A superb set of documentaries, with each episode providing a different segment of the Vietnam war, as seen through the eyes of the veterans of the war. With excellent interviews and rare footage. Hosted by reporter and veteran Jack Smith.
This is the episode: “War in the Skies.” The air power in the Vietnam War was greater than in any war in U.S. history. Flying "low and slow," evading rifle fire, SAMs and MIGs, the F-105 and the A-1 Skyraider "jocks" learn that "win equals live." To be shot down over North Vietnam is sometimes a trip to the "Hanoi Hilton." Two American Air Force "Aces" make aviation history--shooting down two MIGs in 90 seconds. This is the dramatic story of a daily routine punctuated by terror under constant fire, uncommon courage and unspoken heroism. This program includes historical footage and interviews with the people who know this story the best, the soldiers who fought it.
This series first aired in October 1998 in six parts. Apologies for any technical issues with the picture or audio - this transfer was taken from an original VHS copy of the program.
For education, entertainment, enlightenment and inspiration. We hope you enjoy and even learn something. Never forget!
I'm Jack
Smith,
and
these
are
stories
of the
Vietnam
War,
told
by the
people
who
know it
best, those who fought it.
I was one of them.
We often talk about Vietnam as a guerrilla war,
but more than any other war fought by
the U.S., Vietnam was an air war.
Hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs dropped
and more than 3,000 U.S. aircraft lost during
the course of the war.
But the statistics only tell part of the story,
a story of fighter pilots flying directly
into heavy fire, of helicopter pilots
who risked their lives to save downed airmen.
A POW standing together to survive the hardships of captivity.
This is their story.
The first U.S. airstrikes
into North Vietnam come in the summer of 1964
as retaliation for an attack
on a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Then, after another enemy attack
in early 1965,
this time on an American base at Pleiku,
killing eight Americans and wounding more than a hundred,
the U.S. responds again.
As a result of this action...
Elements of the U.S. and South Vietnamese Air Forces
were directed to launch joint retaliatory attacks
against barracks
and staging areas in the southern portion of North Vietnam.
By early March 1965, the U.S. begins
a formal bombing campaign against the North,
codenamed Operation Rolling Thunder.
I don't know.
The five-year-old
Air Force captain's
first combat tour,
he was briefed to fly one of the early Rolling Thunder strikes.
I remember the name of the target, it was Zambang,
it was an ammo dump, right just north of the DMZ.
It was kind of great because we had gone to war
and we had hit our first really hard target with a lot of flak,
there was a lot of flak that day, but everybody was home
and that night we were drinking at the bar and having a good old time.
The strategy behind Rolling Thunder is one of gradual escalation,
slowly turning up the heat on the North Vietnamese
and forcing them to the negotiating table.
We'll be right back.
The U.S. is afraid of provoking the Chinese or Soviets,
so President Lyndon Johnson holds
back the bombing of key targets in Hanoi, the capital of North Vietnam.
Instead, the Air Force
and Navy focus on transportation links farther south.
Paul Galante is 26
when he begins flying Navy combat missions from an aircraft carrier.
We had alternative targets in case the primary target was obscured
and we were cleared to
Any rolling stock we saw,
trucks or trains or any of that sort of thing.
Despite the dangers of flying over enemy territory,
the pilots love flying and they love their aircraft.
The most heavily used plane is the F-105 Thunder Chief,
which flies 75% of all Rolling Thunder missions.
Pilots call it the Thud.
Veteran Air Force pilot Charles Vassiliadis flies early test missions
in the F-105 to
prepare it for its new combat role in the North.
There were thuds because early
in the F-105 we crashed an awful lot of them.
And people would ridicule pilots.
They'd say,
how do you thud drive a thud?
The F-105 is a single seat, single engine ground attack aircraft.
It is armed with a cannon
and can carry a sidewinder missile, but it is essentially
a bomber.
Thank you.
Rolling thunder missions probe ever deeper into North Vietnam.
Flying closer to Hanoi means more danger.
Anti-aircraft artillery, as well as Soviet-built MiG fighters,
surface to air missiles known as SAM.
The SAM drives the air war in Vietnam.
To avoid their deadly aim, the American pilots drop down low.
But this tactic makes the sophisticated
fighter-bombers vulnerable to small arms fire.
That's just what happens to Fred Cherry,
an experienced pilot from the Korean War who is now flying in Vietnam.
I was hit by anywhere from small arms to .50 caliber max.
I was just down in the middle of it.
I could see the muzzle flashes from the rifles
that the people were shooting at me.
Whether it is small arms fire, a SAM, or a MiG,
enemy firepower starts to take its toll.
Cherry, shot down by small arms, becomes a POW.
Major Charles Vassiliadis is hit while flying three miles high.
As I started shooting, the airplane lurched a little bit,
so I pushed the button down for stability augmentation,
and the button came back in my hand.
Now I'm not hard maneuvering.
I look at the number one hydraulic system, and it's zero.
And I made the decision, I'm too far north.
If I bail out here, I'll end up spending the war with the Hanoi Hilton,
and I don't know when this stupid war is going to be over.
I'm going to take a chance on staying
with the airplane as long as it'll fly,
and then take my chances on a high-speed ejection.
Severely wounded, Vassiliadis is rescued by an American chopper
that reaches him just before the North Vietnamese.
As soon as he is physically able, Vass is back at the stick of his 105.
It takes a special breed to be a pilot in the air war.
You don't get military aviation if you're a pessimist.
I mean, it's a horrible way to die when you think about it,
coming down in flames.
But that always happens to somebody else.
By the end of the first year of Rolling Thunder,
more than 450 U.S. planes are shot down over the north.
At the same time, pilots are hampered
by the political restrictions on targets in and around Hanoi.
We could not penetrate. We couldn't go
in there under any circumstances.
And what that allowed them to do, of course,
is to build up these tremendous anti-aircraft sites and missile sites.
For the war managers back in Washington, bridges are a favorite target.
They can be justified as militarily significant,
and they are unlikely to cause many civilian casualties.
Some pilots disagree.
Bridges, lousy targets, quite frankly.
We'll go after a little old wooden bridge
when we have a real meaningful target.
But there again, McNamara's going to win this war statistically.
And the reason was a sortie count.
So they exposed twice as many aircraft to hostile fire
to be put in harm's way just for a sortie count.
Well, I thought that was very unfair to the jocks.
Drop a lot of bombs, hit a lot of targets,
even though they're worthless targets,
and then statistically every measure of figuring out
who's going to win that war would accrue to us.
But he didn't seem to realize we're exposing valuable equipment,
highly trained pilots, to hit crappy targets.
Eight Air Force and Navy pilots died during early attempts
to knock down one bridge in particular, the Thon Wah.
You know, we'd just keep on hitting the bridge,
never knock it down, then repair the bridge,
and we'd go back and we'd hit it again.
John McCain arrives in 1967,
flying the A-4 Skyhawk off the aircraft carrier Forrestal.
And I remember when I first arrived how frustrating it
was to be assigned a target that had been
bombed 37 times before.
Every time we went there, somebody got shot down.
They were just very, very tenacious, very gallant fighters.
Let's see if there's...
Originally, we didn't realize that.
We went there thinking they were just backwards people,
and we found out that they were very brave and loyal,
I guess, to their cause.
Pampered by an enemy that is more resilient than expected
and an administration that reigns them in,
pilots feel animosity toward the civilians
who are shaping the strategy of Rolling Thunder.
Steve Ritchie is the only Air Force pilot
to shoot down five enemy aircraft in the Vietnam War.
You can either do it or get out.
And
And it became very obvious to us as aircrew members,
with all of the restrictions that we had.
There were times when we were fired upon, we couldn't fire back.
Well, my goodness, how do you send someone into combat
and tell them when they're fired upon, they can't fire back?
How in the world can you send someone into combat over North Vietnam
and tell them that these major targets are off limits?
It takes three years, but by the summer of 1967,
senior policymakers finally conclude
that Operation Rolling Thunder has no measurable effect on the enemy.
Not only have strikes failed to stop the flow of supplies to the south,
the bombing has also had the opposite effect of boosting
the enemy's confidence and his determination to fight.
Before Rolling Thunder began,
Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay made a controversial suggestion
that success depended on all-out air bombardment of the North.
Curtis LeMay said, let's hit the dikes,
you know, because of the rice country,
and flood the rice fields with starvament of the Stone Ages.
The human cry back home is, oh,
what an animal, you know, that's so barbarous.
You know, you don't get involved in a war to be humane.
On March 31st, 1968...
Good evening, my fellow Americans.
President Johnson announces the halt of the bombing of North Vietnam.
Tonight, I have ordered our aircraft
and our naval vessels to make no attacks on North Vietnam.
November 1968, the strikes come to an end.
For three years and nine months,
rolling thunder rains destruction on targets throughout the North.
Over 300,000 tactical strikes
and 2,300 B-52 sorties deliver more than 640,000 tons of bombs.
These are bigger numbers than have ever
been amassed by any Air Force in any war.
But impressive statistics do not win the day.
Hanoi and Haiphong Harbor remain off-limits,
allowing the North to maintain its ability to make war.
The Americans will not venture another air campaign against
the North for more than three years.
We could have stopped the aggression from North to South in 1964-1965.
We could have knocked out the Northeast
and Northwest railroads coming into Hanoi to slow the flow of supplies.
We could have taken out Haiphong Harbor.
And there was probably a 90% chance of success
that we could have stopped the aggression from north to south
with air power and naval gunfire in 90 days.
The air war in the south
is a very different story.
Close air support, American and South Vietnamese ground troops,
a down and dirty war where the odds increase.
The air war in South Vietnam differs
sharply from the one in the north.
Here, the flying is low and slow,
with pilots operating close to the ground.
Rolling Thunder missions out of the North were supposed
to have stopped the escalation of the ground war in the South.
This does not happen. The ground forces, almost
200,000 Americans by the end of 1965, are sent to fight
a new kind of war, which calls for a new concept in air power.
Air mobility. If the North will not stand and fight a conventional war,
the Americans will go to them by helicopter.
Air mobility will make more use
of the helicopter than ever before in combat history.
And Washington feels it is now only a matter
of time before the enemy is on the run.
Wayne Coe arrives in Vietnam to fly an Army helicopter at age 19.
We lived to support the grunts on the ground. We fed them.
We medevaced them and we, you know, we did everything
that was done for them we did with our helicopter because there
were no roads going in, whether it was daytime or nighttime.
And, you know, we basically lived in sync with these men.
Air mobile operations in the South involve
an enormous commitment of men and machines.
The most important helicopter in the effort
is the UH-1, known as the Huey.
I love flying the UH-1P. It was really a truck.
We all knew it was a truck
and we loaded it to the gills with everything that we could.
It would haul about 10 combat troops that was running real good,
about six if it wasn't.
And we just absolutely loved those helicopters and we flew them all day
and maintained them all night and we lived in them.
You know, some of the pilots have an extraordinarily high times
of flying these helicopters because
they basically lived in them all day long.
And we hauled troops, we made combat assaults,
you know, we did our own medevacs, we did
our own everything with our helicopters.
And I, for one, thought flying a helicopter
was the best job in the entire world and had
volunteered to go to Vietnam
and volunteered to fly over there just so that I could fly
the helicopter, just so I could be over there and do it.
Army pilot Mike Haas also flies Hueys.
As a member of a helicopter group called the Robin Hoods,
Haas carries troops into dangerous combat assaults.
We were dedicated to carrying infantrymen on what
was subsequently known as search and destroy missions.
Intelligence would give us some idea where
the enemy might be or should be.
We would fly from our base to a certain area, pick up infantry,
and attack into landing zones as close to the enemy as we could get.
Getting troops into a battle area requires a team
of helicopters descending on a landing zone,
or LZ, in carefully coordinated assault waves.
Come on!
Abjibo watched the assaults from his gunner's seat
at the open door of his Huey, or Slick, as the crews call it.
It was like a ballet. Okay, everything was coordinated.
The gunships would be flying right alongside the slicks,
leading them a little bit.
The helicopters I flew that carried the infantry were nicknamed slicks.
We had one machine gun on each side
of the helicopter for self-defense only.
So I had two door gunners in the back
and myself and a co-pilot in the front.
So we would have my nine helicopters coming
into a landing zone with usually four gunships
circling around, either attacking the landing zone
in advance in case somebody was there
or responding to enemy fire when they did open up on us.
Our job, as the slicks were being inserted into the LZ,
was to lay down a tremendous volume of fire.
To keep the heads of the enemy down.
At 1,500 feet you don't get much small arms fire,
but where we were operating down in the jungle,
down in the landing zones and stuff,
I mean, you're a sitting duck.
There's virtually no protection on a helicopter.
Thank you.
Quite easy to knock one down if you hit it in the right place.
As a chopper pilot,
you are also closer to the harsh realities of war
than any other member of the air war.
It's pretty hard to erase the memories
of hauling dead bodies all day long in your helicopter.
It's pretty hard to erase, you know,
the fact that you're covered in blood all day long
and the inside of your helicopter is filled with blood
because the men you were hauling
were pumping out of their arteries and stuff
and was catching a 120 knot slipstream
and depositing itself all over the inside of the helicopter.
We would come back from flying these missions
and get a water truck and hose out the inside of the helicopters
so that we could get in and fly them back down.
It's also kind of hard to forget, you know,
a guy in the middle of the night calling on the radio saying,
we're completely surrounded.
If you don't come get us when it's daybreak, we're dead.
The war on the ground is fought at such close quarters
that fixed-wing aircraft need help zeroing in on enemy targets.
It's the job of the forward air controller.
Piloting unarmed aircraft, usually a slow-moving Cessna,
they look for enemy troops or friendly troops in need of help.
Then, using smoke for reference,
they call in and coordinate airstrikes.
FACs, as they are called, are the guardian angels of the ground troops.
John Flanagan arrives in Vietnam in 1966,
flying as a forward air controller.
We were as much Army infantry as we
were fighter pilots or jet pilots.
And we had to be able to think from the perspective
of some poor draftee on the ground
who was getting shot at, who was frightened,
who was scared, maybe bleeding, ambushed, panic setting in.
So one of our first jobs that we had
to do was we were that reassuring voice.
We were his window to the outside world. He wasn't abandoned.
They just loved the forward air controllers.
They'd say, FAC, help me. Please, FAC. Okay.
And then you get them calmed down, and then you start to work.
And that was part of it.
We were as much counselor and psychologist as we were warrior.
Air support of ground forces simply cannot happen without
the FACS coordination.
Fire bombers didn't have the appropriate radios
to talk to the people on the ground.
So we would be the intermediary, and then one day
the friendly troops would describe to us where the target was,
or we could frequently find it,
because as soon as the enemy saw us, they'd start shooting us.
They'd hide until we found them, and then all hell would break loose,
because they knew that there was a rule in Vietnam that no airstrike
could be conducted without the control of a forward air controller.
This is how we held down or minimized friendly casualties.
That's why we put in so many airstrikes there without
hitting any friendly troops or friendly villages, anything,
because the forward air controller was intimately aware of that area.
You go to a certain locality,
you contact the forward air controller, the forward air
controller's got radio equipment,
communication with the ground forces, and then he directs
you where to go ahead.
Okay, uh, 6-1, I'd like you to put your bomb just short of 2.
And then the market, with a white phosphorus rocket, hit my smoke.
I got your smoke still, all right.
Early on, Charles Vassiliadis
is flying close air support in the Skyraider,
a holdover from World War II
and Korea pressed into all kinds of service in Vietnam.
Had a reputation of carrying as much ordnance as it was heavy,
and of course you could put centerline tanks on it
and it'll stay up in the air forever.
The A-1 Skyraider is ideally suited to close air support missions.
Prop-driven, and able to fly at slow speeds,
it can stay aloft much longer than fuel-guzzling jets.
It has endurance, and it can carry up to four tons of weapons.
And of course, one of our favorite ordnance loads was napalm.
Napalm and white phosphorus.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Skyraider, for example, I'd carry a 150-gallon Sunalign tank,
two 750-gallon napalm cans on my stubs,
then six 500-gallon pumps on my wings,
and four 100-pound white phosphorus pumps.
Air support of ground actions takes many forms,
but none more controversial than the missions flown under
the codename Operation Ranch Hand.
Ranch Hand pilots do not use bombs, rockets, or bullets.
They do not see combat.
They fly into battle zones to clear the jungle for fighting.
Ralph Dresser heads Operation Ranch Hand
and flies 350 defoliation missions.
We were in support of the American ground troops.
That was our purpose,
to help them survive by cutting down surprise or ambush on them
and giving them more of a chance.
We defoliated every province in South Vietnam.
We defoliated an awful lot in Laos,
trying to uncover the many aspects of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
Ranch hand pilots used a number of different chemical agents
to thin jungle canopy and to destroy enemy crops.
The most notorious chemical that we used was called Agent Orange.
It came in country in a 55-gallon barrel with an orange band around it.
Later, Agent Orange would be linked to health problems in ground troops
who came into contact with it.
But during the war, the herbicide,
working along with Agents Purple and White,
provides rapid defoliation in critical battle areas.
Once we sprayed this stuff on the foliage, you could see to the ground.
You could tell where their camps were.
You could tell where their supplies were.
You could see the people. They couldn't move around unobserved.
So that was the reason that it was used and that it was asked for.
Support from the air, be it ranch hand defoliation,
close-in air support, fax, or helicopter air mobility,
proves highly effective.
But air power does not change the outcome of the war,
and many airmen become POWs.
Every pilot and flight crew member who flew a combat mission over
the North knew full well it was dangerous business
in the face of anti-aircraft missiles and gunfire.
A successful airstrike
and safe return to base was only one of several options.
They hoped for the best, and they trained for the worst.
The story of being shot down over North Vietnam is one of sudden
and dramatic reversals of fortune.
One moment, these pilots are in the cockpit
of some of the world's most advanced planes.
The next, they are prisoners of war,
ridiculed by the North Vietnamese and tortured by interrogators.
This part of the air war is not a story of fast flying
and high technology.
It's the human story that picks up where the machines left them off.
I rolled in over the target.
There were lots of surface-to-air missiles in the air.
I released my bombs, and just as I released the bombs, a surface-to-air
missile hit and took off the right wing of my aircraft.
I got hit in the engine, the generator exploded,
lost all the instruments,
and then it snapped hard to the right, the fire warning light
and black smoke coming in the air conditioning vents.
Big, big giant fire light, it seemed about that big that day,
and I said, Lee, this is too low on fire.
I noticed there was smoke in front of the instrument panel coming up in
front of me, and I reached over to turn off some electrical switches,
which I felt would solve the problem.
And as my hand got to the switches, the aircraft exploded.
And then I ejected. And it was a very violent ejection.
I broke my arms and hit my knee very badly.
And I had a broken ankle, broken wrist,
and my left shoulder just smashed up.
When I was in the chute, floating down, the one thing
that kept going through my mind for the first ten minutes was,
this can't be happening to me. This cannot be happening to me.
At this point, only one of two things can happen.
The downed pilots will be rescued, or they will be taken prisoner.
When six 105s are shot down over the north on July 27, 1965,
Captain Frank Tullo is the only one picked up.
My first concern was that nobody knew exactly where I was,
and having been involved in these rescues before,
I knew it was very important to know exactly where that man is.
I could see Hanoi in the background. I could see the city.
I can see a little farmhouse.
To the west of me, that was not too far away, a mile or two.
It becomes a race between Tulo's rescuers and the approaching enemy.
Captain George Martin, pilot of a new long-range rescue helicopter,
the Jolly Green Giant, receives a call for help on his radio.
They called us and said there
was a big shebang going on up north near Hanoi,
and people were getting shot down.
Martin is based in Thailand and has never been involved in a rescue
so far into North Vietnam, but he sees no choice.
Because that was his only chance.
There was no other helicopter that could reach him.
So we cranked it up and it sat there,
and believe it or not, just like John Wayne, I said,
well, you can't live forever, and I
shoved the stick forward and we went.
This will be the first of some 1,500 recoveries made
by Jolly Green Giants during the war.
Back on the ground, Frank Tullo did
not know if anyone could get to him.
To be perfectly honest with you,
I was interested in the one-man truce with North Vietnam.
I was not going to do battle with 17 million people.
And the only time I was going to fire that gun
was if somebody was between me and a chopper.
Tullo reaches Martin by radio and gives his location.
The drama is far from over.
They drop a cable to haul him up, but the winch breaks.
Then the engine starts overheating.
With Tullo hanging on the end of a 50-foot cable,
Martin shouts to his crew chief.
I asked him again, how far off the ground is he?
He had a horror of dragging him through the trees
because you don't know exactly what the terrain is
or what the trees are or anything else
or what kind of shape he's in.
He might be about ready to fall off the rope
and then one more little twitch and he's gone.
While this was happening, I would look down every now and then,
but every time I looked down,
I'd see these little pups of white smoke in the grass everywhere,
and I didn't like that because it was people shooting at us,
so I stopped looking down.
Martin is able to carefully set Tulo
and the chopper quickly down in a nearby field.
So I slapped the thing in my ground.
Something happened. Although there was a lot of noise
and a lot of dust being picked up,
I realized something to my right had happened.
He just dove right through the door.
As I jumped into the chopper,
I looked forward and I could see the two pilots.
And the pilots were...
Crouched down, and they were hiding, and it dawned on me that they
were hiding because somebody was shooting at us from that farmhouse.
So then everybody's hollering, let's go, let's go, let's get off
the ground, and they're pulling ropes and cables and cranking the door,
and oh, one big jump, and off we went. That's when we smiled.
But often, the enemy beats the U.S. rescuers to the scene,
and pilots become prisoners of war. The majority of American POWs
are Air Force and Navy pilots downed over North Vietnam.
I came down right in the middle of a group of armed peasants
who were really not crazy
that I had just arrived in their country.
The crowd was very hostile.
They began kicking and beating me.
I was bayoneted in the foot and in the groin.
Another smashed my shoulder with a rifle butt.
And they wanted to take my boots
and they took my anti-G suit off and almost stabbed
me doing that because I was trying to cut it off.
They captured me almost immediately,
tied me to a tree, and lined up a firing squad.
They all of age carried rifles.
I just didn't like to see them all shaking
with their fingers on the triggers.
I'm sure they were getting ready to shoot.
It looked like a regular Army guy.
He was all in brown, came up and made them stop.
After I was being so belligerent, they just let me keep my boots,
which did help because my ankle was broken.
To have the boot laced around my ankle was better for walking
because I had to walk a couple of miles.
We started the march north, it was about a hundred miles and it took
twelve days to get there because we could only travel at night.
And they were gong ringing and everything up ahead and they were
signaling somebody through the gong communications that I was coming.
They marched me through that village
and paraded me in front of it in my underwear and the women
and kids were out there throwing stones and rocks.
The POWs are taken to the Wa Lo prison,
which they dub the Hanoi Hilton.
I was thrown into a cell as soon as I got
into what we called Heartbreak Hotel.
It was part of the huge Hanoi Hilton complex.
It was the initial interrogation wing.
They threw me in a cell and forgot about me for three days.
A couple nights and days it was beating on me.
Banging my head on things.
I was in very bad shape, so it didn't take a lot of interrogating.
They would slap me a few times
and I would go in and out of consciousness.
I went to my first interrogation, which lasted several hours,
up in Hanoi with a camp commander
we called The Bug,
who was the most sadistic individual I ran into in North Vietnam.
Dum Dum was my menace.
Dum Dum and I went around.
He issued more punishment for me than anybody else in the
camp because we couldn't be across the desk
for five minutes before we'd be at each other's throat.
He didn't like me and I didn't like him.
Three days, three days of interrogation and
learning the ropes so to speak,
the rope torture trick they used to which you don't want to do.
And I ended up with a punctured lung which I had to have surgery.
Which I had to remove my seventh rib to get in to do the surgery.
And that was because of the ropes
and the tying me up and all this stuff worked.
I was bound and determined they weren't
going to get anything out of me.
And got wrapped up in the ropes for what seemed like forever.
It was probably more like 45 minutes or an hour.
And the same thing happened inside in the south.
Blood circulation gets cut off,
your hands turn black and they clench up.
Yeah.
It was described by Jim Mulligan, one of the PWs,
as a pain that's so terribly intense
that if you had your baby there,
you'd throw the baby in the fire to get them to take the ropes off.
It's an incredibly painful experience.
Enemy captors tried to break the will of the pilots
and turn them against one another.
But the downed airmen maintained unity
and support through constant communication via a tap code.
When I arrived there, the tap system was in place.
And what it is, we took the alphabet and put it in a grid,
5x5, a grid, leave out the letter K,
because if you really needed K, you'd see.
Everybody learned the tap code within a very few days of getting there,
and the POWs had been shot down before, took unbelievable chances
to teach the new guys the tap code, because it was a lifeblood.
You just tap the grid, and after a while,
you do it as fast as one typing practice.
I'm sure they knew we were communicating.
I don't think they realized how well we could communicate.
Along any wall you can tap from one end of the building to the other
and be heard rather clearly.
Just put your ear there or we used a cup sometimes.
And another thing we learned we could
talk through a wall that's 19 inches thick through a cup
or cup your hands and it would
be heard on the other side.
Solitary confinement but almost always in constant communications
with other POWs, so the fact that I lived alone...
Really didn't mean that much in the respect that I was,
except for a few occasions where I was physically separated
from everybody else, I was always in communication with my fellow POWs.
And even if it was just one sentence a day, tap through, how you doing?
Fine. That was a big victory because we beat the system,
and we knew that there was another American on the other side
of that wall who knew that I was fine, or I knew that he was fine.
It's the most important thing we had going for us, communicating.
That's the most important thing,
and that's why they tried so desperately to take that away from us.
You had to, you had to stand up,
because they wanted to take your dignity.
If they got your dignity and your pride,
then they could make you do what they wanted.
We would communicate at all costs, and we paid to do what we did.
Some of the POWs held the longest were shot down
in the first days of the air war in 1965.
Now, a second air campaign,
beginning seven years later with a new all-out bombing strategy,
holds the key to their freedom.
In April of 1972, President Richard Nixon responds
to increased communist aggression in the South
with renewed airstrikes against the North,
ending a three-and-a-half-year bombing halt.
Nixon also mines Haiphong Harbor,
the main entry point for Chinese and Soviet ships,
which supply much of the North's advanced weaponry.
Codenamed Operation Linebacker,
the new air campaign picks up where Rolling Thunder left off,
but with fewer restrictions on targets.
Pilots are elated to finally be allowed
to go into North Vietnam full tilt.
Steve Ritchie and Chuck DeBellevue remember
a very unusual briefing for their F-4 squadron in 1972.
On 16 April, we knew there was a special mission.
We didn't know what it was.
Briefing boards were covered by
Curtains so nobody knew where we were going
and nobody had any idea where we were going.
And when intelligence rolled back the board, the big briefing board.
Gentlemen your target for today is downtown.
And the target was downtown Hanoi.
It got so quiet in the room you could hear a pin drop.
Finally we're going to go be able to do what we've
been trained to do all these years.
Colonel Gabriel got up and said guys we've
been waiting for this mission for a long time.
Let's go do a good job.
Take a look at the guy sitting next to you.
You may not be coming out.
During Operation Linebacker,
the fighter bomber used by the U.S. is the F-4,
with a new and deadly arsenal of laser-guided smart bombs.
Marshal Michel flies F-4 Phantoms during Operation Linebacker.
Many nice things about laser-guided bombs.
First of all, they hit.
Second thing is you can drop them from very high altitude,
which keeps you out of anti-aircraft fire.
Some of the same bridges
that had seemed invulnerable earlier in the air war
can now be taken out with these new bombs.
On the 10th of May, 1972, Colonel Carl Miller,
leading the 8th Attack Fighter Wing,
with two 2,000-pound laser-guided bombs,
took out the Paul Demmer Bridge,
and that was essentially
the beginning of high-tech combat.
Soviet-built big fighters are out to intercept and engage the F-4s,
Dog fights are not the top U.S. priority.
Our main mission was air to ground,
dropping bombs, not how to dogfight it.
But Ritchie and DeBellevue often have no choice
but to dogfight with the enemy MiGs.
In July of 1972, the two aces score a remarkable victory.
The 8th of July mission is really an example,
a perfect example of how it all comes together.
This was the most perfect mission that I ever flew.
And that day we downed two MiG-21s
in a low altitude dogfight in a minute and 29 seconds.
The F-4 crew puts its Sparrow missiles
to reuse never before seen in aerial combat.
Picked up a radio call from the DISCO controller over 100 miles away.
And all of a sudden our radar controller says,
Paula, which was our call sign that day, Paula, you're merged.
Which meant on his scope,
both us and the MiGs are in the same piece of sky.
He can't tell us any information other than heads up,
they're among you.
We did not have a visual.
As you can imagine, we really began to look around.
Nobody sees anybody and we're moving around.
You never go anywhere in a F4 in a straight line.
Made an immediate left turn from a heading
of east to a heading of north.
I look up and there's a black flyspeck on a white cloud at 11 o'clock.
Their tactic was to take off, come out parallel to our inbound track.
Turn in behind us, either high or low,
get supersonic in our 6 o'clock in our rear quarter,
fire their Atoll heat-seeking missile, and dive away.
And what this lead MiG did was he came by us,
shot a classic Soviet J-leg tactic.
He wanted us to follow him.
His buddy was going to come in and shoot us down,
except we didn't take the bait.
After a lot of high G-force maneuvering,
Steve Ritchie finally gets a radar lock on one of the MiGs.
As soon as the lock came on, Chuck said, it's a good lock.
That's what I needed to know before squeezing the trigger.
The technique is squeeze, release, squeeze.
As soon as the first missile has gone,
it automatically steps to the second missile,
and you've committed that one.
By the way, the Sparrow missile at that time had an 11% PK,
probability of kill,
which wasn't very good, 11 out of 100.
The MiG was in a 5G turn.
So what we saw was the top of his airplane
from canopy to canopy on the first pass until the
first missile impact was 47 seconds.
The second missile went through the fireball, both ends burned.
At that point we thought
that the other MiG would blow out of the fight and be gone
because that's normally what happened and instead he stayed.
That day we had three
perfect missiles under maximum performance, minimum range conditions.
The time that it took from the black fly speck on that white cloud
to the second min-21 blowing up was a minute and 29 seconds.
That is the longest 89 seconds I've ever spent.
It's sort of like being in an arena where living
or dying depends on winning or losing.
And when you win and you live, that's a pretty exciting feeling.
During linebacker,
the formidable B-52 is put to greater use than ever before.
The B-52s can destroy a sizable box
of North Vietnamese territory in one bombing run,
and important tactically and psychologically.
The boxes that they used were essentially a mile by half mile.
So you could take out railroad stations,
transshipment points, and things like that,
I mean, just with a few strikes.
And the specter of actually moving these things
into a city must have been really frightening.
But the heavy B-52s are vulnerable to the enemy's anti-aircraft fire
and surface-to-air missiles.
William Seward pilots B-52s out of an Air Force base in Guam.
You're basically defenseless, particularly on the bomb run,
because once you're on the bomb run, it's straight and level.
And it was one of those situations where,
who was it, LeMay used to say,
just chomp down on your cigar and fly through the flak.
If something got in your way, that's unfortunate.
During Linebacker, the U.S. flies more than 40,000 sorties
and drops 125,000 tons of bombs.
In October 1972, North Vietnam communicates
its willingness to negotiate a peace settlement.
The bombing is no sooner halted than the talks break down.
And by December, Nixon responds
with a massive unrestricted air campaign,
sending B-52s into Hanoi for the first time.
It's called the Christmas bombing.
As we went in-country, of course,
the entire northern portion of Vietnam was blacked out.
You couldn't see anything on the ground.
And as we approached Hanoi,
you could start to see all of the tracers, the AAA,
and then, of course, as we approached the targets,
the SAMs started going out.
And my thoughts were, this looks like Disneyland on the 4th of July.
Weather was a real problem,
which was one of the advantages of Linebacker 2 with the B-52s.
B-52s have an all-weather bombing system.
They don't care.
I mean, they bombed every day, and the weather was crummy,
as I mentioned, except for two days.
They were up there every night.
We knew we had a lot of POWs up in Hanoi,
and we felt this was our opportunity to make
our contribution towards the end of this war
and to bring the POWs home.
At the Hanoi Hilton, the POWs witnessed the attack with elation.
That Christmas, I don't think too many of us
were concerned about what Christmas food was going to be like.
Not like the other Christmases, because it was something to occupy us,
and they were those B-52s, and we loved it.
And the first few nights, it was very exciting, because to see
a plane on fire 32,000 feet, falling in flame, is quite remarkable.
More than 200 B-52s fly over 740 missions during the Christmas bombing.
Fifteen are shot down by surface-to-air missiles.
Nine during the first three days.
The pilot in charge of Tom Cloman's B-52 reported
that the sky was thick with SAMs.
My crew flew five nights out of those 11 days.
Flew three more times after I got shot down.
Out of those five missions, he counted 90 SAMs go by his cell.
So you can imagine, you're dodging a little bit.
When some of the other B-52s did get hit,
it would certainly, it would really light up the sky, unfortunately.
No way.
You know, guys with their bomb bay doors open,
taking the hits from the SAMs, it's going to cause quite an explosion.
On the third night of the bombing, Tom Cloman and his co-pilot
are the only ones who survive a SAM attack.
He doesn't remember much about ejecting.
The force of that ejection sometimes can black you out.
I'm not sure if that's what happened or if I hit the airplane.
I don't know.
Coleman survives his descent
and joins the ranks of the very men he was trying to save, the POWs.
On December 29, 1972, after U.S. planes dropped more than 20,000 tons
of bombs on Hanoi in 11 days,
Linebacker 2 ends.
The North Vietnamese agree to return to the negotiating table.
From the American point of view,
they have finally been bombed into submission.
I think it's pretty clear that at that point we had raised a level of
pain on the North Vietnamese that they had said, we can't stand this.
But the North Vietnamese also claim victory because Nixon soon signs
the accords that end America's involvement in the war.
From the point of view of the American POWs, the Christmas bombing
is an unqualified success, marking the end of their captivity.
Within 48 hours, according to the agreement,
the North Vietnamese had to tell us the agreements
had been signed, and they did.
They got us all together in a big group in the middle of the camp,
and the camp commander
read the agreements to us, so we knew we were going home.
And basically the first group was going to leave two weeks later,
and I was in that group.
The psychiatrist said we were all supposed
to be basket cases, that's what they told
our families, and yet we came back fairly normal.
There's not a shred of doubt in my mind that the Christmas
bombing brought the Vietnamese to their knees militarily
and also brought them back to the negotiating table.
But I'll tell you,
what the B-52s did that Christmas of 1972 was remarkable.
After the first few nights,
they completely neutralized the Vietnamese air defenses.
They couldn't defend themselves.
And it was obvious to us that the war was over.
From the start of the bombing campaign of the North
in 1965 to the end of the U.S. combat role in 1973,
American planes flew more than 500,000
combat missions over North Vietnam.
There is no question that those missions made a difference.
The debate is over how much of a difference.
The lesson of the air war in Vietnam
was realized 15 years later in the Persian Gulf.
When Saddam Hussein's Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia,
a UN coalition led by the United States responded
with airstrikes against Baghdad and other strategic targets.
Using precision-guided weapons and night-vision devices,
they left much of Iraq's capital in ruins.
Once air power had softened Iraqi resistance, the ground war
lasted only 100 hours before Saddam Hussein surrendered.
The success of the Persian Gulf War
was based on the legacy of the Vietnam War.
Some find it tempting to wonder if the ultimate outcome
in Vietnam might have been different
had the full fury of American air power been called in earlier.
It is a possibility that still haunts many of the pilots and airmen
who fought so bravely for the skies over Vietnam.
I'm Jack Smith. Good night.