Why is the RMB rising against the US dollar when the domestic economy is in a recession and everyone is drowning in debt? Is our daily lived experience wrong, or is the currency's strength just an illusion?
In this video, we strip away economic jargon to expose the real mechanics behind the 6.7 exchange rate. We explore how strict foreign exchange controls trap capital at home, why mandatory export settlements create artificial demand for the yuan, and how a strong currency on paper masks severe microeconomic pain on Main Street. Administrative financial controls can prop up a currency, but they can't manufacture a real purchase order or put food on the table.
Stop letting macro data gaslight your daily reality. Watch till the end to see the truth behind the currency illusion.
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Hi, I'm Dong Xiong. Welcome to Digging into China, where we take a deep dive into what's
really happening in China and share some unique insights. Why is it that right now with the
domestic economy clearly in a recession, the real estate market having suffered defaults for years,
everyone drowning in debt and making money harder than ever, the authorities keep letting the
At the start of the year it was 7 to 1. Now it's sitting at around 6.7 to 1.
What on earth is causing this? Is the Chinese economy actually not as bad as we thought,
meaning the daily lived experience as ordinary citizens is somehow wrong? Or is this purely a
deliberate artificial push by the central bank? To see through the core of this issue, we first
need to look at the classic narrative taught in every introductory economics textbook.
Normally, the logic goes like this. When a country's economy is thriving and investment
opportunities are abundant, capital rushes in like a shark smelling blood in the water,
driving its currency to appreciate. Conversely, when the economy sours and the profits dry up,
capital packs its bags to seek better prospects elsewhere, causing the currency to depreciate.
Is this logic correct? In a broader sense, absolutely. But here is the catch. Almost
everyone who applies this theory forgets a critical indispensable prerequisite,
whether the capital account is fully open and whether there are strict foreign exchange controls
in place. Imagine you are sitting at your desk, acutely feeling the lack of investment
opportunities domestically. While watching overseas markets look far more lucrative,
you decide you want to move a portion of your assets abroad. But the moment you walk up to
a bank counter or log into your online banking platform to execute the transfer, you are met with
layers of rigid approvals, strict qualification reviews, and ultimately a flat refusal. Under
such conditions, no matter how intensely pessimistic you feel about the domestic economic
outlook, your intention can never transform into an actual transaction on the global foreign
exchange market. This is why, when analyzing the renminbi exchange rate, we can never bypass the
barrier of foreign exchange controls. When people in China keep their money at home,
is it because they genuinely believe there is a fortune to be made right where they are,
or because they want to leave and simply cannot? These two completely different motivations
might look identical in final macroeconomic data as capital staying in a country.
But their implications for economic health are worlds apart.
Bring that perspective to the foreign exchange market, and the principle is identical. When
the free flow of capital is forcibly reined in by administrative fiat, the stable or appreciating
exchange rate we observe is rarely the product of a free market choice, but rather the outcome
of institutional filtering. To make sure we don't swing to the opposite extreme, mistakenly
believing that whenever a currency is rising, it must be entirely the work of currency controls,
let's look at a landmark historical case study from global financial history.
Let's wind the clock back to 2008. The U.S. subprime mortgage crisis erupted,
Lehman Brothers collapsed, housing prices crashed across America, millions lost their
jobs overnight, and a financial tsunami swept the globe. According to our intuitive logic,
since the U.S. economy was allegedly sinking into an abyss, people should have been scrambling to
dump U.S. dollars as fast as humanly possible. Yet, what actually happened completely defied
intuition. By the second half of 2008, far from collapsing, the U.S. dollar index surged in an
unexpected fierce and powerful rally. Were investors blind at the time? Of course not.
They saw the massive structural problems clearer than anyone. But in the teeth of a crisis,
every entrepreneur, bank, and global investor faced a far more urgent priority. They needed
to pay back their debts. During the good time of abundant global liquidity, countless international
banks and multinational corporations had aggressively borrowed U.S. dollars to buy
assets and expand operations worldwide. Rolling over dollar-denominated debt seemed like a breeze.
But the moment the crisis broke, asset prices plummeted, making it impossible to liquidate
anything at a decent price, while creditors were still demanding repayment. At that point,
no matter how many real estate holdings, stocks, or foreign assets you owned, you had to scramble
to liquidate them at fire-sale prices and convert them into U.S. dollars because
loan contracts explicitly stipulated repayment in U.S. dollars. The scarcer the U.S. dollars
become, the more desperately everyone had to buy them. As thousands of institutions and
individuals rushed into the market simultaneously to secure dollars, they artificially propelled
its price upward, tossing a massive wave of safe-haven capital rushing into U.S. treasury
bonds. And you had a recipe for intense dollar demand. As a result, the world witnessed one of
the most bizarre spectacles in financial history. The U.S. economy was in free fall,
while the rest of the world was locked in a frantic scramble to buy U.S. dollars.
This historical lesson delivers a profound insight. The motivation behind purchasing any currency can
vary wildly. You might buy U.S. dollars simply because a debt repayment deadline is looming.
Similarly, a Chinese enterprise buying or holding renminbi might simply be doing so because it needs
to pay factory workers' wages next week. The foreign exchange market objectively records
what was bought and sold. It never pauses to ask, pardon me, are you buying this currency because
you have unshakable faith in this country's future or because you have no other choice?
Focusing our lens squarely on the current economic environment,
where on earth is the buying pressure supporting the renminbi actually coming from? The most
direct pathway is the foreign exchange settlement demand of export enterprises. Imagine you are a
factory owner in the Pearl River Delta or the Yangtze River Delta. Your products are shipped
globally, and your overseas clients pay you in hard currency, U.S. dollars. However, when it
comes time to pay local workers their monthly salaries, settle accounts with raw material
suppliers, and cover utility bills, those workers and suppliers demand renminbi. Under these rigid
operating constraints, you have no choice but to convert a portion of the dollar you've collected
into renminbi. Pay close attention here. This conversion process can be completely
disconnected from whether you are optimistic or pessimistic about the Chinese economy.
You might very well be grimacing as you swap dollars for renminbi to meet payroll,
whispering to your family that evening, this export business is an absolute nightmare,
profit margins are razor thin, and I'm out of here next year. Driven by this pessimistic
outlook, the company didn't just exchange renminbi to pay wages, it exchanged even more renminbi to
prepay and extinguish its bank debts early. This explains a seemingly contradictory phenomenon.
A sluggish domestic real estate and a consumer market does not mean export collection activities
will vanish simultaneously, nor does it mean companies suddenly have no use for renminbi.
As long as there are domestic overhead costs to meet and historical debts to clear,
businesses will maintain an ongoing demand for foreign exchange settlement.
The crucial question then arises, since business owners universally feel that the domestic economic
outlook is dim and expansion is unnecessary, why are they honestly converting their dollars
into renminbi to pay down loans instead of keeping those dollars offshore or pivoting
to overseas investments? The answer is brutal and straightforward. Because in China,
attempting to execute free capital outflows means running into an airtight, heavily policed
regulatory net. For individuals, nominal annual quotas exist, but direct foreign investment or
purchasing overseas real estate are strictly off-limits. For businesses, the rules are even
harsher. Attempting to spirit the capital out of the country under the guise of arbitrage invites
an immediate regulatory iron fist. Because of this institutional reality, companies holding
U.S. dollars are forced to quietly convert them back into renminbi to pay debts at home
rather than deploying them as outbound capital seeking higher yields abroad. Under this
institutional constraint, the massive selling pressure that would have otherwise fled overseas
is forcefully suppressed. This structural setup creates a unique characteristic that remains
largely invisible in official reporting. We can clearly see completed transactions,
but the unfulfilled demands that were silently crushed never appear on the books. Suppose a
private enterprise owner originally planned to convert 1 million U.S. dollars and channel it
towards investments abroad. Right at the toll gate of the stringent capital controls, the plan
is blocked by administrative channels, forcing the owner to abandon it. Consequently, this pull
of capital, which should have exerted significant downward pressure on renminbi, is trapped
domestically, and a portion of it inevitably ends up settled into renminbi. In official ledgers of
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, aka SAFE, safe, we only see successful settlement
transactions. We can never track how many implicit outbound capital intents were choked off. If you
rely solely on SAFE's transaction volumes to conclude that everyone is buying renminbi and
nobody wants dollars, you miss the bigger picture. Some observers might argue, haven't we seen
authorities loosen certain valves like expanding qualified domestic institutional investor quotas
to let domestic institutions invest abroad? True. But the QDII mechanism is a quota-based,
tightly managed system. Exactly how much capital goes out and into what approved assets remains
firmly under the thumb of regulators. Allowing capital to exit through narrow, designated
pipelines is fundamentally different from allowing market participants to freely decide where to
place their wealth. Since capital controls help prop up the currency, why are there times when
the central bank seems reluctant to let the renminbi appreciate too quickly or sharply?
Suppose you've successfully delivered an overseas shipment, collecting 1 million US dollar. Earlier
in the year, at 7 to 1, that sum converted neatly into 7 million flat renminbi. But as the exchange
rate shifts to 6.7 to 1, converting that same suitcase of dollars yields only 6.7 million
renminbi, just like that. Entirely due to exchange rate movements, 300,000 renminbi of top-line
revenue has evaporated. Your factory workers' salaries, monthly rent, and suppliers' bills
will not automatically shrink simply because the renminbi has appreciated against the dollar.
If your business operates in the razor-thin margins of today's hyper-competitive manufacturing
sector, an exchange rate swing of just a few percentage points over a short window can
completely wipe out your profit margin. From a macroeconomic management perspective,
policy makers walk a dangerous tightrope. For one, they worry that if the renminbi depreciates
too quickly, it will spark market panic and drive capital flight. Number two, they are deeply
concerned that if the renminbi appreciates too aggressively, it will deal a fatal blow to an
already fragile export manufacturing sector. However, we cannot jump to the extreme and
conclude that capital controls are no longer supporting the currency. Capital controls
govern whether money crosses national borders freely, whereas central bank technical adjustments
manage how fast the exchange rate moves in the short term. It is much like driving down a steep
mountain road. You tap the brakes to avoid crushing, but tapping the brakes does not mean
throwing the car into reverse. Having clarified these mechanisms, we must also clear up another
financial misconception. Why do we sometimes see the renminbi appreciating against the US dollar
while simultaneously depreciating against the euro or other major non-dollar currencies?
The secret lies in the inherent relativity of exchange rates. If the euro stages a strong
10% rally against the dollar while the renminbi climbs only 3% against the dollar,
the renminbi appears stronger relative to the dollar but stacked up against the euro. It has
actually grown weaker. Much of the so-called appreciation of the renminbi is largely driven
by the localized weakening of the dollar itself. The international ruler is shrinking.
This brings us to the ultimate question. Once authorities use administrative tools to track
massive amounts of capital inside the country and stabilize the exchange rate,
do ordinary citizens and small businesses actually live any better because of it?
The answer is self-evident. Imagine you are a struggling private entrepreneur with idle
capitals that you originally wanted to deploy overseas, only to have your application rejected
and your funds blocked domestically. Does getting blocked from going abroad make you shed tears of
joy and immediately decide to plow every last cent into opening two more factories
and hiring a massive new workforce right here at home? Probably not. Your primary concern will
be entirely different. Who is actually going to buy what I produce? Where is the effective domestic
demand? If those existential questions lack satisfactory answers, you have every logical
reason to keep your cash tightly locked up in a bank account or used to pay down commercial debts
while you wait out the storm. The exact same logic applies to everyday urban residents.
Limited overseas investment channels and heavily audited foreign exchange quotas do not magically
inspire ordinary people to go out on a spending spree, buying new cars and larger homes.
To fully appreciate modern managed exchange rates, we must look at how institutional friction
alters domestic liquidity distribution. When a government enforces rigid capital controls,
it doesn't just stop money from leaving, it fundamentally alters how credit circulates
within the banking system. In a totally open market economy, if domestic corporate profitability
drops, capital naturally seeks higher yields abroad, depressing the domestic currency and
acting as a self-correcting market signal. But when capital is intercepted at the border,
that excess liquidity has nowhere to go externally. It gets trapped inside a domestic
banking apparatus. Instead of flowing outward into global assets, this pent-up liquidity sits
either in corporate and household savings accounts as precautionary cash reserves,
or gets channeled into low-yielding domestic financial instruments and government debt.
This dynamic explains why we can simultaneously observe massive pools of domestic savings
sitting stagnant in banks while businesses complain about severe liquidity starvation.
The problem is not an absolute lack of money in the system. It is a structural breakdown
in the transmission mechanism. The money is locked in a cage. Furthermore, this creates
a profound disconnect between nominal asset figures and real economic vitality. The state's
capacity to dictate terms of foreign exchange conversion means that the currency's value on
international markets behaves more like an administrative pricing mechanism than a reflection
of organic market health. Beyond the balance sheet and regulatory frameworks, there is a powerful
psychological dimension to currency management. A stable or appreciating currency is historically
viewed by state-managed regimes as a psychological anchor, a badge of sovereign strength and
systemic resilience. Unmanaged, precipitous depreciation risks triggering a severe crisis
of confidence among domestic savers, accelerating capital flight through underground channels,
and importing inflation. However, maintaining this psychological anchor comes at a steep
social cost. By prioritizing exchange rate stability and suppressing outward capital
mobility, the state effectively shifts the burden of adjustment onto domestic exporters
and everyday wage earners. Exporters absorb the pain of adverse conversion margins and
compressed profit lines, while ordinary citizens bear the brunt of a sluggish labor market,
constrained consumer choices, and stagnant real incomes. The illusion of strength presented by
a resilient exchange rate masks a growing divergence between elite macroeconomic
stabilization goals and the harsh microeconomic realities faced by the population. When state
mouthpieces point to a strong currency as proof of macroeconomic soundness, they commit a fundamental
category error. They confuse the plumbing of financial control with the health of the
underlying economy. A tightly managed pipe can hold back a flood, but it cannot water the crops
or generate new wealth. At the end of the day, an exchange rate staying steady on paper is simply
the macroeconomic outcome of intersecting supply and demand forces within the foreign exchange
market. Where the ordinary people are living comfortably or barely scrapping by ultimately
comes down to employment rates, salary levels, real debt burdens, and the very real cost of daily
living. There is no real mystery here. Just because a currency looks strong for the season
doesn't mean anyone should lecture struggling business owners and workers by saying,
your daily life doesn't matter. Look at how great the macro data looks. Ordinary people aren't wrong
for feeling the squeeze. The real blindness is letting superficial numbers trick us into ignoring
what is actually happening on the ground. Thank you so much for watching. If this video was helpful,
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