Foreign policy
Nehru's entire term as prime minister was conterminous with the peak of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but he refused to ally India with either of them. Originally, this policy was an assertion of India's right, after attainment of independence, to conduct her international relations without being tied to the apron strings of Great Britain or any other great power. But it also became, in Nehru's hands, a calculated and sophisticated response to the postwar scene, dominated as it was by the rivalry of the two superpowers. Nehru, who, besides his lifelong association with Gandhi, had been trained as a scientist and was a self-taught historian, was quick to perceive that the two power blocs were poised for mutual destruction, which, in the post-Hiroshima era, posed a serious threat to the future of humankind. India's refusal to be stampeded into either bloc blazed a trail that most of the newly liberated countries of Asia and Africa followed. The organization of the nonaligned movement remained somewhat loosely knit and amorphous, but it nevertheless became a force to reckon with inside and outside the United Nations, and it acted as a vocal pressure group in the battle against neocolonialism and racism and in favor of world peace. At the Bandung (1956) and Belgrade (1961) conferences of nonaligned countries, Nehru's was on the whole a reassuring voice and a steadying hand on the leaders of the Afro-Asian bloc.
Nehru's diplomatic style was peculiarly his own; it owed much to his experience as a nationalist leader for three decades, when he was continually, and publicly, analyzing problems and suggesting solutions in intellectual and moral terms. His instant and candid comments on world events, especially in the early 1950s, evoked much resentment in the West. It was alleged that his criticisms of the actions (such as in Hungary) of the Soviet Union tended to be more cautious and modulated than his criticisms of the actions (such as over Suez) of the Western powers. The fact is that Nehru's sharp criticism of particular policies of the Western democracies was intended to bring to bear the pressure of public opinion in these countries on their governments. Since this method could not work in the case of the Soviet bloc (the media being controlled by the state), the use of the diplomatic channels was a better option for Nehru than was public criticism. Nehru's object was, as he once put it, "to bring about results rather than put up people's backs." On such issues as West Berlin and the independence of Austria, his moderating influence through personal appeals to Soviet leaders, exercised behind the scenes, was much greater than what has been commonly assumed. Willy Brandt, the chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) during the Berlin crisis, told the author of this article in 1971 that Nehru had used his influence with the Soviet Union to calm the crisis. Similarly, according to Chancellor Kreisky of Austria, Nehru had already before 1955 begun to mediate between Austria and the Soviet Union. "We asked Nehru," Kreisky recalled, "to tell the Soviets that if the Soviets were to sign a treaty, Austria would become a neutral country."
It was a great disappointment to Nehru that he failed to win and sustain the goodwill of India's two great neighbors, China and Pakistan, but it was not for lack of trying. "The root cause" with Pakistan, as Nehru explained to President Harry Truman in 1949 during his visit to the United States in 1949, was "the emotional climate of Pakistan whose people were being constantly encouraged by the government and leaders to pursue a policy of inspired fear and hatred towards India. Kashmir was thus not so much a cause as an illustration of tensions between the two countries."
India was one of the first countries to recognize Communist China. Nehru showed extraordinary restraint when Chinese troops marched into Tibet in 1950. He even incurred the displeasure of the Western bloc by supporting China's entry into the United Nations. But from 1959, India was faced with territorial claims and encroachments on the India-China border. Three years later came a surprise attack in full force. On the Indian side, there were doubtless lapses both in diplomacy and defense. The Indian positions on the mountainous terrain in the northeast were not well defended; India suffered a defeat that deeply hurt Nehru and perhaps hastened his death in May 1964.
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