n this chat at Startup School Paris, Datadog CEO Olivier Pomel reflects on his startup journey in New York, how staying close to raw customer feedback and support tickets keeps an 8,000 person company honest, and why moving faster on both hiring and firing remains the hardest thing for any founder to actually execute.
00:00 — Intro 01:43 — How Datadog Actually Started 04:47 — The DevOps Insight Behind the Company 06:17 — Riding the Cloud Explosion 07:29 — Was It Ever Obvious It Would Work? 09:03 — Building Culture Without Writing It Down 10:28 — Why Olivier Still Reads Support Tickets 14:22 — 20–25 Products: How They Decide What to Build 16:04 — Going Public on COVID Lockdown Day 19:19 — AI: Winner or Loser? 21:40 — The New Bets: Agents & Smarter Observability 24:17 — "In Two Quarters, No Code Anymore" 25:49 — 20 Years With a Co-Founder 27:10 — Start in Europe or Move to the US?
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Video Summary
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Olivier, co-founder of Datadog, shares the company's evolution from early rejections to becoming an observability leader. He discusses the impact of the cloud explosion, his pragmatic approach to leadership and culture, the challenges of navigating public markets, and how AI is fundamentally transforming software engineering and operational models.
My co-founder stood in front of the whole engineering team
a couple of months ago saying,
hey, in two quarters,
we're not writing any code anymore.
And we saw, like literally,
absolutely excellent developers,
like not beginners,
but people rebuild whole systems in a couple of days alone
that were absolutely amazing.
Things that would have been possible,
but, you know, done by a team of six over six months.
Welcome, Olivier.
Thank you.
By the way, it looks like an IQ test of sorts here,
like there's six microphones of different colors on it.
We always like tests.
As we were preparing that session,
Olivier, he reminded me about something here.
I'm sure you wanted to say that, right?
Yes, so we actually did not get into Y Combinator.
Datadog did not get into Y Combinator.
I checked, they applied.
Yes, we applied.
We got an interview.
I've got a rejection email from Paul Graham still, you know.
You put that on the wall,
so it's thanks to us that you became such a big player.
Exactly, you know, like we had to prove you wrong.
Okay, so if any of you get ever rejected,
here is the outcome.
Yes, yes, and then here's the thing.
So then I received, like when I agreed to do this,
I received an invite to a YC dinner in Paris.
And then I said, oops, sorry, we are not into YC,
so you're not invited anymore.
So I got rejected twice by YC.
Well, the second time, hopefully it didn't hurt as much.
Well, but you're here, and we'll make up for that, hopefully.
Yes.
All right, you and your co-founder, Alexi, you met,
so you were in Paris, right, at Central?
Yep.
That's how you met, and then you ended up working in New York.
So why did you leave?
Like, was that a deliberate choice back then?
So no, it was not a deliberate choice.
So I graduated in 99.
I had an end-of-study internship,
and I did it at IBM Research in upstate New York,
which at the time was a fairly legit place for research.
Not anymore?
I mean, now, you know, look, now there's, you know,
DeepMind and OpenAI.
More sexy places to do research.
Yes, yes.
Were you doing research there?
I was doing research on internet protocols,
you know, so at the time, sending emails.
So not quite AI, but, you know, email works.
So, but anyway, Alexi, my co-founder,
was a couple of years ahead of me in school.
He had already been to that internship
and was still there.
He had started working at IBM after that.
And so we met there, for real.
Like, we met a little bit in school, in weird ways.
I can come back to that.
And then we spent some time at IBM.
I thought I would stay in New York six months
and I'm still there.
You know, it's like 26, 27 years later.
So that part was a happy accident, I would say.
When halfway through the experience at IBM,
it was the dot-com boom.
So startups everywhere in New York, super exciting,
lots going on.
I started working for startups.
We actually started working together with Alexi.
How many here know about the dot-com boom?
Well, they may have heard a little bit about it.
And then after that, it was a dot-com bust.
So I got a little bit of the dot-com boom
and the entirety of the dot-com bust.
So a lot of lessons learned about what to do
and what to do in a startup for that reason.
But you were not building a startup back then?
I was working in startups, not mine,
but I was working in startups.
One of them was actually, should have been pretty amazing,
but made a lot of mistakes, you know,
in terms of spending too much on the wrong things,
not shipping product when you should have shipped product,
like a number of things to remember.
Okay, is that where you got the idea for Datadog?
So later on, so after that,
the things got worse in New York.
There was the September 11th and everything else.
So it was pretty dark,
but I decided to stay there for personal reasons.
And I started working again with Alexi
in an educational software startup.
And at the time, it was after the bust,
so nobody thought technology would be worth anything
ever again.
And so we started working there.
That company was pretty successful.
We built the tech teams there.
So I was building the dev team,
Alexi was building the ops team, the tech ops team.
It was pretty successful, it grew, it was fast.
And that's what led us to Datadog.
How big was the company?
When we left, it was like 800 people or something.
Okay, so it's pretty big.
So you had like a lot of DevOps issues, operation issues.
Yes, yes.
And also we lived through developers hate operations,
operations hate developers,
people point fingers at each other all the time.
And it was weird because Alexi and I
were very, very good friends.
The team supported to us.
We tried not to hire any jerks.
There were already observability companies
out there back then, right?
It was not called observability, it was called monitoring.
Okay.
And it was very job-specific and very reactive.
So for network monitoring, you'd have a product.
You'd have something that the ops team would use,
but the developers would never touch it.
Developers would be blind to anything
that happened in production, pretty much.
And you started targeting that audience, right?
You were mostly bottom-up, at least at first.
Yes, bottom-up.
And we started in 2010.
And what we didn't completely realize at the time
was that the premise for the company,
which was, let's bring DevOps together into one platform,
was actually completely central
to the explosion of the cloud.
And we also completely underestimated
the explosion of the cloud.
We thought, oh, that's interesting,
this Amazon thing.
But when you talk to real companies,
they all say it's a toy and they're never going to use it.
Turns out, they all did.
But that was your bet back then?
Because you were at cloud first.
Yeah, so the bet was DevOps together.
And then the first infrastructure
we started supporting for that was cloud infrastructure,
because we talked to smaller companies.
And the smaller companies, or more modern companies,
were built on the cloud.
And that's what got us to that.
That became the tailwind of everything.
Yes.
The cloud market exploded.
Cloud market exploded, DevOps was smushed together.
Our product also was,
we called it infrastructure monitoring initially.
We didn't call it observability, the word didn't exist.
But it didn't look at all like infrastructure monitoring
that came before.
And one of the reasons for us to there was,
we didn't do that initially.
Initially, we called it something different.
It was a data platform for DevOps to collaborate
and things like that.
And because we thought monitoring was a thing
from the 90s, and it was boring, and it was old.
And it turns out people love the idea of a new thing,
but they have no idea why they should pay for it.
And their boss has no idea why they should pay for it.
Whereas you say, oh, it's infrastructure monitoring.
And then everybody and their boss understands,
yes, actually, it's a product.
We need that to categorize it.
It's real.
Let's get it.
How fast did you get there?
Because we kind of like are nearly,
I mean, owning that category, I would even say today.
Was that obvious really fast that it would work?
Or did you have to go through some very difficult times?
It was not obvious at all.
I mean, for one, we didn't get into web commutator.
Did I mention that?
Probably, yeah.
Did you have any other rejections or any low times after?
No, the first one, we raised an angel round
and it was super painful.
We couldn't get any of the smart investors
to pay attention.
If you were a big VC, we were in New York.
You had VCs in New York, VCs in the Bay Area.
Not much going on in Europe.
And we'd go to New York and the VCs would be interested.
And then they realize,
like they see our competitor slide
and they realize they don't really understand
any of these companies.
And then they think, okay, it's not for me.
I don't know this market.
And then we'd go pitch the VCs in the Bay Area.
At the time, they only invested in the Bay Area.
It's very, very focused.
And to them, it was a form of mental impairment
to try to start an infrastructure company,
but not in the Bay Area.
And so I could even hear them speak slower and louder.
Just to make sure you understand that.
Yes, yes.
So I think it was-
You couldn't frame that on the wall.
I couldn't frame that.
Yeah, you know.
But I guess it's kind of like,
you want to prove them wrong.
And in a way, you can turn that into crazy motivation
to prove them wrong.
Oh, exactly.
And I think we,
in the way we build a company afterwards,
there's a number of things we did
that were on purpose different
from what we saw Bay Area companies do.
Because we thought, hey, we're going to do differently.
We're going to be better.
We're going to do a-
So for example, we never wrote down the culture.
At the time, I think a bit less today,
but at the time, every company had five values
or eight principles or nine concepts, or there's a-
So what did you do instead?
So what we didn't,
we said, what we said is,
hey, look, if you need don't be evil
to be written on the wall,
you probably shouldn't work here.
And what we said instead is culture flows from the top.
So we exemplify the culture.
We hire, we promote, we fire based on the culture.
And today, that still works.
So your culture is you.
Well, I mean, the culture is what we do.
That's not us.
Yeah, I mean, like you say,
it needs to come from the top, but that's cool.
I mean, I'm not-
And look, we're fairly, we're pragmatic too, right?
Every year we ask ourselves,
hey, is it the year we need to write it down?
Because look, we need to hire 3,000 people.
We need to train those 3,000 people.
How many people today?
We are 8,000.
8,000.
We need to train those people.
What do we tell them?
And so far, I think it still works.
That actually makes me think about a conversation
I had with Pierre Béthouin, that you know very well,
because I work with him too.
And because of this conversation,
I asked him, hey, what should I ask Olivier?
And actually, one of the things he was very impressed
is how heavily involved you are still
on some very small product decisions,
and you don't spend your time
in that strategic kind of whatever,
slide decks and stuff.
How do you keep that?
How do you keep that going?
Yeah, so first of all, I hate the S word.
When people use strategic in a sentence,
I usually, I replace that mentally by bullshit.
In some cases, it's meaningful, right?
Not always.
And like everyone in the company knows that.
Yes.
I guess.
That's the culture thing.
Well, people make the mistake once usually, but you know.
So first of all, I think product,
when you, for what we do,
like we are like Enfra and product company,
it's very important to be in touch with the product.
It's a big part of my job.
Of course, we have plenty of people who handle the product.
Like we have people who spend time with customers.
We have people who are focused on all the small things,
but I think it's very important for me
and a lot of the management team
to be aware of everything that's happening in product,
read all of the new developments.
And as you get further up in the org, ending with me,
you're in a position where you can really edit.
Like you can say, hey, I think this is too much.
Or I think it's not enough.
Or let's stop doing that.
Or I don't understand that part.
If I don't understand it,
how are the customers going to understand it?
Like this is this level of a-
If you could become a bottleneck at some point.
So it's not blocking, you know?
So I don't try to,
I'm not a necessary approval step, you know, and everything.
But, and part of the game is to understand
where to direct the attention and where not.
Another thing I think I encourage everyone to do
as soon as you start scaling a little bit in your company
is to keep in touch
with what's actually happening on the ground.
And by that I mean the actual support requests,
the actual sales transcripts from the sales conversations,
the actual customer feedback,
the actual employee comments that you get
in the employee surveys and things like that.
Of course you can't read everything.
I mean, except for,
I still read all of the employee survey comments,
but for the rest, I don't read everything.
You sample.
But when you do that,
you get a good sense
for what the fabric of the universe actually is
in the company.
And you don't just get the beautiful summaries that,
you know, find their way up to you,
you know, where everything's beautiful.
All these new products is great.
And they say,
but I read two complaints about it from customers.
Like they say it doesn't work, you know,
or it's too expensive.
What do you mean?
How often does it happen?
Like, I kind of like,
you discover something reading some survey
or some feedback from customers,
and then you go to the team.
Hey, come on, like, it's not working.
Look.
And before they were kind of like trying to message,
open message.
Well, what I do is I just pick up those random emails
or, you know, Slack or whatever.
And I just, I just reply with a question, you know.
I say, I don't understand what's going on.
And then, you know.
That's passive-aggressive.
And then, you know, the,
what happens is that,
there's two things that happen.
First one is the person who's receiving that
is wondering, oh, why, why,
why is he looking at that?
And then after that,
the positive effect is that the whole management chain,
if they're not,
instead of looking up and trying to figure out
who they're going to manage up,
they start looking down and starting to figure out,
okay, so it's actually happening.
I better know because if I get asked,
I need to understand.
So you're going back to the culture,
showing by example in a way.
Yeah.
You need to demonstrate to leave the culture yourself
so that you're, everyone who reports to you
is going to do the same thing.
Yeah.
Your job is not to understand what I want as a boss.
Your job is to understand what's happening
within your span of control.
And there's a need to very, very precisely
what's working and not working.
I mean, the company has become huge now
and is a multi-product.
How many products have you, do you have?
We have about around 20, 25.
20, 25 products.
I mean, how,
how do you decide how you expand the portfolio?
How do you decide the next thing to build?
In a way,
so we're kind of platforming as a product.
So we see a lot of usage from our customers
around our products.
So they sort of build things around our product.
Like they have their own kind of extensions,
their own workflows that they use us in.
So it gives us an idea of what kind of problems they have
and where they think we belong.
So we do a lot of that.
Like we build a lot of the things that we see them do.
And sometimes we also have some more,
I can say,
I'll use the S word,
some more strategic projects.
Come on, bullshit.
Yes.
Where we think, okay, we're not,
nobody's asking us to do that,
but it looks like the world is kind of going that way.
And so we should be doing something there.
When you do that,
those tend to have potentially a bigger impact
because this can be brand new things.
On the other hand,
you tend to be wrong often because you just made that up.
And I would say one thing that's a bit changing now
is that with AI in particular,
things are changing so fast
that you just can't wait to see the demand materialize
from the customer base.
So you need to get ahead of it,
which I think us and many others,
I think are going to get wrong more often.
We need to be at ease with that.
How does the fact that you're public now
impact how you make decisions then?
Like, I mean, I guess like, yeah,
like the price of the share is an important factor
for you now?
The price of the share is not, like we,
so we've been public since 2019.
Our lockup expired the day of the COVID lockdowns.
So I don't know if you remember,
there was a big market crash that day.
It was also a lockup expiring.
One of our biggest investors got scared
and he dumped everything that day.
So I think we're down like 65% or something like it was.
What was the entry price?
Like, I know that what you are valued today,
but I don't know how that was when you-
Well, at that time, I think we went down
from being worth 10 billion
to being worth, I don't know, four or something like that.
Okay, like a huge drop.
Yes, especially when, you know,
when everybody's sitting at that valuation
and people are waiting to sell after the lockdown expires,
you know, like it's real money
that people can use to buy real apartments.
Like, you know, it's tangible, right?
And so that was pretty bad.
And then we saw, and then that crash lasted two weeks.
Then the market went up like crazy again.
And then it kept going up like crazy in 2021, 2022.
And then it started crashing again
and then it started going up again.
So, you know, we've seen, like,
we've seen the stock go up and down all the time.
And I think that we've gotten used to it.
Did you have to change how you lead the company
because you were public?
So not really, no.
I think it's a, like what you'll see,
like as you run a company, a private company,
you spend a lot of time talking to investors
because you probably will need to raise funding again.
And your job when you're the CEO of a company
is to make sure you don't run out of money.
And as part of that, every single investor out there
should believe that you're the future of sliced bread.
And, you know, for that, you need to spend time
and make sure that they know you
and they understand what you do
and they think you're great.
So you spend a lot of time, at least I did,
spend a lot of time with investors.
When you're public, it's very choreographed.
Like there's a couple of-
Every quarter, you have that call.
Yes, you have, you spend a couple of days
every quarter on that, spend a week preparing,
you know, to make sure you have the right message.
But then you don't worry about the share price,
like how the market's going to react
to whatever you announce?
You do, I mean, look, the main issue it creates
is if you do something that's unpopular with the market,
you're going, maybe you're going to lose,
you know, 20, 30, 40%.
Does it impact the company in the short term?
No, but it creates a comp issue
because people are paying RSUs.
So the main things you have to worry about is,
okay, so what does it change to comp
and how can we make that?
The actual risk is not the survival of the company,
it's kind of like losing key performers
because their RSUs are worthless.
Yes, yes, and that becomes comp management.
That becomes, okay, so how do we do,
and also keep in mind that people join
at different point in time,
so their comp is actually at different levels,
you know, so you have to be more,
to look into more details of what's going on.
How about the AI kind of like revolution in a way?
I guess the market also was thinking about that,
looking at your company, because obviously early on,
it was not the views, you would be a winner or a loser.
How did that impact you?
I mean, we'll see, it changes every couple of months now.
Okay, it looks like you're on the good trend now.
Yeah, now we're on the winner side, which is good.
We should be.
But you didn't start there.
Yeah, well, we started in the, I don't know, side
from the investors, and I mean, look,
the variety of it is there's a ton of disruption,
and for investors in general,
but I would say even more so public investors,
it's really, really hard to understand,
what things look like three, four, five years from now.
And something, if you, when you start a company,
you're going to reach VC investors,
you're going to have maybe two or three
of these VC investors that are on your board
or spend time with your company.
And you might go and have coffee with your friends
and say, oh, my VCs don't understand me.
But the VCs you have as a private company,
they spend so much more time on your company,
they're so much more concentrated than the public investors.
Like public investors have,
they're looking at 20, 30 different names.
They come in and out of these names
a couple of times a year, as opposed to a VC
that's going to be in like seven, eight companies
and stick around for five to 10 years.
So that's a very, very, very different deal.
So public investors, they have less,
it's for them, it's harder to reason about things.
So what you need to do is you need to make sure
that you tell the right story to benefit your company.
And then you produce numbers
that actually agree with that story.
And if you do that consistently enough
throughout the years, that's our job as a public company,
then you do fine with them.
And what does that mean for you on the company side,
not the public investor side?
Because I guess you had to rethink the product,
you had to make new bets.
In a way, you couldn't stay defensive,
you had to become aggressive and on the attack, right?
Yeah, so I mean, there's a few things.
One is working in a bit of a different way.
So I mentioned earlier, AI is changing fast.
So you need to take more shots and be wrong more often.
And so we pivoted a little bit to that.
In one example being,
look at the way development has changed.
It's changed three times,
like the way you write code or don't write code
has changed three times in the last year.
It's impossible to predict that a year ahead of time.
So you have to be very reactive
and you have to try a lot of things all the time.
So what are your latest bets?
Well, so we're getting earlier into the...
So a few things.
One is, we're investing a lot
so that the product can be used by agents.
Because we see that in our customers,
we see a lot of that.
Another one is that we're building a lot of the smarts
directly to the product.
If you use cloud code, for example,
to work on your ops issues,
it's a little bit like trying to send a postcard
by buying a business class ticket for it.
There's a lot you can do and you should be able to do
that would be directly fused on the data plane for us
inside your observability as being outside of it.
So we're building a lot of that
so that the system can do everything on its own.
And I guess AI companies who are growing super fast
also need observability.
Yes.
Is that a big piece of your market now?
Yes.
And that's also, in terms of how we find out
what to do next and where the world's going.
So we have the top 10 AI companies in the world
as customers.
We have all of the startups that are doing,
or not all, but a good fraction of the startups
that are building on AI.
And we also have the big enterprises
that make up the normal work, so to speak,
like the big banks, the trained companies and whatnot.
And so we get a pretty good panel of what people do.
We see the AI labs, like the top two or three AI labs
in the world use our product in weird ways
because they have infinite compute and infinite inference
and models that nobody has yet.
And so it...
Does it give you a glimpse of what's coming up after?
Yes, but it's not necessarily the most representative
because again, they have all that.
So we see, we get a sense of that,
but the rest of the world doesn't have infinite compute.
So they might do things in a way
that the rest of the world is not going to do.
Like, most companies are not going to be very happy
to incinerate a billion in compute
to do a lot of internal things.
In the West, they do this kind of...
How about you?
Are you, like, how do you use AI internally?
Are you token maxing?
We're not token maxing.
But look, my co-founder stood in front
of the whole engineering team a couple of months ago
saying, hey, in two quarters,
we're not writing any code anymore.
So directive, no code anymore.
Yes, I mean, look, the reality of it is we will write code.
We will read code, right?
But the point here is it's an inversion.
Like, you used to mostly write, sometimes automate,
and now you're going to mostly automate, sometimes write.
Does that change how you lead the teams,
how you hire them?
Like, I don't know, any surprising things you've seen?
It changes everything.
But the tricky part is we don't know
what the destination looks like yet.
So we know, for example,
that smaller teams can do a lot more,
which is part of the, hey, you can do more
and be wrong more often, but that's fine
because you also, instead of having a team of eight
to explore something,
you can do it with a team of two or three.
So that's great.
On the other hand, nobody knows
what the process looks like a year from now.
Nobody knows how many PMs, how many designers,
how many security people,
how many engineers you need to build a thing.
Do you get some benefits on the way?
It feels like you probably have already
some big ROI on some of these changes.
Oh yeah, I mean, look, we've seen, like many companies,
like we had this moment in December,
I think in part because the models got really good,
the threshold was crossed,
but also in part because people had a bit more time
on their hands, you know, it's the holiday season.
Hey, maybe I'll do a bit of a hack project on my own.
And we saw like literally absolutely excellent developers,
like not beginners,
but people rebuild whole systems in a couple of days alone
that were absolutely amazing.
Things that would have been possible,
but, you know, done by a team of six over six months.
And so that convinced us that, yes, you know,
there's enough, we have to pivot.
The organization is going to be painful,
it is painful, but we're doing it.
And speaking of your co-founder Alexey,
I mean, you've been working together
for like 20 years or something.
Like, how can you still, like,
how did you make that last?
Yeah, I mean, look, we're a bit of an old couple now,
I guess, you know, I think there's a couple of things.
So one is we work together without starting a company
together for almost 10 years.
And so we already had a good, a lot of experience,
like, you know, with the right way of working together,
the right boundary, you know,
like, you have to test those things a little bit, you know.
And then as we, when we started the company,
like, we also tried to give ourselves
a lot of space to talk.
So...
Any hack, any tips?
I mean, you just have, we just have a standing launch,
you know, and there's no...
Once a week or something?
Yeah, well, I mean, it's mostly once every two weeks now,
but yeah, it's a, and the point here is
you don't have a specific agenda, you just talk.
And it's important to get what's in...
Got to agree more.
Yeah.
And also, you know, when you run a company,
there's not a lot of people you can bitch to,
or, you know, like you, you can't, you...
So a co-founder is a great person for that.
So most of the people here are not necessarily Paris,
but at least Europe.
If they start a company, should they start it here,
or should they go to New York or SF?
I think it's fine to start here.
I think it was not true when I started Datalog.
I think you started a little bit later.
I started here in 2012.
Yes.
But then we moved to SF, so it's kind of like...
I see.
But we kept the team here, so...
And I think it, so when I started, it was not,
it was hard to get funding, it was hard to get everything.
I think now you can get funding
pretty much anywhere in Europe.
On the other hand, I think it's absolutely critical
to go after the U.S. market as soon as you can.
So as soon as you have a product
with some form of market fit, go after the U.S. market.
But don't you need to be in the U.S. when you do that?
Yes, but I think the whole company doesn't need to be.
I think typically if there are two founders,
one of the founders moves to the U.S.
And you cannot start in the U.S.
without having a founder there.
And you should absolutely go to the U.S.,
but I don't think you need to move the whole company.
And you did the reverse move, right?
You created a team in Paris once you were bigger.
Yes.
Was that mostly talent acquisition?
It was mostly talent.
In fact, we had a number of people in the U.S. on visas
who either couldn't renew their visa
or wanted to go back to France for family reasons.
And that started our office in Paris.
You had a lot of French employees in the U.S.?
Yes, we hired, like, we came there on an internship
and that's the thing, we hired a lot of people that way.
Excellent.
All right.
Maybe to conclude, is there one piece of advice
you would give yourself 15 years ago?
So here's the thing.
All of the mistakes and all the hardships and everything,
this sort of kind of made us successful.
I said, not being easy to fundraise initially,
I think that sort of created our value.
Selection from YC is the reason for your success, right?
Yeah, I mean, maybe we could have gotten to YC
and everything would be better.
Hopefully we would not do that mistake again.
Yes, but look, there's the one thing,
the one lesson I keep learning all the time
is that you should always move faster,
especially when it comes to hiring and firing.
I think these are the two things that...
Firing I hear all the time.
Yes.
Hiring, I don't hear it that all the time.
Well, I think the two go together.
I think it's, you can take more risk
and you can hire faster instead of...
So for example, one thing I hear often is,
oh, we are looking for a head of sales
because most founders are not salespeople.
And so, oh, I'm looking for a head of sales.
But I'm not sure I found the right profile yet.
And my answer to that is,
hey, let's find someone who looks good,
hire them right away.
And if it doesn't work out, you know, you fire them.
But it's much better to do that than to wait.
Like you'll run more cycles, you'll have more chances.
I think it's too hard to know anyway before you've tried.
So I guess you've done that yourself now.
Yes, but, you know, I made the mistake initially.
I was paralyzed trying to make the perfect hire,
and you know...
And then you would keep them for too long.
And then, and well, that's the other part.
You know, it's usually the first time
you fire someone in your company,
you feel horrible and you think
everybody's going to hate you for it.
And mostly what you see the rest of the company is like,
I mean, what took you so long?
What did you wait?
Awesome.
Thank you, Olivier.
It was awesome to have you with us.