FAILED Ejection Seat - Pilot Killed - Counterfeit Components?
1 Video View·Jan 9, 2025
What's up today.
I'm going to jump into an article that came out in Air Force Times on September
14th, written by Rachel Cohen that is linked down below, and we're talking
about counterfeit components inside ejection seats, Lieutenant David Smith
was killed in June of 2020 in an F-16 mishap at Shaw Air Force Base when his
ejection seat failed to work properly.
His digital recovery sequencer, the DRS, which we'll talk a lot about in this
episode, his wife, his widow has filed suit against three defense contractors.
Regarding this, this report goes through several components, including
which an Air Force research laboratory briefing dated in August of 2020,
where they suspect there are multiple counterfeit components of
this digital recovery sequencer.
There are a few other claims in there.
I will say upfront, I'm going to make the assumption that no one is doing
this in malice because I think in this case, it's absolutely criminal.
I'm going to make some assumptions that when they're testing these
and a chip doesn't make it to the research laboratory or it has been
removed, there's possibly some issues with chain of custody and how these
things move from the safety investigation board to the expert in this case, which
is Teledyne, the manufacturer of the digital recovery sequencer, and then
to the accident investigation board and to the Air Force research laboratory.
So I'm gonna assume there's some chain of custody issues.
I am imagining that Teledyne is trying to troubleshoot and figure out what
part of that DRS malfunction.
And in doing so, they're doing some destructive things to it, changing
out chips, seeing if things are moving and firing electrons the way they should.
And that's just me making that assumption.
Bottom line is these ejection seats, this is your last line of
defense and they have to work.
The fact that there are counterfeit components or suspected counterfeit
components is definitely a big red flag.
All right.
I received a few messages about this article that came out in Air
Force Times on September 14th.
It was written by Rachel Cohen entitled, an Air Force pilot died when
his ejection seat failed, was it counterfeit?
So inside this article, which we're going to look at today, there are some
claims that components of Messer's seat, Lieutenant David Smith, Messer,
who died on June 30th, 2020 at Shaw Air Force Base, when he ejected
in his seat, did not work.
There are now claims that components of that seat or counterfeit chips,
et cetera, inside that, which if it's true, is not a good thing to say the least.
So let's jump into the article.
An Air Force investigation of fatal fighter jet crash in June of 2020
quietly discovered that key components of the pilot's ejection seat may have
been counterfeit, Air Force Times learned.
First Lieutenant David Smith, an F-16 pilot at Shaw Air Force Base in
died June 30th, 2020 when his ejection seat malfunctioned as he tried to
escape from a failed nighttime landing.
I did two episodes on this episode 23 and episode 24, 23, we break down the
accident investigation board report in detail, which goes into a lot more than
that little paragraph I read there or sentence rather, and then episode 24,
I talked with Bender, who is an F-16, who's an F-16 pilot at the time, now
an F-35 pilot, and we kind of go through to get another perspective outside of just mine.
To summarize that accident investigation board report, essentially found two
faults, one being Messer, because he did land short and damaged his landing gear.
Two, supervisor of flying, who was another F-16 pilot in the tower, didn't
call Lockheed Martin to discuss with the engineers what their recommendation was.
The issue here is the digital recovery sequencer in the seat.
This recovery sequencer was supposed to be replaced three
years prior to this mishap.
And in fact, Messer's flight was the last flight this jet was
going to fly before that was going to be replaced.
But that part had been extended, that maintenance had been extended for three
years due to parts availability and the maintenance consolidation efforts right
there at the end in May of 2020.
We're going to be talking about the digital recovery sequencer here in depth.
And that's where one of the many problems lie.
So an Air Force official inquiry in months following the accident found that
electronics inside the seat were scratched, unevenly sanded, and showed
otherwise shoddy craftsmanship.
The Air Force official inquiry in the months following the accident found
that electronics inside the seat were scratched, unevenly sanded, and
showed otherwise shoddy craftsmanship.
I'm assuming this is either the Safety Investigation Board or
the Accident Investigation Board.
Not all this information was released, but the Accident Investigation
Board report is public and you can read it.
I have that linked in episode 23.
So that raised flags at the Air Force Research Laboratory, AFRL, that's the
Air Force Research Laboratory, which we'll talk more about as well, which
was called for a closer look to confirm whether the pieces were fraudulent.
According to previously unreported slides provided by the Air Force Times, it's
unclear whether the question was ever answered.
While the Air Force suspected parts of the seat were counterfeit, it buried
the information in a non-public section of the Accident Investigation Report.
The details came to light in a federal lawsuit filed by Messer's widow, Valerie.
She's suing three defense companies for negligence in misleading the Air
Force about the safety of their products.
So in the case, Lockheed Martin, Collins Aerospace, which builds the
ejection seat and Teledyne Technologies, which has multiple business units and
Teledyne makes the seats digital sequencer.
Jumping over to Teledyne's website, there's a couple recovery sequencers.
The digital recovery sequencer that we're talking about that was faulty inside
Messer's jet is also in the F-15, F-16, F-22, F-117, A-10, B-1B, and B-2 aircraft.
Since 2005, over 7,500 units have been delivered to the United States Air
Force as well as FMS users, that's Foreign Military Sales users.
So there's a lot of these digital recovery sequencers that are out there.
So in Messer's case, again, when he ejected, the seat never deployed the
parachute and ultimately he was killed upon impact, again, as a fighter pilot.
When all else fails, you're supposed to have the ejection seat and that should work.
So according to the Air Force Research Laboratory slides dated 3 August 2020,
however, the service suspected that several transistors, microchips
inside the sequencer were fake.
Valerie's legal team obtained the slides for the Freedom of Information Act.
Six transistors had no conformal coating or heavily gouged and arcing scratch
marks were considered obsolete or suspected to be counterfeit.
The lab also found signs that Teledyne had destroyed evidence related to the case.
Teledyne appeared to have replaced five microchips on the
sequencer before sending it to the lab.
Teledyne had removed the printed wiring board from the DRS housing and had
mounted the board to a test fixture, the lawsuit said.
Teledyne had cut the leads on the channel number two parallel flash memory chip
to facilitate the chip removal.
Still, the lab said it wasn't sure whether any of those parts
caused the ejection seat failure.
AFRL says the parts are strictly considered suspect at the time.
That's in 2020 when they wrote this.
Destructive analysis of these components and analysis of components of other DRS
boards would be required to provide a higher level of confidence in
whether or not they're counterfeit.
So basically you'd have to go out there and destroy these boards inside
ejection seats all across the Air Force inventory to even figure out if there's
more counterfeit chips, et cetera.
Counterfeiting has plagued the Pentagon supply chains for decades and
contractors are often unaware they're providing faulty materials.
The DOD is aware of the problem and is working to eliminate these
components from supply chains, says AFRL.
To a certain extent, I absolutely can believe that there might be an
unintentional or non-malice use of counterfeit parts, especially when
we're talking about supply chains.
On slide one, I'm not sure who annotated on here, who received this brief.
So if you're watching this on YouTube, you can see it.
You can also click it down the show notes, but slide one up in the top and 12 point
font, obviously added after this slide said who received this brief.
That is a great question because depending on where this one stopped, I
would have a few questions that if we have counterfeit parts and bad ejection
seats, it obviously stopped somewhere.
High level discussion.
It looks like overall workmanship was good.
The wiring board components are generally clean.
The solder junctions were formed, no cracks, no evidence of delamination,
corrosion, tin whiskers, parking, thermal damage, et cetera on it.
Then it goes into anomalies on slide five.
Five surface mounted devices did not have conformal coating and had
evidence they had recently replaced.
Some components were suspected of being counterfeit.
More analysis is needed.
There is a note again, that will looks like it was added after I'm
imagining by the legal team.
If counterfeit and components cannot have met contract specifications.
And I also agree with that.
We will see later on.
They say these components most likely did not have caused the ejection seat to fail.
If the component is counterfeit one, how is it passing
the test and two, if it's counterfeit and not needed, like, why is
the chip there to begin with?
What, what, what does it do?
And I don't have those questions, but someone who's smarter than
me should, and it's questions.
I think we should be asking.
Slide seven hits the first counterfeit component, which is super thick
glasses, a chip that's expected to be, or suspected to be counterfeit title
suspected to be counterfeit components.
Jumping to slide 10 dual axis accelerometers suspect counterfeit components.
This original chip that was mounted on the board during the incident was
removed by Teledyne after the incident and a new one was installed.
So maybe they're doing testing here just in troubleshooting and working
down the trouble tree to eliminate what might be factor here.
Hopefully not covering anything up, but it said both of these
are suspected of being counterfeit.
So they got counterfeit chips in their stockpile as they're
going through testing slide 12.
Pictures of what the counterfeit chips look like different angles.
And it's talking about chamfers of the chip, et cetera.
Again, you're really getting, getting into the analysis here of these chips.
As we move through, it's showing more pictures of various components that
are suspected to be counterfeit and examples of why they think they're
counterfeit on slide 14, it does talk about two chips that were counterfeit
or suspected of being counterfeit that failed in the mishap specifically.
Then we move into a summary from AFRL.
The parts in the previous slides are strictly considered suspect at this
time, destructive analysis on these components and analysis of components
on other DRS boards would be required to provide higher level confidence in
whether they are, whether or not they are counterfeit thus far, AFRL has not
seen evidence that any suspect counterfeit components were causal in the failure
of the ASIS 2 ejection system, presence of the counterfeit parts in the DRS
would not necessarily result in an operational failure of ASIS 2 ejection
system, counterfeit components and DOD inventory has been an ongoing
problem over the past few decades.
Often the manufacturer supplier is not aware of components are counterfeit.
The DOD is aware of the problem and is working to eliminate these
components from the supply chain.
So a couple of questions that popped to my mind with this one.
All right.
We have counterfeit or suspect counterfeit components, but
essentially we're just saying, yeah, this is just how we do business.
And we've obviously had a seat that failed and now they're saying most
likely the components in here that are counterfeit did not result
in the ejection seat failure.
We know the DRS was bad and that's what caused the seat to fail in the
first place and it has multiple components on it that are counterfeit.
So how did this thing pass whatever tester they put it on
prior to putting it in the seat?
That's my first question.
Because that should have been caught unless the counterfeit components
are just working just barely enough.
They don't work in extreme environment or extreme scenarios such as an injection.
And then two, do we not want to look at this any further?
And how does it just kind of like, yeah, we have counterfeit components.
We know it's a problem in a critical system that is your
lifeline should all else fail.
Now flying jets is inherently dangerous, but again, the
ejection seat should work.
The components of your lifeline are not working or have suspected
counterfeit components.
And we've seen recently, you know, supply chain issues in F35 with Chinese alloy.
Spoiler alert, if you're looking for cobalt, that's not owned by China.
Good luck.
They own 80% of the cobalt mines, but I digress.
So AFRL did recommend TASP and they want to do more detailed examination, which
again, includes destructive analysis examined for suspect parts of this
briefing was in August of 2020.
The question that was added on the notes, I think again, from the legal team was
what were the results of the analysis?
The last slide is AFRL is in current possession of the incident DRS unit.
Again, digital recovery sequencer, Teledyne is requesting a return of the
DRS for additional tests and evaluation.
All right.
To summarize this, Messer did make mistakes.
He made mistakes that other pilots have made in landing short.
Unfortunately, he needed his ejection seat based on the damage done to the
aircraft and his ejection seat didn't work.
The fact that this is now coming to light that following the safety investigation
board or the accident investigation board, the Air Force Research Laboratory
raised questions and has suspect that components inside this digital recovery
sequencer, the DRS, that there are counterfeit parts.
And I asked, where did that stop?
Is there more analysis going on?
Again, they said it requires destructive analysis.
Can you ground your entire fleet and destroy all your DRS units?
Probably not.
Really requires a harder look, I think, at this, because if your ejection seat,
again, that lifeline that you have when all else goes south doesn't work,
the competence is completely shot.

