2 bombers that went to Iran also went over Syria. I believe if they didn't go over Syria they went over Turkey. So, uh, one way or another, we were able to attack Iran and the Israelis were able to attack Iran because the Turks, um, facilitated might be too strong of a word, but, you know, didn't interfere. Did not interfere and they could have interfered if they want. they could have made life very difficult uh if they uh if they if they wanted and I think we should all remember that uh they they saw it as in their interest how what whatever feelings they may have toward Israel uh they didn't see it as a bad thing that Israel won this war well and so now you're speaking to this you know dramatic realignment in the region which is I think really started with the Abraham Accords which were you know one of these things that I never thought I'd see anything like that I don't know what you what you thought maybe you were the one guy that was predicting it all. I wasn't I wasn't actually I wasn't I wasn't totally on top of that but uh but prominent diplomats are saying there's more coming right more Abraham Accords are going to be expanded now with this situation. Well Steve Wood the president's special envoy uh suggested and he said we're going to be surprised at some of the countries that are going to get involved. I'm not sure what he's uh what he has in mind. One of them might be Syria. Now that that would be very very interesting. They're saying that I'll I'm a little skeptical. Uh I think a lot of people are a lot of Middle Easterners are are uh telling Donald Trump what he wants to hear in order to ingratiate themselves. Uh so uh I'll be surprised if there's a Lebanon Israeli peace agreement and I'll be surprised if there's a Syrian uh Israeli peace agreement. I won't be shocked completely and I wouldn't say it won't happen, but I I'll I'm more inclined to say, well, let me let me let me see how this unfolds. Couple of uh weeks ago, a few weeks ago, Steve Wood talked about Armenia and Azarbaian joining the uh uh joining the Abraham Accords. Now, there I know the Turks are very much ready to normalize with the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis are almost uh ready. There's a couple of points where there's sticking points, but we could see uh we could see a historic reconciliation between Turks and Armenians. But but the bottom line, and this is what I think I'm hearing after thinking through everything we've discussed right now, is that this has reduced the CCP's power and influence in the region. Totally. I have no doubt about that whatsoever. And just it's enhanced the United States and the United States and its alliance through Israel. So if the is if the Saudis normalize with the Israelis are more move closer toward normalization um they're not going to call it Abraham Accords because Abraham of Accords was the UAE. Uh and and I I don't know that they're going to rush to do that right now because the Gaza conflict is still going on and it is uh soured relations somewhat. But if that if we move in that direction in a year or so uh and and and I think it's quite possible that that the that that could happen, we we should think of um Abraham Accords and re and related developments as the American answer in the Middle East to to one belt, one road. And just speaking about Gaza, what do you think the implications are for the Gaza war? I I think that President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu are going to try to solve the the war in to end the war in Gaza sooner rather than later with a with with some kind of big deal. And if they do that, if they if there's a major deal and all the hostages are returned, I think that uh Prime Minister Netanyahu will go to early elections. You know, you know, there's a cloud hanging over him because of October 7th because he was the man in power on October 7th because he's the dominant politician uh in Israel of the last 20 years. So, some measure of responsibility for October 7th attaches to him. He has u almost completely redeemed himself because he has removed an existential threat to the Jewish people. Uh you know, all all Jewish holidays are they tried to kill us, they failed. Let's eat. Let's eat. Yeah. That's the uh as people go, it's Friday, as you and I are talking to each other as they go to have their Shabbat meal tonight. This is basically what they're all going to say. They tried to kill us, they failed. Let's eat. And um uh Prime Minister Netanyahu knows he's got that story now. Uh and this was his life's mission, ending the Iranian nuclear threat. Uh on that basis, I think he's going to want to go to elections. Mhm. And just very briefly for the record, the threat of war in the Middle East, which there always is some, more or less at this point. Oh, much less. Yeah. Much less. Yeah. Absolutely. And and I mean we discussed all the many of the reasons why that might be the case but like but succinctly why does this arrangement right now after this 12-day war after the US involvement which a lot of people feared would create more war or unleash even a world war. I mean this is what some of some of the I I never understood how they were saying Russ what how's it going to be a world war China is supporting Iran but from a distance like we discussed you know with the um with the companies providing data and technology and missile technology and and that kind of thing but they're not getting directly involved with their military Russia can't get directly involved because it's been weakened by Ukraine and it's busy in in in Ukraine So, who's going to come to the aid of Iran? And Iran is a Iran is a third rate military power. You know, it's like a boxer that has one arm that's atrophied. There's no there's no regular military. There's no regular air force to speak of at all. Uh they ha what they have are terrorism, ballistic missiles, drones, and cruise missiles, and a nuclear program. Uh and uh that's it. And thei the United States can can handle that. Clearly, we saw it with the President Trump. So, there wasn't going to be any kind of large coalition coming and attacking in America. Iran was behind all of the wars in in the Middle East of the last uh of the last 20 years. And so, we're going to have a little bit of stability now because the ring of fire is gone basically, right? Except for the hoodies. Except for the Houthis. Right. Right. Which China is going to be interested in keeping on a low boil, I think. Mike, as we finish up, of of course Israel wanted to degrade the nuclear program of Iran. That's that's obvious, but we have, you know, basically different motivations, all these different stakeholders that are playing out. You know, we've got the Gulf States, we've got America, um we've got Iran, the Iranian people, which are certainly not the same thing as the Mullas. Where where do you think they stand in this picture? All of those different elements. Yeah, I think the American people were overwhelmingly in favor of what President Trump uh did. He did split his own coalition because there were there is this younger crowd that is very much influenced by these uh online uh influencers uh who saw this as some kind of betrayal of the um of the MAGA ethos. Uh but the but the poll polling shows that the American public and particularly the MAGA base were uh were supportive of this. Every president since Clinton has said Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon. Uh o in Israel again overwhelming support particularly among the Jewish population but even a very significant percentage of the Arab population was was supportive in the Gulf. Uh I think you have a kind of um duality in people's minds. People are afraid of instability. They're afraid of another regime change war, more turmoil. And in particular in the Gulf, they were afraid that the Iranians might retaliate against the Americans and the Israelis by targeting them, by targeting Saudi oil fields, the uh the the Imirati oil fields or even Imirati population uh and so on. So there was a there was there were uh there was a lot of vocal opposition by the leadership in Saudi Arabia and the uh and the UAE um to the war which was partly out of fear of the thing uh devolving into something that was going to be um detrimental to everyone and partly out of fear of being targeted by the Iranians. Nobody in the Gulf, nobody in the Gulf is sad to see Iran cut down a few pegs, to see its proxies neutered, uh, and to see its nuclear program, uh, destroyed. They're all ecstatic about that. Mike, this has been an absolutely fascinating conversation. A final quick thought as we finish. My final thought is that there's a gap between the Israeli position, stated position in the war and the American. The American position is that we have to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. The Israeli position is that we have to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon and prevent them from developing their ballistic missile program. I think the Israelis have it right and I hope that American policy will put as much emphasis on the missile program as on the uh as as on the nuclear program because that missile program is being put at the service of the global coalition the Chinese Russian and Iranian coalition against the United States. Well, Mike Duran, it's such a pleasure to have had you on. Thank you. Thank you all for joining Mike Duran and me on this episode of American Thought Leaders. I'm your host, Yana Kellik. [Music]