美參議院就國防動員舉行聽證會

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美東3月6日上午,美參議院軍事委員會就二十一世紀的國防動員舉行聽證會,新唐人、大紀元進行網絡直播(即時翻譯字幕)。
今天的會議是關於防禦勞動
我非常榮幸邀請三位來賓參加今天的會議
Jerry McGinn是一位曾經擔任DOD的官員
他曾經在聯合國工業基礎措施的核心領域工作
Chris McKenzie帶來了相似的履歷表
她在DOD的工業基礎政策辦公室工作了一段長時間
Dave Berto是DOD的職業服務委員
他曾經擔任DOD的防禦勞動部長
Welcome to the witnesses, Senator Wicker, the chairman of the committee is detained for a little bit, and when he comes, he will enter his testimony into the record.
With that, I would like to recognize the ranking member, Senator Reed.
Thank you very much, Senator Fischer.
I want to welcome our witnesses, Dr. Christine McKenzie, Dr. Jerry McGinn, and Mr. David Burke, too.
Thank you very much for joining us.
This is a very important conversation, and we are fortunate to have such a distinguished panel before us.
Throughout history, we have consistently seen nations with well-prepared militaries lose to nations with superior industries.
The ability to deploy well-trained troops and advanced weapons to the front line is important in any armed conflict,
but the ability to sustain those forces with adequate amounts of supplies and munitions is just as important.
The Defense Acquisition University defines industrial mobilization as
the process of marshalling the industrial sector to provide goods and services, including construction,
required to support military operations and the needs of the civil sector during domestic or national emergencies.
Put more simply, industrial mobilization represents the Defense Department's ability to call on the private sector in times of crisis.
I am concerned that the United States is not currently prepared to do this effectively in a sustained, large-scale or protracted conflict.
The war in Ukraine and the incredible amount of military support we have provided has been vital for Ukraine's survival,
but it has exposed our own industrial-based vulnerabilities.
We have learned that our capacity to produce vast amounts of artillery shells, precision munitions and other modern weapons
in a rapid, responsive way is much more limited than we realized.
Our capacity has expanded significantly over the past three years,
but we have relied on existing tools such as the Defense Production Act to overcome supply chain problems and increase production.
Any future conflict we may face, particularly in the Indo-Pacific,
will require much greater levels of military industrial capacity,
as well as interagency coordination to leverage a whole-of-government response.
The process for large-scale mobilization dates back to the World War II era.
When America entered the war, there was an enormous increase in military production of ships, planes, artillery, vehicles and more,
which eventually earned us the title as the arsenal of democracy.
However, we must not forget that the industrial ramp-up actually began long before the war started
and did not yield significant results until we were years into the fight.
This is an important lesson we should remember today.
Industrial mobilization does not occur overnight.
Further, while we have a useful model for our experience in World War II,
it is not a blueprint for the future.
We must recognize the industrial base of today is very different from any period in the past.
Especially considering our reliance on information technology and software-based systems.
We will need to mobilize different sectors of the economy and workforce unlike any time before.
Moreover, we cannot assume, as we did in World War II,
that our production facilities will be safe from kinetic or cyber attack
or that we will have uncontested supply lines for materials.
I would ask our witnesses to discuss the lessons they have drawn from the war in Ukraine
and what processes they believe need to start now
so that the United States is prepared to win the next contest.
This committee has spent years examining the challenge around these issues.
We have worked to identify supply chain problems
and improve investments in long-lead items of the military.
In recent National Defense Authorization Acts,
Congress has directed the Department of Defense
to stress test its industrial mobilization and supply chain capabilities.
The Department has found a number of challenges,
including integration of software and information technology,
but it is clear that material and labor shortages
are the biggest problems in increased production.
Indeed, there is nothing more important
for our defense mobilization strategy than our workforce.
The men and women in the Defense Acquisition Corps
and the personnel in the Defense Industrial Base.
We cannot solve our industrial mobilization and acquisition problems
without an adequate supply of skilled and trained workers.
I would note that acquisition reform is necessary,
but it is not sufficient to address
the broader issues of industrial mobilization.
In a crisis, having an acquisition system
that is efficient and effective is important,
but production capacity is far more so.
Many of the policies and processes we put in place in peacetime
for the sake of efficiency
may actually be counterproductive in a prolonged crisis.
That is why I am so troubled by the mass firings
of the defense civilian workforce
which the administration is undertaking right now.
The urgency around these issues has never been clearer.
As Russia continues its onslaught against Ukraine
and China calculates its own potential expansion,
we have to make sure our defense industrial base
is able to adapt, scale and outpace
our competitors in the 21st century.
I would ask our witnesses' thoughts
on how we might overcome this challenge
and how we can ensure that the workforce in place
is there to do so.
Thank you again to our witnesses.
And thank you, Senator Fischer.
Thank you, Senator Reid.
Again, welcome to the panel.
Dr. McGinn, you are recognized for your opening statement.
Thank you, Chairwoman Fischer
and Ranking Member Reid and members of the committee.
Good morning.
It is a privilege to be here
and thank you very much for having this hearing
on this important topic,
which is critical facing the nation.
The United States has the most lethal
and capable fighting force in the world.
Full stop.
But as we've seen in recent war games
as well as in challenges
that Senator Reid alluded to
in production capacity for munitions,
we have real industrial base capacity challenges.
So these challenges led me to do a study
that addressed the following question.
How well is the U.S. industrial base
prepared to mobilize
in the event of major conflict?
The short answer published in our report
before the balloon goes up
is that our ability to win a major war
with a near-peer competitor
is very much at risk.
Unless senior officials
across Washington and industry
pursue bold actions immediately,
we face potentially catastrophic consequences
should the balloon go up
in East Asia or elsewhere.
Drawing on historical and recent cases,
we developed a series of recommendations
to enable industrial mobilization.
I'd like to focus on two areas specifically.
One is the authorities
and planning capabilities,
and then secondly,
our ability to scale.
So in the area of authorities and planning,
as you all know very well,
the government's ability
to mobilize industrial base
starts with our legal authorities
and the policies and plans.
The famous War Production Board
of the Arsenal of Democracy in World War II
helped organize government industry
to address those challenges.
Similarly, during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars,
the development of the AMRAP,
the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle,
the use of the Defense Production Act
was critical to help produce those vehicles.
And then we all felt
that saw the power of DPA during COVID.
So overall,
our legislative authorities are strong,
but I think there are
several opportunities before us.
The first, as you know,
DPA is up for reauthorization this year.
DPA has had tremendous impact
on rebuilding and reshoring
industrial base capacity,
and it is essential to reauthorize DPA
and keep it focused exclusively
on national security issues,
particularly threats from China.
DPA Title III
is an important tool
for building industrial capacity.
The use of purchase commitments
under Title III
would be a great way
to enable a strong demand signal
for industrial capacity
and capabilities
such as specialty chemicals
and critical materials.
But currently,
purchase commitments
are not enabled
because the DPA funds
are being appropriated
with procurement dollars
which expire,
as opposed to
traditional DPA appropriations
which do not expire.
And there's a real opportunity
in another section of DPA,
Title VII,
where we have two sections of authority
that haven't been used
since the Cold War
that are really powerful.
One is Section 708,
which allows the creation
of voluntary agreements
between government and industry
that allows collaborative
industry-government engagement
on critical supply issues.
If we were to establish,
we have a few of these available now,
but if we were really
kind of invest in these efforts,
we could have that collaboration
we had during the
War Production Board years.
The second section is Section 710,
which allows the creation of
what's called
a National Offensive Executive Reserve,
which is essentially
a group of industry experts
that can come into government
during a crisis.
So this is a tremendous authority
that has not been used
since the 1980s.
So the other thing
we need to do on the planning side
is we have to restart
mobilization planning.
That ended in the early 1990s.
We have to build this
across the U.S. government,
and then we also have to relook
some of the executive orders
that govern DPA.
Now,transitioning from authorities
to our capabilities,
we really have to focus on
turbocharging our efforts
to change how we design,
resource,acquire,
and sustain capabilities.
As the ranking member talked about,
it's not just about
acquisition reform.
It's about how we buy.
We have to design things
for production.
We have to focus less
on requirements
and have more adaptive ways
to create technologies.
We have to resource.
We have to have more resource
would be helpful, of course.
But another way
that we can go beyond appropriations
is to really tap the power
of U.S. capital markets
as one of our strengths.
So building on the authority
that you all created
with the Office of Strategic Capital,
there's opportunities
to grow the scale of investments
so private capital
can make larger bets in investments.
On the areas of production,
we've gotten the prototyping game down.
I think that, you know,
but it's really now the time
to transition more to production.
And there are ways to do that
through other transactions,
follow on production agreements,
more buying of tradable systems
and unmanned systems and the like.
And then finally,
the area of sustainment
is frankly our biggest challenge,
being able to address,
do logistics at scale.
And there we can actually do things
like create contract line items
or CLINs
that develop search capacity.
So you can,
so instead of having, you know,
cantalized very limited supply runs,
you can have the ability to grow that.
And also second sourcing
and multisourcing
are important options
to be able to create more capacity.
One final point I'd like to make
is on allies and partners.
Our recent experience
has made it crystal clear
we need a larger industrial base
engaging our closest allies,
those with whom we go to war
through robust industrial partnerships
will help us build overall capacity.
Unfortunately, time is not on our side.
If the Davidson window is correct,
we have two years.
And it takes a while,
as this senator alluded to,
to mobilize.
The Trump administration and Congress
in partnership with industry
and our allies and partners
must harness innovation,
manufacturing capacity
and other means
to unleash the true strength
of our industrial base
to deter our enemies
in today's very dangerous world.
The time to do this is now
before the balloon goes up.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Dr.McGinn.
Dr.McKenzie.
Thank you, Chairman Fischer,
Ranking Member Reed
and distinguished members
of the committee
for the opportunity
to speak with you today
on defense mobilization,
which is essential
for our nation's security.
The defense industrial base
necessary to build our DOD systems
is fragile.
But this fragility
didn't happen overnight.
Key decisions
by the U.S. government
and industry
have played a very large role.
For instance,
decades-long private sector
and public policy approaches
to domestic production
prioritize low short-term costs
over security, sustainability
and resilience.
So the industrial base
has become optimized
for efficiency
and not resiliency.
Just-in-time deliveries
versus inventories
of long lead-time items
cut warehousing costs
and increased efficiency
but limits industry's flexibility
and responsiveness.
And the DIB
has many single
and sole source suppliers
due to the decades of consolidation.
Often those are
foreign adversarial sources
that are cheaper
but can introduce risk.
At OSD,
I was in the trenches
of mobilization efforts
for almost a decade.
I was the lead for DOD
for scaling up production
for all of the weapon systems
we were sending to Ukraine.
A function I led
for various crisis scenarios
since 2017.
I was also very involved
in DOD's efforts
in response to COVID-19,
working with the interagency partners
using the defense production authorities.
Jerry talked about
Titles I, III, and VII
to execute CARES Act funding
to increase production
of medical resources,
including prioritization
and allocation of supplies,
which becomes important
when we're trying to mobilize
and surge,
and providing financial support
to DOD suppliers.
As the United States
is supporting two conflicts
and preparing for potential conflict
in the Indo-Pacific region,
it has become clear
that the DIB is not equipped
to mobilize,
to support the existing activities,
much less a competition with China.
Although there are
and continue to be
multiple efforts
aimed at mitigating shortfalls
that support mobilization,
there are some systemic issues
and causal factors
that are not being addressed.
The most important of these
is DOD's acquisition behavior.
I'm not referring
to acquisition reform here,
such as different ways
of doing contracting,
but to the decisions
that are made by
the acquisition community
that are the root causes
of many of our supply chain issues.
The industrial base
is very seldom a consideration
when most acquisition programs
make certain decisions,
such as increasing
or decreasing procurement quantities,
or even analysis
during major milestone decisions.
When mitigating supply chain issues,
DOD is often treating the symptoms
and not the cause.
I'll highlight
two representative examples,
but there are many more
I can elaborate on.
The government is funding efforts
to reshore and allyshore
critical supply chains,
and partners and allies
are critical to solving this issue.
However,
if we don't bring demand back
to those more secure sources,
they will not survive.
Even though DOD programs
have the authority
to direct sources of supply,
they most often do not,
letting industry choose.
Because industry is profit-driven,
they will almost always
choose the cheapest source,
which is unfortunately
often a Chinese
or other adversarial source
or more secure source.
DOD reinforces this behavior
by choosing the lower-cost proposal
among technically equal options.
Industry will not risk
losing a contract
by using a higher-cost supplier
even if that supplier
is more secure.
DOD also does not like
to direct sourcing
because it shifts liability
from industry to government
if something goes wrong
with that material or component.
But if we are truly going
to have secure suppliers
for these critical items,
DOD and other agencies,
because DOD is often
only 1 to 2% of the demand,
should be required
to use a U.S. or allied source
if one of it is available
that meets requirements,
and also to incentivize industry
to use those sources
with policies such as
price preferences
and contract selection,
for instance.
Another example
is one of the major constraints
we faced when scaling production
for weapon systems
for Ukraine and other crises,
and something that
continually plagues DOD,
which is obsolescence.
The way DOD deals with obsolescence
is reactive and ad hoc at best.
With a few exceptions,
programs do not plan
or budget for obsolescence,
choosing instead to wait
until an obsolescence issue occurs
to determine a mitigation plan
and scramble to find funding
to execute that plan
before time runs out.
Obsolescence was the main reason
we couldn't make more stinger
and pack three Patriot missiles
when the Ukraine conflict
started initially.
Acquisition program managers
and even service acquisition
executives have told me
they can't afford to budget
for obsolescence,
but many studies have shown
that being proactive
by planning and budgeting
in advance saves time and cost.
Programs should be required
to plan and budget
to deal with obsolescence
more proactively.
Lastly,
as we've been trying
to mobilize the DIB
to support various efforts,
I'm often asked
why can't we do what we did
in World War II
as described in the book
Freedom's Forge.
I gave a lecture each year
on mobilization
to the entire class
at the National Defense University's
Eisenhower School,
and one of the slides
I always presented was
why not Freedom's Forge,
where I outlined the conditions
that were very different
between what was happening
and Senator Reid mentioned
one of those,
and what is happening now
that make it impossible
to replicate that scenario.
I'm happy to discuss these
in further detail.
I'll stop there by saying
I appreciate the committee's leadership
and focus on the strategic topic
and in helping in any way I can.
I have submitted written testimony
for the record
and I thank you for the opportunity
to testify today
and I'm happy to answer
any questions you may have.
Thank you, Dr. McKenzie.
Mr. Berto,
you are recognized
for your opening statement.
Thank you, Senator Fischer,
Senator Reid and the committee.
We really appreciate
the opportunity to be here today.
I am David Berto.
I'm the president and CEO
of a trade association,
the Professional Services Council.
But I need to reflect for the record
that I'm here today
in my personal capacity
and the opinions and suggestions
that I make today
are my own
and not those of my organization
who would otherwise be considered guilty.
There's been a lot of talk
about the World War II example
of full-scale modernization
of mobilization
and really in American history
we've really only had
two such examples,
the other one really being the Civil War.
As ill as I am,
I was not allowed to participate
in World War II
as part of that process.
But my experience is actually
in a different segment
that's already been touched on a little.
And that's the Cold War
and particularly the Reagan build-up
during the Cold War.
I arrived at the Pentagon in 1981,
served there until 1993
and was very actively involved
in a number of issues there.
And there's a couple of lessons
that I'd like to propose to you
from that period of time
that may be relevant
to the discussion today.
The first is that
we actually had an operational plan
and a scenario
on which we could calculate
what our mobilization requirements were.
It was in fact Soviet tanks
coming through the Folding Gap
in Germany and invading Europe.
That was the driver.
That was the thing
that if we didn't prevail there,
we'd go nuclear.
And Global Thermonuclear War
was clearly not an option
we wanted to pursue,
although we were prepared for that.
How were we able to use that?
We were able to build the requirements
and actually secure the funding
from the Congress
because we had a common agreement
between the White House,
the Pentagon and the Congress
as to what the threat was
we were facing
and what the scenarios were
on which we'd have to plan
and be prepared to execute.
So the first thing is
we had that common ground.
I don't think we have that today
and I think
one of the most important things
this committee can do
is drive us to get
that common understanding
of what the scenario is.
We had an operational plan
which is the Fight Today piece
and then we had a scenario
which is how that evolves over time.
We need that in place today.
The second lesson,
and by the way,
by being able to do that,
we were able to propose funding
for surge capacity,
for war reserve spares,
for training,
for sustainment investments,
for actually deploying
and being able to show
that we were able to do this.
And the appropriators
would give us that money
because it was justified
and everybody agreed
on the basis for it.
We don't have that today.
An example of that, in fact,
is when one of the lessons
from Ukraine
is the multi-year procurement
for expanding munitions production capacity.
The Pentagon's first submission
to the Congress
was decremented by
a lot of the extra money
that was going to go into
building the multi-year procurements
for many of those programs
because there were higher priorities
the committee had to achieve
than to put those in place.
Ultimately that got fixed,
but it took a long time
to get agreement on that.
So we have to have that agreed upon
set of scenarios
on which to base requirements.
The second thing
that we learned
from that Cold War experience
is the best way to deter
was to demonstrate,
demonstrate,
not put on paper,
but demonstrate
that we had the capacity
to deliver that.
So every year
we would have massive exercises
where we'd literally deploy forces
from the U.S.
and sustain those forces
in operations in Europe.
Thousands and thousands of troops
from all the NATO countries combined.
Clearly showing the Soviets
that we could make it work.
And that demonstrated capacity,
I think,
is the second key lesson.
The third key lesson
been referred to a lot here
is the partnership with industry.
And that partnership with industry
is oftentimes
an arm's length partnership.
Dr. McKenzie did a good job
of describing some of the flaws
in that process.
And I think that partnership
has to include long-term contracts.
It has to include stable design
so you can maximize productions.
That's one of the big advantages
we actually had over Germany
in World War II.
Hitler and his team
could not stop putting change orders
into programs
because new stuff would come along
and they'd actually stop production
in order to do it.
Whereas we would actually
move those new ideas
into the next iteration
of different aircraft
so we'd maximize production
while still getting
the benefits of new technology
and research and development.
We did that throughout the war.
The fourth lesson
is the reliance on allies and partners.
And Senator Reid,
you mentioned Indo-Pakistan
and the China threat.
DOD uses the word
the pacing challenge.
I think it's actually
much bigger than pacing,
but it is the threat,
but it's not the only threat.
And I think a big difference
between even the Cold War
as well as World War II
is the changing nature of the threat
and the much more complex nature
of that threat.
Allies and partners
are a key piece to this.
And then the fifth lesson,
I think, and we did not
really learn this lesson very well
during the Reagan build-up,
is mobilization is much more
than just defense
and much more than
defense industry.
It's the whole nation.
You mentioned workforce, sir,
and we've got shortage of workers.
We've kind of come out
of that bathtub from COVID
where we had twice as many
vacant jobs as we had
people looking for work.
But throughout the industry,
both at the production end
and at the services
and sustainment end,
we've got a shortage
of workers today
that's continuing
going forward there.
So those are five lessons
I think that would be useful
for this committee to undertake.
And my one suggestion to you
is I think it's time
and I don't think
you have time to wait.
I think I would suggest
that this committee
direct DOD to do
between now and the time
you go to conference
a full-blown exercise
of say what our mobilization
really requirements look like,
what's the scenario
on which we base that.
You need that as a committee
before you finalize
the FY26 National Defense
Authorization Act.
With that,
I've got negative time
to yield back,
so I don't actually have
any time to yield back,
but I stand ready
for your questions.
Thank you, Mr. Brito.
We will have five-minute rounds
and I will begin with questioning.
I strongly believe
the administration
should maximize its use
of the Defense Production Act.
They have the authority
to address challenges
in our defense industrial base.
However, I am concerned
by the expanding definition
of what qualifies
as national defense.
For example, in 2022,
President Biden
invoked the Defense Production Act
to ramp up domestic production
of clean energy technologies.
Dr. McGinn,
how should the Defense Production Act
be used for defense mobilization?
Should the DPA investments
be focused on areas
clearly related
to the national defense
of this country?
Thank you very much,
Senator Fischer.
Yes, the Defense Production Act
is an incredibly powerful tool
and it is best used
for national security defense purposes.
And that's how it's been used
during the development of the MRAP,
during the Afghanistan-Iraq War.
That's how it was used during COVID.
And that's how it's being used
to rebuild our defense industrial base
in areas such as rare earth processing,
castings and forgings,
and the like,
specialty chemicals.
So that is how it is best used.
The more it is focused
on national defense,
it takes it off the...
It is not a political issue,
therefore it's a national security issue.
Thank you.
And Dr. McGinn,
how should the act be used
for defense mobilization?
Should the investments
be focused on areas
clearly related
to being able
to get that done?
I'm sorry.
Dr. McKenzie.
Thank you.
I just wanted to make sure.
Yeah, it should absolutely
be focused on
mobilization efforts.
But some of the efforts
that DPA is funding now,
it's difficult sometimes
to realize that
those go towards mobilization.
So things that Jerry mentioned
such as rare earth processing
and critical chemicals that are...
Would you look at any
statutory changes
to be able to
make it work
and make it identify
truly what is national defense?
Is there anything
we need to be looking at here?
I mean, I think
making sure that it is centered
on national defense issues
and national security
is critically important
as Dr. McGinn mentioned.
Because we don't want to
dilute the efforts of the DPA
that are being very successful
to use currently
and can be used going forward.
Okay, thank you.
Dr. McGinn,
on January of 2024,
the department released
its first national defense
industrial strategy
and later in October
released an implementation plan.
What's your assessment
of the strategy?
Well, I think the strategy
did a very good job
at kind of bringing together
a lot of efforts
that have been led
across recent administrations.
One of the interesting
good things about this area
is it's very bipartisan.
There's been a lot of
similar themes being addressed
across the Obama administration
through the Trump administration
first, through Biden and today.
And I think that the strategy
did a good job at identifying
the progress that's been made
but also setting a vector
for the future.
And I think that there were
a number of good things
in that report.
I particularly liked the focus
on importance of production
as well as the importance
of working with allies and partners.
The key will be kind of
how that's instantiated
in the 26th budget submission.
Are there any additional areas
that you'd recommend
the department would consider
that maybe were lacking
from the previous strategies?
Yeah, I think two things
I would recommend.
One is mobilization.
I mean, it is not
it's mentioned briefly
in the strategy,
but there's no talk about,
you know, restarting
kind of mobilization planning.
I mean, there actually are
program elements in the Army, Navy
and Air Force, Marines
for mobilization,
but they're really all about
pre-positioning equipment
and the like.
There's no kind of planning function
that's being done today
that all stopped
and that needs to be restarted.
And then the other area
that is on the strategy
talks a lot about
building exportability in systems,
that is, building systems
so that we can share them
with our partners and allies.
That requires investment
in terms of,
because you're going to have
different capability levels
of different missiles
going to different partners
depending on how close they are.
So that requires investment
up front, and that needs to be,
that's a big priority
that needs to be invested
in terms of making exportability
a priority in acquisition
and also investing the technology
needed to build that capability.
Thank you.
Senator Reid, you're recognized.
Well, thank you very much,
Senator Fischer.
First, let me commend you all
on excellent testimony.
Thank you.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Berto,
we've seen a lot of chaotic initiatives
over the last several weeks,
significant cuts
of workforce.
We've seen funding cuts
that don't seem to be organized.
And then we've tariffs
in place on Canada
and other countries
who presumably
we'd like to see work with us.
Can you indicate or give an idea
about the impact on these decisions
with respect to mobilization
of our industrial base?
Senator, let me think out loud
with you a little bit on that
because I don't have a prepared script
to answer that question.
Every administration,
this is my eighth transition
of one president to the next.
My first one was
President Carter to President Reagan.
And every administration
needs to and does undertake
to make sure that
the programs and projects
across the federal government
are in line with their priorities.
And I think that's a lot of
what's underpinning
the efforts we've seen underway.
It's being done differently
than many have done.
And one of the differences
is stopping things
while you're reviewing it
rather than keep going
while you're reviewing it.
I think from a government-wide
point of view,
this has caused a bunch of hiccups.
But more importantly,
there's a second element
of that review.
And that is,
don't just focus on
the things you're going to stop,
the money you're going to save,
the reductions in workforce,
unnecessary workforce
that you're going to do and so on.
You also have to focus on
where you want to
not only keep going,
but go further and faster.
And I think one of the things
that we're trying to focus on
is what are those areas.
Clearly,
national security
is a huge piece of that.
Board security is another one.
There's probably others
that will emerge
as part of that process.
So I think my personal concern
is that you need to
actually undertake
those places you're stopping
or reducing or re-altering.
And keep in mind,
you need to be able
to keep the capacity
and capability
and competence
in the government
contractor community
to be able to work
where you're going forward.
That's the touchstone,
I think,
that I would advise this committee
to look at it for.
If I could add one thing
on the DPA.
Yes, sir.
It's up for re-authorization
this year.
It's obviously not
the jurisdiction of this committee.
I've been through
two DPA re-authorizations,
including one in 1990
where we actually
let the act expire
under a veto threat
because it got loaded up.
Senator Fischer,
as you indicated,
with a bunch of things
that didn't really,
from our perspective,
contribute to national defense.
And we let the act expire.
That's a dangerous time to do it.
Saddam Hussein
had just invaded Kuwait.
And we sort of needed it.
But it turned out
there are other authorities
we could use
for a short-term conflict
such as that.
I do think this
would be important
and input from this committee
might be useful
in that re-authorization
in terms of looking
not only at how the DPA
has been used
over the previous years,
but how it's not been used
and where you ought to do it.
I agree with Dr.McGinn
in terms of Title VII.
DPA worked for me
for a number of years.
I exercised
Title VII authority
a number of times.
And I think it really needs
a refresh
because the nature
in which DOD would use
that authority today
in today's global economy
is very different
than it was in the 1980s.
I'm sorry for that sidebar,
but I think that's
an important thing
for you guys to look at.
Thank you, sir.
Your comments, Dr.McGinn,
and we're running out of time,
so if you could,
with respect to the present
sort of turmoil
that we're witnessing
and the impact
on the industrial waste.
Well, the companies
that support the government
play critical roles
in lots of different functions.
And so the big thing
that I'm recommending
is the importance of us
restarting kind of
mobilization planning.
So that is not going to be impacted
because it doesn't exist today.
So that was something
that has to be developed
and is inherently
governmental function.
Thank you very much.
Dr.McKenzie,
we are much more reliant
upon information technology
and software-based systems
today than we were
certainly in World War II
and other periods of mobilization.
And when it comes to
planning and preparing
for industrial mobilization,
how does this reliance
change the situation?
Well, luckily, software
and software systems
have been, I would say,
more adaptable
than some of the hardware systems
as DoD tries to move forward.
So they do things
like agile acquisition
and refreshes and upgrades
quite quickly.
So I think software
is absolutely key
to any mobilization effort
because that's what's controlling
all of our command and control.
For instance, C4ISR.
So, yeah, it's absolutely essential.
Well, thank you very much.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Rounds, you are recognized.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
First of all, thank you
to all of you for being
with us here today.
We appreciate the time
that you're taking
from your schedules.
For all of you,
the fiscal year 2025 defense bill
includes a provision
from my office, section 1074,
a report on operational plans
of the Department of Defense
which requires an assessment
of the operational plans of the DoD
in the event of multiple
concurrent contingencies
or protected conflicts.
This requirement reflects the reality
that in the event
the U.S. engages in hostilities
with China, other adversaries
such as Russia and Iran
will press their own advantage
in Europe, the Middle East
and elsewhere.
Basically talking about
if we have a conflict,
we're going to have a conflict
on more than one area
or one theater at a time.
What are some of the considerations
that we must take into account
when talking about
a multi-theater mobilization
and what are some of the key shortfalls
that you believe the department
should identify and highlight
in their assessment?
Dr.Berto, would you like to begin?
Thank you, Senator.
Let me again go back a few years.
At the time of the Cold War,
we really only had one set of scenarios
that we cared about
and that was the Soviet threat in Europe.
Everything else was considered
to be what we called
a lesser included case.
That means whatever force structure
and capability we'd have
to counter the Soviet threat
would probably be sufficient
to counter any other threat.
After the end of the Cold War,
we changed that
to several different iterations
from a planning process point of view,
including a two-war scenario
that essentially being
the Middle East and Iran, Iraq
and the Korean Peninsula.
It turns out after 9-11,
we discovered that
lesser included cases might be lesser,
but they weren't included,
and so we had to have a big shift
in terms of both our strategy
and our force posture to deal with that.
In 2012, I was chartered by DOD
to do the first assessment
of what the force posture
would be needed for the pivot to Asia,
and what I discovered
is there was no basis for that,
and so it didn't fit.
Again, this was a greater not included
rather than a lesser included,
and so I think if you look
at that evolution over time,
the request of your provision
is a very valuable and timely request,
but it's important to note
that that's only where we are today,
so from the operational plan point of view,
it really focuses
from a combatant commander's point of view
of if I have to fight today,
if I have to fight tomorrow,
what do I have?
What do I do?
How do I use it?
How do I sustain it
and support it, et cetera?
I think it needs to be
much broader than that
of what is it in day 50,
one of the lessons from Ukraine
and almost every war we've entered in.
It may look like
it's going to be short at the beginning.
It keeps on going,
and so where are you
at day 700?
I think that's another element
that is useful to add on there, sir.
Thank you.
Dr.McGinn.
Thank you, Senator.
Yes, thank you very much
for that provision.
I think that's important
to really focus on
the operational plannings,
but one of the things
that is missing
in most operational planning
is the role of industry,
and so one of the things
that we saw supporting Ukraine
is the challenge of production,
that we've got to really
kind of be able to ramp that up,
and that requires
really close
government-industry collaboration,
and we had that.
During the Cold War,
we had these voluntary agreements
that created integrating committees
that were focused on the production
of 155 munitions
that were actually not,
were non-FACA boards
that allowed for close collaboration
between government industry
on production issues,
and so we need to have,
that needs to be part of the planning.
We need to do the war games
that have that,
because you've seen the war games
where if we have a Taiwan Strait scenario,
we're out of Schlitz
in two weeks on munitions, right?
So we've got tremendous
kind of industrial implications
to these operational scenarios
that have to be part of the planning
going forward.
Thank you.
Dr. McKenzie.
Real quickly,
I'll just add that
the National Defense Strategy
drives how the Defense Department
looks at operational planning,
so the current National Defense Strategy
says focus on China.
Previous National Defense Strategies
did include multiple conflicts
at the same time
and looking at that
from an operational planning perspective,
so National Defense Strategy
would be helpful here
if we are going to really truly look at that.
I do want to mention
some of the impacts, though,
are the types of munitions
that we're going to use.
In Ukraine,
we're fighting mostly a ground war,
so we're using a lot of artillery,
mortars,
things that we are absolutely
not going to be using
in a China fight.
So in a China fight,
we're focusing more on surface-launched,
air-launched,
you know, long-range missiles.
If we now have to add in another fight,
say, Korea,
we're back to a partial ground war.
So it really matters
which fights we're looking at
as to which parts of the industrial base
we're trying to ramp up.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Chair.
Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator King, you are recognized.
Madam Chair,
congratulations on your meteoric rise
to the chairmanship.
Mr. Berto, I was really interested
in your approach
during the Reagan years
of defining the scenario
and then defining the strategy
to meet it.
I can't believe that's...
Isn't that what's done now?
I would assume
that's exactly what's done.
Or is it being done
in too broad a sense
without focusing on particular scenarios
that will require a particular response?
So I should probably
clarify my use of the words, right?
So you have an operational plan
which from my perspective in history
is the today fight
with the forces today
in the theaters they're in.
Scenarios can go beyond that
both in terms of time
and in terms of geography.
And what we had in the Cold War
was almost no difference
between the operational plan
and the fight today
and what the long-term scenario
would look like.
Today, as we just heard
in the discussion
in response to Senator Rounds' question,
we have a wide variety of potential conflicts
that could arise.
In addition, we've got...
But still, shouldn't we...
Within that wide variety,
we should try to choose the most likely.
You can't just throw up your hands
and say we have a very complex situation
and therefore,
we can't have a specific response.
Shouldn't we be saying,
OK, this is the most likely scenario
and that's what we should be preparing for?
So I think you're right, sir.
You need to figure out
what you're going to base your requirements on
and what you're going to spend your money on, right,
and what comes first.
You have to have a mechanism for prioritization.
I think it's probably
a combination of likelihood and probability,
and I'm certainly not qualified
to put those on there.
But it's also a question of
where's the greatest stressors
and what are the vulnerabilities
if we can't combine or meet those stressors.
That could, in fact,
require an integration across multiple scenarios
to look at what's the aggregated
or combined impact and effect
and where are the greatest things
where we need to put our resources first.
We will never have enough money to do everything.
So the question is,
where do you put it first?
The likelihood.
A very quick, easy question for everybody.
Can we all agree that
continuing resolutions absolutely
are not part of the solution to this problem?
Franklin Roosevelt did not face
a single continuing resolution
in the entire build-up to World War II
and the execution thereof.
Yes, I concur.
All of you agree with that.
Of course, that's one of the difficulties
that we're in now.
And it creates all kinds of downstream effects
with regard to the industrial base
and preparation and everything else.
Well, thank you for that.
Let the record show
continuing resolutions
are not the way to do business,
particularly in the defense area.
All of you have mentioned
something very interesting,
which is allies are part of the solution.
And it concerns me
that we seem to be embarked on a course
that at least is not encouraging to our allies
and in some cases
is definitely poking our allies in the eye.
Talk to me about the importance of allies
in dealing with the production necessary
for a significant conflict,
whether it's Japan, the U.K., Canada
or other countries.
So our allies' importance
are a key part of our industrial base.
And we have a number of agreements
and collaborative programs.
I mean, the largest fighter program in the world,
the F-35,
we have a dozen partner countries, I believe.
So we cannot do this by ourselves.
Is that a fair answer?
That's correct.
All of you are nodding.
Could you say yes
because nods don't show up in the transcript?
Yes.
Nods don't show up in the transcript.
Exactly. Thank you.
One of the problems
is the consolidation
within the defense industrial base.
How do we go about expanding
the options available
One suggestion we had from one witness earlier
was to go to major manufacturing facilities,
Ford Motor Company, for example,
and getting them engaged in military production
as well as making F-150s.
How do we expand the industrial base?
Everybody comes here and says
we need to expand the industrial base.
Give me some practical suggestions
as to how that might happen.
Senator, it's a great question.
And I think, one, we have to recognize
that the consolidation industrial base,
people talk about it,
it's largely a function of spending.
During the Cold War, during the 80s,
when Mr. Pateau was in the Pentagon,
we were spending 5.5% to 6% of GDP.
Now we're spending around 3%.
So you're going to have less companies
in the overall ecosystem.
And then it's something
that Dr. McKenzie mentioned,
is that when your acquisition
is focused on efficiencies,
you want to buy the right system
for the right time,
and then what that ends up with
is very limited production runs
and or very production runs that last.
When you have platform programs
like the F-35,
the Bradley fighting vehicle,
the Abrams tank,
they last for 40 years.
And so you have a prime contractor
that has that market position.
So my argument is that
to change the dynamic,
we have to change how we buy,
which means buying more systems,
buying from multiple sources,
and you can do that very much
with unmanned systems.
With some of the platform systems,
you can do that as well.
There's been a lot of work done
on second sourcing
back in the 70s and 80s
where we were buying munitions
from two suppliers,
and that reduces costs.
So there are ways you can
increase competition
by changing your buying approach,
and that has to get away
from some of the efficiency focus
and more on what capabilities
and capacities you need.
And one of the particular things
that ought to be part of this
is modularity so that you can upgrade
without having to upgrade
the entire platform.
Is that correct?
Madam Chair,
would you indulge me for one sentence?
We just don't buy enough
to keep more companies in business.
We just don't buy enough.
The reason we only have
two and a half manufacturers
of tactical missiles
is we only buy enough
to keep two and a half companies
in business.
Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Sheehy,
you are recognized.
Thanks for appearing today.
Mr. Berkdahl,
you talked about
the World War II construct,
obviously,
with regard to revisioning
of product specifications
and how we evolved that.
I share the same concern, though,
with regard to
the customer has created this problem.
The government,
the Pentagon has created
this defense consolidation
and the brittle supply chain we have.
I'm not confident
that the government
can be the solution to it, either.
How do we incentivize
the industry free market solutions
to actually create
a resilient and diversified supply chain,
rebuild the industrial base
in a way that's resilient
for a sustained conflict?
Because during World War II,
Japan and Germany
had a very centralized
defense acquisition ministry,
specified everything from on high
and tried to control
the entire process from A to Z.
That worked very well early on,
but it couldn't keep up
with the sheer quantity required
and there is a certain amount
of quality in quantity.
So that strength for us
came from the free market.
It came from private companies
working in coordination,
of course, with the government,
but how do we take
a defense base
that has largely been
atrophied to the point
of almost nonexistence
for quantity-level manufacturing
and how do we incentivize
the free market
to outpace the government
in fixing the solution?
Thank you, Senator.
There's two ways to approach that.
When I got to the Pentagon,
there's this famous chart
of we went from 51 prime contractors
down to five.
When I got to the Pentagon,
all 51 were there.
Why did they go away?
During a build-up
in which we were doubling
the size of procurement
and research and development
expenditures in DOD,
they went away for three reasons.
Number one is
even with those more dollars,
there wasn't more quantity to buy.
Second is
we began to put more and more
regulations on top,
the compliance regulations.
I'm working on
and I'll be glad to provide it
to the committee
when I finish this
a comparison of
the compliance requirements
that a government contractor has,
not just defense contractors
but any government contractor,
and what happens
in the private sector.
It's a list of at least
15 or 20 things
that cost more,
take time,
and don't really improve results,
in my opinion.
I think that's an important
piece of it as well.
Ford Aerospace,
Fairchild Industries,
Sperry,
Burroughs,
GM,
they all went out
of the defense business
in the middle of the build-up
because it was no longer
two things,
it was no longer
time value money
in the private sector
is way different
than the time value money
in DOD.
So the returns weren't there,
the opportunities
for better returns
elsewhere were there.
So you have to be able
to counter that
with government policies
and programs that offset
that risk-reward basis
that the financial market
is always looking for.
And I think that can be done,
but that's not the path
we're on right now.
So for any of you
who choose to answer then,
how does the government
remove the bureaucratic red tape
that really creates
a sclerosis in the acquisition chain
that disincentivizes companies
from wanting to do business
with the Pentagon,
that disincentivizes companies
from,
that we don't have to have
SpaceX and Palantir
sue the government
to buy a solution
that's better for the warfighter.
And that's what's been going on.
A better solution
can be sitting on the shelf,
but since it doesn't comport
with a dizzying array
of Byzantine regulations,
either it's not purchased
or that company has to sue
the government
to give the warfighter
the equipment they need.
How do we change
those regulations quickly,
internally,
so people want to do business
and want to support the warfighter?
Yeah, great question, Senator.
I would start, again,
what's unique about
the government contracting system
is, you know, it's a monopsony.
You have one buyer
or one sets, you know,
different sets of buyers,
and, you know,
so it creates different dynamics.
They can set the market.
So the power is in the hands
of the government
or the Department of Defense
to change incentive structures,
because companies,
private companies,
public companies,
they respond to incentives.
And so the onus is on the department
to change those incentive structures,
and Congress can help here.
And a couple of ways
that we can do that
that will create more opportunities
for companies across the spectrum
is to, you know,
to bring the power of our capital system
that you allude to bear.
And because if we want to build factories
in advance of need,
that can be done
through the government investing.
But, you know,
we aren't going to be doing
any more big chips bills,
you know, that kind of
government investment.
But if you incentivize companies
and create off-take agreements
or financing programs
that enable them
to make a bet
at below market rates
like the Department of Energy has
and builds off
what the Office of Strategic Capital is doing,
that is how you get lots of money
which is there,
the private equity
and venture capital money
to invest.
And that will help build capacity
and build competitors
for the department.
Can I just add one quick thing?
I think there also needs to be
a recognition of risk acceptance
in the department.
You know,
the contracting officers
are personally liable
for, you know,
something goes wrong
with the contracting.
Program managers
are promoted
if they produce things
and nothing goes wrong.
So there is
a very low risk tolerance
in the department.
And I think that
contributes to the fact
of not introducing new suppliers,
not wanting to change things,
not wanting to, you know,
bring in new industries.
So I think there needs
to be that piece of it
that accounts for it as well.
Well, thank you.
Quantity, iteration and speed are key.
And, you know,
one World War II for us
wasn't the capability
of our technology.
It was our ability
to build lots of things fast
and get it in the hands
of our war fighters.
So we got to get back to that.
Thank you.
Thank you, Senator Sheehy.
Senator Cain, you are recognized.
Thank you, Senator Fischer.
And thanks to our witnesses.
My concern about mobilization
is heavily on the workforce side.
And I think maybe
because I'm on
the Health Education Labor Pension,
I look at a lot of things
through this workforce angle.
But also in my dialogue
with our shipbuilders
and ship repairs in Virginia
and elsewhere,
I'm very, very nervous
about us not having
the workforce we need.
And I think this is
sort of a long-term problem
with birth rates declining
and they're not going to
change immediately.
And if they did,
we wouldn't see it for 25 years.
So I think there's some
big-picture solutions
like a workforce-based
immigration reform
that we're going to have
to grapple with to get this right.
But I'd love it
if each of you could just address
workforce strategies
to help us with mobilization
and maybe even include
workforce strategies
that we can do jointly with allies.
And I'll start with Mr. Berteau
because I know you talked about
workforce in your opening statement.
Thank you, Senator Kaine.
A lot of what
we've already talked about
has an impact on that.
But I think there's
two additional points
that I'd like to make here.
One is, in fact,
the impact of COVID
and both the inflation
in general costs
and the increase in cost of labor
over the last five years.
Many defense companies
and many other contractors
in the rest of the federal government
have bids that were put in place
accepted by the government
and contracts currently underway
that made assumptions
about 0% interest rate,
very low inflation,
a balance between job vacancies
and those seeking for work,
so a stable workforce,
low unemployment.
None of that is true
over the last five years.
Many of those contracts
have not been adjusted.
In fact, DOD is still issuing
contracts today
with an annual inflation clause
of somewhere around 1 or 1.2%.
Both for workforce,
for wages and benefits
and for other costs
associated with that.
That's not only unrealistic,
it leads companies to bid proposals
that are unexecutable in the end.
What have we done about that
is this committee
actually put some language in
a couple of years ago
in the NEA,
I think it was three years ago now,
that gave the Defense Department
the flexibility
where funds were available
to offset some of those costs.
We've seen very little effort
on the part of the Defense Department
to look at those
economic price adjustments
come into play.
What's the result?
You know this.
You've got a starting welder salary
at a shipyard
or even after a year of experience
that's substantially less
than what that person can make
at Walmart or Costco.
Not standing out in the cold
or the heat.
Welding is an honorable profession,
but it's hard work.
I'm not saying
that being a warehouseman at Costco
is not hard work,
but it's a lot easier on the body.
We've got to offset some of that
or else we're never going
to climb out of this hole.
Could I ask Dr.McGinn
and Dr.McKenzie?
Yes.
Thank you very much, Senator.
I think one of the strengths
of the workforce,
the defense industrial-based workforce,
is the nature of the business.
Unlike commercial industries,
we generally have longer-term contracts,
five-year contracts,
or one year with four options
that enables stability in the workforce.
It enables companies
to plan for the future.
However, when you have
continuing resolutions to use,
as Senator King mentioned,
and you have stability in budget,
it makes it harder for companies to do that.
So the more that Congress
and the department
can create stable demand signals,
and that's through things
like I mentioned.
If you do purchase commitments
for certain capabilities
that you need,
or you do multi-year
procurement contracts,
that enables kind of the stability
to grow and stabilize workforce.
Great.
And Dr.McKenzie,
you've got a minute 15,
but the chair may let you
go just a little bit longer.
Okay, thank you.
It's a great question,
and I've been involved in this very much
as we have been scaling up production
for Ukraine and other obstacles.
The quickest way to scale up
is to increase capacity
if you aren't already
operating at full scale, right?
But you need people for that,
and it was always an issue
to get the people,
even if you had excess capacity,
getting people to come on board
to observe that excess capacity
was difficult.
A lot of it has to do with areas
that these plants are located in.
By design,
they're in rural kind of areas
that are not near exciting cities,
and so young people
don't want to move there.
So I think things
that can build infrastructure
and make those places better
for young people
and make them want to go there
and want to stay would be helpful.
It also goes to,
you know,
when we were growing up,
we wanted our kids
all to be engineers, right?
Not technicians.
That wasn't considered
a valued job description.
So we need to make
being a technician exciting,
and there are some efforts
in the department to do that.
So, you know,
make sure that they understand
that what they're doing is important
and it goes direct
to the work fighter, et cetera.
And lastly, for allies,
I've done a lot of work in that area.
I was the lead
for the guided weapons
explosive ordnance program
with Australia,
and one of the things
that we had proposed
was as they were trying
to ramp up their capacity
to make munitions in Australia,
which they haven't done
in a long time,
bring some of their folks over
to train here
and fill some of the
workforce shortages
that we had here,
so it's a win-win.
So that's, you know,
something that we should pursue.
Which is sort of
what we're doing
with AUKUS a little bit.
We have Aussie shipbuilders
and sailors here
training with us
so they can go back
and do the same thing.
But we need to do more.
Thank you very much.
Thanks.
Senator Fischer.
Thank you, Senator Kaine.
At this time,
I'd like to ask
unanimous consent
to enter Chairman Wicker's
prepared statement
into the record.
This concludes today's hearing.
I'd like to thank the witnesses
for their testimony.
And we are adjourned.
