►關於台灣的大實話 - 川普國防部政策副部長提名人參議院聽證會◄

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川普國防部政策副部長提名人參議院聽證會
I know that's come up a lot today, and thanks again for the copy. It was one of the first
meetings I had in that early basement office in the Senate when you came and saw me a few years
ago. You talk about the importance of coalitions and maintaining a regional balance of power.
So if a coalition is too small, it lacks influence. If it's too big,
it may lack commitment from the members. So what does an optimal coalition look like to
maintain the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific? Well, thank you very much, Senator. You're very
kind, and that's something, as you may recall, I discuss in my book a lot. I think we actually are
in pretty good shape in terms of the formal security commitments, apropos of my discussion
with Senator Cotton, I think, and the chairman as well. We have very strong alliances with Japan,
South Korea, the Philippines. I think we have effectively a very strong security relationship
with Taiwan. Of course, Australia is very strong. And then I think we have a very deepening and
important relationship with India that's directly proximate. I think we also could build effectively
on a partnership with Vietnam. Obviously, we have a long and kind of fraught history with Vietnam,
but the Vietnamese, say what you will, they're committed to defending themselves, and they see,
I think, the challenge from China. So I think those are some of the places where we can work.
I think if we can kind of hold the line that way, that would be an effective model going forward.
And then, of course, there are ways at the diplomatic level and political level to use
mechanisms like the Quad to build on that. But from a defense point of view, I think the defense
perimeter along the first island chain is the one that makes the most sense.
Thank you. But if you look at what he himself has said...
Can I ask you a quick question? Do you think that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea
are working in concert against us to present this multilateral challenge against us so that
we won't fight back? So how do you justify taking your eye off the ball anywhere?
Arithmetic with respect, Senator, we have...
First of all, your answer to that question was yes. And now you're elaborating on that answer.
Yes.
Again, I hear much slower than you two talk.
My apologies. Would you like me to continue, Senator?
Yes. If you would elaborate on your affirmative answer to that question.
Yes, Senator. I do believe there's a counter coalition that is working
and active. And I know the chairman, you've talked about this extensively. But again,
the factual predicate that I think we all must proceed from is that as the 2022 National Defense
Strategy said, we have a one war military and change. We don't have a military that's capable
of fighting four adversaries at the same time. I would like, in theory and principle, to have
such a... But that's not the reality. I believe, especially because the threat is so acute and so
realistic, and because of the very real possibility of multi-front war, we must have a realistic plan.
And I feel a special obligation that if confirmed, I must deliver a strategy that actually deals with
that. That's not neglecting the Iran threat. That's not neglecting the military threat that
Russia poses. But it is a realistic plan to deal with that. And part of that, of course,
is greater defense investment and revitalization of our defense industrial base. But it's also
making intelligent use of our allies. And in particular, in the case of Europe and countries
like Japan and Taiwan, pressing them to take greater responsibility, which they can and must do.
What does, in your role, in your, hopefully your new role here,
could you elaborate on what that prioritization, how that would play out, how you think about these
things? Because the truth is, if you have a strained industrial base, if you're building
things for a land war in Europe, you might be neglecting long-range fires in the Indo-Pacific,
right? So how do you view all this? Well, thanks very much, Senator. And obviously,
really an honored and very similar perspective as yours. And I would say that I think, and I
talked about this in my responses to my advanced policy questions, this so-called Lipman gap,
named by the famous journalist Walter Lipman, who talked about the danger of a gap between what
you're aspiring to do and what you actually can do. And if you get that bluff called,
that's catastrophe. And I feel, again, and forgive me for getting a little emotional about it,
but I feel we are at the precipice. I think the President is exactly right. And Mr. Chairman,
I think you're absolutely right that we could be at the precipice, not only of a major war,
God forbid, with China itself, but by deduction of a multi-front war. And we do not have the
capacity. And I don't luxuriate in that limitation. I would like to get, as you say, Senator,
to a position, and we've spent a lot of time in this hearing, and I spent a lot of time
saying, let's do the things necessary, Senator, Mr. Chairman, as you've talked about,
to get us out of the situation, not only for our own forces, but to supply our allies.
But what I've found a difficult challenge is, I feel there's a kind of recognition in one part of
the collective brain of the American system that this is a reality, but the behavior hasn't actually
adapted yet. And what I fear is if we don't have a realistic plan, that the worst could happen,
and we could find ourselves in the worst possible outcome, like losing a war. And that's why I
mentioned it in my opening statement, because I think, God forbid, that is actually plausible.
And I want to avoid that at all costs. And by the way, I also don't want to abandon the Middle East.
I don't want a nuclear Iran. I don't want Russia to run roughshod over Europe. I don't want North
Korea to take over South Korea. But if we know, as a factual, empirical matter, that we can't do
all those things in even remotely concurrent timelines, don't we need to have a credible plan
for how to do so? And I think part of that is greater resources, Mr. Chairman, as you've
advocated for, and I think that, you know, in the reconciliation, hopefully, that will be part of
that reindustrialization. But also the secret sauce, I think, Senator Sullivan, as you were
saying, is our allies, and they can do more, and they have done more. I mean, Japan is an incredibly
wealthy economy. I mean, Taiwan, look at the investments the president got for TSMC yesterday.
These are incredibly wealthy societies. Why are they not spending at levels commensurate with the
threat? I don't understand. Well, and that level of, and the type of spending matters, too, right?
When our European allies talk about stepping up, it can't be for pensions. Right, exactly.
You know, in tough talk, in percentages of increase for GDP don't win wars. Weapons do.
I want to move on. Last year, INDOPACOM admitted to Congress that it had the most unfunded
priorities in its history, $11 billion. One of INDOPACOM's biggest shortfalls was missile defense.
At the same time, we've been giving Patriot missile defense systems to Ukraine.
We fired off hundreds of million-dollar missiles shooting down thousand-dollar Houthi drones. How
wise is it to burn through our missile defense stocks in less important parts of the world when
INDOPACOM is so desperately short of those weapons? Well, I think, Senator, thanks. This is
exactly the problem I'm pointing to. That's not to say that we shouldn't be doing anything in Europe
or the Middle East. To the contrary, but it's to say if we all agree that China is the top
challenge and China is the most formidable threat, we need to act like it, because especially given
what Admiral Paparo and others are saying, and Bill Burns has been saying, that we need to act
like this could actually happen. I agree with Secretary Rubio. There is a very real threat
under President Trump's, in the term that he's been elected to, given the 2027 date,
that God forbid a war could happen. And I agree that President Trump has said that China would
not attack Taiwan under his watch. And if confirmed, I would make it my business, my
particular business, to give him the military strength to back that up, coupled with the
negotiating ability, Senator, that you just referred to. Yeah, on that note, our Navy's not
as big as it needs to be. We especially don't have enough Navy ships in the Pacific to counter
China's rapidly growing fleet. Despite that, President Biden decided to permanently deploy
more Navy ships in Europe to counter Russia, a nation which lost most of its Black Sea fleet to
a country without a Navy. Mr. Colby, should we be putting more vessels in Europe when we
already don't have enough in the Pacific? Senator, I think we should be putting
the military capabilities, especially that are relevant in the priority area, ships, submarines,
missile defense assets, have to be focused on deterring a conflict over Taiwan. And if,
God forbid, it happens, giving our soldiers and sailors and airmen and defenders and Marines
the best shot. I mean, that's something I feel very deeply is I'm not in uniform, but if confirmed,
it would be my job to make sure those who are in uniform or who do stand in harm's way, the best
shot at winning, because the American military shouldn't get in a fair fight.
Thank you. I yield back. Good. Let me go back to Taiwan very briefly.
I would agree, and you talked about it earlier. It's the KMT, and it is the KMT, by the way. They
control the legislature. It's different from the president's party. They're playing a dangerous
game on their defense budget. If anyone from Taiwan is watching this hearing, they need to
realize they're playing a dangerous game. Cutting defense spending right now is not the right signal.
We all agree with that. As you know, the Taiwan Relations Act requires the U.S. to make
weapons available to Taiwan for its defense. Every administration since 1979 has pledged to
abide by that and has. Trump administration did a great job its first term. If confirmed,
will you work with us to make sure we're going to turn the Taiwanese around, but that we will
commit to work with Taiwan and us to comply with the Taiwan Relations Act?
Yes, certainly, Senator. Even more than that, I would make it a special focus
to accelerate and revamp and focus those capabilities and expand those weapons
transfers and sales and so forth to assist Taiwan in its ability to defend itself.
I've mentioned the pressure that we need to put on Taiwan. I think you're absolutely right,
but we also need to do our part on the U.S. side to make real capabilities available in a timely
fashion, which we've not done a good job on. Get those weapons out there. I met with the
previous president. She had a great statement to me when I talked about will, and she said,
will is often a function of training and capability. If you're stronger and you have
weapons, we have this giant backlog, for example, of harpoons that we should be getting to the
Taiwanese. So I think that's an important point that she made. Will is a function.
I don't contest the fact that the Chinese are looking at what we're doing in Ukraine at all,
but fundamentally, Senator, my view, and I think it should be of particular interest to this
committee, sir, is that we have to have the military capabilities in Asia or relevant to Asia
to be able to conduct a local defense of Taiwan at a cost and level of risk that the American
people are prepared to tolerate. And that has been my main focus. My aspiration, if I would put
another and to kind of build on what the vice president was saying, a longer term top priority
for me would be, if confirmed, would be to revivify our defense industrial base so that we are no
longer in a position where our defense industrial base cannot produce at levels where we can
resource in multiple theaters at the level that we need. That's where we want to get back to.
I want to turn briefly to Taiwan. You have said here today and in your past writings that Taiwan
is a critical matter for us. You wrote in 2016 that you thought we should give explicit security
guarantees to Taiwan, reversing a decades old policy of strategic ambiguity. You opined in
the same way in 2020 in response to a hearing in the House of Representatives. Over the past
couple of years, you've started to say, as Senator Wicker pointed out earlier, that Taiwan is a
vital interest, but it's not existential interest to us or it's not essential to us.
It seems that you have changed your thoughts somewhat in the last couple of years. That is
not, I suspect, because of Taiwan's defense spending, which though still inadequate, I agree,
has been trending upward for seven straight years. So could you explain to us
why in the last few years your views seem to have softened somewhat about the defense of Taiwan?
Absolutely, Senator. I've always said that Taiwan is very important to the United States,
but as you said, it's not an existential interest. It's very important to core
American interests in denying China regional hegemony. What's changed, Senator, as we discussed,
is the dramatic deterioration of the military balance. So if I could use the Churchill example
again, it's different to engage in a futile and overly costly effort that would destroy
our military. I know you've written very eloquently about this danger in your recent book.
The other point that I would say, Senator, is that I believe that we actually have implicitly,
our relationship and our commitment to Taiwan is largely implicit or indirect or customary.
We actually have specified our commitment through things like the designation of Taiwan as the
pacing scenario for the department. So my view that the combination of the greater threat from
China and the lack of preparedness on our part, I have a different assessment with respect,
Senator, about Taiwan's efforts. I think actually as a portion of GDP, it's well below 3%. I agree
with President Trump that they should be more like 10% or at least something in that ballpark,
really focused on their defense. So we need to properly incentivize them. So together,
that means that my focus has been, again, with the shooting the flare metaphor I used earlier,
Senator, to get Taiwan motivated to avoid precipitating a conflict that is not necessary
with Beijing and giving us time and space to be able to try to rectify this problem,
because that is my goal, Senator. Thank you. Talk a little bit about your perspective on AUKUS,
the promise of the concept, and if there's practical skepticality, what that is. Yeah.
Thank you very much, Senator. I appreciate that. And this is another area where, as I mentioned
in my opening statement, where new facts arise. I mean, my perspective is fundamentally,
I would say, realistic or pragmatic and kind of data-driven, if you want,
adaptive based on new facts. The idea of empowering our Australian, in some sense,
perhaps our closest ally in the world, they've been with us even in our less advisable wars,
is the way I put it. It's a great idea for them to have attack submarines. But the problem is,
is that we are, as Secretary Rubio has said and others, there's a very real threat of a conflict
in the coming years, God forbid, over along the first island chain. And our attack submarines,
as you know well, Senator, are absolutely essential for making the defense of Taiwan
or otherwise a viable and practical option to my conversation with Senator Cotton.
So if we can produce the attack submarines in sufficient number and sufficient speed,
then great. But if we can't, that becomes a very difficult problem because we don't want
our servicemen and women to be in a weaker position and more vulnerable, and God forbid worse,
because they're not in the right place at the right time. So my perspective, and what I've
told the Australians and also the Brits is, if confirmed before, I think it should be the policy
of the United States government to do everything we can to make this work. And again, as we talked
about in your office, Senator, this is getting back to restoring our defense industrial capacity
so that we don't have to face these awful choices, but rather can be in a position where we can
produce not only for ourselves, but for our allies. Just a note on Taiwan. To me, one of the
critical questions is how much is Taiwan committed to its own defense? It's disturbing to me that in
recent months, the parliament of Taiwan has moved to cut their defense budget.
And how are we to be expected to think about sending Americans into harm's way
on behalf of an entity that doesn't seem all that interested in protecting itself?
Are you disturbed by that move in the Taiwanese parliament?
I'm profoundly disturbed, Senator. And I think the question that you're raising is one that I've
heard not only Democrats, but Republicans raise often in private. Secretary Mattis,
who was mentioned earlier, said we can't care more about your defense than you can.
So this is where I think I've been trying in my communication and my recommendations for policy
vis-a-vis Taiwan to try to induce them in whatever way possible to become, say, more like South
Korea. So it's a very plausible model with a much more serious military, because not only do I don't
think it's fair to Americans to ask Americans and our servicemen and women to suffer if our allies
are not pulling their weight, but also that it won't even be viable. And you've written in your
excellent book, Strategy of Denial, that we need to provide a credible deterrent in the Taiwan
Strait to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony. But on deterrence itself, here's my
question. Is deterrence divisible for the United States? And what I mean by that is, you know,
when people say, well, we can let bad guys, Putin, roll in Europe, Iran, roll in the Middle East,
but we're going to be strong in the Taiwan Strait. Is deterrence divisible in that way? I think it's
not. Just look at Joe Biden, Afghanistan. Holy cow, that was a disaster. And guess what happened?
And I predicted this. Every bad guy in the world was like, hey, I'm making my move. Putin probably
would not have even invaded Ukraine had it not been for Afghanistan. Same with Hamas and Iran,
with Israel. So is it? We've got to rebalance. But is deterrence divisible? Because I think that's
where you and I might have a little disagreement and get into the danger zone there. I don't think
it is. But what do you think? I think, Senator, that things are definitely interconnected. But
what I'll say, and I recognize I'm over time, is that it's really important. I can't remember who
said it, but you've got to have the right stuff in the right place at the right time. And we need
to make sure that we've got that. So we've got to do both of these things. We have to pay attention
to political credibility issues and how we're perceived. But at the end of the day, as you know,
well, given your distinguished military service, Senator, we need to have the right stuff in the
right place at the right time to have the right effect. As I think Douglas MacArthur famously
said, the two most infamous words in military history are too late. Right. And I think that's
that's really what I'm that that side of the equation is what I'm driving towards.
