5:1 Tariff Tempest: Can China Outmaneuver U.S. Pressure?

Just Strange
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4 Video Views·May 14, 2025
U.S.-China Trade Clash: Geneva Sparks Hope! Tariffs slashed, but with a 5:1 edge, is China’s economy buckling under Trump’s pressure? Can Beijing outsmart this high-stakes game, or is a trade showdown looming? Dive in for the explosive details!
US China trade clash Geneva sparks. Hope
tariffs slashed but with a 5.1 edge. Is
China's economy buckling under Trump's
pressure? Can Beijing outsmart this
highstakes game or is a trade showdown
looming? Dive in for the explosive
details. From May 10 to 11, highle trade
talks between China and the United
States were held in Switzerland. At
around 300 pm Beijing time on the 12th,
both countries simultaneously released
the US China Geneva trade talks joint
statement pledging to significantly
reduce the tariffs imposed on each other
over the past month by May 14th, 2025 to
continue advancing negotiations.
Specifically, both sides will retain a
10% additional tariff on each other's
goods, while the 145% additional tariff
will be suspended for 90 days. All other
newly imposed tariffs will be completely
cancelled. China will also suspend or
cancel non-tariff retaliatory measures
against the US which may involve China's
export ban on rare earth products to the
US. However, this does not include the
20% tariffs imposed by the Trump
administration in February and early
March this year citing the fentinel
crisis nor the 20% average tariff
imposed in 2018 under section 301
provisions. US trade representative
ambassador Jameson Greer stated clearly
other measures that the United States
has put in place in the past whether
it's uh you know tariff measures from
2018 or since uh tariffs under other
statutory authorities uh tariff relate
to fentanil uh th those remain uh
unchanged uh for now to the side uh I'll
just make one point is that both the
Chinese and the United States uh agreed
to work constructively together on
fentanyl and there's a positive path
forward there as
This equates to a cumulative unilateral
50% tariff on Chinese goods exported to
the US. In other words, the current
tariff ratio between the US and China is
5.1. The fact that China was able to
reach a consensus with the US in such a
short time indicates that the Chinese
Communist Party CCP is at its wits end
in the face of a rapidly deteriorating
domestic economy. Although Beijing
authorities are actively trying to
rebuild consumer confidence and revive
China's crumbling real estate market,
this summer and fall, China will face
tens of millions of university graduates
entering the workforce. If the economy
remains sluggish, their employment
prospects will be precarious. Moreover,
the latest data from Chinese customs
shows that in April this year, China's
exports to the US fell by 21% yearonear.
Therefore, China is more eager to escape
this highly disadvantageous and passive
situation. On April 2nd this year, after
President Trump introduced tariff
reciprocity measures, China was the only
country to outright refuse negotiations.
The Trump administration then adopted a
strategy of continuously raising tariffs
as leverage in negotiations. If
negotiations ultimately succeed, the
tariff rate is likely to drop to 80% or
60%. Even so, an 80% or 60% tariff is
still close to a trade embargo. It would
pose a significant barrier to the export
of Chinese goods. effectively making
normal trade impossible. Thus, while
both the US and China appear to be
reducing tariffs and making concessions,
in reality, the US incurs no substantial
losses, maintaining its high pressure
stance against China. President Trump
posted about this, saying, "A very good
meeting today with China in Switzerland.
Many things discussed, much agreed to. A
total reset negotiated in a friendly but
constructive manner. We want to see for
the good of both China and the US an
opening up of China to American
business. Great progress made. In fact,
on May 2nd, the Trump administration
also terminated the Dominse exemption
policy, which allowed packages ordered
online from mainland China and Hong Kong
valued under $800 to enter the US
duty-free. The US will now impose a 120%
tariff on such packages. However, the US
China joint statement on the 12th did
not address this issue, and it remains
unclear whether the minimum duty-free
threshold for goods exported from China
and the Hong Kong S will be reinstated.
Trade experts say the policy's future is
still uncertain. Martin Palmer,
co-founder of crossber data provider
Hurricane modular commerce, stated, "The
dimminimus exemption policy is simply
unclear." He added, "Logically, if you
reduce tariffs on all other products, it
should apply to the dimminimous
exemption as well since it accounts for
a significant portion of goods imported
from China to the US." For the Trump
administration, tariff reciprocity is
merely a means, not the ultimate goal.
On one hand, tariffs can generate an
additional 300 billion to 700 billion in
annual revenue for the federal
government. On the other hand, they
address trade imbalances and reduce the
US trade deficit. In reality, the Trump
administration is more focused on
pursuing America's re-industrialization
and the localization of strategic
resources and core industries. Strategic
resources and core industries. During
World War II, these were steel and oil.
The US has now achieved energy
independence, producing and exporting
its own oil. So, oil related issues are
not part of the negotiations. As for
steel, aluminum, and automobiles, during
World War II, US automakers converted
their production lines to manufacture
military supplies, making the auto
industry a core sector tied to national
security. Another similar industry is
ship building as the Navy relies on it.
In other words, the Trump
administration's tariff reciprocity
policy serves multiple purposes.
Although discussions about USChina
decoupling and the US no longer needing
to import cheap goods from China have
been ongoing for years, progress has
been slow. Based on the current
situation, achieving a complete
severance in the short term is unlikely.
US Treasury Secretary Bessent stated,
"No one wants to do a generalized
decoupling, but we are going to do a
strategic decoupling because we realized
during COVID that efficient supply
chains were not secure supply chains. So
with steel, with semiconductors, with
medicines, with a couple of other
strategic categories, uh we are going to
have to become self-reliant again."
Bessent added, "Let me say again, one of
the most important things we're doing is
we don't want a generalized decoupling
with China, but we do want a decoupling
of strategic necessities, which we
couldn't access during co. We realize
that efficient supply chains are not
resilient supply chains. In other words,
the US has two main demands in its
negotiations with China. Diversify
global supply chains. reduce reliance on
China as the world's factory by
fostering second and third tier import
sources such as Southeast Asia, Latin
America, and Mexico with the goal of
supply chain diversification and
reducing economic dependence on China.
Full market access in China demand that
China eliminate non-tariff barriers and
fulfill the structural reform
commitments made upon joining the WTO.
open its market to allow American
companies such as e-commerce platforms
like Amazon, tech firms like Apple, and
social platforms like X and Facebook to
enter China and eliminate unfair trade
practices. Market access represents
significant opportunities for US
businesses, which is clearly preferable
to merely profiting through tariffs.
However, implementing this in practice
is quite challenging. In fact, this
tariff battle began as early as May 3rd,
2018. During Trump's first term, from
the initial US China talks to the
signing of the phase 1 agreement on
January 15th, 2020, the process took
over a year and a half. At that time,
trade pressures between the two
countries were not significant, and
while tariffs increased, the overall
rate remained around 20%. For a long
time, China's economic structure has
been oriented toward foreign trade and
exports. As a communist authoritarian
regime, the Beijing authorities tightly
control nearly all core resources.
Demanding the elimination of non-tariff
barriers and the fulfillment of WTO
structural reform commitments is
tantamount to asking the CCP regime to
fundamentally restructure itself, which
would be a devastating blow. Take
Chinese state-owned enterprises, S SOE,
as an example. Data shows that the
annual revenue of Chinese SOE accounts
for over 60% of GDP, but their
contribution to GDP has gradually
declined over the past few decades.
According to estimates from the World
Bank and other research institutions, as
of 2023, SOES directly contribute about
20% 30% to GDP. A 2022 report by China's
Kaijing magazine analyzed the proportion
of S so Suees in the economy noting that
their share of industrial added value
and total output is significantly lower
than that of private enterprises. So are
primarily concentrated in capital
inensive industries such as energy,
telecommunications and infrastructure
while private enterprises dominate in
consumer goods, the internet and some
high-tech sectors. According to 2024
data from the AllChina Federation of
Industry and Commerce and related
studies, central and local SOES directly
employ between 60 million and 80 million
people including contract and informal
workers. Thus, S SOE employment accounts
for approximately 8% to 11% of the
national workforce, while private
enterprises, especially small and
medium-sized ones, provide over 80% of
urban jobs. Research from the School of
Economics at Renman University of China
shows that SOE have a significantly
higher share of bank loans compared to
private enterprises. As of 2023, SOES
are estimated to account for 50% to 60%
of corporate loans from banks with SOE
facing far fewer hurdles in obtaining
financing, securing lower interest
rates, and longer loan terms. Capec,
China's largest refining company and a
superersized S SOE directly under the
state council provides a case study.
Public data shows that CIPEC's crude oil
imports over the past five years have
ranged between 150 million and 200
million tons per year with 2023 2024
figures slightly higher than the
previous 3 years at around 180 million
tons annually accounting for roughly
half of China's total crude oil imports.
Since the international market price of
crude oil is transparent, import costs
are almost fully visible. Refining costs
can also be estimated. China's refining
cost is approximately $50 per ton of
crude oil. The output ratio of refined
products is also relatively fixed. One
ton of crude oil yields about 0.4 tons
of gasoline and 0.3 tons of diesel. From
this, the cost of refined products can
be roughly calculated. China's refined
oil prices are set by the National
Development and Reform Commission,
including taxes such as a 13% VAT and
consumption taxes, approximately 1.5 W
per liter for gasoline and 1.2 yen per
liter for diesel. In 2023, the average
price of 92 octane gasoline in China was
about 8.5 W per liter, equivalent to 4.5
per gallon, while diesel was around 7.8
W per liter or 4.1 per gallon. This
price level is quite high even by US
standards. In terms of nominal per
capita GDP, the average income in the US
is 6.5 times that of China. Based on the
above costs and prices, CIPC's refining
business alone had a profit margin of
approximately 110 billion UN in 2023,
equivalent to 15 billion. However, CIPC
has long been reported to be operating
at a loss or with minimal profits. In
reality, as a mega SOE, Capeex losses
are not only due to market factors such
as oil price fluctuations, but also stem
from systemic issues with SOEs, low
efficiency, policy burdens, management
problems, corruption, related party
transactions, and financial
arrangements, taxes, profit remittances.
If China's energy market were opened up
under the fierce competition of
international capital and energy giants,
Cineipek's fate can be easily imagined.
Thus, demanding that the communist
Chinese authoritarian regime proactively
eliminate non-tariff barriers and
fulfill its WTO structural reform
commitments is nothing short of a pipe
dream for the CCP. This would be
tantamount to self-destruction. While
China's economy faces immense pressure
from slowing growth and restricted
exports, urgently needing relief from
the high tariffs imposed by the US, and
the potential long-term impact of supply
chain shifts, its inherent limitations
will likely lead it to adopt delaying
tactics. Its short-term goal is to stall
until the 2026 US midterm elections,
hoping the Republicans lose control of
Congress, thereby weakening Trump's
negotiating leverage. The long-term goal
is to outlast Trump's four-year term as
they may believe Trump's policies are a
temporary shock that can be endured.
However, Trump's current push is for
structural changes in the US,
geopolitics, economy, and social issues
with impacts that will far exceed his
4-year term. Some scholars believe
Trump's policies are influenced by two
books. Peter Navaro's The Coming China
Wars, which advocates a hardline stance
on China, and J D. advances hillbilly
elegy which focuses on the struggles of
America's lower classes under
globalization. From the policies set by
the Trump administration, it is clear
that the goal is to fundamentally
address these two issues. Moreover,
Vance is still young and likely to be
Trump's ideological successor currently
being groomed for leadership.
Additionally, through high tariffs and
reductions in corrupt federal spending,
the Trump administration may achieve a
balanced federal budget. If this is
realized by 2026, it could introduce an
income tax exemption, not a reduction,
but a full exemption for Americans
earning less than
$150,000, some say $200,000 annually.
This policy would benefit 85% of
Americans, significantly boosting
Republican support in the midterm
elections and increasing the likelihood
of retaining control of Congress. In
other words, the Republicans are
unlikely to lose congressional control,
and the CCP's delay strategy may well
fail. Typically, bilateral negotiations
can be divided into four stages:
reaching a consensus, making substantial
progress, signing an agreement, and
ensuring verifiability and
enforcability. An agreement requires
oversight mechanisms and penalties for
violations to ensure enforcability.
Otherwise, it is meaningless. Currently,
the US and China have reached a
consensus, which is a good start. As for
future prospects, further observation is
needed. Welcome your comments and unique
opinions or suggestions on this matter.
Thanks for you watching. We'll see you
next time.
