084: Rome Arrives in the Hellenistic East

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Hi there, you're listening to The Hellenistic Age Podcast.
Episode 84 Rome Arrives in the Hellenistic East
The final decades of the 3rd century BC were a time of great turmoil for much of the ancient
world. Within a short window, three new young monarchs, Philip V of Macedon, Ptolemy IV of
Egypt, and Antiochus III of Syria, took the thrones of the great kingdoms of the eastern
Mediterranean. Philip and his Achaean allies fought the Aetolian League to a standstill
in the Social War of 220-217, positioning the talented Macedonian king to dominate the
Greek peninsula. From 219-217, Antiochus and Ptolemy battled it out for control over coily
Syria in the Fourth Syrian War, concluding with a surprising victory of the less than
competent Egyptian king over his northern rival. In spite of his loss at Raffia, Antiochus
was able to restore the fortunes of his crumbling empire by launching an Anabasis that saw him
campaign from Anatolia to Afghanistan over the next ten years, securing his dynasty's
authority over the world's largest empire by 205. Of course, outside of the Hellenistic
kingdoms, the Second Punic War saw the armies of Rome and Carthage engulf much of Europe
and North Africa in a conflict that raged for nearly twenty years before Hannibal Barca
formally offered terms of surrender to Scipio Africanus in 201 BC. While we have covered
all of this in our Grand Narrative, I must admit that I neglected several key events
that transpired during this time period. Although the Roman Republic was preoccupied by many
theatres of operation during the Second Punic War, its attention was increasingly being
drawn across the Adriatic, eventually leading to their arrival and intervention in the Hellenistic
East. This is arguably the turning point of the podcast as a whole, as the interactions
between Rome and the Hellenistic world would dictate the course of my show until its very
final episodes. The decision to put aside these important moments was a conscious one,
as I believe that they better served as the prologue to the eventual Roman expansion into
and conquest of the Hellenistic East. The connections between the Greeks and Romans
go rather far back. Greek colonies had been established in East and South Italy for many
generations, a region broadly described as Magna Graecia. Its members traded and interacted with
the developing republic, before they were eventually conquered and brought into the
Roman alliance system by the early 3rd century. Hellenic influence on Roman religion and literary
culture are undeniable, and the consumption of Greek goods certainly grew alongside the
expanding economic and the political reach of the republic. In terms of finding a Greek
viewpoint on Rome's rise, there are a few scattered references. It seems that the Romans
were somewhat recognized as a major player in Italy by Greek authors in the 5th and 4th centuries.
Aristotle and others were said to have written about a few key moments in Rome's history,
such as its founding by Aeneas or the sack by the Gauls in 390, but none of these quotations
directly survive, and do not suggest anything beyond a general curiosity. However, the invasion
of Pyrrhus of Epirus in 280 was Rome's very violent introduction to the new political dynamics of the
Hellenistic world, one that cost many lives as they faced against the ambitious commander.
The Epirote king was invited by representatives of Tarentum to defend against the republic's
encroachment, and later patriotic historians viewed it as the equivalent of the republic
fighting against Alexander the Great and emerging victorious, but it was a hard-won struggle.
News of Pyrrhus' defeat and expulsion in 275 must have spread eastwards,
as we find the first recorded diplomatic event between one of the successor kingdoms
and the republic. A meeting between representatives of the senate and Ptolemy II Philadelphus of Egypt
is said to have taken place in 273, including an exchange of gifts and establishment of friendship.
There does not appear to have been anything official set up between Egypt and Rome,
as the Ptolemies refused to take sides in the first and second Punic Wars.
The only possible pro-Roman action was allowing them to buy grain when Sicily and Italy were
being ravaged by Hannibal's armies. There were encounters with the other Hellenistic kingdoms
as well. According to the Roman biographer Suetonius, the senate established friendly
relations with Seleucus II Callinicus on the grounds that the people of Ilium, the former
side of Troy, were to be exempt from taxation, given their shared Trojan ancestry. Only he attests
to it, but it is possible that some sort of contact was made between the 240s and the 230s.
The most substantial relationship to be formed between Rome and a Greek power
was the city of Syracuse, ruled over by King Hero II. After early hostilities,
terms were drawn up between both parties in 263, shortly following the outbreak of the first Punic
War, and for nearly five decades, Hero remained a loyal ally of the Republic.
The pair coordinated military actions in support against the Carthaginians,
and after the war's conclusion, Hero was left in charge of his territory without any direct
oversight from the Senate. Such was the diplomatic situation between Rome and the Hellenistic world.
In brief, the successor kingdoms took little to no interest in the Republic,
which was probably viewed as a notable regional power but minor in the grand scheme. Outside of
the Greek cities absorbed by the Roman conquests of Italy, the Republic seemed to have very little
interest in engaging in expansion eastwards, even after Pyrrhus' violent attacks. The relationship
between them and Syracuse was a mutually beneficial one that could deter further
troubles with the Carthaginians, who, along with the Celts, remained on Rome's radar.
This brings us to our starting point. During the interim between the First and Second Punic Wars,
the Republic faced two separate threats. The more immediate crisis was on Rome's northern borders,
as a combined force of over 50,000 Gauls moved across the Alps into Italy in 228,
and caused a bit of havoc before being defeated, while the other was based across the Adriatic Sea,
in Illyria. Occupying much of modern Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina,
the Illyrians have frequently popped up in past episodes as rivals of Epirus and Macedonia.
By the mid-third century, the region's various tribes were united under the leadership of King
Agron and his formidable wife Queen Teuta, rulers of the Ardei. This pair managed to
consolidate the full military might of the Illyrians and greatly expand their naval capabilities,
much to the dismay of their neighbors, who often faced the brunt of Illyrian piracy.
King Demetrius II Aetolicus of Macedonia tried to enlist their help in his war against the Aetolian
League in 231, chiefly as a way to deter attacks on his own kingdom and allies. To the surprise of
everyone, including Agron himself, the Ardei managed to crush the Aetolians in a pitched battle.
King Agron was so caught up in the celebrations afterwards, that he accidentally drank himself
to death, leaving behind the infant-crowned prince, Pines, and Queen Teuta, who would rule in his
stead. Emboldened by the success against the Aetolians, Teuta launched a series of raids that
drove deep into Epirus and sacked their capital at Phoenice in 230. Soon after this, they followed
up with the capture of Corsaira, modern Corfu, along with attacks against the surrounding islands
in 229. Phoenice's sack had sent shockwaves throughout Greece, and it compelled the Achaeans
and Aetolians to set aside their mutual enmity to try and launch a counter-strike against the
Ardeian fleet, but to little success. Queen Teuta and the united Illyrian kingdom were poised to
shake up the balance of power in the Balkans and Greece, but perhaps not in the way they may have
expected. How does this connect to Rome? Our two main sources, Polybius and Appian, differ in terms
of how the Republic got involved. Illyrian pirates had preyed upon Italian traders sailing in the
Adriatic for quite some time, which was annoying, but an expected outcome of doing business in the
area. According to Polybius, the piracy of the Ardei had intensified to the point that these
merchant communities, many members of whom had been killed or sold into slavery, began to send
repeated messages to the Roman Senate to force a response, which eventually came after much delay.
Writing nearly 400 years later, Appian claims that the city of Issa, under siege by the Illyrians,
had sent an embassy requesting the aid of Rome, and the Senate agreed to play peacemaker.
Both sources agree that the Senate dispatched two brothers, Gaius and Lucius Corincanius,
to meet with Teuta and investigate the disturbances that were affecting the Adriatic in 230.
In Polybius' retelling, the brothers asked for an explanation behind the attacks on the merchants.
With an aura of arrogance, the Queen challenged the ambassador's inquiry by claiming that the
attacks were the acts of private individuals, something that was part of Illyrian custom,
and couldn't be prosecuted. This apparent refusal of responsibility and lack of diplomatic courtesy
angered the younger of the two Romans, who snapped back and accused the Ardei of being
lawless barbarians. In what Polybius claims to be an act of womanish petulance, the furious Queen
ordered the murder of the outspoken brother, leaving the remaining ambassador to flee back to
Rome. Appian's account is quite different, suggesting that the meeting never took place
due to the premature death of one of the ambassadors, who was killed by an Illyrian
pirate while en route to Issa. In either case, the Senate would declare war on Teuta and her
kingdom for this transgression, while the Queen would resume her conquest of Corsaira and the
surrounding islands. The outbreak of war between the Roman Republic and Illyria has been heavily
scrutinized by later scholars, not only because of the incongruous stories presented by the sources,
but the fact that it was the first time that Rome would intervene in the affairs of the Greek
peninsula. Was Rome acting as an opportunistic imperial power, looking for any excuse that they
could to gain a foothold on the other side of the Adriatic? The fact that Polybius and Appian give
two very different versions of the events that solicited the Senate's response raises an eyebrow.
Polybius is usually a reliable author, but his description of Teuta's behavior is colored by a
misogynistic tone, and not particularly well sourced given the detail of the conversation.
The only consistent feature was the death of one of the envoys, albeit in different circumstances.
While a later summary of Livy's work seemed to confirm the brother's demise as well,
there is no explanation of how it happened. It is possible that the death of one of the
Coruncani was retroactively used as an excuse by later historians to justify the war against Teuta,
even if she was not directly responsible for it.
However, the Senate certainly had a vested interest in keeping the peace in the Adriatic.
They were receiving complaints from their allied communities in Magna Graecia,
who kept in close contact with the Greek cities of the western Peloponnese,
and suffered from the depredation of their ships. The decision to send a small investigation was
probably a way just to appease these settlements, but the problem intensified with each passing
month. We also cannot assume that the Queen was merely a victim of circumstance.
Teuta was aiming for a policy of expansion, as evidenced by her seizure of Corsaira and other
territories. Her actions were concerning enough to the Greeks that it compelled the Aetolian and
Achaean leagues to work together, a rare sight indeed, who were called in to aid the very cities
that were under threat by the Illyrians. It is doubtful that Rome feared a burgeoning
empire on her doorstep, enough to warrant the Senate to declare war in preemptive self-defense,
but the Queen was presented with a request that she was apparently unable or unwilling to adhere
to, thus pushing Rome to escalate into open conflict, in order to secure the loyalty of her
allies. In 229, an enormous fleet of 200 Roman ships crossed the Adriatic, while a land army
of 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry was being ferried from Brundisium. Consul Gnaeus Fulvius,
commander of the navy, had sailed to Corsaira with the intent to interrupt the siege,
but it had already fallen into Illyrian hands. Instead of dealing with a protracted siege of
his own, Gnaeus had been receiving messages from a representative named Demetrius of Pharos regarding
the island's surrender. Demetrius was a Greek official serving underneath Agron as the overseer
of Pharos and, more recently, Corsaira, but the security of his position was threatened by
accusations of political intrigue against the Queen. Given his later opportunistic behavior,
Teutas' suspicion would have been justified, as he betrayed both islands to the Republic when the
Roman fleet was within safe distance. With Corsaira under protection, Gnaeus met with his terrestrial
counterpart, Aulus Postumus, and the rest of the army at Apollonia in southern Illyria. From there,
Aulus marched north to relieve the siege of Epidamnus, while the fleet sailed in concert
to take many smaller Illyrian settlements along the way. The overwhelming force of the Romans
easily drove back any of the Ardeia that they came across, with many Greeks and Illyrian tribes
preemptively coming to offer terms. By the end of 229, much of Illyria was wrenched from Teutas'
grasp, who was forced to spend the winter of 229-228 locked away in a small fortress with
only a handful of her trusted advisors. The prospects of facing another renewed campaign
were too much, and the Queen offered to surrender in early 228, bringing the first, but certainly
not the last, Illyrian War to an end. The Roman expedition into Illyria had been
remarkably successful. In less than a full year, the Republic was able to curb the expansionist
Ardean Kingdom without any real resistance, something that the combined might of the Achaean
and Aetolian Leagues failed to do. In the process, Rome established her first true diplomatic
foothold in Greece. Many smaller cities like Corsaira, Apollonia, and Epidamnus all became
friends of the people of Rome, a process often described in the sources as amicitia in Latin
or philia in Greek. Illyrian power was significantly reduced, with Demetrius of
Pharos, now a Roman agent, being given control over much of its former territory, and a young
king Pinnus was also made a friend. Because of this, it has been argued that one of the
consequences of the war was the establishment of some sort of Roman protectorate in Illyria,
one that would enable the Senate to justify their further wars of conquest.
When looking at it further, the evidence seems to suggest that the aims of the Republic were
relatively short-sighted. Firstly, the exact nature of amicitia is vague, but it appears to
be an informal establishment of friendly relations, without any real legal requirements
for either party. This practice is not exclusively a Roman one either, as the Hellenistic kingdoms
and Greek cities could share a non-committal bond of generally good terms. As we have already
discussed, amicitia was established between Rome and the Ptolemies and Seleucids, but without any
real substance binding them together. The policy of Rome towards the Succii and other Italian allies
was a completely different story, which demanded military service in the armies of the Republic
in return for protection and a share of booty. The Republic certainly manipulated the political
framework of the Adriatic coast, but we have no evidence of any garrisons being installed,
no soldiers were levied from these cities, nor was there any Roman military activity in the region
for nearly a decade. Once they made peace with Teuta, the legions evacuated and returned to Italy,
while cities like Porcyra and Apollonia were to be left free. The Republic's sudden departure
lends credit to the idea that this was intended to be limited in scope and scale, rather than
outright conquest. Rome came to deal with the piracy, got what it wanted, and left. Along with
the cities of the Adriatic, embassies were sent to the headquarters of both the Achaeans and
Aetolians to explain their involvement in the affairs of Illyria, but were said to have been
rather amicably. No doubt that the crushing of the RDI was a huge sense of relief for everyone
involved, and it also gave the Romans a reputation of being a strong military force.
Other embassies were sent out shortly afterwards to Athens and Corinth, and for the first time in
their history, the Romans were allowed to participate in the Isthmian Games,
one of the major Pan-Hellenic competitions held in Corinth that was only reserved for Greeks.
This was quite significant, as the Romans were now being considered as honorary Hellenes,
which could be a useful tool to leverage for both Greeks and Romans alike. It is also rather
strange that despite the Senate's efforts to contact the leading states of the Greek Peninsula,
there are no records of missions being dispatched to Antigonus III of Macedonia,
arguably the most powerful figure of the region, but there isn't much we can conclude from this
omission. After the end of the war with Teuta, the Romans tended to their own affairs in Italy
and the Western Mediterranean, preoccupied with the incursions of the Gauls and actions of Hannibal
Barca. Most of the trouble in the Adriatic would arise due to the behavior of Demetrius of Pharos.
His strengthened position following the Roman reorganization of Illyria and the distraction
of the Senate gave him the confidence to continue expanding his power. In 228,
Demetrius married the mother of Pinus, effectively making him the standing region of the Ardei.
Alliances were established with other Illyrian tribes, and he began to flex his new muscle by
engaging in piracy along the coastline. The most egregious act was his raid of the Cyclades and
other islands in the Peloponnese in 220, a direct violation of the terms of the treaty from 228,
which forbid any Illyrian ships from sailing south of the city Lyssus, modern Lyse in Albania.
Though the Senate had turned a blind eye to Demetrius's actions prior, this was the final
nail in the coffin. His past assistance during the war against Teuta earned him a considerable
amount of goodwill, but his blatant disregard of the treaty was a disturbing change, perhaps
signaling his aim to form a new Ardeian Empire. A decade following the First Illyrian War,
the Senate dispatched Consul Lucius Aemilius Paulus, the same Paulus killed at Cannae,
to sail across the Adriatic and put Demetrius's ambitions to an end at the beginning of 219.
Paulus made his first move against the fortified city of Dimale, and captured it under a week,
causing many local Illyrian communities to capitulate out of terror. He then directed
his attention to Demetrius himself, who had bunkered down in Pharos with an abundance
of supplies and troops. A lengthy siege was to be expected, but the Consul chose to take
most of his force and land them in a small valley near the city, while he made his approach
to the harbor with only 20 ships. Demetrius took the bait, and positioned his soldiers
near the harbor to defend against what he thought to be a rather pathetically small invasion force.
His delight soon turned to dread, as the rest of the Roman army made its appearance over the
nearby hill, and charged the Illyrians. The prospect of a two-front battle was too much,
and the RDI broke rank and fled. Demetrius managed to flee from the city on a boat that he kept in
reserve, leaving it in the hands of Rome. Paulus then allowed his legionaries to plunder Pharos,
and burn it to the ground. With Demetrius removed from power, the Consul's mission was complete,
and he returned to Italy by the end of the summer to celebrate his triumph. Roman interference in
the political framework of Illyria was even more limited than after the end of the First War,
as King Pines remained in charge of the RDI. The Senate had little to no interest to tighten
their control of the region, and it was perhaps for the best. In only a matter of months,
Rome would begin its epic struggle against Hannibal Barca and Carthage, following the
destruction of Saguntum. The First and Second Illyrian Wars were effectively a watershed moment
in the history of both Rome and the Hellenistic world. As relatively minor and small-scale were
these conflicts, the Republic's swift defeat of both Queen Teuta and Demetrius of Pharos
served as a demonstration of Roman power to the important political entities of Greece.
It certainly received attention from the likes of the Aetolian and the Kean leagues,
who might have seen a potential ally in these semi-civilized Westerners.
In the chaos of Pharos' capture, Demetrius escaped to Macedonia, where he had gained the trust of
King Philip V, and brought word of the actions of Rome. His influence in the court would
help push the Antigonid ruler into a collision course with the Republic, leading to the First
Macedonian War.
