069: The Second Punic War - Hannibal at the Gates

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Hi there, you're listening to The Hellenistic Age Podcast.
Episode 69, The Second Punic War, Hannibal at the Gates.
In the wake of the panic caused by Trasimene, one man rose to take control of the situation,
Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus. An unflattering surname bestowed upon him due to a pronounced
wart on his upper lip. A taciturn and somewhat unassuming figure, he was a member of the Fabii,
probably the most prestigious nomal family of his day. Fabius previously served as Consul of 233 and
oversaw a successful campaign against the Ligurians. He was also part of the embassy that
was sent to Carthage to declare war after Hannibal's destruction of Saguntum. Possessing
a solid reputation among his peers, Fabius was unanimously elevated to the seat of dictator,
a position that would grant him near absolute authority over the conduct of the Republic
and reserved for only times of great crisis. Serving second in command as his master of
horse would be Marcus Minucius Rufus. With the powers vested in him, it was up to Fabius to
restore order and devise a plan to deal with the Carthaginians before they arrived at Rome's
doorstep. As both Trebia and Trasimene demonstrated, to face Hannibal in open battle was tantamount to
throwing the legionaries into a meat grinder. Fabius recognized that a war of attrition was
needed to achieve victory. The so-called Fabian strategy stressed the need to avoid a decisive
confrontation, instead staying just within sight of the enemy army but only getting involved in
smaller engagements and raids before retreating out of reach. Roman troops constantly harassing
and henpecking at the Carthaginian army would wear them down, and Hannibal could not easily
replace his casualties. Though they may have captured the grain depot of Clasidium the year
prior, Hannibal and his men were foraging off the land, and this dictated their movements throughout
the most agriculturally rich areas of Italy. A sort of scorched earth policy was also put into
effect by Fabius, who ordered the evacuation of small towns unable to resist sieges and for its
inhabitants to burn whatever crops or materials they left behind. Later on this would be enforced
on the threat of severe punishment and government seizure of all foodstuffs should they not comply
by the summer harvest. Attacks on Carthaginian foragers would only aggravate their plights
further, working to the benefit of Rome. Though the name Concutator, the Delayer, was initially
bestowed upon Fabius as a mocking title, it later became a badge of honor as it clearly demonstrated
that it worked. Though he is claimed to have admired Fabius as a commander, Hannibal was
growing frustrated and tried to retaliate by laying waste to any Roman villages that he came
across in his path. But, as Plutarch puts it, the Romans saw that Fabius was dealing with Hannibal
like an experienced wrestler and had mastered the technique of frustrating his opponent's moods
now that his grips and holds had lost their original force. This strategy was not universally
appreciated by his contemporaries however, many of whom were concerned about protecting their farms
and their martial honor. Accusations of cowardice were soon thrown in the dictator's direction.
One of these was from Janusius himself, who frequently disagreed with his superior and
pushed for a more assertive approach. The commoners also demanded results, as they were the ones that
felt the cost of this strategy the most. Fabius proved that he was willing to share the burden
though. In an act of solidarity, he chose to sacrifice his own estates to Hannibal's marauding
forces and pay the expense of ransom for Roman prisoners of war without asking for recompense.
This concern around the Fabian strategy was exacerbated however, when the dictator was
tricked by Hannibal. Trapped in a pass by Roman armies, the bark had engineered an escape by
tying firebranches to the horns of cattle during the dark of night, misleading the Romans into
believing that the Carthaginians were on the move and sending them on a wild goose chase.
Minucius, meanwhile, was able to score a victory against Hannibal's army when they were attempting
to forage, and his successes were exaggerated all the way back to the Senate. Because of his victory,
and through the political maneuvering of his relative, Minucius was essentially given the
position of co-dictator. In yet another instance, the Romans had played themselves right into
Hannibal's hands. While he did not intend to lose the skirmish against the master of horse,
as informants told him of the co-consul's hunger for open battle. Minucius and his army were nearly
slaughtered by the Carthaginians after he took Hannibal's bait, but the insightful Fabius managed
to come to the rescue of his grateful subordinate. The rest of 217 was uneventful, and both parties
returned to their quarters for the winter. After six months of service as dictator, Fabius was able
to give the Romans valuable time to recover from their losses and prevent Hannibal from striking
another devastating blow. But new leadership was being brought in, and Lucius Aemilius Paulus
and Gaius Terentius Varro were elected to the consulship in 216. Paulus was a respected veteran
commander during the wars in Illyria, while the novice Homo Varro is said to have achieved his
position thanks to his reputation as a demigod, and is subsequently characterized as the more
aggressive and hot-headed of the pair. Like with Trasimene, there may be some retroactive meddling
on the part of ancient historians. Paulus was the patriarch of the Aemilii Paulii, a powerful
noble family whose later members would be closely tied to the Scipiones. His son would be Lucius
Aemilius Paulus, the conqueror of Macedonia, and his grandson was Scipio Aemilianus, the conqueror
of Carthage and adopted son of Scipio Africanus. Scipio Aemilianus was the direct patron and close
friend of Polybius, and the parallels in his inscription of both Varro prior to Cannae and
Flaminius before Trasimene are too noticeable to discount the possibility of a reworking of the
story by either him or later Roman authors. With the arrival of the new year, the Romans
doubled down on the recruitment of the legions to replenish what had been lost and to strengthen it
past its previous limits. The senate was pushing for an aggressive stance against the Carthaginians,
and despite the demonstrable success of Fabius' generalship, they would not tolerate any more
delays as Hannibal marched through Italy causing wanton destruction. Rather than having two
consular armies moving independently of one another as per the norm, Varro and Paulus merged
their forces into the same umbrella, and to adhere to the legal principles of the consulship, each
man would be given total command of the army on alternating days. This also operated under
the presumption that while Hannibal could easily handle consular armies that were the same size or
even a little bit bigger than his own, there was no way that he could resist a force of this
magnitude. Accounting for the exaggeration of ancient authors, its size was staggering. The
combined manpower of both leaders amounted to eight legions, and with the inclusion of cavalry
and allied contingents, this totaled nearly 80,000 infantry and 6,000 horsemen. This was the single
largest army ever fielded by Rome up to that point in history, and during the late summer, they all
were mobilizing towards the small village of Cannae. The winter of 217 and 216 was rather quiet
for Hannibal, but the spring and summer saw him harassed by Roman armies without any real gains to
be made of his own accord. The Varkids saw a burgeoning crisis, as his camp faced a sudden
dearth of supplies, money, and morale among his troops. Carthage's council of elders proved to be
somewhat uncooperative with regards to sending over any sort of assistance either, so Hannibal
decided to pack up and move to the southeastern region of Apulia, capturing the grain depot at
Canusium. This was a temporary solution, and a decisive engagement was needed to keep their
spirits up and to enhance his army's reputation. Even after two crushing victories, the Soccii
remained hesitant on throwing their lot with Carthage. Fabius knew how to avoid this mousetrap,
but the new consul seemed more amenable to Hannibal's plans. Such were the circumstances
that led up to the legendary confrontation in August of that year. Varro and Paulus followed
the Carthaginians to Apulia, intent on bringing forth their legions to destroy these interlopers,
once and for all. But, if we are to believe the ancient historians, Roman leadership was
anything but united at this point, with the belligerent Varro and the more cautious Paulus
nearly coming to blows over the best course of conduct, the former looking to force a battle
with Hannibal and overwhelm a superior numbers, while the latter looked to continue the policy
of Fabius and wear the Carthaginians out. Plutarch goes so far as to suggest that Fabius
warned Paulus about having to contend with two enemies, Hannibal and Varro. Truthfully,
they could not remain idle for long. The sheer number of men amassed in one place would heavily
tax the Roman logistical system, and the uncontested ravaging of Hannibal's army was
brewing resentment among the affected Italian allies. With the support of the senate and the
alternating command structure, Varro was likely going to get his way. An initial skirmish between
the Roman and Carthaginian troops only egged on the ambitious consul further, and so, when the
day came, Paulus was forced to take a backseat. While the additional manpower initiatives were
helpful, many of the legionaries that would be fighting at Cannae were unseasoned recruits,
compared to the battle-hardened Carthaginian army that had been working together for over two years.
Even accounting for the disparity in troop quality, however, victory against such an
overwhelmingly larger force was a tough sell. Hannibal's army had not significantly varied in
size since the last engagement, and amounted to 40,000 infantry from various backgrounds,
with an impressive 10,000 cavalry supporting it. Outnumbered two to one,
the barque commander was going to be hard-pressed to emerge intact from the fight at all.
To the horror of the Romans, and to the delight of military strategists and tacticians throughout
history, Hannibal would prevail, and inflict a defeat that would defy all expectations,
and would be the one the Romans would never forget. The two camps were situated along the
river, the modern Afonto, with the riverbank likely on the Roman right as they approached
from the north. On the Roman left was a large hilltop, which restricted the arena to the
plains between the elevated terrain and the river. Paulus pointed out that the plains were
exceptionally flat, and would only give the advantage to Hannibal's superior cavalry should
they decide to pursue a battle, advice which Varro flatly ignored, much to the regret of all
involved. At the break of dawn on August the 2nd, the two armies rose from their camps and
marched to the plains. The Romans were arrayed in a three-lined formation known as the Triplex
Achilles, with the heavier infantry and skirmishing units in the middle. Roman horsemen
were stationed on the right wing of the command of Paulus, and the Italian allied cavalry was
situated on the left and overseen by Varro. The legionaries had grouped together in a denser
formation than normal, perhaps compensating for the terrain limited by the position of the river,
which in turn prevented them from fully deploying an army of this size. While this would give them
greater overall depth, they forfeited their maneuverability. In contrast, the Carthaginian
army was positioned across a single row, but the distribution was slightly unusual. On the Punic
left was the Celtic and Spanish cavalry, and the Numidians were situated on the right flank,
and the infantry were seated in the middle. Rather than being placed in a straight line though,
the men formed a convex shape akin to a horseshoe, with the center bulging out towards the Roman
line. Hannibal placed himself and his Gallic and Iberian infantry at the peak of this horseshoe,
personally overseeing that they complete their assigned duties, while the Libyan fighters
divided into columns on each side of the center fanning backwards. It is likely that the African
troops were stationed some distance behind and hidden from Roman view. This center would face
the brunt of any Roman attack, and was paradoxically the thinnest section, while the Africans were held
in reserve from the initial fighting. After an anxious period of inaction, the tension was broken
by a clash of the cavalry of the Roman right and the Carthaginian left, while slingers and javelin
men threw their initial volleys at one another. Upon meeting face to face, the Celtiberian cavalry
dismounted and attacked the enemy riders, hacking away at them and their horses. The Romans were
soon overwhelmed and nearly cut down to a man, and the few survivors were chased off the battlefield.
As the chaos on the flanks was transpiring, the two armies made their approach towards one another.
Sand and dust kicked up by the foot traffic of over a hundred thousand men was blown by the
wind into the faces of the legionaries, while the sunlight blasting from behind the Carthaginians
blinded them. August is the height of summer in Italy, and temperatures reach an average of 30
degrees Celsius or higher, which no doubt added to the discomfort of the crowd of men so closely
huddled together. When they finally managed to reach the Punic line, the ensuing fighting appeared
to be in the Romans' favor, and the Gallic and Spanish infantry was slowly but steadily being
pushed back. Their waning resistance compelled the eager legionaries to press on forwards,
and more and more men were concentrating into the middle of the engagement.
Despite being wounded by a slinger during the collapse of the Roman cavalry,
Paulus made his way to the infantry to help rally his soldiers and spur them on towards victory.
Hannibal too was riding back and forth behind his men, delegating his officers to have the units
carry out their orders. The Numidians on the Carthaginian right then sped towards the Latin
cavalry of Varro, tying them up and preventing their involvement in the battle any further.
This was the moment that Hannibal had been waiting for. In their pursuit of the seemingly
retreating Celtic and Iberian infantry, the Romans failed to notice that their momentum was not
breaking the Carthaginian line, but only pushing the middle backwards. The formerly convex Punic
battle line had now become concave, with a mass of legionaries unable to move as the fresh African
troops began hacking away at their flanks. Worse yet, the Gallic and Spanish horsemen from the
left wing had swung around like the lid of a trapped door, blocking off the retreat for the
troops in the rear. Hannibal had managed to do the unthinkable. He was able to double envelop
a larger army. Polybius' description of the battle is rather clinical, but Livy goes into extensive
detail on the carnage. Nearly 60,000 Romans were now being crushed by the Carthaginian vice,
incapable of fleeing, yet barely able to put up a fight as they inched ever closer to the spears
and swords that awaited them. All would have to be dispatched in hand-to-hand combat by the weary
Carthaginian troops, which meant that the process would have taken hours. Rather than wait amidst
the dust, heat, and screams of the dying men in front of them, some chose to commit suicide by
digging a hole in the earth and burying their heads so they could suffocate. Others were only
wounded in their legs, unable to move as bodies piled up around them. It was only during the
dawn of the next day that they were given mercy by a quick slash of the throat from the Carthaginian
soldiers scavenging the dead and dying. One wounded legionary that was no longer able to
hold weapons fought to his last breath by using only his teeth to savage the throat and face of
an unlucky Numidian that came within reach. The horror did not conclude until the sun had begun
to set and the field belonged to Hannibal. The Battle of Cannae was one of the most bloody
events in antiquity and the worst military disaster yet faced by Rome. Over 45,000 Romans
were killed, nearly 20,000 captured, and only about 14,000 managed to escape. After two years
of war, over 10% of the entire military-age manpower available to Rome had been wiped out
by Hannibal's army. The losses at Cannae in particular ravaged the Roman upper class. 80
senators, nearly one-third of the entire senate body, and half of the military tribunes were
killed. The Consul Paulus fell in a hail of missiles as he chose to die alongside his men
while Varro made a retreat back to Rome. In his presentation to the Carthaginian assembly,
an officer named Mago emptied a bag on the floor containing hundreds, if not thousands,
of golden rings worn by the Equites, the Roman knights, as a demonstration of Hannibal's
successes. One cannot help but wonder what sort of impact this made on the political arena for
decades to come. But for the moment, the Romans were in a state of absolute panic. Religious
rites were cancelled, wives bemoaned the fate of their husbands and sons. Like in 228, the terror
inflicted upon the city was such that it compelled the Romans to take pairs of men and women of Greek
and Gallic origin and bury them alive as an act of human sacrifice. Cannae was a turning point in
the war, for the defeat was sufficient evidence for many that the Romans were now a lost cause.
A number of southern Italian communities soon betrayed the Romans and joined Hannibal. Those
like the Samnites, Lucanians, Rutians, and with the most important being the city of Capua.
This gave Hannibal access to the most productive farmland in the entirety of Italy as a base to
deprive the Romans of a great amount of manpower and would continue to tie up whatever was left.
Additionally, he was able to form an alliance with the king of Macedonia,
Philip V, who was able to interfere with Roman interests across the Adriatic.
The so-called First Macedonian War would be fought between 214 and 205, and for our purposes,
we will avoid speaking about this event until we progress further along in the show.
A question has perplexed military historians for centuries.
Why did Hannibal not march upon Rome and besiege it?
Tradition recounts a famous scene that was said to have taken place the day after the battle,
a conversation between the barque commander and his officers who urged the general to push on
toward Latium to take the now defenseless city. To the confusion of his subordinates and even
the ancient writers themselves, Hannibal declined the proposal and instead set about allowing his
army to rest, collect their plunder, and organize the prisoners of war. This prompted one of the
officers to proclaim, you know how to win a victory, Hannibal, but you do not know how to use it.
By 216, the Carthaginians had already successfully besieged and captured at least four separate
Italian settlements, never mind Hannibal's feats as he passed through the Pyrenees,
so ability to besiege is not a matter of question. But it is equally important to recognize that
Hannibal's army was not in its best state by this point. While he was able to deliver a spectacular
defeat at Cannae, the battle took a heavy toll on his own manpower. Over one-tenth of his army
was killed or wounded, a figure that would be more appropriate for the losing side,
and parallels have been drawn to the costly victories of Pyrrhus of Epirus. According to Appian,
Hannibal had sent repeated messages to Carthage prior to the battle asking for additional troops
and money to make up for his losses, but was ultimately refused. To engage in a protracted
siege of Rome, even with their government in disarray and the additional Italian allies,
may have been a fatal decision for Hannibal's exhausted and decimated force.
This also begs the question of Hannibal's war aims. Did Hannibal intend to destroy the Romans
outright? Evidence suggests not. The terms of the agreement struck between the Carthaginians
and Macedonia indicates that Rome was to be made into a subordinate power.
Hannibal says as much himself, for in a speech delivered to the prisoners of Cannae,
he explained that he had no intentions of destroying Rome, but aimed on restoring
Carthage's prestige and honor prior to the disgraceful end of the First Punic War.
Perhaps he was hoping for the demoralized Romans to lay down their arms and accept a
Every other ancient society, barring perhaps the Qin and Han Chinese Empire,
would have crumpled after suffering losses on this scale, but the resilience of the
Roman people was surprising, even for Hannibal. After the initial chaos,
several men rose to take up control of the situation. Fabius was made consul again,
and another figure named Marcus Claudius Marcellus would become one of the premier
generals of the Republic. One individual to emerge in the aftermath of Cannae was Scipio
the Younger, who was one of the surviving military tribunes. As per Roman tradition,
Scipio was able to rally the nearly 10,000 stragglers that gathered at the nearby site
of Canucium and lead an organized retreat back to Roman territory. His courage and overall
popularity would allow him to continue the war in the Spanish theater, a topic of discussion
for the next episode. The Senate outright rejected Hannibal's offers of ransom for the
prisoners taken at Cannae, even putting out an edict proclaiming that the families of those POWs
were not allowed to pay either. They instead chose to lower the age of recruitment and property
requirements to rebuild their legions. Slaves and criminals were conscripted in return for
their freedom. Money to fill the now depleted coffers was scrounged up from tax increases,
land auctions, and loans. Even the weapons and armor of past enemies dedicated in temples were
dusted off and used to equip the new legions. Though much of southeastern Italy defected to
Hannibal's side, the majority of Succii did not, a testament to the loyalty that this system
engendered or the fear of Roman retribution, or perhaps both. Through natural selection,
the inferior Roman commanders were weeded out, and the survivors were far more vigilant against
Hannibal's tricks. Any defeat faced by the Romans was nowhere near the disasters that befell them
at the Trebia, Trasimene, or Cannae. The war would continue to rage on Italian soil for another 13
years. But for now, let us pause our narrative of the events on the mainland, and instead turn
to the events that have been transpiring to the south, on the island of Sicily.
I'm Mark Pimenta, the host of the Warlords of History podcast. Exploring the lifetimes of
lesser covered warriors, leaders, ancient and medieval. People such as Philip II of Maston
of Classical Greece, and like him, those who were titans during their respective ages.
Also delving into, the surrounding environmental and political conditions,
their motivations for taking on the mantle of war, and what their legacy was beyond their demise.
If any of this interests you, join me as we dive into each of their stories,
their worlds, in the Warlords of History podcast.
At the start of the war, King Hero II was still sitting comfortably as ruler of Syracuse,
the most powerful Greek city in Sicily. He was a long-standing ally of the Republic since the
First Punic War, and continued to offer his support by providing supplies and even a small
degree of manpower prior to the Battle of Cannae. Given the importance of Sicily as a staging point
for an invasion of North Africa, it is unsurprising that the Senate had ordered that troops be moved
to help defend against any potential Carthaginian attacks, both by land and by sea. Sempronius,
the same man responsible for the loss at the Trebia, had fended off a Punic fleet in 218.
With word of Publius Scipio's defeat at the river Tychinus, Sempronius brought most of his force
back to Italy, leaving only a limited garrison given the small likelihood of a Carthaginian
invasion of the island. But the security of Rome's Sicilian interests would be compromised by
Syracuse's ruling dynasty. Having served as leader of the city since the days of Pyrrhus of Epirus,
Hero was in his 90s, and his health was quickly declining. His son, Ghilon, never got the chance
to become king, and he died in 216 at the age of 50. In terms of his character, Ghilon is split
between our sources. Livy considered him to be a weak and ineffectual man, accused of organizing
anti-Roman parties within Syracuse after Cannae. Polybius does not speak of any such conspiracy,
and considered Ghilon an honorable son for his willingness to obey his father's wishes
in spite of never taking power. But when Hero died in the following year, the crown would fall
to his grandson, the 15-year-old Hieronymus. As it was with many child monarchs, the threat of
manipulative advisors quickly became apparent, something which Hero apparently feared in his
final months. Two of these figures, Adrenodorus and Zoippus, had pushed for a pro-Carthaginian
stance while allowing the young king to indulge himself in the benefits of power. In contrast to
his more austere father and grandfather, who presented themselves as being men of the people,
Hieronymus was fully committed on taking the mantle of king and all the pomp and circumstance
that came with it. One of the advisors that tried to temper these vices was Thrasso, who insisted
that the king should keep the alliance with the Romans. Little good it did, for Hieronymus was
apparently prone to committing all sorts of atrocities, including the murder of companions
who challenged his views and preying upon the women that had the misfortune to catch his eye.
Little wonder, then, that a conspiracy was developed among his ranks, but an informer
revealed the plot to the king before any attempts on his life could be made. After the extensive
torture of a conspirator, Thrasso was falsely named as the originator of the plot and subsequently
executed. In the mind of Hieronymus, there was little to be gained by dealing with Rome,
and he consented to the plans of Zoellus and Adrenodorus, who sent a message to Hannibal,
undoubtedly pleased to hear of a new ally. The Punic general ordered two brothers named Hippocrates
and Epicides to head to Syracuse to assist with the king's change of heart. This development was
clearly concerning to the Roman governor stationed in Sicily, who dispatched an envoy shortly
afterwards under the pretense of renewing the alliance between the dynasty of Hero and the
Republic. Hieronymus, clearly treating this audience as a joke, questioned the integrity
of Rome regarding their supposed best intentions for the destiny of the city. A rumor of Hero's
death once brought a Roman fleet to the island, perhaps looking to take control of Syracuse
despite Gielon being the heir apparent, but only to be turned back when the claim was
demonstrated to be premature, though the ambassador disputed such allegations.
The king then contemptuously asked how the Romans fared at Cannae, and the meeting was brought to a
Hannibal and Hieronymus soon came to terms, with the Carthaginians supplying troops and manpower
to help expel the Romans from the island, and in return, Sicily would be divided between Syracuse
and Carthage at the river Himerus. Yet again, the Romans warned against breaking the treaty,
but the boy king, his ego stoked by comparisons to his maternal grandfather Pyrrhus of Epirus
and the backing of the Carthaginians, accepted the declaration of war without concern.
Much to his misfortune, the would-be Pyrrhus never got the chance to demonstrate his military
prowess beyond his saber rattling. In 214, Hieronymus was traveling in the city of Leontini,
leading an army bent on expelling Roman garrisons from the region.
Little did he know that another plot had been formed along his officers,
and when one caused distraction on account of needing to lace up his boots,
assassins leapt upon their regal prey and stabbed Hieronymus to death,
who burned all of his goodwill after only thirteen months as king.
For the first time in a century since Agathocles declared himself tyrant,
democracy was within the grasp of the Syracusans, and they took upon themselves to abolish the
monarchy, with the surviving members of the once-proud House of Hero murdered on the order
of the Assembly and the demands of the mob. Despite the loss of his new ally, Hannibal
continued to benefit from the volatile situation, as the pro-Carthaginian members of the Syracusan
elite were elected to high positions in the new government and exerted a strong influence.
Now that the Syracusan monarchy had collapsed and the island fell underneath the sway of Carthage,
the Roman Senate authorized the deployment of an army and navy to clean up the mess in Sicily,
leading this joint operation would be Appius Claudius, the governor of Rome's Sicilian
holdings, and Marcus Claudius Marcellus, the consul of 214. In contrast to the reserve Fabius,
Marcellus was a warrior and a man of action. While he was not as hot-headed as some of his
contemporaries, the consul was ruthless in his command and did anything but shy away from a
fight. His brutal campaigns against the Celts demonstrated his willingness to pursue victory
and where he earned himself a distinction for single combat. Fabius and Marcellus have been
called the shield and sword of Rome, respectively, and now the blade was pointed directly at
Syracuse. Though steely in his resolve, Marcellus was no fool and did not deny an opportunity when
he saw one. The survivors of Cannae, officially exiled by the Roman Senate and unable to return
to Italy until Hannibal was defeated, journeyed to the consul's camp by the thousands, begging for
the chance to redeem their lost honor, a proposition which Marcellus gladly acquiesced to. In 213,
the Romans sailed to Sicily once again to battle the Carthaginians for control.
The first order of business was to capture the city of Leontini, for its Roman inhabitants had
been massacred on the initiative of Hippocrates, though the consul chose not to punish the local
citizenry. Marcellus looked for a diplomatic approach if he could, hoping that he was able
to bank on the goodwill of the aristocracy, who may still have held pro-Roman leanings,
but both Hippocrates and Epictetus twisted the situation to their advantage. The brothers had
fled Leontini in the wake of Marcellus' attack and fabricated a story of Roman atrocities being
committed against its entire population, and alleged that the same would happen to the people
of Syracuse. Even the 8,000 Syracusan soldiers sent to Leontini by the city to aid the Roman
reconquest had been hoodwinked by the pair's honeyed words, never making it to Marcellus' camp.
This was how Hippocrates and Epictetus seized power. It could be possible that this story is
overly dramatized, and the Syracusans had simply resented the Romans
for their meddling in Sicilian affairs for the better part of a century. Whatever the circumstance,
Syracuse was to be treated as an enemy, and needed to be dealt with as such. But this proved to be a
greater challenge than what was to be anticipated. Situated on a peninsula in the southeastern part
of Sicily, Syracuse's access to the sea enabled it to be resupplied, and a blockade would be
necessary to cut it off. Making a direct assault overland was even more challenging, not only
because of its strong defensive walls which once guarded against a siege from the Carthaginians
a century prior, but also because of the weapons that the Syracusans possessed. The city boasted
a staggering array of anti-siege defenses, a benefit of being the home to one of the greatest
scientific minds the ancient world had ever seen, Archimedes of Syracuse. Under the patronization
of Hero II, he was requested to construct a variety of siege equipment to aid in the defense
of the city, and these weapons were in turn deployed against the Romans. Along the ramparts
were small holes, through which large crossbows known as scorpions fired bolts that could skewer
enemy attackers while protecting the defender. Using a system of levers and pulleys, and a large
grappling hook known as the Archimedes Claw, the Syracusans were able to hoist Roman ships right
out of the water or tip them over, like a demented version of the claw game at an arcade. One of the
most fantastical devices was the so-called Death Ray, a weapon that was said to have lit Roman
ships on fire by focusing sunlight on the hulls, using a parabolic mirror or even polished bronze
shields, similar in function to a magnifying glass on a summer's day. This tale is only reported on
by the poet Lucian and historian Cassius Dio in the 2nd century AD, whereas earlier authors like
neglect to mention this spectacular imagery. Whether such a weapon was even plausible remains
under heavy debate. Regardless, the siege of Syracuse stands among the most daring ever
conducted in the ancient world, and the prospects of getting around all of these wonder weapons
allegedly led some legionaries to believe that they were fighting the supernatural,
with any item resembling a pole or beam on the walls was enough to make them quiver in fear of
what may lay in store. Firstly, the Roman fleet was stationed on the harbor, with four pairs of
ships tied together port to starboard. Now with a large platform acting as a base, this would support
a long ladder that could be manually raised and lowered to allow the attackers to bypass the
height of the enemy wall, and was given the moniker, Sambuca, after the stringed instrument
of the same name. These were brought forth to the walls of Syracuse while the army made an overland
assault. Archimedes' machines quickly turned into a bloodbath for the Roman troops on the ground,
and his torsion-powered catapult managed to lob several boulders weighing upwards of 500 pounds
that destroyed the Sambuca. The failure of this first attack reportedly led Marcellus to gripe
that, quote, Archimedes uses my ships to ladle seawater into his wine cups, but my Sambuca band
is flogged out of the banquet in disgrace. Having learned their lesson, both Marcellus
and Appius Claudius accepted that victory was probably going to be achieved through a long
and protracted process, rather than a head-on attack. For the time being, two-thirds of the
army and navy were left to blockade the city, as Marcellus took the remaining third to raid the
Punic-held regions of Sicily. The Carthaginians did not rest either, as an army of 30,000 led
by the commander Himilco, arrived on the island and took the large and powerful settlement of
Aggregentum. While the Roman commander was unable to come to the city's aid, luck would have it that
he stumbled upon Hippocrates, who was emboldened enough by Himilco's arrival that he led a force
of nearly 10,000 men to meet up with his counterpart. Marcellus descended upon the
Syracusans and utterly destroyed them, with a few survivors and Hippocrates himself only making it
to Aggregentum by the skin of their teeth. Reinforcements both Roman and Carthaginian alike
sailed to the island, leading Livy to comment that for a brief time it appeared as if the main
theater of war had been moved from Italy to Sicily as the two parties battled for control.
After almost eight months of trading blows while his main force encamped outside of Syracuse,
Marcellus reassessed his position in early 212. The blockade was not working as efficiently as
he had hoped, which meant that Syracuse was receiving foodstuffs from Carthaginian smugglers
who broke through the line. Hope for a victory may have been found in the unlikeliest of ways,
though. The northern port of the city had become a meeting ground for the ransoming of prisoners,
and one curious Roman soldier who frequently was stationed there spent time calculating the height
of the nearby stone walls and noticed that one was shorter than the others and could easily be
reached by ladder. Normally this area would be impossible to approach, but an upcoming three-day
long festival to Artemis ensured that the guards would be supplied with a liberal amount of wine
and caught up in the revelry. On the final day of the festival, a group of legionaries reached
the walls and slew the somnolent guards in their towers, while the rest of the army prepared their
ladders and took their positions. Once the northern gate was opened, the Romans poured
on through, the city's inhabitants woken in terror as trumpets and war cries soon echoed
from all districts. Epicides made a futile effort to repel the attackers, but abandoned the city
shortly thereafter. The Romans by this point had captured the entirety of Syracuse barring the
citadel, but soon a delegation from the hulled up Syracusans managed to make terms with the consul,
and the city was delivered into Marcellus' hands. But the battle for Sicily was not yet finished.
In the autumn of 212, Himilco, Hippocrates, and Epicides attempted to launch a counter-attack
against the Romans, but the horrid conditions brought about by the near-constant warfare
and August weather resulted in the outbreak of a plague that ravaged much of Sicily.
The Carthaginians were hit far harder, and both Himilco and Hippocrates succumbed to their sickness
along with much of their force. Reinforcements, including a talented Livio-Phoenician commander
named Mutinis, led to another violent clash with Marcellus' army, with the Romans emerging
the victorious. In 211, Marcellus returned to Rome and was replaced by Marcus Valerius Livinus,
fresh from his own campaigns against the Macedonians. Hanno, Epicides, and Mutinis had
fortified themselves at Aggregentum, and it appeared that another lengthy siege was in order,
Hanno accidentally hamstringed himself, for he replaced Mutinis' command with that of his own son,
out of fear that his officer was getting a little too popular, which earned himself the
enmity of the disgruntled subordinate. Mutinis made a secret deal with Livinus to betray the city,
which was taken in a vicious sack and plundering, while Epicides and Hanno sailed off to Carthage
in the sunset. An additional forty towns surrendered to Livinus, while another twenty-six had to be
taken by storm, marking the end of the Sicilian campaign. Let us conclude this episode by returning
back to Syracuse in early 212. When the remaining Syracusans negotiated the terms of their surrender,
they begged and pleaded at the feet of Marcellus for the safety of their families.
Marcellus was considered an early philhellene, a great admirer of Greek culture. He reportedly
wept upon seeing the cityscape, not so much for its beauty, but rather because he knew of its
impending fate. As per the conduct of ancient warfare, any city that resisted as fiercely as
Syracuse did was entirely at the mercy of the conqueror. A vicious sack and the enslavement
of its entire population was almost certainly in store, and there was little that the commander
could do to stop the loot-hungry legionaries that had suffered in the process. Tradition maintains
that out of his own generosity, Marcellus agreed to keep his men at bay and leave the majority of
Syracusans unmolested, granting them their freedom. It is highly unlikely that such an
operation went so smoothly, and Livy himself admits that there were many acts of slaughter
and rapacity throughout the city. One of the casualties of the sack was none other than
Archimedes himself. According to one tradition, a legionary had stumbled into a room where he
found the scientists sitting over circles drawn in the sand, pondering over some mathematical
question in ignorance of the events around him. When the Roman demanded that he come with them,
the scientists allegedly yelled back, do not disturb this diagram.
Over time, this has transformed into, do not disturb my circles, but the outcome is the same.
The Roman, likely a commoner who probably did not speak a word of Greek, never mind knowing who the
man before him was, lost his temper and slew Archimedes on the spot. Another version suggests
that the scientist was carrying a chest of his mathematical instruments out to meet the consul,
but was murdered by a passing legionary, who mistook its contents to be gold or treasure.
Marcellus had been looking to receive Archimedes unharmed, and was infuriated to find out that he
had been so carelessly killed. While the complete destruction and enslavement of Syracuse may have
been averted, a debt still had to be paid. Marcellus allowed his troops to plunder the
hero. Despite his supposedly tearful sympathy, he personally oversaw the seizure and removal of
virtually all of the city's artwork. Many valuable pieces were taken to Rome and displayed in his
ovation. He was unable to put on a proper triumph due to the war in Sicily not being brought to a
conclusion, and there they would adorn private homes and public buildings. The fate of Syracuse
served as an ominous prelude, the first of many Hellenistic cities that would be put to the sword
and plundered by the Roman legions. Indeed, many ancient historians and conservative moralists
pinpoint this moment to be the beginning of the Philhellenic movement that would grip Rome for
centuries. Greek authors like Plutarch and Polybius generally frowned upon the act,
viewing it as uncouth. Polybius understood the consequences of war, and does not reproach the
Romans for having sacked the city and taking its valuables like precious metals and bullion,
as was the right of the victors of the vanquished. What he did criticize was that the wholesale
plundering would send a negative message to the rest of the Greek world, as he thought the seizure
of the city's art was to invite scorn and resentment. There were indeed perhaps good
reasons for appropriating all the gold and silver, for it was impossible for them to aim at a world
empire without weakening the resources of other peoples and strengthening their own. But it was
possible for them to leave everything which did not contribute to such strength, together with
the envy attached to this possession, in its original place, and to add to the glory of their
native city by adorning it not with paintings and reliefs, but with dignity and magnanimity.
At any rate, these remarks will serve to teach all those who succeed to empire that they should
not strip cities under the idea that the misfortunes of others are an ornament to their own country.
