"China’s political scene has long been infamous for the saying: “Right after the meeting, straight to prison.” But when figures like He Weidong, Lin Xiangyang, and Miao Hua—three pillars of Xi Jinping’s inner military circle—began to vanish from the spotlight one after another, the nation couldn’t help but shudder at the scale and speed of the storm sweeping through the Chinese military. This isn’t just about individuals falling from grace. It’s a sign of an intense power struggle—one so fierce that even Xi’s personally appointed confidants are no longer safe.
China's political scene has long been infamous for the saying,
right after the meeting, straight to prison.
But when figures like He Weidong, Lin Qianyan, and Miao Hua, three pillars of Xi Jinping's
inter-military circle, began to vanish from the spotlight one after another,
the nation couldn't help but shudder at the scale and speed of the storm sweeping
through the Chinese military. This isn't just about individuals falling from grace,
it's a sign of an intense power struggle, one so fierce that even Xi's personally appointed
confidants are no longer safe. He Weidong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission
and effectively the third most powerful man in China's military, had been missing for over two
weeks by the end of March 2025. Rumors of his arrest began circulating on March 13th,
and U.S. intelligence agencies found these claims credible.
When Defense Ministry spokesperson Wu Qian responded with,
I'm not aware of the situation, it only added fuel to the fire.
Before that, Lin Qianyan, commander of the Eastern Theater Command, China's frontline
force against Taiwan, also disappeared on the afternoon of March 24th, according to commentator
Kai Shengkun. And let's not forget Miao Hua, director of the Political Work Department
of the Central Military Commission, who was suspended back in November 2024
for serious disciplinary violations. These names are no coincidence. All three are loyal proteges,
groomed by Xi from his political cradle in Fujian, a group often referred to as the Fujian
clique, the foundation of his military network. Looking at their rapid rise, it's hard not to
be impressed. Lin Qianyan rose from major general in 2013 to general in 2021, faster than a missile
launch. He Weidong, once the commander of the 31st Group Army, climbed to vice chairman of the
Central Military Commission, becoming a godfather figure within Xi's circle. Miao Hua, in charge of
ideological control in the army, was the torchbearer of loyalty to Xi. These weren't just
generals. They were handpicked loyalists placed in key positions to solidify Xi's grip on power.
Yet now, all three have fallen in under six months. This is no minor event. When the biggest
dominoes in Xi's inner circle start to topple, one can't help but wonder, how many cards does
Xi still have left in his hand? This saga echoes some of the darkest chapters in Chinese Communist
Party history. During Mao Zedong's era, Lin Biao, once seen as his successor, died tragically in a
mysterious plane crash. Under Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, both personally endorsed by
him, were purged without mercy. History seems to be repeating itself, only this time with a pace
and scale that's even more chilling. If even loyalists like He Weidong, Lin Qianyan, and Miao
Hua can't survive, how shaky has Xi Jinping's seemingly unbreakable power base become? The
To understand why these three powerhouses fell, we must look deeper into the silent war raging
within China's military, a ruthless battlefield between the Fujian clique and the Shanxi clique.
Contrary to popular belief, the Central Military Commission, CMC, the highest military authority,
is not a monolithic entity under Xi Jinping's control. It is a complex web of interests where
factions silently vie for dominance. The Fujian clique, comprising He Weidong, Lin Qianyan,
Miao Hua, and even Defense Minister Dong Jun, was handpicked and groomed by Xi during his time in
Fujian. These were his most loyal subordinates, fast-tracked into top positions to replace the
old guard. The 31st Group Army, Xi's launching pad in Fujian, was the birthplace of this iron
triangle. But that triangle is now shattered. Miao Hua fell in November 2024, He Weidong
vanished in mid-March 2025, and Lin Qianyan was reportedly arrested on March 24th. The Chinese
military's inner circle is now a bloody storm. As commentator Zhao Longjian revealed that between
March 13 and 23, as many as 100 to 200 senior officers were purged, a number that would shake
even fans of palace intrigue dramas. The plot reads like tit-for-tat revenge.
You purge my men, I strike back. The rival faction, the Shanxi clique, is led by Zhang Yuxia,
the remaining vice chairman of the CMC, and a second red generation, offspring of revolutionary
veterans, with deep military roots. Zhang's father was a comrade-in-arms of Xi Zhongshun,
Xi Jinping's father, creating a revolutionary brotherhood between their families. For years,
Zhang enjoyed Xi Jinping's utmost trust as an unshakable ally within the military. But in
politics, trust can quickly become a blade. While the Fujian clique fell one by one and Xi remained
unusually silent, Zhang Yuxia rose to prominence, making frequent public appearances at meetings,
military inspections, and delivering speeches an unmistakable contrast. What made Zhang switch
sides? Perhaps it was political survival. He likely realized he could easily become the next
target in Xi's purge strategy. But it wasn't just self-preservation. Zhang also holds something Xi
lacks, the support of military generals. As one of the few veterans of the Vietnam War, he commands
respect as a seasoned warrior. During his time commanding the Beijing and Shenyang military
regions, Zhang played a masterstroke, developing military land and allowing officers to buy housing
at reduced prices, which they could then resell on the market. This turned many officers into
overnight millionaires and built him a vast loyalty network, especially in the northern
and central military zones. While Xi used rapid promotions to consolidate power through his Xi
army, thereby disrupting traditional advancement systems and angering veteran generals, Zhang opted
for tangible rewards, winning hearts from the grassroots up. That support allowed him to control
the Central Guard Bureau and the defense zone around Beijing, making him a formidable force.
A subtle but telling detail lies in the difference between public statements.
He weighed on pledging loyalty to Xi Jinping, while Zhang Yuxia emphasized loyalty to the party.
This indicates Zhang isn't just shielding himself. He's reframing power around the party's supremacy
over the gun, a long-held principle of the CCP that Xi has sought to bend for personal control.
When the PLA Daily repeatedly underscores collective leadership and opposition to autocracy,
it reeks of an open rebellion in the making. Looking back at two major military purges since
2023, a pattern of tit-for-tat retaliation becomes clear. The first wave targeted the
Shanxi Clique, taking down Li Shengfu, former defense minister, and the rocket force leadership.
But just when it seemed Xi's faction had triumphed, the second wave turned on the Fujian
Clique, dragging down Miaohua, Dong Jun, reportedly under investigation, and now Huidong and Lin
Xiangyan. Expert Gordon G. Chang, writing in The Hill, called this a sign of intense infighting,
an all-out counterattack by Xi's rivals to reclaim military power. The PLA is no longer a tool in
one man's hands, but a battlefield of factions, and Xi Jinping is slowly losing the upper hand.
Xi Jinping, From Lifetime Emperor to a Leader Cornered
Xi Jinping was once hailed as the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong.
In 2018, he amended the constitution to abolish term limits, paving the way for his dream of
becoming a leader for life. By 2023, he secured an unprecedented third term, despite health rumors
and silent dissent within the party. But now, as his trusted allies He Weidong, Lin Xiangyang,
and Miaohua fall from grace one after another, people are starting to ask, how much of Xi's
former glory actually remains? Take a closer look at the roles of these vanishing figures.
Lin Xiangyang wasn't just the commander of the Eastern Theater Command, he was the strategic
mastermind behind Xi's long-held ambition of militarily unifying Taiwan. He Weidong,
as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, oversaw the entire military
apparatus and ensured the general's loyalty. Miaohua, in charge of political ideology,
served as the spiritual backbone of Xi's inner military circle. Their collective downfall has
not just shaken Xi's military foundation, it's all but collapsed it. This isn't a case of Xi
proactively cleansing the ranks to reinforce his power. If it were, he wouldn't have allowed key
figures like Lin Xiangyang, who was entrusted with the critical Taiwan operation, to become
casualties. So why hasn't Xi struck back? Following the third plenum in 2024, when rumors of a stroke
began to circulate, a wave of purges swept through Xi's circle. And yet Zhongnanhai,
China's political epicenter, remained eerily silent. One theory suggests Xi is deliberately
lying low, feigning weakness to bait his opponents into revealing themselves. But that theory is hard
to buy. This is the same man who rewrote the constitution to stay in power indefinitely,
who forcibly removed Hu Jintao from the 20th Party Congress. He's not someone who gives up easily.
A more likely scenario? Xi has truly been cornered, lacking the strength to resist the
growing counteroffensive from internal rivals. One of the clearest signs came in October 2024,
during the National Day Banquet, when retired heavyweights like Wen Jiabao and Li Ruihuan
made unexpected appearances, standing among the Politburo Standing Committee members.
A subtle message that Xi no longer holds absolute power. Another major blow came when Chen Guoqiang,
Xi's so-called number one enforcer in the military, was demoted to political commissar
of the National Defense University shortly after the third plenum. Even Xi's sharpest
knives are now being blunted. When Xi showed up in Guizhou on March 25th, 2025, with a head full
of gray hair and remarked, at the 20th Party Congress, we established a central leadership
team to carry on and develop. This ensures that even if I retire due to health reasons,
the central leadership will remain stable. The air was heavy with the feel of a final farewell.
When even Zhang Youxia, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, turned his back on
Xi during the closing session of the National People's Congress on March 11th, it became clear
Xi Jinping's days at the top may be numbered. As military power crumbles, the dream of forcible
reunification fades. The downfall of Heiweidong, Lin Xiangyang, and Miaohua isn't just a matter
of internal Chinese Communist Party politics. It has far-reaching implications for the
international stage, particularly China's longstanding ambition to reunify Taiwan by
force. Lin Xiangyang, as commander of the Eastern Theater Command, was in charge of monitoring the
Taiwan Strait. Heiweidong, as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, oversaw major
military strategies. With both men suddenly disappearing, Xi Jinping's dream of reunifying
Taiwan through military means has been all but choked off. Let's take a look at the recent context.
China's much-hyped Exercise B in 2024 began with fanfare but fizzled out abruptly,
without any official statements from the Ministry of Defense, a highly unusual move. Meanwhile,
under President Lai Ching-te, Taiwan has passed 17 national security provisions, labeling China
as a hostile foreign force and strengthening defense cooperation with the United States.
On March 20, 2025, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence released a report exposing the Xi
family's multi-billion dollar fortune, further damaging his credibility on the world stage.
With internal chaos mounting, China can no longer sustain military pressure on Taiwan,
and the path toward forcible reunification appears to have closed. Back at home, the rise of
signals a new trend, a possible return to the principle that the party commands the gun,
rather than the military serving Xi Jinping personally. By taking control of the Central
Guard Bureau and Beijing's Strategic Defense Zone, Jiang hasn't just defeated the Fujian clique,
he has positioned himself to influence the political fate of China's top leadership.
History offers a precedent. In 1976, Hua Guofeng and Ye Zhenying used the Central Guard Bureau
to arrest the Gang of Four in just 35 minutes. Is Jiang Yuxia preparing for a similar scenario?
Xi Jinping now resembles a king trapped in his own palace. With his loyal lieutenants falling,
military authority slipping away, and rivals like Jiang on the rise, Xi's power is no longer
untouchable. From dreaming of being a leader for life, he now finds himself on the verge of being
abandoned by history. The question is no longer how much power Xi still holds, but how long he
can survive this political storm. What do you think about the disappearances of He Weidong
and Lin Xiangyang and the current state of Xi Jinping? Share your thoughts in the comments
below. Thanks for watching, and see you next time.