Xi Jinping’s Destiny: Ruling Forever or Falling Fast? || Digging into China

Hi, I'm Dong Shong. Welcome to Digging into China, where we explore China in depth to reveal unique perspectives. Since Xiinping assumed the power, China has experienced a significant political regression, particularly with his constitutional amendments. This change dismantled the Communist Party's tradition of leaders stepping down after two terms. As a result, the future of Chairman Xi has become increasingly uncertain. What then might be the ultimate fate of a leader like Shiinping by analyzing the outcomes of over 800 dictators since the end of world the world two in 1945. We can categorize their fates and attempt to predict Xiinping's possible destiny. Although more than 800 dictators have emerged globally since World War II, their outcomes can be distilled into three primary categories. Orderly transition, ruling until death, and removed by coup. These categories encompass eight distinct outcomes, some of which may apply to Xi Jinping while others may not. Let us examine each in turn. First, an orderly transition is an outcome many might hope for. While some in China may not fully embrace Western democratic systems, they value the concept of regular power transitions within an authoritarian framework, believing it upholds a fundamental democratic baseline. Without the regular leadership changes, China risks resembling a modern imperial system. For Xi Jinping to be replaced through an orderly transition reminiscent of the Hu Jing Tao and Wjaba era is a vision cherished by those who oppose shei but a support communist party. Yet this vision is unlikely to materialize. An orderly transition is highly improbable for Shiinping primarily due to his evident desire for power. Since taking office, he has consolidated authority through numerous maneuvers, centralizing power in his hands. Naturally, there is no indication he would willingly relinquish it. Beyond the Xi Jinping's personal ambitions, China lacks the political conditions for an orderly transition. Regular transitions are exceedingly rare in authoritarian systems. Many younger Chinese whose memories begin with the transition from Jang Zamin to Huin Tao and then to Shi Jinping may perceive such changes are the norm. However, orderly transitions are exceptionally rare. Among the eight possible outcomes for dictators, they have the lowest probability with only 2% to 3% of dictators experiencing this fate. While Xiinping may seem an outlier compared to Jang Zamin or Huin Tao, historically it is who and Jang who are the exceptions among dictators. Low probability alone does not fully explain the absence of transitions in the Communist Party. Another critical factor is the transformation of China's political power structure under Shiinping. Globally, authoritarian regime transitions primarily occur in communist countries like Vietnam, Laos and China. These nations share a key trait. They operate under a one party multi-leer authoritarian model rather than a single leader model. This multi-leer model often referred to colloquartly as the nine dragons ruling the water describes the collective governance of the standing committee. The communist party calls it a democratic centralism, a term also used by Vietnam. Democratic centralism is closely linked to regular dictator transitions. Only in the multileer system guided by party elders is there room for such transitions. When this system is dismantled, the transitions become nearly impossible. After 1988, following the death of Vietnam's general secretary Lelay Doom, Vietnam saw the end of dominant single leaders. Factional struggles led to multi-leer model enabling leadership transitions. This changed when Yen Fu Tong rose to power after conducting a party purge. Hong established a unified system consolidating military party and admin administrative authority dismantling Vietnam's multileer structure. Consequently, he ruled until his death without stepping down. Two political principles underpinned this dynamic. First, regular transitions result from political group struggles and a power redistribution in multi-leer system. Once power is consolidated, transitions become unnecessary. Second, the consequences of stepping down defer between single leader and multi-leer systems. In a multi-leer system, a retiring dictator retains some political influence remaining part of the collective structure. In a single leader system, stepping down means total loss of power. Relinquishing authority leaves a dictator vulnerable as successors may purge them and their allies to secure their own position. For a single leader dictator, voluntarily seeding power is akin to selfdestruction. China has undergone a similar shift as Vietnam under Yan Fu Pong. Moving from a multile to a single leader system. In this framework, regular power transitions are unfeasible. This explains my skepticism towards online rumors suggesting Xiinping might step down in 2027 or speculation about his successor. As long as Xiinping can govern, he will likely rule until his death in a single leader system. This leads to the second possible outcome. Xiinping ruling until his death. Many consider this the most probable scenario and it is indeed the most common for dictators representing about 35% of all outcomes. Barring major political upheavalss, China is likely to follow this path implying at least two more decades of Xi Jinping's leadership. However, this trajectory may evolve in its later stages. As leaders age, their physical and cognitive abilities may decline, particularly their intellectual capacity. Significant governance failures could lead to a variant known as a tyrant mode, where designated successes seize power before the dictator's death, exploiting their diminished capacity to become the effective ruler. Notable examples include a Soviet leader like Yuri Andropov and Leonid Breznip. In Breznip's final six years, strokes rendered him mentally incapacitated, reducing him to a figurehead. This scenario is uncommon, affecting only about one in five dictators who rule until death. In such cases, declining health leaves them in power in name only with the real authority usurped. Whether Xiinping's later years will steer China toward this tyrant mode and who might emerge as the usurper remains uncertain. China currently adopts a model similar to Putin's avoiding a designated successor to prevent challenges to the dictator's authority. Much like aqing dynasty emperors who refrain from naming a crown prince until Xi Jinping's health visibly declines, a clear successor is unlikely to emerge. At 71, Xiinping is younger than Putin by one year and Trump by seven, suggesting he is far from physical or cognitive decline. A potential successor may not appear until at least 2032. Even then, assessing their power base and she's health would be necessary to determine if they could assume control early. Notably, such usurpers are unlikely to be figures like Lie Chong or Tai Chi, who at the 66 and 69 belongs to she's generation. Any usurper would likely come from the next generation. A clear successor would not necessarily indicate she's retirement but rather signal health issues serving as the clearest sign of his physical decline. These scenarios assume Xi Jinping and the Communist Party can maintain control for over 20 years. Another plausible outcome for China is Xiinping's removal through a coup. The third major possibility coups encompass a broad category with several subcategories. Surprisingly, the most common outcome is exile. While the term exile is less familiar in China due to the scarcity of exiles, globally it is the most frequent fate for dictators ousted by coup with nearly half ending up in exile. This trend has grown in modern times as armed revolutions have waned and the political conflicts have softened making exile more prevalent. In 2024, two prominent dictators failed. Syria Assad overthrown by armed forces and Bangladesh's Hassina holded by protest. Neither faced execution or trial. Both went into exile. Assad now resides in Russia while Hassina is in India. However, this outcome may not suit Shiinping. Exiles typically flee to countries with which they have geopolitical ties, often a patron state. Assad's regime relied on Russia, so he fled there. Hassina's government was supported by India, leading her to seek refuge there. China has geopolitical partners like Iran, North Korea, and Russia. But nonequalify as a patron state, limiting their ability to host Xiinping in exile. If she were to go to exile tomorrow, where might he go? North Korea's poverty makes it an unlikely destination, and Iran's cultural differences may deter sheep. Russia might theoretically serve as a patron, but any new Chinese government, democratic or authoritarian, would wield significant global influence, sheltering she could antagonize the new China, a risk Russia might avoid. Only a nation far stronger than or comparable to the new China could afford to host sheep. The United States or European Union might fit this description, but their acceptance of an exiled she seems implausible. With no viable host nation, Shiin Ping is unlikely to follow the exile path of other dictators. If exile is improbable and a Shiinping is ousted, only a few outcomes remain. Execution, imprisonment or house arrest. The outcome hinges on the intensity of the conflict during his removal. High intens higher intensity leads to harsher fates. Lower intensity results in better treatment. Intensity refers uh refers to the level of struggle during Xiinping's ousting. Low intensity involves internal party conflicts with minimal civilian impact. Medium intensity includes public protest, a mild suppression, and a dictator's eventual removal. High intensity entails widespread protest, severe suppression, or even armed the revolutions before the dictators fall. Consider the lowest intensity, internal party struggles. If Xiinping were ousted by fractional rivalries, his outcome would likely be favorable. Such conflicts rarely involve bloodshed, limiting public resentment. Hardy elites often adhere to a principle of restraint. Globally, dictators removed by internal struggles are rarely executed or jailed. House arrest is common, accounting for about 10% of outcomes. Nikita Krushchev exemplifies this. After reforms threatened the Soviet elites, he was ousted by Brev in 1964 during a Black Sea vacation. He was treated decently living in a rural estate under restricted contact effectively under house arrest. House arrest is familiar in China. Leaders like Haong and Jaoyang faced similar fates. After losing to Dang Xiaoing, Huaong was effectively under house arrest, rarely appearing publicly but retaining some party roles. Jao X Yang's fate was harsher. After the 1989 reform failures, he was stripped of all positions and a place under house arrest. However, Shiinping facing house arrest due to internal struggles is unlikely in China's current political climate. After repeated purges, the Communist Party lacks any force capable of challenging sheep. Highranking threats have been neutralized with the Janzaming deceased and Hu Jing Tao marginalized. Expecting an opposition faction to stage a coup is unrealistic. The improbability of internal coup reduces the likelihood of house arrest for Xi Jinping. Yet public protests remain possible. If largecale protests erupt, Xi Jinping's response will shape his fate. if he employs a ruthless suppression, crushing descent, imprisoning uh protesters and creating a dedicated repression apparatus until the military or party at least defect. Execution is likely. Nico Chosko's uh case is illustrated. His brutal rule in Romania fueled immense resentment leading to his immediate execution upon overthrow. While some hope for this outcome for Xiinping, it is rare, affecting only 5% of dictators. This outcome's reality stems not from the low frequency or dictator of dictator oustings. Over half faces issues during their tenure, but from the fact that a few dictators are as inflexible as the choses. Many surrender or flee during protests or rival factions seize power within the communist party. Reformist factions may exist currently lacking strength but potentially empowered by protest to oust Xiinping possibly reversing the 1989 Tanaman dynamics. She might compromise rather than resist. Even without the reformists, Xiinping could step down amid the relentless protest driven by economic decline or a failed Taiwan campaign. Compromising with protesters or supportive party factions could lead to imprisonment, which accounts for about 15% of dictator outcomes. In this case, Xi Jinping's treatment might remain lenient, likely facing symbolic imprisonment rather than a lengthy sentence. South Korea's Tron Doan and Ro Taiw sentenced to death and life imprisonment in 1996 were pardoned in 1997 serving just over two years. Argentina's Hi Videla despite persecuting thousands was pardoned after two to three years. Such pardons reflect negotiations to ensure smooth transitions, balancing justice with safety guarantees to encourage surrender, a compromise in revolutionary transitions. This also mitigates public anger, making symbolic imprisonment acceptable. While some view Xiinping as power hungry, his cautious governing style suggests he might yield quickly to massive protests. Another less common outcome is assassination, representing under 5% of dictator fates. Slightly more likely than orderly transitions, but less common than others. For Xiinping, this may not be as improbable. Assassinations typically arise internally, not externally due to dictators robust security. South Korea's Pakuni was killed by his intelligence chief. Congo's Lu Hong Desi Cabella by a bodyguard and Egypt's Arwa Sadat by an army officer. These deaths stemmed from internal betrayals under specific conditions. The dictates of dominance prevents traditional challenges and a significant discontent fest within the ruling elite. Pakongh's harsh rule purging dissenters created a resentment but his economic success solidified his power. Frequent purges left officials paranoid leading to his assassination by Kim Jagu who feared his own purge. China's current situation mirrors this. Xi Jinping's purge have eliminated organized opposition but fosters unease. Recent purges reached the vice chairman Hwong, a political bureau level figure. Could they extend to Lie Ch or Tai Chi? Those targeted may resist and lacking political means to challenge Shei, assassination becomes plausible, elevating its likelihood for Shi Jinping. Having reviewed all outcomes, some can be excluded for Xi Jinping. orderly transition, exile and a house arrest. This leaves ruling until death, imprisonment, execution or assassination. Importantly, whether Xiinping faces imprisonment, execution or assassination, these outcomes do not guarantee democratization. Only 35% of dictators die in power peacefully. If every ousting led to democracy, authoritarianism would have vanished, many authoritarian regimes simply replace one dictator with another. So, optimism should be tempered. Thank you so much for watching. If you find this video helpful, please like it, drop a comment below, and hit the subscribe button right here. It really helps YouTube suggest my video to others. I'll be back with more content soon. and