We've explored the intense battles of the Atlantic and the deadly campaign against German U-boats—but what about the Pacific? Why is the war on Japanese shipping far less talked about? In this episode, Indy Neidell dives into the specific strategic and logistical reasons why the fight against Japan's merchant fleet took a different course.
Discover how geography, industrial capacity, and naval doctrine shaped a quieter—but no less critical—campaign in the Pacific War.
Hosted by: Indy Neidell Director: Astrid Deinhard Producers: Astrid Deinhard, Spartacus Olsson Executive Producers: Astrid Deinhard, Indy Neidell, Spartacus Olsson Creative Producer: Marek Kamiński Community Management: Ian Sowden Written & Researched by: Indy Neidell Map Animations: Daniel Weiss Map Research: Sietse Kenter Edited by: Iryna Dulka Artwork & Color Grading: Mikołaj Uchman Sound Design: Marek Kamiński Colorizations: Mikołaj Uchman
Okay, I've talked a lot about the Battle of the Atlantic, the U-Boat War, various naval
tactics and techniques, life in a U-Boat, life in a merchant ship, and so forth, but
I have not talked much about the war against Japanese shipping, have I?
Well, that's what I'll do today.
I'm Indy Neidell.
This is a World War Two in real time special, a naval one.
There are a few reasons I have not talked much about the war on Japanese shipping before,
but it's mainly because there hasn't been all that much to tell.
Just after Pearl Harbor, the US did begin a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare
against the Japanese, sure, but it had big flaws.
I mention a couple times in the regular episodes the defective American torpedoes for one thing.
These are the Mark 14s.
They run on steam and can go like 8km at speeds approaching 100km per hour and then detonate
with nearly 300 kilos of explosives.
The US Naval Bureau of Ordnance thinks they'll work 98% of the time, but this has not been
the case in any sort of reality.
They swim under their targets, they make circle runs, sometimes they explode prematurely or
not at all.
USS Seawolf, for example, has had serious issues with them.
One time it fires off 8 Mark 14s, 7 misses, and a hit that doesn't explode.
Another time it attacks a Japanese transport with 4 Mark 14s with no result, however, that
time they also have some old Mark 10s on board, so they fire off two of these.
One hits the stern and the second sinks the transport.
The torpedoes run about 3 meters deeper than they are set to, which causes a whole host
of problems, and they have issues with their magnetic and contact-detonating pistols, but
the Bureau of Ordnance does not have a big budget and torpedoes cost a lot of money each,
so they don't do live firing tests against real targets.
None of them at all.
And Rear Admiral Ralph Christie, who helped develop the Mark 6 Magnetic Exploder, which
the 14s use, and for a time is Inspector of Ordnance, is absolutely convinced there is
nothing wrong with the Mark 6 or Mark 14 and the problems lie with submarine crews
and captains, or with faulty maintenance.
But it hasn't been just torpedoes.
For much of 1942, American submarines are hunting big Japanese warships and not trying
to blockade Japanese merchant shipping lanes.
In the first six months, they only sink 35 merchant ships, while at that same time in
the Atlantic, German subs can sink that on a single patrol.
For the year 1942, the Japanese lose 700,000 tons of shipping.
If you will remember, the Germans sink that much in single months in the Atlantic, and
since Japan produces over a million tons of new shipping that year, they aren't really
badly impacted shipping-wise from submarines.
Japan had over 6 million tons of shipping when the war began, which was roughly enough
for moving cargo and military supplies around the empire, but they soon created issues for
themselves.
The army requisitions a lot of merchant ships as freighters, which affects the amount of
shipping available in 1942 and 1943 to bring back stuff from their far-flung new empire.
But that is not a major problem until late 1943 and early 1944.
See, in February 1943, Charles Lockwood becomes commander of submarines Pacific Fleet- come
sub pack.
Late in the year, the American submarines and the submarine campaign begin to finally
become more effective.
Lockwood has made big changes.
He replaces like a third of his submarine captains with younger, more aggressive commanders,
because he feels lack of aggression has been a big issue.
He moves submarine bases from Pearl Harbor and Australia to ever more forward locations
as the Allies advance through the Pacific Islands, which cuts down super long travel
times.
This also helps with the problems of crews running out of decent food on long trips.
And Lockwood addresses the torpedo issue.
After a series of tests in Hawaii, shooting torpedoes into cliffs and using cranes to
vertically drop the torpedoes, in which nearly three quarters of them fail to explode when
they hit their targets at 90 degrees, he famously blasts a Washington Naval Conference with,
"...if the Bureau of Ordnance can't provide us with torpedoes that will hit and explode,
or with a gun larger than a pea shooter, then for God's sake get the Bureau of Ships to
design a boat hook with which we can rip the plates off the target's sides."
In September 1943, the first torpedoes with new contact pistols are put into service.
The sinking of Japanese ships begins to noticeably rise.
After 21 months of war, the three major defects of the Mark 14 torpedo had at last been isolated.
Each defect had been discovered and fixed in the field always over the stubborn opposition
of the Bureau of Ordnance.
That month of September 1943 sees the sinking of 172,082 tons of Japanese shipping, the
record for the war so far, and in total over 1.5 million tons of Japanese shipping is sunk
in 1943, more than twice it was in 1942, though John Costello points out Japan has still produced
a net gain in tankers.
The beginning of this year, 1944, sees major effects begin.
Lockwood organizes his force in wolf packs like the Germans used against convoys off
the Luzon Straits, through which a lot of Japanese shipping lanes run.
Japan is still way behind in convoy and escort tactics.
US submarines now operate out of Midway, the Gilberts, and soon enough the Marshals.
Codebreaking and radio intelligence plays a big part now in concentrating the submarine
forces.
Daily radio reports are sent out at noon from Pacific Fleet's Fleet Radio Unit detailing
the Japanese convoy signals and position reports, and the shipping losses grow higher and higher.
The Japanese lack the weapons, escorts, and training to provide more than token cover
to the convoys, which multiplied through the spring of 1944 as troops and supplies were
rushed to the threatened island perimeter.
Assembling the merchantmen into poorly protected and ill-disciplined gaggles only made success
easier for the American submarine skippers.
In January 1944, 294,902 tons of Japanese shipping were sunk, a clear warning to Tokyo
that the assault against both their island defense and convoys was accelerating.
Atushi Oyu writes,
"...in a nutshell, Japan failed in anti-submarine warfare largely because her navy disregarded
the importance of the problem."
This has been the case since the war began.
It isn't in fact until June 1943 that the building of 40 anti-submarine coastal defense
ships is even approved, but this comes from an anti-submarine request for 360 of them.
The priority is carriers, submarines, and high speed transports for the Combined Fleet.
The Navy Ministry and Naval General Staff are very much dominated by the Combined Fleet.
It has been allocated almost all of Japan's naval resources, so without at least some
sacrifice to the fleet's strength, how will they step up AS activity?
Well, on November 15, 1943, they finally create Grand Escort Command at Okinawa under Koshiro
Oikawa.
This is to run shipping protection, and has charge of all sea areas outside of those of
the Combined Fleet and the China Sea Fleet, which means only such local routes as Truk
Marshall Islands, south of Truk, or south of the Philippines are not under their jurisdiction,
but they don't have that many ships for that vast area of water.
Grand Escort Command has fewer than 50 ships of over 800 tons, and some of those are destroyers
so old they are not capable of ocean travel.
GEC's best escort ships are 15 destroyers built between 1920 and 1925.
There are, among the listed ships, four escort carriers, CVEs, and an air group, but all
four CVEs had to undergo a great amount of repairs at Navy Yards.
It was not until July 1944 that one of them joined a convoy.
One of them never joined.
The use of CVEs was only experimental and perhaps did more harm than good.
To use the CVEs, it was necessary to teach green flyers how to take off and land on a
carrier.
These flyers were forced to join a convoy mission before sufficiently trained.
The result was numerous accidents to aircraft, and as soon as they finished the first convoy
trip, most of them were transferred to Combined Fleet carriers.
So in effect, the escorts are just being used as training for carriers.
Escort Command has the 901st Naval Air Group, sure, but no airmen in Japan are trained for
anti-submarine warfare.
There are not even AS doctrines.
The escort and merchant ships do not have direct communication with the planes, and
even among convoys, communication systems vary.
Now, four of those best destroyers are a destroyer group, but all other ocean-going escorts run
independently.
No tactical doctrine, no unified communications, and the vast majority are captained by graduates
from merchant marine academies, not naval.
By 1944, anti-air and anti-surface radar is installed on most ships of the Combined Fleet,
but it's not generally in use among the escorts for nearly another year.
But the shipping situation is suddenly soon worse.
On February 17 and 18, as you can see in the regular weekly episode, some 200,000 tons
of shipping is destroyed at Truk.
A large convoy system with something approaching modern ships and using set and established
tactics and communications may well now be out of the question for Japan.
I'm going to quote Atushi Oye again now to end this thing.
Definitely look up that article, though.
It's very interesting.
He wrote it in 1952.
During the war, he served on the Japanese Naval Ministry's Bureau of Personnel and
as operations officer with the 2nd China Sea Fleet.
In referring to another article that postulates that a short way of losing a war is the single
military concept, the adoption of one chosen means of maintaining national security to
the exclusion of others, Oye writes,
In the realm of the Japanese Navy, the single concept was long since born, the concept that
the Combined Fleet was the embodiment of the Navy.
The Combined Fleet, in its turn, was gripped in a single concept that the fleet-versus-fleet
action was the only warfare it must aim at.
The task to protect the seaborne trade was miserably slighted.
The Navy sold the concept to the nation.
The nation expected the Navy would win in fleet actions, overlooking the outcome of
trade protection.
If a fleet action was lost, the Navy's popularity would be undermined.
On the other hand, the failure of AS warfare could be left unobserved.
It was only natural that the Navy was more eager to win a fleet action than to succeed
in AS warfare.
And there you have it.
To sum up the situation quite simply, Japan's convoy protection system is way too little
and way too late.
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And if you want to see what life was like on a merchant ship, check out our special
about that right here.
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