The Battle of the Barents Sea WW2 Documentary

AtoZ Heritage
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7 Video Views·Oct 11, 2022
On New Years Eve 1942, a battle in the Barents Sea took place between a British arctic convoy and a larger German fleet that included the cruisers Hipper and Lützow. The results of this was so shocking that the German Surface Fleet was threatened with being abolished. So what happened? Let's find out!
This is a historical documentary about the Battle of the Barents Sea that took place on the 31st of December 1942. It features quotes, references and maps. For more content like this, check out my other videos and consider subscribing!
My Patron Muhammad Alibi asked,
"...was the Battle of the Barents Sea as decisive as often claimed? Did it make Hitler
scrap his surface fleet?"
Well, let's tell the story and see what you think.
In late December 1942, a convoy was sailing from Britain to deliver much-needed supplies
to the Soviet Union. This was Convoy PQ-19. And this is at a time when Paulus was trapped
at Stalingrad, the British had just defeated Rommel at El Alamein, and the Americans had
first landed in North Africa alongside the British and others. So, we're basically
at the midpoint of the war. The Axis were just starting to fall back from their peak
in terms of territory captured.
Well, the U-boats had been a menace for a while, so there was some debate regarding
whether this convoy should remain as one, or be split up into multiple little convoys.
And there were advantages and disadvantages to both, but in the end, Admiral Torvay decided
to split the convoy into two.
Thus, Rear-Admiral Turler, who was actually retired at this point, sailed with Convoy
JW-51A on the 15th of December, while Commander Rust sailed with JW-51B on the 22nd of December
1942. The second convoy was where the action would take place, and it was escorted by the
17th Destroyer Flotilla, led by Captain Sherbrooke. Sherbrooke anticipated a surface attack and
prepared accordingly, ordering his destroyers to engage the enemy, while the minesweeper,
the corvettes and the trawlers provided a close escort to the convoy. But during a storm,
one of the destroyers, Bulldog, was damaged and had to sail home, leaving just six destroyers
to protect the convoy. Then, due to getting lost in another storm, and the untimely failure
of her navigation equipment, the O-class destroyer, the Oribe, was forced to sail south to the
Norwegian coast in order to orientate herself before continuing on.
Oribe's separation deprived Sherbrooke of its only other ship, armed, as was Onslow,
with 4.7-inch guns. The remaining O-boats mounted the older vintage 4-inch type. Five
merchant ships and their trawler escort, the Visalma, also became separated from the pack
as a result of a gale. Rust and the minesweeper Bramble went off in search of them the next
day. Three were found and returned, but the Visalma and one merchant ship were still lost,
as was another lone merchant ship, and the Bramble was still out looking for them.
Bernat's Force R, which had two cruisers and two destroyers, were well north of the
convoy as a backup force. The idea was that they could remain undetected further away
from the coast from U-boats and aircraft, and if the convoy got into trouble, they could
move south to assist. Well, U-354, commanded by Herbschleib, spotted the British ships
on the 30th, and told Dönitz that a weakly escorted convoy was in the area. The sources
differ, with some saying that the Germans didn't know about the British cruisers,
while others say Herbschleib believed a light cruiser was protecting the convoy. But the
actual order assumed that there were several destroyers and one light cruiser, which was
actually incorrect. The British cruisers weren't with the destroyers or this convoy.
But anyway, U-354 moved ahead of the convoy and fired three torpedoes. But she had been
spotted and the convoy dodged the shots. When she tried again, the destroyer Obdurate tried
to ram her and force the U-boat to dive and avoid the depth charges. The German cruiser
Lutzow, commanded by Captain Stanger, joined up with Captain Hartmann's Hipper, and Vice-Admiral
Kometz ordered them to move against the convoy. They had six destroyers with them as well.
But Kometz received conflicting orders. On the one hand, he was to only take the Lutzow
out to the Atlantic, which was his original mission prior to the spotting of the British
convoy. On the other, he was to engage the convoy, but not engage it if the enemy had
superior firepower, and a little later if they had equal firepower, because the command
was scared about needlessly sacrificing their capital ships.
And the British might have superior firepower because it was then confirmed that the two
British cruisers had left port a few days previously. Also, the Germans were concerned
about the British destroyers because of their torpedoes, so they had to be careful not to
risk the loss of their own heavy ships. In other words, Kometz was deprived of freedom
of action prior to the engagement.
No captain of a heavy warship engaged on such a foray as the proposed attack on JW 51b would
unnecessarily risk losing his vessel. That would be understood, an innate part of his
training for command. Yet, actually telling Kometz and Stanger, with such emphasis that
they were not to engage superior forces, could have only one effect, to make them over-cautious.
Nonetheless, Kometz split his force into two, and had the Hipper come in from the north,
while the Lutso attacked from the south. He was later criticized for these tactics, but
they actually worked. The British destroyers were about to be split from the merchant ships,
as hoped. It was an excellent plan, and, given Sherbrooke's scheme of defence and his power,
one that was set fair to succeed. Hitler was informed of the situation, and gave the green
light for Kometz to engage. The Germans spotted the convoy at 0718 hours on the 31st of December
1942, and moved in for the kill. At this point, Wieselma and her merchant ship still hadn't
joined up with the main convoy, and the Bramble minesweeper was elsewhere looking for another
merchant ship. Worse, the cruisers of Burnet's Force R were miles away, and wouldn't be
able to immediately intervene, so it was looking like the Germans would have the advantage.
One of the corvettes spotted two destroyers to the south of them. But, because of a previous
message about Soviet destroyers coming to meet the convoy, which was a misreading of
the signal anyway, the corvette's crew assumed these were the Red Fleet coming to reinforce
them, so didn't report the sighting. Ten minutes later, the obdurate spotted three
destroyers, and alerted Sherbrooke. Sherbrooke ordered the obdurate to investigate, and she
moved off to take a look. At the same time, Sherbrooke sent his own ship's company to
breakfast, and ordered them to change into clean clothing. It must have been one of the
few occasions when the traditional order before battle was actually given during the last
war.
As the British ate, the obdurate followed the three destroyers of the Hipper's Group,
who then opened fire at 0930 hours. Slater was about to alert Sherbrooke, but Sherbrooke
had already seen the flashes of the guns, and ordered the O-class destroyers to line
up with him, while the Akartes and the other escorts deployed smoke between the enemy and
the merchant ships. Sherbrooke also reported to Burnett via radio that they were engaged
by the enemy. And at this point, Burnett was actually moving north. His radar had spotted
ships north of him, and he misread the situation, believing that the convoy was north, not to
his south. In fact, he had spotted the Wieselmer and the lone merchant ship with it, not the
Germans. But at 0930 hours, his ships spotted gunfire to the south, so he would now move
south, right? Nope. Instead, Burnett hesitated, wondering where the convoy actually was, and
believed that this gunfire to the south was Russian aircraft. He therefore didn't move.
At 0939 hours, the Onslow, with the Orwell beside her, spotted the Hipper, which had
moved up and opened fire on the Akartes. Sherbrooke reacted by engaging the Hipper with his ship
and the Orwell for a good half an hour. The threat of torpedoes forced the Hipper to
retreat northwards. This surprising reaction persuaded Sherbrooke that Kometz feared his
ship's torpedoes, an accurate perception that was skillfully exploited as the two sides
skirmished in the semi-darkness to the northwest of the convoy.
But something should be noted here. If Sherbrooke's destroyers fired their torpedoes, which they
didn't have many of, then the threat of a torpedo attack would be gone. So the British
couldn't actually use their torpedoes, because the threat of the torpedo was what gave them
their potency. The British ships, all of them armed with 4-inch guns, except the Onslow
which had 4.7-inch guns, weren't that effective against German cruisers. They could damage
them, but the Graf Spee had received numerous hits, perhaps 70, from 6 and 8-inch guns from
the Ajax, Achilles and Exeter, but had been able to sail away before scuttling. So, as
Dudley Pope puts it,
"...a bee dies once it has used its sting. Once their sting, the torpedoes waiting ready
in their tubes, was used and missed, then the Hipper would have nothing to fear from
them and they would surely die under the weight of her guns."
The merchant convoy had turned south-east as the fighting continued, and uncertain were
some of the enemy destroyers were, Sherbrooke split his destroyers into two. His Onslow
and the Orwell would stick together, while the Obdurate and Obedient moved back to the
convoy.
At 0946 hours, Berner observed heavy fire to his south that he concluded must have come
from his ships, and then received Sherbrooke's report about being engaged. Therefore, at
0950 hours, he turned about and moved south. At 1000 hours, Berner informed Sherbrooke
that his ships were approaching from the north. Meanwhile, the Hipper moved in again to engage
Sherbrooke's ships.
But the German gunners were disorganized and fired poorly. Visibility wasn't ideal, plus
the rough seas, but the situation wasn't helped by the fact that Kometz kept firing
off a salvo, then sailing out of range before coming back to fire again, switching between
different targets. All this put off their aim. However, at 1020 hours, the Hipper finally
got her act together, found the range, and started hitting the Onslow. The bridge was
struck, Sherbrooke was wounded, the engine room had holes in it, fires were spreading,
40 men were either killed or wounded, and the radar and half the guns were put out of
action. Petty Officer Cook, mortally wounded with both legs blown off, dragged himself
along an alleyway, complaining that they would only give him bloody aspirins in the sick
bay, and that he would rather have his daily ration of rum. Burnett could see the gunfire
south of him, but couldn't tell who was who, and therefore decided to go east at 1032
hours, leaving the British destroyers to their fate.
The wounded Sherbrooke continued to do his duty, ordering the ship to stay where it was,
and took a damage report. Meanwhile, the Hipper shifted its fire to the Orwell, but soon disengaged
thanks to a snow squall. Sherbrooke stayed on the bridge until his crew insisted that
he get treated for his wounds, and he was later awarded the Victoria Cross for his actions.
Kinloch took over command of the flotilla at 1035 hours.
The Hipper though had moved east, and ran straight into the Bramble. Rust reported that
he was being engaged by a German cruiser, but the only ship that picked up his signal
was the same corvette from before that had failed to report the sighting of the German
destroyers. Well, assuming that this signal from the Bramble had been picked up by the
other ships, which it hadn't, the corvette decided not to report this either. Kinloch
was only informed several days later.
To be fair though, there wasn't really anything that could have been done, because by the
time help arrived, it would have been too late anyway. The Hipper therefore pummeled
the Bramble unhindered, with a destroyer called the Friedrich-Eckholt finishing it off. All
hands were lost.
Meanwhile, the British O-class destroyers had regrouped with the Okhartis. And that's
when one of the corvettes, can you guess which one? Oh yeah, that one, spotted a large
enemy ship coming towards them. And again, it decided not to report this. And this time,
the sources don't say why, so it's anyone's guess. Only at 1045 hours did the other corvettes
next to it spot and then report that enemy ships were to their south. The large vessel
before them was the Lutzow, accompanied by her destroyers. It was right next to the merchant
ships, but by chance they couldn't engage because of the poor weather and visibility,
so moved south-east. Ironically, Kometz's plan had worked perfectly. The Hipper had
drawn off the escorts to the north of the convoy. The convoy had turned south and run,
unprotected, into the Lutzow. Only, the Lutzow had not fired a shot. That's when the Hipper
turned up again and started to engage the Akhatis, as it was moving up to join the Onslau
ahead of the convoy. The Akhatis was hit, lost her bridge, lost one of her guns, flames
were everywhere, she had taken on water. Worse, her captain was killed, and Lieutenant Peyton
Jones, who was just 24 years old at the time, had to take command of the ship. Jones ignored
his orders to rejoin the convoy because he knew he couldn't, so instead deployed smoke
as more shots came in.
But Kinloch led his three destroyers towards the Hipper. The Hipper turned her attention
to the Obedient, which then lost her wireless but wasn't seriously damaged. And fearing
a British torpedo attack, the Hipper turned northwest, followed by Kinloch for a short
time before he turned back. Having lost their wireless, Kinloch wasn't able to command
the ships, so Lieutenant Commander Slater of the Obdurate now took over the flotilla.
As the Hipper moved away, moments later at 1131 hours, she came under fire from the north.
Burnet had finally entered the battle, and 24 shells came streaming in, then more coming
every 20 seconds as the Sheffield and the Jamaica took turns to fire. Shocked by the
appearance of the British cruisers, the Hipper was too slow to react, and was hit by four
salvos. She had her guns facing the opposite direction, and so couldn't respond in kind,
and the damage she took reduced her speed. She was on fire, and had to deploy smoke to
get away, getting hit twice more as she did so.
Taken aback by this action, and facing a potentially serious situation of being caught between
British cruisers and destroyers, Kometz ordered his ships to disengage the enemy and withdraw
westwards. This time, the poor weather helped her escape, just as the British cruisers were
about to open fire at a closest range. Unfortunately for the Germans, two of their destroyers,
one being the Friedrich Eckholt, mistook one of the British cruisers for the Hipper and
moved up to her. The Sheffield identified the German destroyer from her guns, and opened
fire on the destroyer at close range with multiple salvos before the Germans could react.
The Eckholt's captain radioed the Hipper saying to stop firing, but the Hipper replied
no, it's a British cruiser. They were that close that the Sheffield's anti-aircraft
guns could shoot at her as well, which they did. The destroyer set alight and sank, as
the Jamaica fired on the other one. The Biteson though had turned sharply and disappeared
under the smoke, so got away. Also in their withdrawal, the Lutzo spotted and fired at
the merchant ships that were miles away at this point, but only inflicted minor damage
on one merchant ship. Then the Hipper appeared, and the British destroyers turned to face
it, getting shot at, but the Hipper sulked away at 1149 hours.
Another engagement happened at 1230 hours, but again, nothing happened, and that was
the last of the action. At 1315 hours, Peyton Jones called for assistance as his ship was
sinking from its earlier wounds. He ordered his men to abandon ship. Luckily, a trawler
came up to rescue the survivors as the ship sank, so many were pulled out of the icy water
in time. Of course, many were also not pulled out of the icy water in time.
The last evening of 1942 was for us memorable, if only for the shock we felt at the loss
of so many of our shipmates, and our anxiety for the lives of those who seemed unlikely
to survive. Hitler waited for news about a German victory, but Kometz kept radio silence
during the retreat, so Hitler just assumed that the attack had been successful. Then
he heard about what happened via the BBC. The British convoy had sailed on, and the
merchant ships reached their destination unscathed. Hitler therefore raged at Grand Admiral Raeder.
"...the ships are utterly useless, idly lying about and lacking any desire to get
into action. This means the passing of the High Seas Fleet. It is now my irrevocable
resolve to remove the guns of the heavy ships for shore defence."
Shocked by the threat of having the fleet dismantled, Grand Admiral Raeder resigned
to be replaced by Dönitz.
However, despite Hitler's raging, and despite some sources saying that it was, the fleet
was neither disarmed nor scrapped. Yes, the Hipper never saw action again because it was
so badly damaged, and the German navy was demoralized by what had happened, but there was no scrapping
of the fleet. It lost reputation, it lost status, and it was restricted in its operational
abilities because this battle showed that the Allies had total above-surface naval superiority.
But it wasn't scrapped. So going back to the original question, no, Hitler didn't
scrap the fleet. But was the battle as decisive as sometimes claimed? Well, the British lost
one old A-class destroyer, the Alkartes, and one minesweeper, the Bramble, and had
another O-class destroyer damaged, the Onslau, although this was quickly repaired. The Germans
had lost one destroyer, the Friedrich-Eckholt, and had sustained significant damage to one
heavy cruiser, the Admiral Hipper. Enough that she was never made operational again.
So in effect, the total losses for the British were one destroyer and one minesweeper, and
the total losses for the Germans were one destroyer and a cruiser. So we could definitely
conclude that the Germans came off worse in this battle, and since the merchant ships
got to their destination without taking any damage, this has been classed as a British
victory.
But the losses weren't significant for either side. If the loss of one destroyer and one
cruiser was enough to decisively cripple the German fleet, then the issue isn't the losses,
but the inferiority of the German fleet. So I don't think the losses are that significant
or decisive.
What is decisive is how the losses were sustained. For most of this battle, two German cruisers
and six destroyers were held off by five British destroyers, one of which was an old variant,
plus a couple of corvettes and a minesweeper. The British were significantly outnumbered
and outgunned. Now yes, it was the two British cruisers that did the damage to the German
ships, but they didn't turn up until right at the end of the battle. Before they turned
up, the Germans should have done a lot more damage to the British ships than they did.
They absolutely had the advantage, and they dropped the ball.
That an enemy force of at least one pocket battleship, one heavy cruiser, and six destroyers
with all the advantages of surprise and concentration should be held off for four hours by five
destroyers, and driven from the area by two 6-inch cruisers, is most creditable and satisfactory.
There are several factors which caused the battle to go the way it did. The German naval
commanders had been hesitant and unwilling to take risks, and were only willing to engage
if they had a decisive advantage. Some have blamed Hitler for this, but this is actually
a necessary strategy in the face of naval superiority. The Germans couldn't afford
to take losses when the British outnumbered and outgunned them, so they told their admirals
to only engage if an opportunity presented itself. The problem is that this resulted
in excessive hesitation, and the lesson that the Germans took away from this was that their
naval commanders had to be given freedom of action. They had to assess the situation themselves
and decide whether to risk a decisive engagement or not. And had this happened at the Barents
Sea, it probably would have resulted in more losses for the British.
But Admiral Cummets was restricted by his orders from above, and received conflicting
orders too, so that when he was presented with a golden opportunity to overwhelm a British
destroyer force and take out a convoy, he hesitated and then disengaged. The weather
also played its part in this, as did the British tactics and the threat of British torpedoes.
Although the intervention of the British cruisers had been timely, it was the constant threat
of the British destroyer's torpedoes, which never actually materialized, which had decisively
robbed the Germans of the advantage they had possessed.
But I wouldn't say this battle was decisive. It's not a turning point or anything like
that. What it is, is a shocking victory for the British. This battle should not have turned
out the way it did, and for that reason, it is an interesting and important battle
to study. So, if you want to read up on this, the most detailed book I've come across
was Dudley Pope's 73 Degrees North. However, if you're interested in hearing about all
the Arctic convoys, not just this battle, then I'd recommend the book Arctic Convoys
by Woodman. Less detailed on each convoy, but a fantastic introduction to the topic.
And for a similar question about how important the Battle of the Atlantic was, check out
this video right here. Thanks for watching, bye for now.
