The U.S.-China trade war paused with a temporary truce, sparking debates over tariff reductions despite clear U.S. Commerce Committee data showing a 50% average tariff on Chinese goods. U.S. tariffs, comprising post-April 2 reductions to 10% and pre-existing Section 301 and fentanyl tariffs, remain significant, with punitive rates on key industries. China’s low nominal tariffs mask non-tariff barriers like taxes and strict import rules, favoring state-owned enterprises. After intense negotiations in Switzerland, China conceded, accepting a 10% tariff and abandoning countermeasures. The U.S. lowered reciprocal tariffs but retained a 54% average, with a July 1 deadline for a trade agreement. While Trump gained short-term leverage, his approach risks long-term U.S. credibility, fueling Chinese nationalism and diverting focus from domestic issues, potentially undermining America’s global democratic leadership.
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Hi, I'm Dong Shan. Welcome to Digging
into China, where we explore China in
depth to review unique perspectives. The
US China trade war has reached a
temporary ceasefire. In recent days,
heated debates have erupted both
domestically and internationally over
the extent of tariff reductions by each
site. Astonishingly, despite official
data released by the US Commerce
Committee, disputes persist, an entirely
unnecessary squabble. The fact is clear.
The US imposes an average tariff of 50%
on Chinese goods. Yet in China, some
falsely claims this figure is only 30%
or even as low as 10%. Allow me to
clarify the tariff structure. Following
the joint statement issued by both
nations on May 12th, US tariffs on China
are divided into two components. The
first includes tariffs imposed after the
tariff conflicts escalated on April 2nd,
now reduced to 10%. The second
incompasses all tariffs in place prior
to April 2nd, which remains unchanged.
This includes the section 301 tariffs
from the 2018 US China trade war and the
fent related tariffs added in February
and March of this year. President Trump
addressed this in a detailed press
conference underscoring that the
historical section 301 and the fentinel
tariffs remain in effect. Additionally,
punitive tariffs on specific sectors
automobiles, semiconductors, steel,
aluminum, and pharmaceuticals continue
to apply. Let me elaborate on the
section 301 tariffs as they warrant
further explanation. Implemented in
2018, these tariffs established the
varying rates across different
industries, covering nearly all Chinese
exports to the US initially. The
weighted average tariff under section
301 was approximately 10%. Over time,
these tariffs became a cornerstone of
the Trump administration's trade
strategy against China with periodic
increases. During the Biden
administration, President Biden not only
retained the section 301 tariffs, but
also raised them once. By the time of
Trump's second term, the tariffs ranged
from 5% to 25% across industries,
averaging about 20% when waited. This
formed the baseline for Chinese exports
to the US at the start of 2025. To
circumvent this 20% tariff, Chinese
exporters have pursued various
strategies. Roughly one-third have
established factories in Southeast Asia
and Latin America, while another third
have engaged in questionable
transshipment practices. It's worth
noting that China once had its own
retalatory tariffs under section 301,
but these were unilaterally cancelled by
China after 2020. By Trump's second
inauguration, China's baseline tariff on
US imports stood at approximately 7%.
Thus, the tariff landscape at the
beginning of 2025 was 20% from US and 7%
from China. On the surface, China's
nominal tariff rate appears low.
However, China employs alternative
measures such as value added and
consumption taxes along with the
stringent product entry and technical
certification requirements to function
as non-tariff barriers. These have long
posed significant challenges for foreign
manufacturers. Following Trump's second
inauguration in January 2025,
containment measures against China
intensified. In February and March,
citing widespread fentanyl smuggling,
the Trump administration imposed two 10%
punitive tariffs on China. These
penalties applied across all Chinese
export industries, not just specific
products, resulting in a cumulative 20%
increase. By March, the US tariff rate
on China had risen from 20% to 40%.
China responded to the faint no tariffs
with counter measures targeting US
agricultural products, energy, and
machinery. However, these measures were
never fully enforced. The reason is
straightforward. China's strict import
qualification system ensures that only
large state-owned enterprises such as um
Kofco for grand or China National
Machinery Industry Corporation for
precision machinery are authorized to
import these goods. These enterprises
can secure tariff exemptions by
submitting a document under article 57
of the customs law claiming the products
are irreplaceable. Customs authorities
rarely scrutinize these claims. The
actual impact falls on the small number
of private firms importing minor goods
with limited overall effect. By late
March, China's nominal tariff rate on
the US was approximately 15%, a modest 8
percentage point increase from the
year's start. Then on April 2nd, the
liberation day, the US initiated a
global tariff war, imposing reciprocal
tariffs worldwide, and China mounted a
solitary
counteroffensive. Notably, China was the
only nation to retaliate. Others such as
the EU and the Canada merely voiced
complaints without taking action. During
this period, the US escalated its
reciprocal tariffs on China to
125% added to the prior 40% resulting in
an average tariff rate of
165%. After April, in summary, before
the tariff agreements on May 12th, the
US tariff on China stood at 165%.
The negotiations in Switzerland,
however, were astonishing. The Chinese
delegation made a dramatic concession,
proposing a mere 10% tariff on the US
and abolishing all other counter
measures, including the rare earth
export bank. This effectively nullified
all of China's retiratory measures from
this year, including those against the
Fankno tariffs. China essentially
accepted the US's punitive tariffs in
full. For the US to reject such a
capitulation would have been unwise. The
US responded by reducing the 125%
reciprocal tariff to 10%. While
preserving the 20% section 301 tariffs
and the 20% faint not tariffs, this
totals 50% 10% plus 20% plus 20%. I must
emphasize that the US also retained the
punitive tariffs on automobiles,
semiconductors, steel, aluminum, and
pharmaceuticals with rates ranging from
50% to 100%. Given China's limited
exports in these sectors, their impact
on overall average tariff is minimal,
raising it by roughly four to 5
percentage point. As evidence, Trump
signed an executive order on May 12th
adjusting the tariff on small parcels
from China to 54% which approximates the
current average tariff across all
Chinese goods. Also in this word, Trump
signed the order again to reduce to 30%.
A second critical point is the US's time
condition. China must reach a
substantive trade agreement within 90
days from April 2nd by July 1st. Failure
to do so will trigger an additional 24%
tariff, bringing the total to 78% when
added to the current
54%. However, the existing 54% tariff
already exceeds the capacity of Chinese
exporters, effectively spelling their
demise. An additional 24% by July 1st
would merely compound an already dire
situation. The Geneva negotiations
outcome is clear and opinions on two
prevailed will vary by ideology. In my
view, Xiinping suffered a short-term
defeat, but Trump faces a long-term
loss. Allow me to explain. From the
narrow perspective of trade
negotiations, Trump has the upper hand
for now. Future US China talks will
likely use current tariff levels as a
baseline, meaning China has absorbed the
fentinel tariffs. This aligns with
Trump's strategy of applying extreme
pressure then easing slightly to prompt
concessions. His dealmaking prowess was
evident here, giving him a clear win in
immediate term. However, the notion that
China's forceful retaliation achieved a
favorable tariff outcome is unfounded. A
popular narrative in China claims US
buckled under trade war pressure
pointing to the first quarter GDP
contraction, the first since 2022 as
evidence of economic collapse due to
tariffs. This reflects a
misunderstanding of economics. The US
GDP shrank in the first quarter due to a
sharp decline in net exports driven by a
surge in preemptive imports amid tariff
fears. This caused a negative 4.83% 83%
drag on GDP from trade. This anomaly
does not signal broader economic
distress. Other indicators such as the
NASDAQ closing at 17,600 points before
tariff liberation day support this.
Despite a dip on a tariff announcement
day, it recovered before negotiations.
CPI and employment data further show no
signs of US economic weakness. Consider
April 2nd. If China had not retaliated,
unlike other nations, many would have
deemed it timid. Yet, the current
outcome mirrors what would have happened
without retaliation. China fought only
to accept the tariff liberation day
terms and re-enter negotiations. The
only difference is whether it negotiated
directly or fought first. So why do I
argue Trump loses in the long term? What
is the ultimate aim of his tariffs?
Initially he claimed it was to restore
American greatness by repatriating
manufacturing. Later he shift to forcing
China to open its markets and alter its
economic model. However, it's now
evident that China is not uniquely
targeted. Its large trade surplus and
retaliation made it a focal point. But
Trump's demands are uniform across
nations. Using tariffs to extract
concessions, not to dismantle the CCP or
revive US manufacturing. Returning China
to the tariff liberation day negotiation
table was always his aim, explaining his
willingness to engage. She's bold
retaliation likely misjudged Trump's
intentions. Given prior rhetoric about
the defeating the CCP, she may have
believed negotiation was impossible. Yet
post negotiations, he likely realized
Trump views China similarly to Japan,
the EU or Taiwan, not as an existential
threat, but as an opportunity for gains.
She can afford to concede, as he has
navigated Trump's demands before with a
similar difference. If Trump's goal is
not to dismantle the CCP, but to secure
advantages, he's entered the CCP's
domain of deception and evasion. China
has a history of flouting international
agreements such as its unfulfilled WTO
commitments. If talks proceed, the
likely outcome is China promising to
purchase US goods for tariff relief
mirroring the last trade war. Indeed,
China may find it easier to reach an
agreement than the EU or Japan as the
later latter consider compliance while
the CCP can agree without intending to
follow through. This simplifies deal
making with implementation left
uncertain. She recognizing Trump's
pursuit of gains may deescalate the
tariffs draw him into the CCP's
preferred arena out maneuvering him.
This scenario echoes the previous trade
war where after intense confrontation,
China pledged to buy US goods and ease
market access. The soybean purchases
become a running joke. But the China
fulfilled only 60% of its commitments
per the Peterson Institute. Promises
like lifting foreign ownership caps or
granting license to US financial firms
went unfulfilled. Trump was thoroughly
outplayed. Trump attributed this to
Biden's tenure as the 2020 agreement
preceded his exit. Yet the issue isn't
Biden. Reducing the US China trade
deficit requires more than an agreement.
Curbing China's cheap exports demands
coordinated allied action to block trans
shship shipment through nations like
Vietnam or the EU, forcing economic
reform, not a single deal. Similarly,
increasing Chinese purchases of US goods
isn't achieved by fiat. China's
exclusion of firms like Google or
Netflix isn't about the protecting local
companies, but about control. Weak
consumer spending stems not from
unwillingness, but from economic
hardship. A deal doesn't magically boost
purchasing power. Without the systemic
reform, Trump's objectives are
unattainable, a point he seems not to
grasp. Trump recently noted China's
willingness to open markets. This
suggests he's being misled again. As in
the prior trade war, this time his swift
approach may yield a quicker deal,
potentially within his term, allowing
him to recognize the deception sooner,
prompting another trade war. Conversely,
Trump's tactics undermine US credibility
long term. Future containment efforts by
him or successors will face greater
challenges. His aggressive tariffs have
eroded America's standing as a
democratic leader. While yielding minor
gains, this sacrifices America's core
asset, its role as a global democratic
anchor. Last year, China's economic
struggles fueled social unrest and a
growing discontent with the CCP.
Continued pressure might have sparked
upheaval. Instead, Trump's action have
made him a focal point for Chinese
nationalism, diverting eye from the CCP.
The US's democratic beacon is dimming.
To counter the CCP's strategic acumen
horned over millennia, Trump must adopt
a wiser approach. Thank you so much for
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