064: Antigonid Macedon - Of Revolutions and Reforms

Ancient Explained - History Clearly Understood.
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Hi there, you're listening to The Hellenistic Age Podcast,
episode 64, Antigonid Macedon, of Revolutions and Reforms.
The nearly 40 years of rule by Antigonus II Gennatus was a time of general order and
stability for Macedonia. Antigonus' victories over the roving bands of Celts and rivals like
Pyrrhus of Epirus had restored some semblance of peace to the kingdom after decades of civil wars
and invasions. For the Greeks, the Macedonian noose only fell tighter. Despite Gennatus'
alleged claim that kingship was but a noble servitude, Polybius states that Antigonus had
set up more tyrants in Greece than any of his predecessors, a testament to the extent to which
the king would maneuver to keep the Hellenic cities in check. However, the Greeks began to
reassert their political autonomy, primarily through the rise of the federations, above all
else the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues. The Crimean-Indian War of the 260s was a severe
shake-up, and despite Gennatus ultimately triumphing over Athens and Sparta, it was a
taste of what was to come. Alratus of Sicyon, an up-and-coming leader of the Achaean League,
proved to be the Macedonian's chief adversary in his later career. The Sicyonian seizure of Corinth
from under Antigonus' nose brought the Achaeans great renown, and several cities overthrew their
tyrants and opted to join the League as well. The Aetolians were nominally allied with Macedonia,
but their reputation for brigandage and opportunism made them unreliable partners at best.
In addition, the newest king of Egypt, Ptolemy III, was keen to disrupt the Antigonid control
of Greece as much as his father, by bankrolling any potential dissidents to Macedonian power.
This is the situation that the new king of Macedonia found himself in by 239. Demetrius II,
son of Antigonus, had likely been joint king during the final years of his father's reign.
We know little about the man and his career, perhaps he was 36 at the time of Gennatus' death,
but shortly after his accession, he had mentored into a marriage alliance with the family of
Alexander II of Epirus. A change of policy to be sure, as both Demetrius Polyarchetes and
Antigonus Gennatus repeatedly clashed with Pyrrhus, and as a young man, Demetrius II had
apparently triumphed over Alexander in a pitched battle. Alexander's widow, Olympias, had been the
one to approach Demetrius with the offer of her daughter, Phythia. She was driven by concerns for
the stability of the Epirote monarchy, as it seems that her sons were incapable of strong leadership,
and recent attacks from the Aetolians had put significant pressure on the newly acquired
region of Akarnania, just south of Epirus. Her concerns for the fate of the monarchy would
ultimately prove to be correct, but Demetrius' decision to openly go against the Aetolian League
is also curious, since they were allied with him against the Achaeans for the better part of a
decade. It is likely because the hostilities between the Aetolian and the Achaean Leagues
had subsided just a year or two before. As enemies continued to surround Macedonia,
some of whom were explicitly anti-monarchical in attitude, one might as well take any backup
that they could. Perhaps Demetrius aspired to incorporate Epirus into the Macedonian Kingdom
at some point, but we are not told this in the sources. Later in 239, Demetrius would marry
Phythia, and by 238 she would give birth to Demetrius' more famous son, the soon-to-be Philip
V. The marriage between the Epirote and Antigonid houses brought great consternation to the Aetolians,
who rightly felt betrayed by Demetrius' reneging on the alliance. For what it was worth,
Aratus and the Achaeans had made a brief peace in 241 with Ganatus. Aratus, however, had been
provoking the Macedonians by launching raids into Attica and continually working to overthrow
Antigonid-backed tyrants. The Aetolians may have had a frosty relationship with the Achaeans,
but Demetrius had directly gone against the interests of their League, and Aratus' competent
leadership was enough to inspire confidence in reaching some sort of deal. In 238, a coalition
between the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues had formed in response to the Antigonid-Epirote alliance,
though given the poor source material, it is quite possible that it was the other way around,
with the formation of the Achaean-Aetolian partnership leading to the marriage arrangement
between the Antigonid and Epirote dynasties. Regardless of how it came about, both Leagues
were now openly hostile to the Macedonians, and war would be declared on Demetrius by 238-237.
It appears that fighting between both sides was scattered, at least when we try to reconstruct
events. Aratus seems to have aimed for trying to gather further support, and to incite a general
revolt against the Macedonian rule in occupied cities. He unsuccessfully attempted to win over
the support of Athens, who rejected the Achaeans after Aratus was fallaciously believed to have
been killed in battle in roughly 234-233. The Aetolians were not faring much better. In 236,
Demetrius launched an invasion of Theotia, who immediately supplicated rather than face the
king's wrath. This severely weakened the Aetolians while strengthening Macedonian control over Attica,
and Demetrius would also launch raids into the Aetolian heartland as well.
Demetrius' constant warring is probably what led him to earn the nickname Aetolicus,
meaning, who is always fighting Aetolia. But Demetrius was faced with a handful of crises as
well. Despite marrying Phythia to the Antigonids in order to strengthen their control, the royal
house of Epirus had began to fall apart. The two young kings, Pyrrhus II and Ptolemy I,
died in quick succession, the latter perhaps being murdered by his own subjects. Olympias
passed away shortly thereafter, leaving behind two young princesses named Neres and Datamea.
Neres had quickly abandoned ship to marry a prince of Syracuse, but Datamea tried in
vain to hold her ground and keep control of Epirus. A shadow had fallen on the dynasty
that once birthed the mighty Pyrrhus of Epirus, and the Epirots themselves decided that they no
longer needed kings and queens to tell them what to do. By 231, Datamea was murdered in the Temple
of Artemis, and an Epirote League was established soon thereafter, a revolution if there ever was
one. In most circumstances, the extinction of a rival dynasty wouldn't have fazed any of the
kings, it may have even been a sense of relief depending on the circumstance. But the Epirots
were a useful ally during wartime, and were now replaced with a league similar in design to the
Achaeans and Aetolians. They were no more near as powerful, but a few of the regions previously tied
together by the monarchy had joined with the Aetolians, and their proximity to the kingdom
was surely uncomfortable with Demetrius. The loss of Epirus as an ally was bad enough, but the
Macedonian king now faced another unsettling development, one of his own creation. While some
parts of Epirus had defected to the Aetolians, others sought to stay independent, such as the
city of Median. Median was placed under siege by the League in 231. The Epirots looked to Demetrius
for help, but instead of leading an army to stop the Aetolians, the king decided to bring in an
the Illyrians, more specifically the tribe of the Ardei, who lived along the coast of the Adriatic.
Under the rule of King Agron, the Ardei amassed a powerful navy, one that was used to preying upon
merchant vessels crossing from Italy. Demetrius bribed Agron to lead a force of a hundred ships
and five thousand men to relieve the defenders of Median, and the Aetolians were soundly beaten
in the subsequent battle. Mission accomplished, right? Well, not quite. The defeat at Median was
a shock to the Aetolians and the rest of Greece, since the Illyrians had been thought of as little
better than a fractious gang of barbarian pirates. In their defense, Agron and the Ardei seemed to
have been equally surprised at their success, and their celebrations were apparently so great
that the Illyrian king imbibed enough spirit to die from alcohol-related complications shortly
thereafter. Agron's son was too young to become king, and so it was passed to his wife, the
formidable Queen Teuta. Polybius tells us that Teuta, blinded by the triumph over the Aetolians
and her irrational nature as a woman, had aspired to launch a campaign of plunder and pillage against
any Greek cities within sailing distance, including the Epirotes that they had just
came to the rescue of the year before. While the Ardei were causing serious problems along the
coast, Macedonia found itself facing the brunt of another Balkanite tribe, the Dardanians. These
peoples have not had any significant presence since the days of Philip and Alexander, but
opportunism due to the Aetolian War and or a rejuvenated leadership had allowed the Dardanian
ruler Longurus to stream across Demetrius' northern border and smash at least one Macedonian army.
As far as the Aetolian War had gone, it had been a long, dragged-out process. Success in Boeotia
was a high point for Demetrius, but the collapse of the Epirote monarchy, the newly strengthened
kingdoms of the Ardei and the Dardanians, and continuous hostility from the Aetolians and Achaeans
had stretched the Antigonid ruler to the breaking point. The need to hire the Illyrians to relieve
the Epirotes implies that Demetrius was incapable of meeting the challenge in the first place,
an indication of how the military capabilities of the Macedonians were seriously taxed.
Never mind that, by bringing in Agron, he had unintentionally created a new problem that,
in the short term, would be a major headache for the Greeks living along the Adriatic.
In the long term, the emboldening of the Ardei by Demetrius would lead to the intervention of
a new power on the scene, the Roman Republic, a story for another day. But by 229, the situation
had become a lot more complicated. In that year, Demetrius II would die from unknown causes,
or perhaps in battle against the Dardanians. For the first time in the dynasty's history,
a succession crisis emerged. Demetrius' only male heir, Philip, was no older than nine.
Macedonian princes would serve in battle just as they began to emerge out of adolescence,
but a nine-year-old was considered a child even by the standards of the ancient world.
In addition, the security of the kingdom was at great risk, with enemies on all sides looking
to prey upon the instability and inexperience of a young king. There was also a chance for
danger from within. In Macedonian politics, a mere boy on the throne was an open invitation
to civil war. Both of Philip's ancestors, Antigonus Monophthalmus and Demetrius Polyarchides,
were quite aware of this when they tore apart Alexander's empire. Therefore, a solution needed
to be found. Amazingly, it also somehow worked for the best. While the Macedonian assembly chose to
have Philip become the king in name, the reins of power would be handed to a man named Antigonus
Doson. Antigonus was the uncle of Philip, whose father was Demetrius the Fair, the half-brother of
Antigonus Ganatus and the same man who briefly ruled as king of Cyrene before being assassinated
in 248-247. But while Doson would prove to be a capable king and loyal guardian of the young
Philip, the kingdom still teetered on the knife's edge. But for now, I'm going to pause our narrative
of Macedonia, and instead look south to the rest of Greece. For at this time, events had been
unfolding in the southern Peloponnesus that saw the dramatic shake-up of one of the former
great powers of Greece. Let us turn to the Spartans. Gone were Sparta's glory days as Hegemon of Greece,
following their hard-fought struggle over the Athenians at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian
War in 405. Such a victory was to be short-lived. A decisive defeat at Leuctra by the Theban army in
371 and pressure from great leaders like Epaminondas had put an end to Lacedaemonian power,
both literal and symbolic, for quite some time. When Philip II emerged as the ruler of a newly
revitalized Macedonia and had ambitions for the rest of Greece, the Spartans were not in much of
a position to lead any resistance to him. Many members of the Peloponnesian League had since
separated from the Spartan yoke, and their kings spent their time either trying to reclaim whatever
scraps of territory they could or embarked on foreign expeditions like Agesilaus II's service
to the Egyptian rulers Nectanebo I and II. Notably, no Spartiates stood with the force gathered at
Chaeronea in 338. While their once legendary military prowess had since dulled, their wit
remained as sharp as ever. Allegedly, Philip II had once threatened that if he invaded Laconia,
he would bring Sparta to its knees. The magistrates appropriately responded with a simple
if. Though in the end, Philip did drive the Spartans out and captured much of their northern
holdings without much of a fight. When Alexander took the throne following Philip's assassination,
the Spartans did not contribute to the war against Persia. The Macedonian conqueror made his feelings
about their relationship known when he dedicated spoils taken in the Battle of the Granicus River
with an inscription claiming that, quote, Alexander, the son of Philip, and the Greeks,
except the Spartans, won these spoils of war from the barbarians who dwell in Asia.
Instead of fighting the Persians, the Spartans looked to them for help. King August III took
advantage of Alexander's absence and began to openly raise a resistance movement receiving
financial support from the representatives of the great king of Persia. In 331, August marched his
army into the Peloponnese against the standing region of Macedonia, Antipater. Outside of
Megalopolis, the two fought a vicious battle before the few remaining Spartans were driven
from the field, and August died in battle. Despite Alexander's dismissal of the engagement
as a battle of mice, it is worthy to note that Antipater suffered severe losses himself,
and by all accounts, August fought bravely until the very end. In the age of successors,
Sparta was but a blip on the political radar. The defeat at Megalopolis had humbled Lacedaemonian
power for decades, wiping out a huge portion of their central military body.
They refused to take part in any anti-Macedonian activities, such as the Lamian War, and attempted
to stay out of the way for the more ambitious players of the time. Yet, they could not escape
unmolested during this period either. Demetrius Polyarchides nearly conquered Laconia in 294,
possibly killing another Spartan king in the process before being distracted by other affairs.
Twenty years later, fresh from his failures in Italy, Pyrrhus of Epirus had invaded the
region to lay waste to Sparta in 272. The citizens inside, women, children, and the elderly,
had put up a valiant effort, and were able to defend against any forays by the Epirus king,
who eventually decided to pack up and head for Argos instead. Perhaps with newfound confidence,
the Spartans attempted to enter the foray of Hellenistic politics, especially during the
of Arius I. With a remarkably long career, ruling from 309 to 266-265, Arius began to restore
Sparta's status in the affairs of the Greek world. A brief but unimportant war against the
Aetolian League ended in failure, but it is significant since the Spartans were considered
capable enough to lead a coalition of some cities in the military campaign, something which had not
The victory over Pyrrhus no doubt aided this notion, and Arius is said to have been campaigning
as far as Crete when the Epirote king had attacked Sparta. The culmination of Arius'
efforts would manifest in the outbreak of the Criminidian War, as discussed in episode 38.
An alliance between Athens, Sparta, and the king Ptolemy II would seek to challenge Antigonus
and in 267 war would be declared against Macedonia. Sparta's resurgence under Arius was
but a brief flash in the pan. He was killed in battle against Antigonus outside of Corinth,
taking down much of the Spartan army with him. Following Arius' death in 265, we are completely
in the dark, narratively speaking, regarding the events taking place in Sparta. From the year 244,
we suddenly gain a tremendous insight regarding the turmoils that were afflicting the whole of
Lacedaemonia. Our best source on Hellenistic Sparta remains Plutarch, who composed biographies
of the kings Augustus IV and Cleomenes III. He wrote them in parallel to the twin biographies
of the brothers Tiberius and Gaius Sempronius Gracchus, the ill-fated reformers of the Roman
Republic during the late second century BC. Plutarch claims that by the mid-240s, the once
austere city-state had succumbed to vice and greed. Gold and silver had poured into Sparta,
which famously used iron as their currency to discourage the pursuit and hoarding of personal
wealth, and they spent it on personal luxuries and quantities said to rival the Persian court.
The accumulation of land by a select few individuals had gone against the principles
of Lycurgus, who ordered that land be distributed equally among the Spartiates.
Even the normally vigilant Spartan kings had become soft thanks to the pomp and circumstance
of the court. To fix the issues plaguing the Lacedaemonians, two of Sparta's last great kings
would try, in vain, to undo the damage of reckless greed and vice on the once virtuous
Lacedaemonian peoples. Certainly, this all does sound quite dramatic and exciting, but in truth,
we need to cast a critical eye on anything to do with Sparta as a society. Thucydides famously
commented on how secretive the Spartan state was, which always obfuscated the efforts of ancient
authors on trying to report on their customs and modern authors who try to extrapolate. Plutarch
is also a moralist, and the notion of society founded on the rejection of outside luxuries
being faced with the uncontrolled spread of greed makes the story of Augustus and Cleomenes so
appealing to his sensibilities. The image of Spartan austerity and abstention from personal
wealth also stands on shaky ground, and the situation was more complicated. Plutarch does
acknowledge the disparity of the Spartan wealth when compared to that of successor kingdoms,
famously claiming that even the slaves of the Seleucid or Ptolemaic officials possessed more
riches and property than both Spartan kings combined. His biographies are inevitably linked
to the idea of the Spartan Mirage, the notion that Sparta's early history is so heavily mythologized
and idealized that it completely prevents us from accepting much of their generalizations on the way
that they operated. But despite my emphasis on caution, Spartan society had indeed been changing
rapidly throughout the third century. For starters, a severe demographic problem had faced Sparta
during this time. To the other Greeks, who generally kept citizenship a highly guarded legal
status, the Spartan citizen population was considered diminutive even at the height of
their power. If we are to believe the sources, much of this blame can be laid upon the system
that created the Spartiates. These would be the true Spartans, the citizens who underwent the
infamously brutal training of the Agogae and served exclusively as full-time soldiers. By its
nature, the Agogae was inherently restrictive, and each Spartiate was a major investment in both
time and resources. Each time the Spartan army suffered a major defeat, Lutra, Megalopolis,
Corinth, the subsequent losses of Spartiates would be catastrophic and very difficult to replace.
By 244, Plutarch suggests that only 700 Spartiates could be called up for service,
a mere shadow of the 5,000 that stood at Plataea in 479. Truthfully, the Spartiates had always made
up a small proportion of the army, supplying most of the troops that would be known as the Periokoi,
the dwellers around, the free peoples who lived in the larger regions of Laconia and Messinia that
were politically united under the Spartan banner. But the collapse of the Spartan population was
also aggravated by problems of land ownership, both external and internal. Because the Spartiates
were exclusively dedicated to the art of war, the need to fill the void of agricultural production
was supplemented by either the Periokoi or the Helots, the subservient peoples brutalized into
becoming the unwilling economic backbone of Spartan society. Sparta had suffered major losses of
territory during the 4th century, which therefore reduced the amount of available food that was
required to supplement the army. Within the Spartan state, a sharp increase in inequality
of land ownership amongst the Spartiates and the Periokoi had also been wreaking havoc on
Lacedaemonian military capabilities. Of the 700 or so Spartiates that remained in the 240s,
only about 100 of them possessed property of their own. Plots of land had been gradually
concentrating into the hands of a select few, with the remaining majority displaced or squatting in
cities. This in turn also hindered the ability of the Spartan army to draw upon troops under
its current system, and would continue to degenerate as time wore on. The parallels
between Hellenistic Sparta and the late Roman Republic are obvious, and it is unsurprising
that Plutarch considered Augustus IV and Cleomenes III natural counterparts to the brothers Gracchi.
Notably, most of the property wealth was held by Spartan women, especially the ladies of the
royal houses. Some ancient authors consider this a major reason behind the decline of Laconia.
Not only does Plutarch claim that the princesses and noble wives had developed a great taste for
finery that they did not wish to give up, but that they also feared that they would lose much
of their political and personal power if they did so. Beyond its more misogynistic undertones,
there is a degree of truth to Plutarch's point. Women in Sparta, noble or royal Spartan women to
be more exact, did possess a greater control over their property and economic rights than their
Greek females. The decline of the male Spartiates had reduced the amount of marriage candidates,
and property subsequently remained in the same families. It is unlikely that they would be so
willing to give up what they, reasonably, viewed as the base of their power and autonomy.
Through numismatic and epigraphical evidence, we can see that the dual monarchy of the Spartans,
the Diarchy, had been undergoing changes throughout the early Hellenistic period.
The two royal lines of Sparta, the Eurypontids and Aegeids, traditionally ruled in tandem with
one another for centuries prior. Arius I, however, having taken the throne in the 300s,
had begun to rule and present himself in a similar fashion as to his Macedonian contemporaries.
It is during his reign that we see the minting of Sparta's first silver coins,
which were nearly identical in design to those of Alexander the Great's.
Court life began to take on a form not unlike those found in Pella, Antioch, or Alexandria.
Arius' patronage of artists saw the crafting of large bronze statues in his image,
unprecedented in the history of Laconian art. The ruling Aegeid king of 244, Leonidas II,
was said to have directly modelled his court after his time serving in the retinue of the
Seleucid king Antiochus II. Though the Spartan Diarchy inevitably had periods where one house
was more dominant than the other, much of the evidence also suggests that Arius was
moving towards an autocracy. Inscriptions repeatedly stress the preeminence of Arius,
an Aegeid, and neglect to mention his fellow Eurypontid king. The same thing occurs with
Sparta's coinage, as Arius is the only one named on those famous specimens.
In the past, the twin heroes known as the Dioskouroi were venerated in Spartan art to
From Arius onwards, Heracles, the demigod so commonly evoked by both Alexander and his
successors, had been chosen as the sole model divinity. Even their titles had changed.
Instead of the traditional Archegitai, we see a switch to the Macedonian Basileus,
which carried all the dynastic implications not present in the former term.
But even if we disregard changes in the visual presentation of the Diarchy,
infighting between the houses began to destabilize Laconia.
Pyrrhus was drawn to Sparta in the first place on the urging of Cleonimus,
an exiled Aegeid contender of the throne who sought revenge against Arius because the latter's
son had seduced his wife. As will be made apparent later in this episode, this rivalry is going to
be a continuous problem. Paradoxically, as we see a gradual move to a rule of one, the power of the
In Spartan government, the kings were constitutionally checked by the Assembly,
Gerousia, and a group of elite magistrates known as the Ephorate. While the Ephors had always had
a high level of control and influence, they had expanded their power during the third century.
Most of the Ephors were part of the Landon aristocracy that saw the size of their holdings
grow and were keen to keep adding to it. One of the Ephors introduced a law which overturned the
established rule of land inheritance, which had previously been vertical in nature. This meant
that instead of having plots remain within the family, now anyone could inherit them,
which would be quickly exploited by the conniving to the further detriment of the Spartan people.
It is at this point in the year 244 when August IV, a Eurypontid, assumes the throne. By the age
of twenty, he was sickened by the apparent softness of his contemporaries and maintained
a rigid devotion to the customs of old. He absconded finery in favor of a simple wooden
cloak, ate a bland Spartan diet which likely included famously vile black broth, and performed
the traditional exercises and routines befitting a warrior king. But a mere lifestyle change was
not going to affix the issues with Sparta to large. As I have explained, the demographic
decline of Sparta was being aggravated by the gradual consolidation of land by the minority,
and pathetically few Spartiates could have been produced under the current system
given the economic disparity. August recognized the troubles afflicting his kingdom,
and drew strength from the memories of his ancestors in the glory days of Sparta's past.
To combat the issues plaguing his domain, August embarked on a political campaign of sorts.
After polling both commoners and elites alike, it became quite clear to the king that many
were clamoring for change. Among those he courted were Sparta's leading ladies,
including his mother, Augusta Strada, and grandmother, Arcademia, whom he successfully
convinced to provide him financial backing. It is likely that they only supported Augusta's
mission because it could potentially restore power to the Eurypontid house and the monarchy at large,
but it was still a substantial gain on the king's part. After acquiring enough money and political
alliances, he was able to have an ally named Lysander enrolled into the Ephorate, who could
articulate his viewpoints and pass legislation necessary to reform the state. The most important
of these reforms introduced would be land redistribution. Appealing to the magistrates,
August and Lysander argued for a return to the Lycurgan model, which had allowed them to achieve
the position of a first-class power in the Greek world. All territory within and immediately
adjacent to Sparta itself would be equally divided amongst 4,500 parcels to be distributed
to the Spartiates on a one-to-one basis. The lands of the Periokoi would also be reorganized into
equal 15,000 plots that would be run by those same Laconians and Mycenaeans. Such a reform
would greatly improve the quality of life for the many displaced Spartans and Periokoi,
though, presumably, the king did not take into consideration the well-being of the helots.
But more importantly, the reorganization was to dramatically increase Spartan military power.
Theoretically, the output would enable a force of nearly 20,000 strong,
a smaller body of professional Spartiates supported by troops raised from the Periokoi.
August's army would be comparable in size to those fielded by Macedonia or any of the leagues.
To increase the amount of Spartiates, August would draw upon the fittest and most capable candidates
among the Spartans and the Periokoi to be enrolled in the Agogae and the Common Messes,
which would once again be instituted after falling out of practice years before.
The second major reform would be the cancellation of all debts. August contributed his own property
first along with a deposit of 600 silver talents to help pay off the arrears incurred by the
population. More was to come from his supporters, which left many impressed by the seemingly
genuine intentions of the young king. While the Sparta that August envisioned may never have truly
existed, it nevertheless was a powerful image for both he and later Cleomenes to draw upon,
an impetus for how Sparta ought to be. The response of the elders was lukewarm at best.
Wealthy landowners immediately lobbied against August, finding the champion in King Leonidas.
The Agiad ruler immediately lambasted his counterpart by accusing him of being a demagogue,
looking to become sole king, and he challenged the reformer's position by questioning the
moral character of Lycurgus for his apparent hostile attitude towards foreigners.
August retorted that Lycurgus found no fault with outsiders in and of themselves,
but rather those that did not line up with the Spartan ideal. He also dressed down Leonidas,
explicitly calling out his past career as a courtier of the Seleucids, which had corrupted
both his moral fiber and his memory of Spartan history. Little wonder why Leonidas was concerned
about the position of foreign-born Spartans. His wife was the daughter of an Asian satrap,
and thus his children were only half Spartan by blood. Despite the passioned pleas of August and
Lysander, the motion was rejected by the Ephors. To retaliate against Leonidas, Lysander was able
to invoke an ancient law which apparently forbade Spartan kings from taking non-Spartan wives,
and was able to prosecute the Agiad ruler, potentially on the penalty of death. Perhaps
it was on trumped-up charges, but Leonidas was sufficiently concerned enough as to flee the
capital and abandon the throne to his son-in-law Cleombratus for the time being.
Lysander's term as Ephors soon expired though, and now he was subject to a tribunal for illegally
pushing the reforms, while Leonidas was recalled from hiding. August and his group realized that
no change could happen with the current order and decided a firmer action was needed. Convincing
Cleombratus of the growing power of the Ephors, the kingly pair and a band of followers descended
upon the magistrates, forcibly evicting them from their positions and replacing them with
loyal members of their party. Despite the release of indebted prisoners and arming of troops,
none of the Ephors were killed, for August was looking to scare them into submission
rather than inciting a massacre. Against the urgings of his more violent, and perhaps more
politically savvy, allies, he even granted a safe passage for Leonidas and his family to leave
unmolested. Although the Eurypondid king was fully in control of the monarchy and the Ephorate,
and was capable of introducing his reforms, he still faced stumbling blocks.
The first was a member of his own party, his uncle Agesilaus. A man of ill repute, Agesilaus
supported August because he himself had incurred numerous deaths over the years that he was unable
to pay off, and the chance to rid himself of these arrears was too tempting. As a member of the
royal family, though, he was not too keen on the relinquishing of his many estates.
Once before, he directly went against August's wishes. He had been the one to send assassins
to murder Leonidas following the coup, which the king put a stop to upon discovering the plot.
Yet again, he would look out for his own interests, though it must be noted that he was not the only
opportunistic member of the reformist party, as many of the nobles who allied with August
were highly indebted themselves. Agesilaus advised August that redistributing the land
and cancelling the debts at the same time would be too radical, and could lead to pushback from
the elites. Absolving the debts first would act as an olive branch for the landowners,
and so August ordered all financial documents to be gathered in the town square and burned as
proof of financial manumission. The citizenry was happy to see the ashes of their accounts
scattered to the wind, but still awaited the long-promised land reforms. Delay only made them
more anxious, but such concerns were temporarily put aside when an envoy from Aratus of Sicyon
and the Achaean League had reached the city in 241. The Achaeans had recently gone to war with
the Aetolians during this time, and Sparta was called upon as an ally by Aratus. The average
Spartan thought this was an excellent opportunity, as victory in battle would surely guarantee the
redistribution for their services. August agreed, and reportedly as king and army marched to war,
observers were impressed enough with the orderly and silent procession that they dreaded to imagine
what the Spartans must have looked like in their glory days. But, alas, August's triumph was short
lived. When he arrived at the camp of Aratus, who was in command of operations against the Aetolians,
a disagreement broke out between them when it came to the manner of attack. Ultimately,
Aratus decided on a cautious strategy and, politely, dismissed the Spartans so he could
ultimately win the day through ambush and trickery versus an open engagement. Perhaps Aratus,
one of the many land-owning elites that made up the League, did not wish to see August's
enthusiastic redistribution policies infect the Achaean cities, though there is no explicit proof.
The dismissal was an impotent outcome to be sure, and humiliating for the cause of the Eurypontic
king, but there were far worse troubles brewing back home than mere disappointments.
When August was out campaigning, Augustoleus had been stirring up trouble during his term as
ephor. He had taken on a personal bodyguard and levied taxes on questionable terms, which were
funneled into his personal accounts. His misbehavior was so aggravating that it motivated another
conspiracy to form, and Leonidas was recalled back to Laconia to overthrow the new institutions.
Upon Leonidas' return, Augustoleus soon fled. The co-king Cleombachus was sent into exile,
and the pro-August ephors were removed from their magistracies. August, meanwhile,
who had since returned to Sparta, was forced to take sanctuary in the local temple to Athena,
and was unwilling to leave the temple or take offers from the deceptive Leonidas.
To save their own skins, several of August's former allies bargained with Leonidas by promising
to hand August over. During one of the king's secret escapes to Bathe, his observant ex-compatriots
bound and gagged him, then tossed him into a prison. A virtual show trial was had, but August
refused to confess that he had broken any laws, for he was following the will of Lycurgus and had
the state's best interest in mind. The arrest and subsequent trial of the Eurypontid ruler enraged
the people of Sparta, who nearly rioted outside of the prison after their fury was stoked by
August's mother and grandmother. August's lack of cooperation and fear of the populace resulted
in the ephors quickly pronouncing the death penalty. The king was strangled in prison,
while Augustus Strata and Archidamia were also executed by forced suicide. According to Plutarch,
as August was walking to his execution, he told one of his crying attendants,
The death of August IV was a shocking blow to the stability of Sparta.
Never before had any Spartan king been executed on the orders of the ephors,
and clearly the rivalry between the various factions was intensifying to the point
where outright anarchy and civil war could explode. Perhaps if August was more willing
to dirty his hands, his reforms could have stuck, akin to Agathocles' takeover of Syracuse,
but the man appears to be more reserved and forgiving when it came to politics,
which ultimately proved to be his undoing. But all was not necessarily lost for Sparta,
and August's successor would not make the same mistakes as he did. The man to follow in August's
footsteps would be Cleomenes III, Leonidas' son, who would restore Sparta from the verge of
collapse and threaten to bring the existing political order of the Greek peninsula to an end.
All these links will be available on my website at hellenisticagepodcast.wordpress.com
or the podcast description, but until next time, I hope you enjoy the final days of summer,
and you've been listening to The Hellenistic Age Podcast.
