Why Britain wouldn’t just let Hitler go East

Some people, including people like David Hoggan, can't understand why Britain would declare war on Germany in 1939. They argue that it was a secret plot to bully Germany, and that Britain was the instigator of the war, and that they should have just let Germany go east. They also say that Britain had a secret war policy. She started the whole thing, that Chamberlain, Churchill, Eden, and many of the other leaders were all in on it. And more. Okay, well, this argument quickly falls apart just by looking at a map and using your brain. Imagine that you're Britain here, and Germany decided to do this. Would you be happy with this? Does this look like a good thing to you? How about this? Or this? What about this? Or this? It doesn't matter who's in control of continental Europe. It can be Germany, France, the Habsburgs, the Soviets. It doesn't matter. What matters is that this puts Britain in a terrible position. Why? Because a united Europe threatens Britain's sovereignty. The enemy is in control of all the continental ports, and they can now build more ships than Britain can to threaten Britain with. And if they have possession of all of Europe, then they obviously have a large threatening army which Britain can't deal with alone. It would only be a matter of time before Britain itself is invaded, or rendered into vassal status by a dominant power in Europe. The point is that Britain wasn't picking on Germany during the First or Second World Wars. It's not some sort of grand conspiracy. And Britain wasn't picking on France during the She couldn't allow France's fleet to be seized and used by Germany, the dominant power in continental Europe. It's nothing personal. It's just business. Because of her position in Europe, and because she is an island, Britain's traditional strategy since the early 1500s has been to have a large fleet and keep Europe divided by using various alliances to prevent one power from dominating the continent. This was called the European Balance of Power strategy. And it's not just Britain. Why would France want this? Again, France would be in a terrible position. If France and Britain hypothetically united into one blob, do you think Spain would be happy with that? What about Germany? Do you think they would join forces, perhaps with Italy, to deal with this threat? Probably, right? They would react to the biggest threat in Europe, and rightly so. Thus, this idea that Britain and France should have just let Germany ride off into the sunset to conquer half of Europe and then be the dominant power, with a ton of land and resources, doesn't make any sense. It's not some grand conspiracy. It's understandable why they wouldn't let German aggression go unchecked. Arguably, it doesn't even make sense to allow Germany to take Austria or Czechoslovakia, because the stronger Germany gets, the further the balance of power shifts to one dominant power. This also explains why Britain didn't declare war on the Soviet Union when she and Germany divided Poland between them. Again, it's nothing personal, it's just business. Germany is the bigger threat to Britain than Russia is or the Soviet Union, so it makes sense from Britain's perspective to deal with Germany first. Plus, Britain's strategy is not to fight the dominant power alone. She needs allies. France is one ally, but so too, potentially, is the Soviet Union. The British establishment obviously decided to tackle one problem first, and probably knew that the Third Reich and the Soviet Union weren't going to be best friends for very long. It makes sense for Britain to get Germany and Russia fighting against each other a likely scenario, considering Hitler was broadcasting to the world that he was going East. This would also weaken two enemies at the same time, the two biggest threats to Britain in Europe, the Soviet Union and the Third Reich. Italy wasn't much of a threat to begin with, let's be honest, so it also makes sense for Britain to concentrate on taking her out first. Britain has a fleet, it's her biggest military asset, so it makes sense to strike in the Mediterranean, as well as agitate in Southern Europe in general, Churchill's Balkan strategy. Again, Britain can't deal with Germany alone, the dominant power, and Britain can find allies within the Balkans. It also has the added benefit of securing the Middle East, and preventing Germany gaining oil, or threatening Britain's oil sites there. This is why Britain secured Iraq and French Syria. Again, it's just business. Being allied to Portugal and holding Gibraltar keeps Spain weak, and maintaining her neutrality benefits both Britain and Portugal, as well as Franco, who didn't want to enter the war because his country was weak anyway after the Civil War. And this overall weakens the Germans. Since nobody else had survived the German Blitzkrieg except for the Soviet Union, Britain therefore looked for allies to fight with her on other continents. This is where the United States comes into it. Technically, the United States didn't need to intervene in Europe. Against Japan, yes, but Europe, not really. She did so because it became clear that a dominant Germany would be a threat to Britain, and then eventually the United States, as Hitler himself made clear in Mein Kampf and his second book. And, in the event that the Soviets won the conflict in the east, it made sense to liberate Western Europe to prevent them from dominating the continent too. Imagine the Cold War, but the Soviets on the border of France. That wouldn't be good for the United States, let alone Britain, Spain, or anybody else. This is also why Britain was happy to declare war on Finland, but not actually intervene in the conflict against her. Why? Well, it actually makes sense for Finland to survive the war and protect Scandinavia from post-war Soviet domination. Again, it's not personal, it's just business. Churchill also wanted to invade Norway for a similar reason. It was the periphery of Europe, and somewhere where Britain's navy could strike. It's much easier for Britain to attack here than attacking Germany's mainland. Much like the southern strategy, the northern one could have allowed Britain's limited army to harass Germany in tough terrain without needing to sacrifice millions of men in the conflict. And this would have also had the benefit of stopping Swedish iron-ore supplies reaching Germany. But after the disaster of 1940, the British didn't try to land in this area again, although they still thought about it. But the idea that Britain wants to keep Europe divided is why Britain is happier with the Belgians and Dutch being separate rather than together, and why the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was good news too. Lots of little states all hating each other in Europe is less of a threat to Britain and other powers too. That's why Turkey was also taken down a peg in the First World War, and why the British wanted to secure Greek independence. Again, nothing personal, just business. All this and more can be gleaned by just looking at a map and thinking logically about this from Britain's perspective. Obviously, having some knowledge of history and British strategy also helps, but when the Nazis say that Britain was bullying Germany, or instigating against her… yes, because Germany was flexing her muscles and becoming too dominant, just like France had been previously. In fact, during the mid-1800s, Britain originally welcomed a united Germany because this would prevent France from dominating Europe again. But when the Kaiser started building a fleet and flexing his Prussian army, that's when Britain turned against her and started the naval arms race. And is this some sort of grand Jewish conspiracy or something? No, it's just Britain being Britain. Now, this doesn't mean that appeasement wasn't a genuine thing. It was. And that's where Britain messed up. We now know why though. The British people didn't want another war to end all wars like they got embroiled into in 1914. Nobody in Britain wanted a repeat of that disaster, so in an effort to win votes, the establishment tried appeasement. But this backfired, and Chamberlain finally realized in March 1938 that Britain actually had to stand firm against Hitler and revert back to Britain's traditional strategy. That's why there was a shift in the policy, which I mentioned in a previous video. If you haven't seen that, go check it out. Thanks for watching, bye for now.