¡La CRISIS DEMOGRÁFICA de China tras la COVID! Crematorios desbordados, pueblos abandonados

China's demographic crisis after COVID-19. Crematoriums overflowing, abandoned villages. Chinese women with a house and a car but without a husband. Why do Chinese men run away from marriage? The divisions in the PCS deepen. Clashes between the party's elites. Is Xi Jinping losing control? Entire towns in China remain disturbingly silent. Houses are still full of belongings, but there is no one left to tell their stories. Streets that were once full of life are now deserted. In some parts of the country, this is the new reality. An alarming wave of diseases is ravaging China. Despite the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party to minimize the crisis, citizens have gone to social media to warn that 2025 could mark a peak in deaths nationwide. Authorities continue to be vague, but the symptoms remind those observed during the COVID-19 pandemic. What many believed at first was a common cold has frequently led to serious illnesses, including what doctors call a white lung. In a disturbing way, this outbreak seems to be affecting young people more strongly. In Henan province, Mr. Fu reported a series of sudden deaths among young and middle-aged people, all members of the Communist Party. Online statistics have aroused concern. Unofficial reports state 5.2% mortality rates for those born in the 80s and 187% for those born in the 90s. 3% for those born in the 90s. Authorities have described these statements as rumors, but personal testimonies tell another story. A photo of a funeral in Shandong showed an electronic panel with eight recent deaths, three of them between the ages of 14 and 31. Mr. Li, from Zhoukou, in Henan province, described overflowing hospitals and an inexplicable wave of deaths from pneumonia, heart attacks and brain infarctions, many of them in people apparently healthy between 30 and 40 years old. A doctor in Jiangsu province, who uses the alias Zhang Liang, corroborated these reports, pointing to an increase in sudden deaths from heart attacks among young professionals without previous diseases. He related this trend to the long-term effects of the pandemic, describing a country where most citizens now live in a state of sub-health. He said lung nodules are now alarmingly common. Analyst Tang Jingyuan points to another factor, stress. The generation after the 1980s, the first born under the policy of the only child, now bears the greatest burden of family and economic pressures. This suggests that it could be contributing to the increase in mortality among millennials. Meanwhile, hospitals are at the limit of their capacity and crematoriums throughout the country struggle to stay up to date. Videos show long queues of bodies waiting to be processed. Authorities claim that it is simply a season of severe flu, at 99%, supposedly flu A, but citizens suspect a resurgence of COVID. Faced with the saturation of crematoriums and growing economic difficulties, villagers are increasingly opting for burials. The policies of cremation, formerly mandatory, are being discreetly ignored. Mr. Li reports a widespread mortality in rural communities. Each village has dead, he said, hundreds or even thousands of villages. People who die are young and die fast. But where has the population gone in general? Urban centers report closed shops and empty shopping centers. Some suggest that the closure of factories pushed migrants back to their homes. But even rural villages are now empty, without signs of life. A voice in off of a video circulating on social media says, a city of 100,000 inhabitants, now abandoned. Of more than 1,000 homes, only 10 remain. Most of the doors are sealed. Houses still have daily use products, but there is no one at home. Speculation online is unbridled. Some believe that these areas were depopulated by deaths during the pandemic. Others suspect forced eviction. Houses are full of belongings, a user posted. If people moved, why leave everything behind? Another chilling voice in off suggests, we are just now discovering villages that were razed during the pandemic. Parallelisms are traced to the first days of COVID-19 in Wuhan, when crematoriums operated non-stop, and, according to reports, identities were confirmed by collecting the mobile phones of the deceased. An internet user asked forcefully, what kind of country treats its population as a state secret? Some point to the decline in the consumption of raw materials as evidence of theories about depopulation. Salt production in China in 2022 fell 25% compared to previous levels of the pandemic, a fact that many consider revealing. While Beijing works to control the narrative, censor data and suppress leaks from crematoriums, ghost towns say much more than what is allowed to be told. In the end, these abandoned homes can become silent witnesses to a hidden crisis. While the world watches, the question remains, what really happened behind the closed doors of China? In China, a silent revolution is taking place in homes, hearts, and expectations of millions of women and men. The marital market is changing. The pressure is real. And the stories behind this reveal a deeper crisis of values, gender roles and survival in a society on a crossroads. My boyfriend and I plan to get married. Everything was agreed. The dowry is 200,000 yuan. But I made a small request. After we get married, his salary card must be given to me, as well as the cards of his parents, and I want the house to be transferred in my name. As a result, my boyfriend called and said that the wedding was canceled. I don't understand. Is it really a lot to ask? Are you dreaming? This sounds delirious. You don't look like someone who wants a marriage. Rather, someone who is trying to confiscate properties. According to data from the Statistical Annual Report of China 2024, the number of single women in marriage has exceeded one million in several major cities. Beijing leads the list with 2.23 million single women, followed closely by Shanghai with 2.9 million. The term leftover women refers to highly educated and well-paid urban women who are considered past the typical age to get married. Despite their high qualifications and appearance, many struggle to find a partner due to their high standards for marriage. From a male perspective, the worsening of economic conditions is fueling disinterest in marriage. Men cite rising wedding costs, high unemployment, and uncertain futures as reasons to delay or avoid getting married. Statistics reveal a strong correlation between the educational level and the time of marriage. A study by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences found that for each higher educational level, the average age of a woman when getting married for the first time increases by one year. People do not always value older and single women. Many are judged only by their age. For example, I have a master's degree, two houses, two cars, and I used to earn 300,000 yuan a year. I am intelligent, hardworking, and resilient. If I find a man with ambition, I would support him while he builds his career. If he is successful, I would stay home to take care of the family. I speak two foreign languages, so I could raise the children well. I am diligent and manage the home well. Okay, I'm not a good cook, but I can learn. I know I'm older, but I still think I have a lot to offer. Why doesn't anyone choose me? A 35-year-old doctor who graduated from the University of Wuhan and with an annual income of around one million yuan, owns a car and a property in Wuhan. She started dating a man with a master's degree who works at Huawei. He is a year younger than her. When we get married, who will buy the house? Of course, the man should. You are a strong and independent woman. How would that dynamic work in a marriage? Honestly, I'm looking for someone more family-oriented and grounded. Also, I'm worried that you are a little older. I still think about the risks of having children. This does not mean that she is not excellent, nor that he is too demanding. A blogger told the story of a friend, a beautiful university graduate. In the last two years, she has attended several dating events for foreigners returning to Shanghai. The results have been disappointing. Why? She is 32 years old. Can a beautiful graduate of the Jiaotong University of Shanghai have difficulties getting married just because she is over 30 years old? Unfortunately, yes. In our dating events for foreigners returning to Shanghai, there are usually 10 men for every 30 women. Even if you are a graduate of Jiaotong and have a master's degree in EU, many other women have titles of UCL, LSE or Columbia. Those who studied the university degree abroad, especially in the United Kingdom or EUU, have a lot of demand. Do you know why? These men are not stupid. They understand that a woman who did her university degree in EUU or the United Kingdom probably spent at least 2 million yuan. That means it comes from a wealthy family. So, while beauty and education are common in these circles, the real scarcity is age. According to Bloomberg, Mrs. Hao, a wedding organizer in Beijing, says that her business has fallen apart. Her company organized only around 100 weddings last year. A strong decline since its peak of almost 2,000 in 2012. A blogger, a 39-year-old woman with a doctorate who works in a large company earning 8,000 yuan a month, says that she simply can't afford to raise a child. I'm not married yet at 39. Not because I don't want to, but because I'm afraid. How would I live after marriage? Could I afford to raise a child? I don't think I can. I just don't have that confidence. Without a solid economy, it would be irresponsible to bring a child into the world. From prenatal check-ups to childbirth, tens of thousands are spent. Then comes all the costs. Nursery, classes, swimming, piano lessons. Raising a child today is just stacking invoices. Older single women usually share three features. First, they are extremely demanding. Nothing seems to satisfy them. Second, they have too much confidence. They think they are the only prize. Third, their emotional intelligence is almost non-existent. In Shengzhou, the number of single women has also exceeded a million. In many rural areas, the price of the bride, essentially a dowry, is linked to the age of the woman. If a woman is less than 25 years old, the price is around 68,000 yuan. Between 25 and 30, it drops to about 38,000. More than 30, it becomes negotiable. Would you break a relationship for the price of the bride? A friend of mine has been dating her boyfriend for five years. They planned to get married this year, but since she would move to another city, her parents wanted some financial security for their daughter. They asked for 188,000 yuan as the price of the bride. His parents said it was too much and offered only 100,000. My friend worked hard to persuade her parents. Finally, they agreed to lower it to 158,000. Her boyfriend also tried to reason with his parents, but they did not give up the 100,000. Now the two families are at a dead end. The problem is not the economic capacity. Her family can clearly afford it. My friend is disconsolate. She is divided between her long-term relationship and her parents' expectations. She does not know what to do. I think most women would not end a relationship just for the price of the bride. But even so, many long-term relationships are broken by this problem. Have you ever experienced something like this? If you were, what would you do? In today's China, love, marriage and tradition collide with modern realities. For many, the real struggle is not to find a partner, but to navigate the price of being chosen. Something seismic is happening within the ruling elite of China. Xi Jinping, once acclaimed as the most powerful leader in the country, is now facing open disobedience within the Communist Party. From high-level absences to unprecedented leaks of internal plans and political documents, the walls surrounding Xi seem to be closing. It is expected that the fourth plenary session of the Chinese Communist Party will be held in July or August. But long before that, there have been signs of an internal struggle for power, and they are becoming more and more evident. Professor Zhang Yingjie, from the University of Beijing, has openly challenged Xi. Five members of the Politburo have publicly distanced themselves. The high-ranking official Kai Qi seems to be breaking ties. Prime Minister Li Qiang has long exposed Xi's confidential ambitions. Even former President Hu Jintao has issued unusual and forceful criticisms. Altogether, these actions point to what many call the apex of the anti-Xi movement. The recent trip from Xi Jinping to Henan from May 19 to 20 offered a revealing signal. Two of his closest assistants were missing. Kai Qi, head of the Central Committee's General Office, and Jiang Jingquan, director of the Central Committee's Office of Policy Research. In their place were lower-ranking officials, Deputy Prime Minister Heli Feng, Meng Xiangfeng, and Tang Fangyu. The decline in the hierarchical level is remarkable, and indicates a possible reduction in Xi's political status. Commentator Tang Jingyuan notes that the absence of Kai Qi was not due to illness or agenda conflicts. In fact, Kai had no public events in those days, which suggests that his absence was intentional. A subtle but significant act of political distancing. Days earlier, he had been inspecting Tang Shan, showing good health. The report of the Xinhua agency on Xi's visit broke notably with the usual practice. It mentioned General Secretary Xi Jinping only once, and omitted the usual praise phrases, such as Xi Jinping's thoughts and other slogans of loyalty. Tang Jingyuan also noted that just a month earlier, senior official Kai Qi continued to strongly promote Xi's ideology. The sudden change of tone suggests that even the closest allies of Xi could be distancing themselves, and that their control of power could be weakening. At the same time, the Communist Party's General Office issued a rare directive entitled A warning on the prevention and improvement of left-wing extremist thought that interferes with current work. Cataloged as Document 2025 No. 11. Although the text criticizes extreme leftism, its true objective seems evident. It warns against cults of personality, the centralization of power and political purges, characteristic of Xi's term. Emphasizes economic development above political campaigns and denounces the use of political security as an excuse to repress dissent. Although Xi is not mentioned by his name, expressions such as one-man government and the last word directly attack the core of his leadership. The implication is clear. The political tide is changing. Then came an even more explosive development. According to reports, Prime Minister Li Qiang revealed to the Permanent Committee of the Politburo and to the top management the Project 2035, secret of Xi Jinping. The plan, until then unknown even for high-ranking party members, includes objectives such as the unification of Taiwan and the boost of China's rise over the West, goals that Xi hoped to achieve before retiring in 2035. Economist Xu Xiaohui suggests that although Xi's closest circle had known the plan for a long time, Li Qiang's leak was a shocking act of political treason. In essence, he handed over to Xi to save himself. All signs point to a change of great magnitude. The clearest so far came on May 14, when the party convened an unusual extended meeting of the Politburo, the point of the order of the day, if Xi Jinping should be removed. It is reported that Chang Yuk-hsia, vice president of the Central Military Commission, gave a 30-minute speech that surprised the attendees. Analysts believe that the meeting was not so much a debate as a distribution of power in the face of the possible absence of Xi. It is expected that the Youth League faction while others struggle to position themselves. Reports from abroad describe the meeting as similar to an emergency palace council, a last-minute blow to dethrone the emperor. A political storm is brewing behind the closed doors of Zhongnanhai. Xi Jinping, once untouchable, now faces the greatest threat of his political life, as internal struggles intensify and former allies turn their backs on him. The question is no longer whether his power will weaken, but how soon and to what extent. History has shown that when Chinese rulers lose confidence in the party, the fall can be sudden and irreversible.