The Socrates’ Own Philosophy.

Genetic History
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Oct 21, 2024
It was necessary to establish a plausible chronology for the Platonic texts
in order to indicate to what extent it is safe to rely on Plato
as a source of information about the historical Socrates.
Having done this, we can give an account of Socrates' own philosophy
as it is presented in the early dialogues of his pupil.
In the Apology, Plato is anxious, like Xenophon,
to defend Socrates from the charge of atheism.
He points to the inconsistency between the two charges,
that he is an atheist and that he introduces strange divinities.
He also distances him from the secular physicism of Anaxagoras.
The denial in the Apology that he had ever discussed physics
does not ring altogether true, even though it is echoed later by Aristotle.
If Socrates had never shown any interest in issues of cosmology,
Aristophanes' mockery would have been so wide of the mark
that the jokes would have fallen very flat.
Moreover, Plato himself in his Phaedo represents Socrates as confessing
that he at one time shared Anaxagoras' curiosity about whether the earth was flat or round
and whether it was in the middle of the universe
and what was the reason for the motion and speed of the sun and moon and other heavenly bodies.
It may have been Socrates' disillusionment with Anaxagoras
that made him give up scientific inquiry and concentrate on the issues which,
according to the Apology and Aristotle, dominated the latter part of his life.
According to both Plato and Xenophon, another factor that directed his interest
was an oracle uttered in the name of Apollo by the entranced priestess in the shrine at Delphi.
When asked if there was anyone in Athens wiser than Socrates,
the priestess replied in the negative.
Socrates professed to be puzzled by this response
and began to question different classes of people who claimed to possess wisdom of various kinds.
It soon became clear that politicians and poets possessed no genuine expertise at all
and that craftsmen who were genuine experts in a particular area
would pretend to a universal wisdom to which they had no claim.
Socrates concluded that the oracle was correct
in that he alone realized that his own wisdom was worthless.
It was in matters of morality that it was most important to pursue genuine knowledge
and to expose false pretensions.
For according to Socrates, virtue and moral knowledge were the same thing.
No one who really knew what was the best thing to do could do otherwise
and all wrongdoing was the result of ignorance.
This makes it all the more absurd that he should be accused of corrupting the young.
Anyone would obviously prefer to live among good men than among bad men who might harm him.
He cannot, therefore, have any motive for corrupting the young on purpose
and if he is doing so unwittingly, he should be educated rather than prosecuted.
Socrates, in the Apology, did not claim to possess himself the wisdom
that is sufficient to keep a man from wrongdoing.
Instead, he said that he relied on an inner divine voice
which would intervene if ever he was on the point of taking a wrong step.
So far from being an atheist, his whole life was dedicated to a divine mission.
The campaign to expose false wisdom which was prompted by the Delphic Oracle.
What would really be a betrayal of God would be to desert his post through fear of death.
If he were told that he could go free on condition that he abandon philosophical inquiry,
he would reply,
Men of Athens, I honor and love you, but I shall obey God rather than you
and while I have life and strength, I shall never cease from the practice.
And teaching of philosophy.
The early dialogues of Plato portray Socrates carrying out his philosophical mission.
Typically, the dialogue will be named after a personage who claims knowledge of a certain
subject or who can be taken to represent a certain virtue.
Thus, the Ion on poetry is named after a prize-winning rhapsode, a reciter of Homer.
And the Laches on courage is named after a distinguished general.
Charmides and Lysis on passion, temperance, and friendship are named after two bright young men
who commanded a circle of aristocratic admirers.
In each dialogue, Socrates seeks a scientific account or definition of the topic under discussion
and by questioning, reveals that the eponymous protagonist is unable to give one.
The dialogues all end with the ostensible failure of the inquiry,
confirming the conclusion in the apology that those who might most be expected to
possess wisdom on particular topics fail under examination to exhibit it.
The search for definitions serves different purposes in different dialogues.
A definition of justice is sought in Republic I.
In order to determine whether justice benefits its possessor,
and a definition of piety is sought in the Euthyphro,
in order to settle a particular difficult case of conscience.
But Aristotle was right to pick out the search as a notable feature of Socratic method.
The method has sometimes been criticized as involving the fallacious claim that we
cannot ever know whether some particular action is or is not, say, just or pious,
unless we can give a watertight definition of justice and piety.
Such a claim would be inconsistent with Socrates' regular practice in the course of his Alentius
of seeking agreement whether particular actions, such as returning a borrowed knife to a madman,
or carrying out a strategic retreat in battle,
do or do not exhibit particular virtues such as justice and courage.
Socrates' method involves only the weaker claim that unless we have a general definition of a
virtue, we will not, a. be able to say whether the virtue universally has a particular property,
such as being teachable, or being beneficial, or be able to decide difficult borderline cases,
such as whether a son's prosecuting his father for the manslaughter of an accused murderer
is or is not an act of piety.
The other feature of Socrates' method, emphasized by Aristotle,
namely the use of inductive arguments, does in fact presuppose that we can be sure of truths
about individual cases while still lacking universal definitions.
Plato's Socrates does not claim to have a watertight definition of technique or craft,
but over and over again he considers particular crafts in order to extract general truths
about the nature of a craft.
Thus, in Republic, one he wishes to show that the test of a good craftsman
is not whether he makes a lot of money, but whether he benefits the objects of his craft.
To show this, he runs through the products of different crafts.
A good doctor produces healthy patients.
A good captain delivers safe navigation.
A good builder constructs a good house, and so on.
How much money these people make is not relevant to their goodness at their craft.
It tells us only how efficient they are at the quite different craft of money-making.
The two procedures identified by Aristotle are, in Socrates' method, closely related to each other.
The inductive argument from particular instances to general truths
is a contribution to the universal definition.
Even though the contribution in these dialogues is forever incomplete,
never leading to an exception-proof definition.
In the absence of the universal definition of a virtue,
the general truths are applied to help settle difficult borderline cases of practice
and to evaluate preliminary hypo, the seas about the virtue's properties.
Thus, in the Republic case, the induction is used to show that a good ruler is one
who benefits his subjects, and therefore, justice is not.
As one of the characters in the dialogue maintains,
simply whatever is to the advantage of those in power.
In these early dialogues about the virtues, in spite of Socrates' profession of ignorance,
a number of theses emerge both about knowledge and about virtue.
These will be explored in greater detail in later chapters on epistemology and ethics.
For the moment, we may notice that the issues converge on the question,
can virtue be taught?
For if virtue is knowledge, then surely it must be teachable.
And yet it is difficult to point to any successful teachers of virtue.
In Athens, however, there was no lack of people claiming to have the relevant expertise,
namely the sophists.
At the end of the early period and before the central period of Plato's writing career,
we find a series of dialogues named after major sophists, hippias, gorgias,
porgias, which address the question whether virtue can be taught,
and which deflate the pretensions of the sophists to possess the secret of its teachability.
The hippias minor sets out a serious difficulty for the idea that virtue
is a craft that can be learned.
A craftsman who makes a mistake unknowingly
is inferior to a craftsman who makes a mistake deliberately.
So if virtue is a craft,
one who sins deliberately is more virtuous than one who sins in ignorance.
The gorgias argues that rhetoric,
the main arrow in the sophists' quiver,
is incapable of producing genuine virtue.
The protagoras seems to suggest,
whether seriously or ironically,
that virtue is indeed teachable,
because it is the art of calculating the proportion of pleasure and pain
among the consequences of one's actions of one's action.
