China’s Economy Under Strain: How Long Can It Endure in the Trade War

Just Strange
239 followers
May 5, 2025
China’s Economy Under Strain: How Long Can It Endure in the Trade War
As the US China trade war intensifies,
tariffs soar to unprecedented levels and
global supply chains shift. China's
economy faces mounting pressure,
plummeting exports, a looming debt
crisis, and a struggling real estate
market. With the Trump administration
abandoning talks for extreme measures,
can China withstand the storm? How long
can it endure? Join us as we uncover the
stakes in this highstakes
showdown. On April 29th, in response to
the trade war launched by the Trump
administration against China, the
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs took
a hardline stance, releasing a video
titled, "China Won't kneel down" across
various social media platforms as its
latest response. Interestingly, while
the Chinese Communist Party's CCP
official media adopted a tough posture,
claiming that the US was anxious and had
proactively reached out to China for
negotiations, it also hinted that
negotiations might not be a bad thing.
At the same time, the Chinese Ministry
of Commerce signaled that it was
evaluating whether to negotiate with the
US, but in action, it had already
proactively exempted several tariffs and
lifted so-called sanctions on certain
European parliamentarians.
International Opinion widely views this
as the CCP softening its stance with
some even bluntly calling it kneeling
down. On April 30th, during a cabinet
meeting, President Trump criticized the
CCP, labeling it as the number one
predator in trade and the world's
leading deceiver. He expressed strong
confidence in the US economy and vowed
to only accept a fair deal with China.
Some scholars believe that the CCP's
true attitude stems from realizing that
the US has significantly increased
tariffs on China. Reciprocal tariffs of
125% plus a 20% fentanyl penalty tariff
totaling 145% with some items even
reaching as high as
245%. The US has no intention of
negotiating and is instead taking direct
action, a fundamental shift compared to
Trump's approach during his first term.
During Trump's first term, the US
treated China as a trade partner,
prioritizing negotiations with a
courtesy first, force later approach,
seeking structural reforms from the CCP.
This was the core focus of the phase 1
trade deal, which addressed issues such
as intellectual property theft, forced
technology transfer, state subsidies,
market access barriers, administrative
interventions, and interest rate and
exchange rate manipulation. One,
intellectual property theft. The US has
long accused China of stealing American
companies intellectual property such as
patents, trade secrets, and software
through cyber attacks, corporate
espionage, piracy, and reverse
engineering. According to reports from
the United States Trade Representative,
USR, China's intellectual property theft
costs US companies billions of dollars
annually. Two, forced technology
transfer. American companies investing
or operating in China are often required
to transfer technology to Chinese
partners as a condition for market
access. This transfer typically occurs
through joint ventures, administrative
approvals, or informal pressure. Three,
state subsidies.
The Chinese government supports
state-owned enterprises and specific
industries such as semiconductors,
artificial intelligence, and new energy
through direct subsidies, tax
incentives, lowinterest loans, and land
concessions. These subsidies are seen by
the US as distorting market competition,
allowing Chinese companies to dump
products at low prices, which harms
American businesses. Four, market access
barriers. American companies face
numerous barriers to entering the
Chinese market, including industry
restrictions, delays in licensing
approvals, foreign ownership limits, and
non-tariff barriers. For instance,
industries like finance,
telecommunications, healthcare, and the
internet impose strict restrictions on
foreign investment. Five, administrative
interventions.
The Chinese government intervenes in the
market through administrative measures,
including direct control over prices,
production, investment, and business
operations. For example, the government
may require companies to adjust prices
to support domestic consumers or
restrict the expansion of foreign
businesses. The government's
preferential support for state-owned
enterprises, EGI, in procurement and
financing also constitutes implicit
intervention. Six, interest rate and
exchange rate manipulation. The US
accuses China of artificially
suppressing the RMBB exchange rate to
boost export competitiveness and widen
its trade surplus with the US. The R&B
exchange rate is tightly controlled by
the People's Bank of China with limited
marketization. China supports domestic
companies, especially state-owned
enterprises, through low interest rate
policies, reducing their financing
costs, and indirectly enhancing the
price competitiveness of exported goods.
However, China used various excuses to
avoid these deep structural reforms,
resulting in the phase 1 USChina trade
deal signed in 2020 being limited to
superficial agreements, primarily
involving China's commitment to increase
purchases of US agricultural products.
Through this limited concession, the CCP
temporarily alleviated pressure but
failed to address the structural issues
demanded by the US. As negotiations were
about to enter the second phase to
tackle these core issues in depth, China
used the outbreak of the pandemic as an
excuse to delay, leading to a stalemate
in talks. The Trump administration
concluded that the CCP lacked sincerity
and had no intention of implementing
structural reforms. In light of this,
Trump's new administration has abandoned
the negotiation strategy, opting instead
for extreme pressure through high
tariffs, financial sanctions, and
geopolitical isolation, completely
shifting from the courtesy first, force
later approach of Trump 1.0 to a full-on
confrontation in the US China trade war.
China is now viewed as the greatest
threat and strongest adversary to the US
rather than a trade partner. In other
words, the US strategic goal toward
China has fundamentally changed. The
goal during Trump 1.0 was to address
trade imbalances and unfair trade
practices. But in Trump 2.0, it has
expanded to curbing the rise of
communist China and reshaping the
international economic order. The
existence and growing strength of
communist China not only threaten US
economic interests but also challenge
the US-led international system. The
extreme pressure tactics include one,
high tariff barriers, imposing ultra-igh
tariffs on goods imported from China,
such as reciprocal tariffs of 125% plus
a 20% fentanyl penalty tariff totaling
145% with some items as high as
245%. This far exceeds the 25% tariff
target of Trump 1.0. The goal is to
reduce China's exports to the US, shrink
the trade surplus, force Chinese
companies to relocate their supply
chains, or pressure China into making
concessions in negotiations while
protecting US domestic industries and
promoting
re-industrialization. Two, financial
sanctions and asset freezing,
threatening to freeze the CCP's holdings
of US Treasury bonds, approximately 760
billion, or reserve them for a future
democratic China. freezing the overseas
assets of senior CCP officials and
restricting their international
financial activities. Considering
delisting Chinese companies from US
capital markets or limiting their access
to the US dollar transaction system, if
necessary, completely cutting off
China's access to US dollars to
undermine its financial stability,
increasing insecurity among CCP elites
to sew division and suspicion, weakening
China's economic resilience through
financial isolation. Three, geopolitical
isolation, dismantling the ChinaRussia
alliance, uniting allies, Japan, India,
Australia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and
if necessary, imposing secondary
sanctions on China, and Russia. At the
same time, strengthening military
deployments along the first island
chain, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the
Philippines to contain China's expansion
in East Asia. From Japanese Prime
Minister Shagaru Ishiba's visit to the
White House to Vice President JD Vance's
trip to India, the US is clearly intent
on building an encirclement of China
through a strengthened alliance system,
aiming to completely isolate China.
Four, psychological warfare and internal
division. The CIA is now openly
encouraging defections among CCP
officials using videos and other means
to foster internal suspicion and further
erode trust among CCP officials. Five,
supply chain restructuring and
technology blockade, promoting French
shoring and nearshoring, encouraging
companies to shift supply chains from
China to Southeast Asia, India or
Mexico. tightening technology blockades
on Chinese high-tech companies such as
restricting exports of semiconductor
equipment, banning companies like Huawei
from accessing US technology, and
promoting a dechinized global supply
chain system to attract foreign
investment to the US, thereby
accelerating US re-industrialization and
enhancing economic independence. India
has even publicly declared that it will
serve as the primary alternative to
Chinese manufacturing for the US and the
world. This shift disrupts China's
control over critical US supply chains
such as pharmaceuticals. The CCP
controls 80% of the active ingredients
in the pharmaceutical industry, a
dangerous dependency that could
the US in a crisis. By turning to India,
which is already a major supplier of
generic drugs, the US weakens China's
leverage, protecting itself from
Beijing's economic coercion and trade
disruptions amid escalating tariffs. The
video shows that in less than 60 days,
large-scale bicycle production will
resume in the US. This video posted by a
dock worker at the Port of Seattle
reveals that Trump's tariff policies
have not left the Seattle port empty. On
the contrary, it is busier than ever.
The S&P 500 has erased its Liberation
Day losses. The latest data shows that
the US added 177,000 jobs in April, a
strong performance. What's interesting,
the numbers, by the way, were very I was
a little surprised to see how strong
they were, but this is very encouraging
because we're already seeing many of the
uh companies dependent upon foreign
suppliers already reassuring some of
their job. Now, let's take a look at the
Chinese economy. Is it really as
resilient as the CCP's official media
claims across various social media
platforms?
I'm not trying to scare anyone, but a
lot of people are struggling to even eat
now.
Let me make a bold prediction. After
this Mayday holiday, we might see
another wave of business closures. This
is almost predictable. The 3 months
after the new year have been a black
hole for nearly all business
owners. The Chinese economy is facing
multiple challenges, including a sharp
decline in exports, a local debt crisis,
and a sluggish real estate market.
According to first quarter data for
2025, the Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection, CCDI, and the
National Supervisory Commission of the
Communist Party of China reported that
185,000 people were disciplined in the
first 3 months of this year, a more than
50% increase from the 121,000 in the
same period last year. Among them, 14
provincial and ministerial level
officials were disciplined, an increase
of two compared to the same period last
year. From January to March, 220,000
cases were filed, a nearly 50% increase
from the 149,000 cases in the same
period last year. The CCDI stated that
Beijing authorities are focusing on
cracking down on systemic corruption in
sectors with concentrated power, funds,
and resources. So far, among the 16
senior officials who fell from grace
this year, at least four were from
sectors like finance, state-owned
enterprises, tobacco, and
pharmaceuticals, industries known for
being particularly lucrative. Sources
say the CCP has mandated an intensified
anti-corruption campaign from 2025 to
2026, requiring not only political
purges, but also the confiscation of all
assets acquired through corruption by
politically disloyal officials. Since
Xiinping came to power, millions of CCP
officials have been investigated with
the scale of confiscated assets being
staggering. The explicit goal now is to
use the seizure of officials assets to
weather the regime's crises, including
the trade war with the US. The CCP has
also adopted a policy of using
confiscated assets from different
categories of officials for specific
purposes. For example, assets seized
during the ongoing purge in the military
are primarily allocated to military
spending. Assets confiscated from
officials in the public security and
police systems are mainly used for
stability, maintenance funds, and
improving police welfare, among other
purposes. Such large-scale asset
seizures have caused panic within
Beijing's official circles. CCP insiders
believe that such actions are akin to
drinking poison to quench thirst,
self-destructing the regime. So, who are
China's true middle and highincome
groups and the main consumer base? Let's
take a look at the data officially
published by the CCP. According to
survey data from the chips database at
Beijing Normal University, which is
internationally authoritative and highly
consistent with reality in the field of
income distribution and labor market
research in China as of the end of 2024,
among those receiving pensions in China,
approximately 10 million people receive
a monthly pension of 10,000 RMBB or
more. Meanwhile, across the country, the
number of people working in state-owned
or private enterprises with a monthly
aftert tax income of 10,000 RMBB or more
is 8.54 million. In other words, the
number of people receiving a monthly
pension of 10,000 RMBB or more, 10
million, exceeds the number of people
earning a monthly working income of
10,000 RMBB or more, 8.54 million. In
other words, China's true middle and
high-income groups and main consumer
base are retirees from government
agencies or state-owned enterprises
along with some current employees. They
contribute limited economic value yet
occupy a large share of social resources
such as housing and welfare benefits. In
reality, they are a privileged class
supported by taxpayers while the
remaining 700 million workers in China
generally have low incomes. Given this
fragile economic situation, do you think
China has a chance of winning the US
China trade war? How long can China hold
out? We welcome your comments and unique
opinions and suggestions. Thanks for you
watching. and we'll see you next time.
