#TranDynasty#GenghisKhan#battlehistory#battleof#mongols#vietnam"How Vietnam finally CRUSHED the Mongols? Mongol invasion of Đại Việt. Since 1206, Genghis Khan had unified the tribes of the Mongolian steppe and established the Mongol Empire. From that point on, he continuously launched invasions in all directions, expanding his territory without pause. By the reign of the 4th Great Khan, Möngke, he was determined to destroy the Southern Song dynasty by attacking its southwest. To achieve this, conquering Đại Việt, Vietnam nowadays, became an integral part of the Mongols’ grand strategy against the Southern Song. The plan was that, once Đại Việt was subdued, Mongol forces would split into 4 divisions to attack the Southern Song from the north, west, and south. Möngke, Kublai, and another Mongol commander would lead three of these divisions, while the fourth was entrusted to Uriyangqadai.
How Vietnam finally CRUSHED the Mongols? Mongol invasion of Đại Việt. In 1253, Kublai Khan was sent by his older brother to conquer the Dali Kingdom, intending to use it as a strategic base for launching further attacks on the Southern Song dynasty. After successfully subjugating Dali, Kublai returned and left General Uriyangqadai behind to suppress any remaining resistance and secure the loyalty of Dali’s remaining forces. Following their victory, Uriyangqadai's forces established a camp north of Đại Việt. According to the Vietnamese military treatise The Art of War of the Vietnamese People, the Mongols amassed around 45,000 troops in the region. This force included approximately 25,000 Mongol cavalry, supported by indigenous Yi troops, as well as an additional 20,000 soldiers recruited from among the newly-subdued forces of Dali. The vanguard of the Mongol army was led by generals Aju and Cacakdu, while the Mongol prince Kaidu and the surrendered Dali king, Duan Xingzhi, who had pledged allegiance to the Mongols, also played prominent roles in the upcoming campaign against Đại Việt.
How Vietnam finally CRUSHED the Mongols? Mongol invasion of Đại Việt. The army of Uriyangqadai was not particularly large in absolute numbers—about half the size of the Tran Dynasty's forces. However, the Mongol armies had repeatedly proven their ability to succeed even with significantly smaller numbers. Typically, the Mongols fought with a numerical disadvantage of at least 1:2, often with only half the troops of their opponents. Despite this, they excelled in cavalry skills, giving them a distinct advantage in mobility. This mobility allowed them to swiftly concentrate their forces on weak points in the enemy's line or to retreat rapidly if the battle took a disadvantageous turn.
Since 1206, Genghis Khan had unified the tribes of the Mongolian steppe and established the Mongol
Empire. From that point on, he continuously launched invasions in all directions, expanding
his territory without pause. By the reign of the fourth Great Khan, Möngke, he was determined to
destroy the Southern Song Dynasty by attacking it southwest. To achieve this, conquering Jai Viet,
Vietnam nowadays, became an integral part of the Mongols' grand strategy
against the Southern Song. The plan was that once Jai Viet was subdued,
Mongol forces would split into four divisions to attack the Southern Song from the north, west,
and south. Möngke, Kublai, and another Mongol commander would lead three of these divisions,
while the fourth was entrusted to Uriankhadai. In 1253, Kublai Khan was sent by his older brother
to conquer the Dali Kingdom, intending to use it as a strategic base for launching further attacks
on the Southern Song Dynasty. After successfully subjugating Dali, Kublai returned and left General
Uriankhadai behind to suppress any remaining resistance and secure the loyalty of Dali's
remaining forces. Following their victory, Uriankhadai's forces established a camp north
of Jai Viet. According to the Vietnamese military treatise The Art of War of the Vietnamese People,
the Mongols amassed around 45,000 troops in the region. This force included approximately
25,000 Mongol cavalry, supported by indigenous Yi troops, as well as an additional 20,000 soldiers
recruited from among the newly subdued forces of Dali. The vanguard of the Mongol army was led by
Generals Aju and Khachak Du. While the Mongol prince Kaidu and the surrendered Dali king,
Duan Xingji, who had pledged allegiance to the Mongols, also played prominent roles in the
upcoming campaign against Jai Viet. The army of Uriankhadai was not particularly large in
absolute numbers, about half the size of the Tran Dynasty's forces. However, the Mongol armies had
repeatedly proven their ability to succeed even with significantly smaller numbers. Typically,
the Mongols fought with a numerical disadvantage of at least one to two, often with only half the
troops of their opponents. Despite this, they excelled in cavalry skills, giving them a distinct
advantage in mobility. This mobility allowed them to swiftly concentrate their forces on weak points
in the enemy's line, or to retreat rapidly if the battle took a disadvantageous turn.
Mongol cavalrymen were also highly skilled in archery from horseback. They could strike from
a distance while galloping, effectively avoiding enemy retaliation. This combination of speed and
combat enabled them to defeat much larger forces. For example, in the Battle of the Kalka River,
the Mongols triumphed despite numbering only a quarter of their opponents.
Because of this, Mongol generals believed that against a small country like Jai Viet,
an army of only 50,000 soldiers would suffice for conquest. Uriankhadai set up camp near the
Jai Viet border to organize his forces, while also sending envoys with the attempt of forcing
them to give in. He sent envoys to Thung Long, modern-day Hanoi, three times, each time with an
arrogant attitude, portraying the Mongols as a powerful empire and showing disdain.
In response, King Tran Thai Tong did not submit. Instead, he detained all the envoys. Anticipating
that Uriankhadai would be enraged when his envoys did not return and would launch an invasion,
King Tran ordered land and naval forces to assemble along the border and commanded the
entire nation to prepare weapons, with General Tran Quoc Tuan guarding operations.
With no news from his envoys, by November 1257, Uriankhadai decided to invade Jai Viet.
The Mongol army entered Jai Viet in a staggered formation and was composed entirely of
infantry. The first vanguard, led by General Kakak Du, advanced along the right bank of the
Thao River. The second vanguard, led by Mongol officer Khoidu, marched along the left bank of
Chai River to protect the Mongol army's right flank. The main force and final line, the largest
unit, was commanded by Uriankhadai himself. As they advanced into Jai Viet, the Kakak Du team
encountered resistance from the Ha clan, under the command of Ha Ba Chu. However, Ha Ba Chu's
forces could not withstand the intimidating Mongol army and quickly fell. He ordered his
troops to retreat into the forest with the intention of evading the enemy and seeking
opportunities to counter-attack. The population of Jai Viet under the Tran dynasty was estimated
at around 4.5 million people. Based on a policy where one soldier was supported by 10 citizens,
theoretically, the nation could maintain a standing army of 450,000. However, due to an
economic policy called Soldiers Embedded in Farming during peacetime, the practical standing
force ranged from 200,000 to 400,000, depending on the circumstances. In years marked by natural
disasters or poor harvests, the standing army's size could be reduced to as low as 100,000.
This army included 20,000 elite imperial guards stationed near the capital and 80,000 local
troops spread across the provinces. The elite imperial guards were highly trained and tasked
with protecting the king, the court, and the capital and were always prepared to defend the
country in times of war. They bore the mark Tian Tu Quan, Soldiers of the Son of Heaven, tattooed
on their foreheads, symbolizing their unwavering loyalty to the king. These imperial guards could
be fully mobilized, but the 80,000 local troops had responsibilities across the nation,
such as guarding borders, preventing uprisings, defending against banditry, and securing important
sites, limiting how many could be concentrated for an invasion. Thus, the estimated total force
the Tran dynasty could gather for battle against the Mongols was around 60,000 troops. King Tran
himself led elite divisions composed of infantry, cavalry, war elephants, and naval forces.
After consulting with his generals, decided to organize a large, decisive battle at Bin Leng
This battlefield was a high plain alongside a bend in the Fan River,
with winding sections that created a relatively flat but complex battle area divided by the Fan
River. The river acted as a natural trench to hinder the Mongol advance, and Zhai Viet hoped
this terrain would help counter the highly skilled Mongol cavalry. Aju's scouts observed
the Tran army's preparations and quickly reported back to Uriyangqa Dai. Upon receiving the
information, on the twelfth day of the lunar month, January 17th, 1258, Uriyangqa Dai advanced
to meet two vanguard forces at the Bak-Hak intersection, present-day Putho, where the
Mongol army assembled to move towards the Tran positions. The Tran forces had already set up
their defenses on the opposite bank of the river, readying themselves for an attack.
Planning a swift and decisive victory over the Tran forces, Uriyangqa Dai divided his army into
three units for a coordinated river crossing and assault. The first unit, led by General Khachak Du,
took on the vanguard role with an agile cavalry force tasked with crossing downstream along the
Fan River. Their goal was to circle behind the Zhai Viet line and seize the boats to cut off
any retreat. Uriyangqa Dai instructed his commander,
When you cross, don't attack immediately. They will resist. Capture their rear guard. Khachak Du,
seize the boats. If they break and flee toward the river, without boats they'll be ours.
This tactic aimed to trap and crush the Tran forces by pushing them toward the riverbank,
leaving them surrounded. This unit was composed of about 5,000 troops.
The second unit commanded by Uriyangqa Dai himself comprised around 30,000 soldiers.
This force was to cross the river and launch a frontal assault on the Zhai Viet line,
with the Dali defectors placed at the front to bear the brunt of the casualties,
while Mongol cavalry followed behind, ready to deliver a decisive strike.
The third unit, also included over 5,000 troops, led by Mongol commander Khoidu,
was ordered to attack the rear of the Zhai Viet forces, aiming to serve communication
between the front and rear lines of the Tran army, preventing any mutual support.
The Mongol plan appeared carefully designed to annihilate Zhai Viet's main forces,
and either kill or capture King Tran in a single confrontation.
However, despite the strategic planning, the actual events did not unfold as Uriyangqa Dai
had anticipated. However, as soon as Khachak Du crossed the river, he immediately launched an
attack. The general crossed the river downstream, assuming he could avoid detection by the main
Zhai Viet forces, and reach the boat dock. But his troops were quickly spotted and encountered
a rear guard unit of Zhai Viet forces. Khachak Du and his entire Mongol vanguard
were forced to turn back and engage in battle. From across the river, Uriyangqa Dai saw the
Zhai Viet forces shifting position and noticed clouds of dust rising, signaling an engagement.
He immediately ordered his central force to cross the river to support the Mongol troops,
who had just made it to the south bank of the Fan River.
King Tran Thai Tong ordered his war elephants to charge forward,
followed closely by lines of cavalry and infantry. The Mongols pressed on without
retreating, and their rear guard managed to cross the river, forming a line and charging
toward the front ranks of the Zhai Viet forces. Many of the Dali troops among the Mongols suffered
heavy losses against Zhai Viet's powerful war elephants. Though the Mongol cavalry attempted
a counterattack, they could not withstand the assault. Zhai Viet soldiers mounted on elephants
fired arrows and used hooked spears to strike down the Mongol cavalry. Vice versa, the Mongol
cavalry maneuvered around the elephants to fire arrows at them and tried to break up clusters of
infantry and cavalry. The Mongol central army engaged Zhai Viet's vanguard, but it wasn't long
before their rear forces arrived, which included skilled archers. Only 18 years old Aju commanded
the cavalry to target the war elephants, specifically aiming at their eyes. Many
elephants were struck in vulnerable areas, such as the eyes and trunks. Overcome by pain and fear,
they panicked, turned, and rampaged through Zhai Viet's lines, trampling soldiers and horses alike.
This chaos opened gaps in Zhai Viet's formation, which the Mongols quickly exploited,
breaking through along the paths cleared by the retreating elephants. The Mongol cavalry
gradually gained the upper hand. The terrain at Binlin Guiyan was flat and firm, perfectly suited
to the Mongols' steppe cavalry tactics. They employed a strategy of dividing and eliminating
isolated groups of Zhai Viet soldiers, inflicting heavy losses and making it nearly impossible for
Zhai Viet's forces to regroup or mount an effective counterattack. Faced with this situation, following
the counsel of his general Leitan, the Zhai Viet's king ordered a full retreat toward the riverboats.
Uriankhadai immediately ordered his forces to pursue relentlessly,
aiming to capture or kill the king. The Mongols closed in rapidly and almost succeeded.
The king and the general Leitan retreated to the Kuban Mountain Pass,
where an unexpected rescue force led by Fom Ku Chich arrived just in time. Fom Ku Chich and
his troops fiercely counterattacked, stalling the Mongol advance long enough for the king
and the remaining core forces to board their boats. As the Mongols pursued to the riverbank,
they unleashed a barrage of arrows at the fleeing king's dragonboats. Many Zhai Viet
soldiers were struck down, and Fom Ku Chich himself was killed in the fighting. Acting
quickly, Leitan ordered his troops to use wooden planks from the boats to shield the king.
Thanks to this effort, King Tran Thai Tong safely escaped the battlefield.
The Zhai Viet fleet rode swiftly eastward, gradually leaving the Mongol cavalry far behind.
After the battle, Uriankhadai found no joy in his victory. Instead, he was filled with fury
for failing to capture the king and allowing most of the Zhai Viet army to retreat safely.
Blaming General Khachak Du for not successfully seizing the boats, Uriankhadai threatened to
punish the entire vanguard. Overcome with shame, Khachak Du took his own life by drinking poison.
As they withdrew from Binlin Guyen, King Tran and his troops sailed down the Chalo River.
However, Mongol forces continued their relentless pursuit along the riverbanks.
On January 18, 1258, Zhai Viet troops reached Pulau, abandoned their boats, and took a stand
on land to fend off the Mongols. The king ordered the destruction of the Pulau Bridge
and established a defensive line on the southern bank to cover the retreat.
Meanwhile, the rest of the troops marched overland toward Thang Long.
Ton Thu Pu, the king's nephew, was tasked with commanding the rearguard.
Soon after the rearguard completed their landing, the Mongols arrived. At this point,
the Pulau River was considerably wider than the section at Binlin Guyen,
making it temporarily impassable for the Mongol forces. This delay provided Emperor Tran Thai
Thong with enough time to lead his army to safety and for the rearguard to establish
a defensive position. King Thai Thong held secret discussions with Le Tan,
though the details of these conversations remain largely unknown.
At one point, the king met his younger brother, Grand Marshal Tran Nhat Hu, to seek his advice
on the nation's defense strategy. Tran Nhat Hu, too weak to stand, leaned against the side of his
boat, dipped his finger in the water, and wrote the words, Seek Refuge in Song, meaning the southern
Song dynasty, on the side of the vessel. The words written in water vanish, mirroring the transient
and fragile nature of Jai Viet's sovereignty, if it were to submit to the Mongols or seek
protection from the southern Song. Seeking refuge in the southern Song was perhaps a realistic
short-term solution, even if it meant sacrificing independence. The king then visited the chancellor,
Tran Thu Choe, for counsel. In response to King Thai Thong's concerns, Tran Thu Choe declared
resolutely, As long as my head has not fallen to the ground, your majesty need not worry about
anything else. The Mongol forces moved along the riverbank, firing arrows high into the air
so that the arrows would fall freely into the water. In places where arrows sank without floating
back up, they knew the water was shallow enough for cavalry to cross. After a while of shooting
arrows along the bank, the Mongols finally identified a shallow area. The Mongol cavalry
immediately crossed the river in a single file. This unique crossing tactic caught Jai Viet forces
by surprise. Despite fighting valiantly, the small rearguard led by Lord Pu Luong was quickly
overwhelmed by the Mongol cavalry's superior skill and strength. Pu Luong and his troops sacrificed
their lives in the effort to delay the enemy, buying precious time for the main army and the
royal court to retreat safely to Thung Long. Upon reaching the capital, Thung Long, the court
immediately implemented a scorched earth strategy to counter the initial strength of the enemy.
The more literal translation, empty garden, vacant house, emphasizes the complete abandonment and
removal of anything useful to the enemy. On January 18th, 1258, both day and night,
all the residents of Thung Long were ordered to evacuate the capital, taking with them all food
and supplies. The military, the royal family, and the Jai Viet court then withdrew by boat to Thien
Hanam. Uriankhadai and his forces captured Jai Viet's capital with ease. However, before they
could celebrate their victory, the Mongols discovered that the city was deserted, with
only a few residents who hadn't managed to flee. The Mongol soldiers scoured the city but found
only three captive envoys bound with bamboo ropes. When the ropes were cut, they discovered that one
of the envoys had already died of starvation. Most of the court's grain stores and supplies
from civilian households had either been removed or hidden away. The Mongol forces were unable to
find the stockpiles of provisions they had expected. Enraged, Uriankhadai ordered his
troops to rampage through the city, ransacking and killing any remaining inhabitants.
Meanwhile, the surrounding villages near the capital organized efforts to bury their supplies
and build trenches and fortifications to defend themselves. The court had issued strict orders to
the population. If the enemy arrived, they were to fight to the end. If resistance was impossible,
they were to flee into the forests and mountains, but under no circumstances were they to surrender.
These orders were followed rigorously by the people of the villages.
Inside Thung Long, with no sources of resupply, the Mongols faced an imminent food shortage that
made them quickly fall into a state of hunger and desperation each passing day. Forced by the
situation, Uriankhadai divided his forces into small groups to raid the surrounding villages for supplies.
However, this solution proved unsustainable. Fearing a surprise encirclement in the capital,
he led his troops out of Thung Long and established a camp at Zhongbo Zhao. By this point,
the Jai Viet military and court had completely vanished from sight, leaving the Mongol commander
with no opportunity for a decisive battle. The rivers and tributaries surrounding Thung Long
acted as natural defensive barriers, hindering the Mongol army's mobility. Despite still having
nearly 40,000 men, the Mongols found themselves stuck, waiting with no clear strategy. With
excellent logistical coordination, the Jai Viet court had amassed sufficient supplies to sustain
a large army for an extended period. By this time, local troops and private forces from the regional
lords had gathered at Tien Bao, amassing over 100,000 soldiers. Jai Viet's warships crowded
the waters of the Thien Mac river, ready for battle. On the night of January 28th and into the
early hours of January 29th, 1258, the Jai Viet forces extinguished all lights and silently rode
their boats toward Zhongbo Zhao. Once in position, the Jai Viet forces suddenly beat their war drums,
illuminating a section of the river with blazing torches. Arrows rained down from their warships
onto the Mongol sentry posts. Following this, a fleet of large and small ships swiftly landed
troops ashore, launching a deep assault into the enemy camps. The advantage of their ships allowed
the Jai Viet forces to disembark with ease. The Mongols, caught off guard in the dead of night,
initially suffered losses on the outer perimeters and fell into disarray. However, they quickly
rallied, donned armor, and armed themselves for defense. The Mongol commander worked tirelessly
to restore order. Soldiers scrambled from their tents, mounted their horses, and engaged the Jai
Viet forces in fierce combat. By this point, the Jai Viet troops had advanced deeply onto land,
losing some of the critical support provided by their warships. Crown Prince Tran Hoang and King
Tran Thai Tong directed the battle from their command vessels. Generals like Tran Quoc Tuan,
Tran Khan Du, and Le Tan led multiple assault divisions. Notably, General Tran Khan Du exploited
a gap in the Mongol defenses, driving his troops deep into their lines, which caused further chaos
and heavy casualties for the Mongols. The Jai Viet forces gradually surrounded the Mongols.
Recognizing that the tide of battle had turned decisively, the experienced Uriankhadai ordered
an immediate retreat northward to preserve his remaining forces. In total, the Mongols occupied
Thung Long for only nine days. Chinese Yuan and Ming records later attributed the Mongol retreat
to the hot climate of Jai Viet, with texts such as the Economic Strategies of the Great Yuan,
History of the Yuan claiming that the oppressive heat forced the Mongols to withdraw. However,
these claims are inconsistent with the fact that the campaign occurred in January,
midwinter in northern Vietnam. As they retreated along the Red River and Thao River toward the
northwestern border of Jai Viet, the Jai Viet Navy, despite having an advantage on the water,
could not match the Mongols' famously swift withdrawal. However, the local militia forces
intercepted the retreating invaders along their predetermined routes. Here, Commander Ha Bong
rallied troops and local villagers, creating an interconnected series of ambush positions along
the road leading to the border. When the Mongols entered the pre-set ambush zones, they were met
with fierce attacks. Exhausted and disorganized, the retreating Mongol forces suffered heavy losses
in the rugged terrain. Their counterattacks were feeble, a stark contrast to their initial
ferocity when they invaded Jai Viet. The losses suffered by the Mongol army during their first
invasion of Jai Viet were severe, and are subject to differing estimates based on historical sources.
According to Rashid al-Din, a Persian historian, the Mongol forces had dwindled to fewer than 5,000
soldiers by the time they reached Nga Chau in southern China to join forces with Kublai Khan.
This indicates significant attrition compared to the initial size of the invading army.
Meanwhile, the history of the UN and other Chinese records present a slightly more detailed breakdown.
These sources report that when the Mongol forces penetrated Song territory,
their numbers had been reduced to approximately 3,000 Mongol cavalry and 10,000 Dali troops.
These accounts collectively highlight the staggering losses the Mongols endured,
estimated to be between half to four-fifths of their original strength.
Such a reduction in manpower underscores the effectiveness of Jai Viet's defensive strategies,
the challenges posed by the unfamiliar terrain, and the resilience of local resistance efforts.
The high attrition also illustrates the logistical and environmental challenges
faced by the Mongols, which likely compounded their inability to sustain a prolonged campaign
in Jai Viet.