lato's Gorgias (Ethics 2)

Human Migrations
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Oct 23, 2024
Gorgias is a Socratic dialogue written by Plato around 380 BC. The dialogue depicts a conversation between Socrates and a small group of sophists (and other guests) at a dinner gathering.
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As I mentioned in the previous video, it is impossible to produce a perfectly accurate
account of the historical Socrates, as it is hard to say at what point in Plato's own dialogues
the character Socrates becomes a mere mouthpiece to Plato's own ideas. The Gorgias is a fairly
early dialogue in which Plato set forth most of his central problems of ethics. In the Mino and
the Phaedo, Plato constructs the basis of his metaphysics, and in the Republic, he furthers
the ideas set forth in the Gorgias. The Gorgias contain three sections, each having a different
interrogator for Socrates. The first part is out to dispose certain claims of rhetoric. Gorgias,
a first generation sophist, himself upholds that rhetoric, as the art of persuasion, is the means
to man's supreme good, which is freedom to have one's own way in everything. In the city-state,
this means to be able to sway one's fellow citizens to one's own benefit. To dispute this,
Socrates first sets out to distinguish the kind of persuasion which produces knowledge in the man
who is persuaded, which consists of reasons for believing something, and the kind of persuasion
that does not, consisting of psychological pressure. Gorgias accepts that his rhetoric is
the latter kind, and asserts that it is morally neutral, able to being used for right purposes
or for wrong purposes. But in order for Gorgias to hold that persuasion is morally neutral,
he must also hold that it is morally irrelevant whether a man comes to a given belief by reasoning
or in some non-rational way, and further, that a man's exercise of his own rationality is irrelevant
to his standing as a moral agent. This willingness to assume a whole philosophical psychology is one
of the more regressive features of sophists like Gorgias. At this point, Gorgias is replaced by
his pupil Polus, who reiterates that a man can do whatever he wants if he is a successful orator,
since rhetoric is about gaining power. Socrates responds to this by stating that a man may do
what he thinks is good for him, while not doing what he desires or what is actually good for him.
A man who is happy to gain power by conquering others is only happy through a mistake on his
own part as to what is good for him. For Socrates, it is worse for a man to inflict wrong than to
suffer wrong himself. Polus is not prepared to accept this, but he does accept that it is more
disgraceful. Yet Polus also agrees that in order to be the Athenian ideal of a gentleman, one must
be both honourable and thought of as honourable, and so Socrates is now able to demonstrate that
honour and goodness and disgrace and badness cannot be distinct from one another. If to suffer
is more honourable than to make others suffer, then it is because it is better and more beneficial
to suffer. Socrates's next interlocutor, Calyces, asserts that the supreme good is to satisfy all
desires, which contradicts Socrates in two ways. Firstly, Calyces believes that the desires of man
can be fully satisfied, and secondly, that the greater the desires, the greater the satisfaction.
Furthermore, Calyces believes that the strong man has the right to rule, but Socrates points out
that the populace are obviously stronger than the tyrant, and so they should rule, forcing Calyces
to redefine strong to mean more intelligent. Socrates moves on by stating that the good-bad
dichotomy is not equitable to the pleasure-pain dichotomy, as the first is mutually exclusive
while the second is not. Calyces accepts this distinction since he believes that bad men often
feel more pleasure than good men. Socrates argues from this point that the concept of goodness must
be related to the idea and practice of limiting one's desires in such a way that our actions will
always have some property by which we can distinguish them from other actions. In other words,
all of our desires can only be specified as good by specifying the rules which would govern the
behaviour required for that particular desired outcome. In summary, the first notable conclusion
made in the Gorgias is that a desire is only satisfiable if it is given a specified object
where there is a particular goal to be pursued. The second is that if anything is to be a good
thing, which is to say a possible object of desire, it must be specifiable in terms of some set of
rules which might govern behaviour towards it. To do whatever one wants is fruitless since such a
man would no longer be an intelligible agent in human society. And finally, badness consists in
breaching a form of life in which certain goods can be attained, where a form of life is one in
which various concepts are shared between individuals. What a bad man lacks is this
ability to share a common form of life. The next step in specifying what is good
is therefore to determine what kind of common life is necessary for good to be realised.
This is the task of the Republic.
