【海鯤新進展】全身秘密武器 海鯤艦掌握三大優勢 中共「合圍態勢」泡湯；關機坐底伏擊，共艦膽寒！

Hello, everyone. Welcome to the New Cold War News. I'm Lin Yuanshan. The H-AT, the H-AT, which was selected last year, is currently being tested in Bogang, and will be tested in the sea in 2025. The speed of progress shows that Taiwan attaches great importance to the H-AT. So how important is the H-AT to Taiwan's defense? Given that the number of warships is at a distance from the CCP, how can the Taiwan Navy break through the CCP's siege on the sea? The H-AT's service will bring the Taiwan Navy three major advantages in breaking through the CCP's siege. Today, Yuanshan will analyze it with you. First of all, Yuanshan has to praise the H-AT's high concealment ability. I'm going to talk about the following aspects. The H-AT has a high-strength HSLA-80 steel plate. The depth of the H-AT can reach at least 350 meters. This is deeper than that of the Chai Dian H-AT of the Communist Army, and has more combat advantage. As the saying goes, the enemy is in the light, and I am in the dark. As long as a warship is deeper than its opponent, its survival rate is higher. Su Ziyun, director of the National Defense Strategy and Resource Research Institute, explained that because of the various water temperature conditions under the sea, including the difference in sea water density, temperature and salinity, there will be changes in the spread of radioactivity in the water. So if you can hide deeper, the chance of being found is lower. The H-AT has more ways to escape detection, and at the same time fight back against the enemy. As Taiwan's first self-propelled H-AT, the H-AT is basically made entirely by itself. It's all the latest equipment in the world. Did you notice that when the H-AT left the factory for testing, the bottom of the ship was covered with mesh-like material, not to be seen by the outside world. What kind of secret weapon is this? It turns out that this is the position of the H-AT's front test sonar. The test sonar is amazing. It can use a triangular positioning to accurately detect the location of the enemy. It is a standard equipment for advanced warships. General traditional warships have a sonar. The detection range is about 130 degrees, and there are blind spots on both sides. The side sonar makes up for this shortcoming, so that the H-AT can detect the left and right sides. It is equivalent to having eyes on both sides, which greatly improves the sense of the battlefield. Shu Xiaohuang, Deputy Researcher of the National Defense Security Institute, said, as for the soundproof sonar on both sides, it is very useful. With it, the H-AT is no longer equipped with a relatively cumbersome decoupling sonar. In addition, the H-AT uses a composite sonar design. The middle section is a single-layer pressure shell. It is not disturbed by the noise of the water. This design strengthens the soundproof sonar ability of the side of the ship. It has the ability of passive sonar. This design brings a considerable advantage to the H-AT. When the H-AT is submerged under water, to find its existence, it can only be found through magnetic detection or active sonar. If the enemy really uses active sonar to find the H-AT, it is equivalent to using a flashlight to take pictures of stupid behavior in the dark. Before the enemy finds the H-AT, our H-AT already knows where the opponent is. Chairman of Taiwan Shipbuilding, Zheng Wenlong, said, the X-shaped design is a new design. The performance is superior to the cross-shaped seat of the old-fashioned submarine. The X-shaped seat can increase the ship's navigation control and stability. And the propeller of the H-AT is seven-leaf, not five-leaf like the H-AT. In addition, the area of ​​the propeller has also increased, making the speed of the propeller of the H-AT lower. At the same time, it can reduce the phenomenon of hollow stone. What is the hollow stone phenomenon? Because in the high-speed operation of the propeller, it is easy to form a phenomenon of fast flow and low pressure, which causes seawater vaporization, which causes hollow small bubbles behind the submarine. And the noise produced by these hollow bubbles is easy to be captured by the enemy's sonar system, thereby exposing the position of the submarine. Therefore, reducing the phenomenon of hollow stone can increase the secrecy of the submarine and make it safer. The combat system and combat system on the H-AT are very different from the previous submarines. Many of the equipment has been digitized, so it is more integrated. Although the H-AT itself is already a very advanced submarine, the H-AT has advanced for a generation. The overall combat effectiveness is very impressive. Some military fans think that the U.S. Navy already has nuclear-powered submarines. In comparison, does the H-AT of the H-AT look inferior? Not necessarily. The noise produced by the nuclear reactor of the nuclear-powered submarine is higher. For example, the U.S. Navy's H-AT is about 95 decibels, and the Communist Army's H-AT is generally estimated to be more than 100 decibels. The background noise of the ocean is about 90 decibels. This means that nuclear-powered submarines are easier to be heard in the ocean, while the H-AT can only produce engine noise, which is less than 90 decibels. In addition, the H-AT can shut down and land on the ground. In other words, it is very suitable for landing operations to break through the CCP's nuclear-powered Taishi warfare. According to the track map released by the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan and the Japanese Joint Staff, in recent years, the air force has been training in the western Pacific region. The number of aircraft has increased significantly. The Communist Army's H-AT is also training in the western Pacific region. According to the training model, the military experts say that the CCP is training in the tactical warfare of the Taishi warfare. Huang Shuguang, a member of the Joint Staff of the Presidential Office of the Ministry of National Defense, said that the Taiwan military has observed the range of the Communist Army's military exercises, and judged that the Communist Army will have at least three H-ATs for the Taishi warfare. One is deployed in the southeast coast of Taiwan, and the other is deployed in the northeast coast of Taiwan, which contains the United States and Japan. The third H-AT is placed in the southwest coast of Taiwan. In the face of such a nuclear-powered Taishi warfare, the most important strategy for the deployment of the H-AT is to lock the Communist Army in the first island chain, so that it cannot enter the Pacific Ocean, and encircle Taiwan from the north to the south. Therefore, Taiwan's advance troops will also focus on these three coasts. In the southwest coast, in the southeast coast of Taiwan, and in the waters between Suao and Yunnan, the Communist Army will break through the first island chain to encircle Taiwan. To know how to block the Communist Army, we must first understand the geographical environment of Taiwan. Taiwan has a long terrain, but it lacks a wide area. The advance troops can expand the Taiwan coastline to the outside, and at the same time pose a threat to the Communist Army, so as to prevent the fleet from being ambushed by the Taiwan advance troops. This is the effect of the advance troops in Taiwan's military strategy of defending and defending. The advance activities must have deep enough waters. The Taiwan coast is too shallow, and it is not suitable for advance operations. However, the waters in the southwest direction of Kaohsiung and the waters in the east of Huadong are deep enough, which is very suitable for advance operations. The CCP has also been actively collecting tidal data in these waters over the years. There was a classified report that the Communist Army can set up about 16 waters around the Taiwan Strait in the Fuji region. These are the places where the Communist Army's advance can block Taiwan. In addition to the 16 Fuji areas, there are also 6 other areas on the edge of the Taipei Air Intelligence Zone that are suitable for preparation for the CCP's advance. In response to the mainland's combat in the Fuji area, Taiwan has also planned 10 anti-submarine attacks under the advice of the US military. Where are these 16 advance Fuji areas? All in the east and southeast coast of Taiwan. Li Daguang, a professor of military affairs at the National Defense University of Mainland China, reported on the news. Judging from the waters around Taiwan, the east and southeast coasts of Taiwan are a large ocean plain. Most of the waters are more than 3,000 meters deep, which is a typical ocean combat environment. The range of these 16 Fuji areas varies in size, which is about 2 to 4 times the distance of a torpedo. The CCP's submarine torpedoes are about 4 nautical miles long. In this way, the maximum Fuji area is no more than 30 nautical miles. Li Daguang specifically pointed out that there are several seabed canyons between the East China Sea and the Chongsheng Sea, which is very suitable for the submarine torpedoes. In addition, the waters near Keelung and Kaohsiung are also suitable for submarine torpedoes. There is also a Fuji area between Lanyu and Lidao. Taiwan's number is the 9th Fuji area. This is one of the important areas for the CCP to block Taiwan. At the same time, it is also an attack area for Taiwan's submarine deployment. Once the war begins, this area can be said to be a must-go place for both sides. On the other hand, the Philippine Sea, which extends from the east to the south of Taiwan, belongs to the deep water zone. The ocean is vast and suitable for submarine activities. Even the US and Japanese submarines are very active in this area. As long as Taiwan's submarines enter the eastern ocean, it is difficult to detect or kill them. Hiding at the bottom of the sea, an offensive sit-down attack will pose a great threat to the enemy. How will Taiwan counterattack? In addition to the scattered deployment mentioned above at 10 counterattack points, Li Daguang predicts that another possible strategy for Taiwan is to approach quietly, that is, to deploy 10 submarines in Pengjiayu, Diaoyudao, Chiweiyu, or Diaoyudao, Shiyuandao, and other coastal areas to intercept and attack. These are all necessary ways for the PLA submarine to block Taiwan. Thus, submarines play a very critical role in defending Taiwan. This is why Tsai Ing-wen attaches such great importance to the construction of submarines. Lai Ching-de strongly supports the reason for building seven submarines at once. The more submarines Taiwan has, the more advantages it can occupy. Some military analysts believe that the value of Haikun Hull is not to fight against China's submarines. Its most important task is to undermine the PLA's anti-interference and regional deterrence strategy. Anti-interference and regional deterrence, or AQAD, is a military strategy to control the entry and exit in a combat environment. Anti-interference refers to stopping the enemy troops from entering the combat area, while regional deterrence is to restrict the enemy's movement in the combat area. Because once the CCP crosses the northern sea of Taiwan, it will launch an anti-interference and regional deterrence war against the US military to delay the US military's support. So another important task of Haikun Hull is to prevent the CCP from cutting off the airspace and stopping the intention of the allies' aid. Haikun Hull has strengthened Taiwan's military strength. At the northern end of Taiwan, it can join forces with the Japanese army to guard the northern sea, and block the way for the Communist army to enter the Pacific Ocean, and provide cover for the US warships that come to aid. We will discuss this in detail later. Huang Shuguang, the convener of the submarine national defense plan, specifically pointed out two possible routes of transport. One is to cross the Pacific Ocean from the east coast of the Philippines to the port in the east of Taiwan. The other is to enter from the southwest of Japan. These two are the shortest routes. As long as Taiwan can prevent the CCP from fully blocking these two routes, it can maintain contact with the outside world. If the CCP wants to cut off the intention of the allies' aid, it will not succeed. With Taiwan's current anti-aircraft missiles and submarines, it is not difficult to block the CCP's submarines in these two waters. That is to say, the more submarines Taiwan has, the more confidence it has. According to military expert Wang Zhenming, the CCP's army mainly encircles Taiwan in three ways. But all three have their shortcomings and cannot completely block Taiwan. In addition, its encirclement network has a big flaw in the eastern part of Taiwan. The vast ocean is easy to block and block. How many warships and troops must be used is a very large project. If Taiwan takes advantage of the front line to expand Taiwan's coastline to the outside, it will be more difficult for the CCP to block or encircle. Wang Zhenming believes that the larger the block circle, the more gaps and gaps, and the more difficult it is to block. Taiwan's front line can choose the weakest point to ambush and attack in advance to break through China's block network. China must maintain a four-sided block all the time. But as long as Taiwan chooses a favorable time to break through one of the points alone, it can achieve the goal. This will give Taiwan the initiative to fight. In the past, Taiwan's navy only had two warships. There are more tactical applications and deployment restrictions. Once the Navy officially serves, Taiwan's navy will be like a tiger. If the CCP wants to implement a block on the sea, it will face more risks and threats. Taiwan's front-line garrison, coupled with the assistance of the US and Japan, will have an effective restriction effect on the CCP's surface fleet or submarines. These are very beneficial combat conditions for Taiwan's navy. Su Ziyun, director of the National Defense Strategy and Resource Research Institute of the National Defense Council, said that if the US and Japan decide to join forces with Taiwan, other than the possibility of launching aircraft to strike the army, each country can divide the area and be responsible for different areas. For example, the US military nuclear submarine may intercept the CCP's surface fleet and submarine submarines 200 nautical miles east of Taiwan. The Japanese submarine may defend the waters between the islands of Kyushu and Kongu. In addition, the allies of the countries can also share information about each other's submarines, and gain more military and fleet data from allies and enemies. U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Gennady said that once the two sides start a war, the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the North China Sea will be threatened by security interests such as Taiwan and the United States. Submarines can be sent to block China's maritime traffic and military supplies, or Beijing to give in. Gennady added that Taiwan can send submarines to guard the southern and northern ends of the Taiwan Strait, while Japanese submarines and ships with anti-submarine combat capabilities can guard the waters of Kongu, Yunnan Island, and Diaoyutai. In this way, they can completely block the attack of warships and enter the Pacific Channel, and provide cover for the U.S. warships. In short, with the help of the allies, the Taiwan military will be greatly strengthened. If the CCP tries to blockade Taiwan, it will blockade itself instead. How ironic!