A superb set of documentaries, with each episode providing a different segment of the Vietnam war, as seen through the eyes of the veterans of the war. With excellent interviews and rare footage. Hosted by reporter and veteran Jack Smith.
This is the episode: “Secret Wars, Secret Men” - it returns the soldiers to those battlefields forthe personal stories of the war's pivotal battles-recounted by the people who were there. With rare combat footage and live interviews, this series documents the conflict from a soldier's viewpoint. The footage is startling, dramatic and frequently graphic. The interviews are crisp and tightly woven into the narrative.
This series first aired in October 1998 in six parts. Apologies for any technical issues with the picture or audio - this transfer was taken from an original VHS copy of the program.
For education, entertainment, enlightenment and inspiration. We hope you enjoy and even learn something. Never forget!
I'm Jack
Smith,
and
these
are
stories
of the
Vietnam
War, told
by the
people
who
knew it
best, those who fought it was one of them.
While the Vietnam War was playing out
on television screens in living rooms across America,
there was another war going on,
one that few Americans ever knew about, a war in the shadows.
These clandestine operations involved assassination,
kidnapping, and cross-border incursions into neutral territory.
The veil of secrecy continued
to be maintained long after the war ended.
But now, the secret soldiers in these covert operations
are telling their chilling stories.
Many for the first time.
The country of Laos is strategically important
to the North Vietnamese,
and it's equally as important to the United States.
From the correct vantage point, the easternmost part of the country,
one can see deep into North Vietnam,
the perfect spot for a radar station to guide U.S. bombers.
But since Laos is neutral,
any such site must be top secret and manned by non-military personnel.
As the air war heats up in the summer of 1966, and U.S. bombers
work their way further and further into North Vietnam,
the United States chooses the perfect site in Laos, just 150 miles
from Hanoi, on a rugged mountaintop more than 5,000 feet high.
Phou Pha Thi, or Sacred Mountain, is dubbed Lima Site 85 by the military.
A tactical air navigation station,
or TACAN, is placed at the mountain summit.
The high-tech radar equipment must be manned by Air Force technicians
who volunteer for their assignment.
Stan Slez has never received combat training,
but he volunteers for the dangerous mission.
We had to go through an interviewing process.
I imagine the suits that interviewed us were CIA types.
They made sure that we were, quote-unquote, patriotic.
And the kind of people that they wanted to go to do this kind of thing.
John Daniel is married with two children
when he goes to Lima Site 85 in 1967.
And you look around at all the people in the briefing room,
you've never seen so much talent in one location in your life.
It was quote unquote the pick of the crop out
of the whole combat evaluation group,
which had some 20 odd radar sites around the United States.
The mission is so secret
that the men officially retire from the Air Force
and then are rehired as civilians under contract to a private company.
The process is called sheep dipping.
They go in in military uniform,
change all of your clothes out,
get rid of all identification, dress in civilian clothes.
Everybody put those on.
Picked up the Lockheed employee identification card
and hopped out the door and on the chopper, and we're going north.
Slez and his crew leave for Lima Site 85 in the fall of 1967.
I remember that first trip when we were going up there.
Everybody was pretty jolly and joking until we crossed the river.
It got very somber. It was like there was a curtain over Laos.
Despite the danger, the men quickly settle into a routine.
Well it was just a normal get up in the morning.
We cooked our own breakfast. Our cook was John
Daniel. So he cooked breakfast.
Usually it was french toast and Spam and coffee. Before he
volunteers to go to Lima Site 85,
Jack Starling is an Air Force instructor in survival training.
He is 21 years old. There just wasn't a lot
to do up there other than working on your equipment.
The radar people stayed a little busier than I did
because they worked 24 hours
Hmm.
around the clock. Stan was the controller.
He's the one who did the actual talking to the air crews.
He controlled the aircraft and he pointed it to the target.
I would drive them into that drop point and tell them,
give them a hack. Just take them right down,
say five, four, three, two, one, hack.
That's when they would pickle their bones.
The guidance from the men on Lima Site 85 is so accurate
that the bombs rarely miss their targets by more than 25 feet.
Up north out of Thailand, came right over our site because
the attack hand was the last position that they had.
And it was quite a sight to see them flying right over the deck
because they would swoop down after they got over the mountain.
And you could stand out there and look down at this whole force.
It made you feel pretty awesome
to see them swooping down through the valleys.
Lima Site 85 is protected by a sheer cliff on one side,
land mines and CIA-led Thai mercenaries protect them on the other.
In all, 16 Americans man the site.
They are told that they are safe from attack.
They had told us how secure this thing was,
and then after you get up there and look at it,
you could think how easy it could be secured,
which it wasn't.
All the activity on top of the mountain does
not go unnoticed by the enemy.
The North Vietnamese begin building a road toward the mountain
in order to bring in artillery for a major attack.
We knew that the enemy was coming.
We could see them on the other mountains around us.
Look out through binoculars, you could see them.
They'd throw a finger at you,
you'd throw a finger back at them, you know, that kind of stuff.
By early 1968, 23% of all strikes over North Vietnam
are under the control of Site 85's radar.
The site is considered so essential
by the United States government that President Johnson
is personally reviewing the effects of its work.
The first report the President looked at every morning
when he went to his office was the
report from Lima 85.
Give you a good feeling.
The President looks at what you did yesterday,
this morning, and last night.
First thing he does before he even has coffee.
The enemy is desperate to put a stop to the site's work,
but their road has yet to be finished.
So they attack using a small biplane,
which is shot down by the Thai mercenaries.
Looked up and here comes a biplane.
What in the world is this doing here?
I said, my God, this is the Spanish Civil War.
They were throwing grenades and mortars
and whatnot out of the window, out of the door.
And it jerked like this.
And fired a salvo of rockets right over the top of our equipment.
Thai soldiers shot them down with pistols and machine guns.
I think he probably got one round in the pilot or two,
but shot the aircraft down and it crashed down in the valley below.
To the U.S. government,
the attack signals that Lima Site 85's time is running out.
The men are issued weapons and survival vests
and a second radar crew is sent in
so that bombers can be directed against North Vietnam around the clock.
None of the men have been trained for combat.
On March 10, 1968, with the North Vietnamese road nearing completion,
there are reports that the enemy is likely to attack.
To make matters worse,
a secret cable arrives from Washington to hold at all costs.
The men hold a meeting to decide who will stay on the site.
This was about 5 or 6 o'clock in the afternoon
and we were in the process of grilling steaks
out there in the outside the radar unit.
And so we're all sitting there talking about the
situation is getting grave. We're going to get evac'd out.
Do we want to get evac'd out tonight
or do we want to get evac'd out the next morning?
And to a man we said let's spend the night.
We've got targets fragged for the night. Let's do that. And
We'll get out of here first thing in the morning.
I know to this day, if it was to do over again, I'd do the same thing.
Let's drop some more bombs on them.
Let's kill them. That's what we've set up here for.
And just as we were getting ready to break this off,
this loud explosion occurred out the door.
That kind of broke up the meeting.
There wasn't no more discussion about
who was going to leave and so forth.
So we kind of all took cover.
The first barrage lasts three hours.
A dozen Air Force men are killed.
In the lull that follows, several technicians return to the site
and manage to keep directing bombers to their targets.
The way we were set up, I felt pretty secure
with all the rounds that were going over us,
and it couldn't actually get to us from the way they were firing.
But the fight is far from over.
As North Vietnamese troops overrun the site,
the remaining Americans take refuge at the edge of the cliff.
So we went down.
Into a little nook, cranny, cave, except it wasn't a cave,
just a little overhang over the trail, kind of.
The five of us squeezed into that little hole
that was just barely enough room for two guys.
It really wasn't the greatest spot,
but it seemed to work well for most of us.
Yes.
About 2, 2.30 in the morning, we heard the voices of many people,
and they weren't speaking English,
so we knew we were in trouble
from all over.
Lots of small arms.
Hand grenades going off,
and we knew at that time nobody was going to get out of here alive.
I wasn't waiting for anything. I thought I was dead.
That thought flashed through my mind, so this is what it's like to die.
In the second barrage, both Slez and Daniel are hit in the legs.
One of their cavemates dies in the blast.
I reached a threshold of pain that I just didn't feel anymore.
You know, it was just a nuisance.
It was like standing in a heavy rainstorm.
The grenade, I couldn't get a hold of it.
I was thinking about trying to jump at it, and I couldn't move.
John said, here, grab Hank, he's dead.
And so I took Hank, and I went like this on top of this grenade,
and it blew me back, and I woke up, you know,
after the concussion, pieces of Hank all over me.
But we didn't get killed from the grenade.
Using an emergency radio,
SLEZ manages to make contact with U.S. planes circling overhead.
And he calls for maximum firepower.
And Lee dropped his, and then number two,
and then everything was deathly still.
It was just, I thought I'd gone deaf.
I couldn't hear a thing.
It was ringing in my ears.
And then I heard this radio
and talked to these guys.
He said, you got any smoke down there?
I think I had one round left in my weapon.
Best aircraft I ever flew on.
I guarantee I told you nothing.
Jack Starling remains trapped on the mountain and wounded.
I just stayed there.
Kept still because I didn't have anything
to protect myself with or anything.
Finally, at great risk, a helicopter comes and rescues Starling.
He couldn't land. He had to take me up by a rope, a wire rope.
It was too close to the edge of the mountain.
Following the evacuation of Lima Site 85,
U.S. planes bombed the installation for a solid week
in an effort to keep the equipment out of enemy hands.
Because of the secret nature of the assignment,
the participants are never given the full
recognition their valor deserves.
They only receive Purple Hearts for their injuries,
but none of them has any regrets.
I was there to do a job, and I think all of us, when we had
chances to discuss what we were doing there,
we were all of the same mind that we thought that
we were doing something good.
And we were prepared to stay up there as long as it took to get the job
I don't think anybody ever thought about going back.
Until the job was done.
Well, it was good, and yes, even today,
if I was physically able, I'd go back, if needed.
Lima Site 85 is lost.
The cover of neutral Laos is crucial
to another highly secret operation,
one which involves small teams
of American soldiers working with local tribesmen
to gather intelligence,
kill, and kidnap the enemy.
Beneath triple canopy jungle, in a country officially off-limits
to both the United States and North Vietnam,
a secret war is being waged.
The foliage conceals an elaborate network of supply roads used
by the North to transport weapons and troops to South Vietnam.
Known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, these roads are the backbone
of the North's ability to make war effectively.
If the United States is going to counter the North,
it will have to cross borders into neutral territory.
To do this the military forms a crack top secret unit.
The men are drawn from the ranks of the
special forces, green berets,
air commandos and navy seals and cloaked with a purposely dull name
the studies and observations group or SOG.
They volunteer with a firm commitment to serve
but with an unclear idea of what they will do or where they will go.
John Plaster served three tours in the war
and recalls his first SOG briefing.
Behind him was a
curtain with Top Secret on it, large bold letters.
He announced, gentlemen, welcome to SOG.
And he jerked the curtain aside.
Behind it was a map of Southeast Asia.
Because we were there to fight the Vietnam War,
we're all ready to look at this map of Vietnam.
But it was not a map of Vietnam, it was a map of Laos.
With all these little red boxes where SOG recon teams
were at that moment monitoring and conducting operations
along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
As a young boy, John Caviani immigrated
from Europe to the United States.
By age 20, he lived here long enough
to want to fight for America's freedoms.
It was an obligation that I had to my country, you know.
Anti-war, I was a farm boy,
anti-war didn't mean much one way or the other.
I never really questioned the validity of the war
because I believed that much in my country.
John Frescura is a special forces demolitions expert
who joined SOG in 1967.
I think it's just, uh...
Personal challenges, and you see other people doing things.
It's the old story of why would you want
to jump out of a normally functioning airplane?
Because it's a challenge to be airborne,
and it was a challenge to go in Special Forces.
Bob Donahue joined SOG in 1968.
It's just hard to explain to people what we went through.
I was 21 years old at that time.
I was at an impressionable age,
and of course we all thought we were infallible.
SOGers worked closely with local Montagnard tribesmen.
who have a long democratic tradition of electing their village chiefs
and are fiercely anti-communist.
The Americans teach them modern warfare
and form a tight relationship with the tribesmen they call
the little people. You develop
a pretty strong bond with the people because
you're going out on operations, you're eating, sleeping together,
fighting together, dying together. After being fully trained
eight or nine tribesmen team up with three Americans
to form an elite team of secret commandos.
The strategy is two-pronged, gather intelligence,
and create chaos within enemy ranks.
Interdiction efforts of the North Vietnamese were vital.
What roads are they using now?
That isn't something you could always tell by flying over the top of it
and taking aerial photography.
You had to have the feet on the ground,
the eyes on the ground, and that's what these guys did.
And they did it exceptionally well,
to the point that the enemy had to start bringing in companies.
And I tell you, these are guys that aren't out fighting somebody else.
They're looking for us.
SOGers operate black,
wearing uniforms stripped of all trace of whom they're fighting for.
Craig Lansing completes his special forces training in 1966
and volunteers for SOG the next year.
So we wore black uniforms, and when we went over the border,
we never wore any kind of identification.
Dog tags, ID cards, rank, or anything.
So it had no way of knowing who we were.
Jack Singlaub, a veteran
of secret wartime operations dating back to World War II,
head SOG in 1966.
He is one of the few high-placed military
and civilian leaders who know of SOG's existence.
This allows deniability.
We could actually deny an operation if it were compromised without
people knowing who were in the government whether it was true or false.
Because if you have it staffed in the normal way, it means that you've
got hundreds of people in Washington who know about the operation.
So it's pretty difficult for the president to deny it.
So they can move quickly and easily,
most SOG reconnaissance teams are kept small.
Any more than six men would require a second helicopter.
Occasionally, the mission requires
a larger group called a hatchet force.
These teams consist of 20 to 40 men whose job
is sometimes to aid a recon team in trouble
and at other times to look for trouble on their own.
Harry Van Winkle leaves Texas for the Army at age 19.
Six years later, he is a SOG team leader.
The hatchet force
It was designed primarily, number one,
to exploit targets of opportunity that were
located by the recon teams and to go in and secure downed aircraft,
to go in and secure
locations where a contact had taken place
and we had lost someone.
Saugers also practiced the dark art of psyops,
or psychological operations, counterinsurgency
techniques designed to terrorize the enemy.
The most classified, codenamed Eldest Son,
involves booby-trapping captured North Vietnamese ammunition.
Eldest Son was a black operation that,
with the help of the CIA and SOG headquarters in Saigon,
would take captured enemy munitions, mortar rounds,
anti-aircraft shells, ammunition for AKs,
and they would re-manufacture the ammunition.
The booby-trapped ammunition
is then placed back in the original containers,
and the SOG team places it in ammunition caches behind enemy lines.
So then they would take that ammunition, load it into their weapons,
and when they go to shoot at U.S. forces,
the ammunition would explode inside the weapon.
The weapon, hopefully, would destroy the person operating it.
SOG uses many methods
to create disruption in enemy ranks.
Kidnapping can have this effect
and can provide valuable information as well.
There's no intelligence source
so good as a freshly snatched enemy prisoner of war.
You're deliberately making contact with the enemy behind
his lines where he's concentrated.
And
And when we ambushed him
and snatched one of his own people, he knew it.
Literally, they would come after you with thousands of troops.
In March 1970, John Plaster's team plans to ambush
a North Vietnamese truck convoy in Laos and snatch the lead driver.
The team slips past enemy patrols
and waits for the trucks along the trail.
I will always remember the vision of those headlights coming
at us because you could see them in the darkness.
For probably 10 minutes before
the truck's got there, you know it's coming.
You're just waiting and waiting and waiting.
It's a little like watching a distant locomotive approach.
Plaster lays mines for the lead truck, then positions himself nearby.
The truck blows up as planned. Plaster's team moves in.
We were up, assaulting,
and had the driver out of the truck in perhaps six or seven seconds
from the time that we detonated. He just had no time to resist.
Which was part of the plan. If you give someone enough time to resist,
that's when they do a foolish thing.
Pull a grenade, pull a gun, try to run for it.
But when you overwhelm them
so quickly that they don't even know what's happening,
and already you've got them face down on the Ho Chi Minh Trail,
handcuffed, and you're leading them away,
that's how you have a success.
And indeed, our operation was a great success.
SOGs and others who operate clandestinely in Laos suffer some
of the worst casualty rates of any group in the Vietnam War.
They also receive some of the highest honors.
Though SOG's ranks are few in number,
an astounding 10 medals of honor are awarded to these men.
These men say it's just a job, albeit dangerous,
and it's one they very much believe in.
And the difference between life
and death is a mix of courage and simple luck.
Take, for example, John Caviani's defense
of a remote radio relay site called Hickory Hill in June of 1971.
Caviani realizes that an attack by the enemy is inevitable.
I was so sure we were going to get hit.
I wrote my father the night before and sent it out,
the day before and sent it out on a helicopter letter telling him
that this would probably be the last letter he would get.
The enemy attacks in the early morning.
By the afternoon, the camp is almost destroyed.
He calls for choppers to evacuate the dead and wounded.
I guess it's about four o'clock in the afternoon.
They call in and they say, OK, John, this is the last helicopter.
And I got 17 little people,
I got actually about 26 little people, and I got four Americans.
After the chopper leaves, only Caviani,
his American partner, and a few tribesmen remain.
Started to turn around to get out off the bunker, I got hit in the back
and it went all the way up to my neck, threw me off the bunker.
Caviani tells the remaining tribesmen
who try to dress his wounds to run for their lives.
Now, just he and his partner are left on the mountain, trapped
in their bunker, and surrounded by more than 85 North Vietnamese.
I said, now, if anybody comes in, I'll kill them.
Don't shoot, because they don't know we're here.
As luck would have it, the first two guys through the door,
one of them, no weapon, and the other one's got an AK.
The one in front's got a flashlight shining about that far.
So I let him go, because he doesn't have a weapon,
and my threat's the second guy.
So I stabbed and killed the second guy.
Turned around, grabbed the first guy,
and my partner looked loose with a 30-round magazine.
So they knew where we were.
So the next thing, and I didn't realize it,
but there was an air hole in the back of this bunker
with one sandbag being hand-cut through it,
got a grenade in it, and drops it.
Well, they drop it right between Jones' legs, and it goes off.
He says, I've got to surrender. I said, I'm dead.
Just keep that in mind. I'm dead.
So he ran out.
Unfortunately, when you're surrendering,
it's not a good idea to call him an MF-er, which he did.
They shot and killed him dead on the spot,
blew him back into the bunker.
The North Vietnamese set the bunker on fire,
then leave, thinking the fight is over.
Caviani passes out until daybreak.
Well, I've got meat hanging off of my hands from being burned.
And I'm kind of holding them up like this,
because this fog that's coming through feels pretty good on my hands.
All of a sudden, there's a pair of legs there.
Because the bunker is half underground, half above ground.
And this guy decides to come in and loot through all the nails.
And he does.
I reach up and grab a piece of cardboard, and I get behind it.
I got it with my fingernails, and I pulled out my knife.
And the poor guy just comes up and goes,
brings it down, and I stabbed him and killed him.
And I crawled over the wall and started escaping
and evading for the next 11 days.
I finally got captured by a little old guy about 78 years old
with an old Finnish rifle.
Just as scared as I was. I had no weapons.
And then they hauled me up north.
I spent a couple of years in prison up until I got released in 1973.
I was presented with the Medal of Honor
for actions up on Hickory on December 12, 1974.
What drives men like John Caviani and the Studies in Operations group
to volunteer for some of the most dangerous missions of the war,
knowing that if they fail, they die, and if they succeed,
there will be no public recognition of their exploits?
I think the majority of us fought for each other.
There was intense team loyalty, and people were risking their lives.
Not for some abstract patriotic goal.
They were risking their lives for the best friend they ever had,
and that is a guy on the team with them.
And there was always the knowledge
that what we did was truly important.
You can look at that black wall a lot of our guys have.
They did it because of what we thought we could do,
which is save Americans' lives
by telling them what's coming down the butt.
And we hung our butts out to do that.
Covert operations like SOG do not become public until years later.
But an operation run by the CIA,
one of the most controversial of the entire war,
falls under the glare of public scrutiny,
allegations of assassination and torture.
The CIA calls it Operation Phoenix.
It is a counterinsurgency program designed
to cleanse loyal South Vietnamese villages of Viet Cong infiltrators.
Be charged later that it's a vehicle
for political assassination and torture.
Operation Phoenix begins in the early 60s under a different name.
Controversial plan to counter terror with terror.
In the hamlets of South Vietnam,
villagers can be allies or enemies.
Warren Milberg works for the CIA
in the early days of the Phoenix program in 1969.
Everything was foggy in Vietnam.
Policies were foggy.
Operations were foggy.
Nothing was really clear.
You didn't really clearly know who the enemy was.
The enemy here is not North Vietnamese Army regulars.
But the Viet Cong, the shadow government
and secret army of North Vietnam operating throughout the South.
Some Viet Cong live in the jungles. Others infiltrate the villages.
Double lives. Citizens of the South by day
and revolutionaries of the North by night.
Phoenix officers are given the tricky task
of sorting these Viet Cong from the loyal villagers.
It was not uncommon and did in fact happen on a couple
of occasions that we in our little compound
in Quang Tri were attacked by women and children.
We had a little guy who used to deliver bread,
French bread, little baguettes of bread in a bag every day.
And one day, instead of delivering baguettes of bread,
he delivered hand grenades that he threw over the wall.
Children that had somehow been perverted into a combat role.
The Viet Cong are elusive to the Americans, but their presence
is very real and brutal for the villagers of South Vietnam.
John Cook is an Army intelligence officer
who works in the Phoenix program at the district level.
It was part of the doctrine to sacrifice a certain part
of the population to send a message to the other part.
And their principal weapon of choice was terror,
that they would go into a hamlet and village and tell the people.
We don't want you cooperating with the government.
If you do, we're going to come back and we will kill your children.
This wasn't an idle threat.
Phoenix officers work with South Vietnamese police
and intelligence agencies
to identify Viet Cong, then mount operations against them.
It is a painstaking process.
You would gather your own intelligence,
you would refine it, and you would act on it.
In one operation, maybe successful,
you would make a capture, or you'd capture documents.
They would lead you somewhere else.
So you would go wherever the evidence would take you.
And slowly, a picture would emerge
of the Viet Cong structure in your own district.
We would attempt to...
To determine how accurate the information was, is that we had a name,
we had a place and was this person really a Viet Cong
or was this person's name on this list for the wrong reasons?
The wrong reasons could have been anything you could guess
at from somebody reporting somebody because they didn't like them,
because they stole their pig, or they were growing rice
in a place where they shouldn't be growing rice,
or they really were a Viet Cong infrastructure member.
Once a suspected Viet Cong is identified,
he or she is captured by any means possible.
By whatever means possible either meant
that a U.S. military unit would be assigned the task
or that a South Vietnamese police
or military unit would be assigned that task
or in some cases members of a provincial reconnaissance unit,
which were mercenaries hired by me
and paid for by the CIA, would be used.
The CIA call it neutralizing the Viet Cong,
but what exactly does that mean?
Much of the controversy surrounding
the Phoenix program turns on this phrase.
Bruce Lawler joins the CIA
in 1970 after graduating from college.
To neutralize did become a buzzword.
It became a hot button, and they probably shouldn't use it.
But the reality is...
What we were trying to do was to decrease
or eliminate the impacts of this political structure on the people.
Most of the operations were clearly geared to capture.
And if that didn't succeed, then you would try something else.
But the name of the game was to take him out.
And the first choice would be capture.
The second choice would be killing.
In one case, Cook and his South Vietnamese team identify
a Viet Cong assassination squad
and successfully launch a military operation against them.
We actually had lists for the first time
of who their potential victims would be.
And the satisfaction of knowing that rice farmer would not die
because we had actually eliminated these guys
was probably one of the most satisfying feelings you would have.
Phoenix teams try to capture the VC alive,
then persuade them to defect.
Defectors provide valuable information about Viet Cong membership
and guerrilla tactics,
like how to breach the defenses of American camps.
But many hardcore VC resist and fight rather than trade sides.
John Cook and his team track a notorious VC leader to a tunnel,
then ask him to defect.
The man begins to fight.
His team responds by throwing a grenade into the tunnel.
The VC leader is pulled out, mortally wounded,
and asks his captors a question.
How bad am I?
And the reality was he was very bad. He was going to die.
And he asked my counterpart, Lieutenant Howe,
if he would do him the honor of killing him.
And Howe did.
He took out his .45 and shot him in the head.
I think that was a very profound scene that I witnessed.
You know, you could argue was that
Technically was that a war crime?
Probably was, but I don't think any of us at the time thought so.
When the Viet Cong are successfully captured,
they're taken back to province headquarters for
interrogation. Some VC fear that they will
be treated as harshly as their own units treat
uncooperative villagers.
Nelson Brigham, one of the early architects of the Phoenix program.
They came into a province interrogation center,
for example, a scared witness.
They were frightened. They were expecting torture.
They were expecting to be beaten.
And instead they got in there
and they got medical care if they needed it.
They got some decent food, which they'd been eating
on rations of rice for God only knows how long.
And they were not treated roughly,
and they would spill their information just like that.
It was not a problem in most cases.
Press reports of innocent civilians being killed
by CIA mercenaries reach the United States and
Congress demands an explanation.
In 1970, William Colby, the CIA station chief in Saigon, attempts
to defend the program.
To capture, rally, or kill members of the enemy apparatus.
But the CIA is too closely tied to what
the public feels is a morally corrupt operation.
Feeling the heat from the public outcry, the CIA relinquishes
leadership of the program to Army Intelligence by 1973.
Operation Phoenix, for all the controversy about excessive brutality,
has a positive side.
It helps stave off the defeat of South Vietnam
at the hands of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese.
On an individual level, I think the service there was honorable.
I think that the folks that I know
that worked in the programs that I worked in
We're good men. We made mistakes.
Sometimes we went in the wrong direction.
Sometimes there were people that were hurt.
But we were in a very dirty, nasty, difficult conflict.
And I think they fought it honorably.
Secret CIA operations began in Vietnam in the early 1950s.
In one just now coming to light,
the CIA infiltrates hundreds of South Vietnamese agents into the North.
All are killed or captured.
Long before the Vietnam War becomes a very public war,
long before any U.S. troops become involved,
the CIA is secretly working with the South Vietnamese,
trying to hold back what it sees as a communist tide.
In one of the secret war's earliest operations, dating back to 1961,
the CIA begins parachuting Vietnamese agents into the North
to set up undercover bases of resistance.
Hung Tran is one such agent. Born in North Vietnam,
he comes to the South and is recruited by the United States in 1958.
I mean...
We weren't supposed to know the real names of all the people,
but I can say that the people who trained me belong to the CIA.
After two years of training,
Hung Tran sets out in a boat to infiltrate North Vietnam.
It was about one o'clock in the morning
when the crew dropped me on shore.
It was very dark and very quiet because I had never done this before.
I didn't know what was about to happen and I was so scared.
His job is to recruit and train agents in the north,
but on the second day in Hanoi he realizes he is being followed.
I spotted five different people who were following me.
I acted like a tourist and visited different places
in Hanoi in order to elude the secret police.
But after being in Hanoi for about a month,
they discovered my secret plan and they captured me.
Sedgwick Tourison is a former intelligence officer
who investigated Hung's story while working for a Senate subcommittee.
Some of those operations had gone in successfully, 1960, 1961.
Hung's.
It was part of the program as part of the failures
that began to creep in, because from
1961 onward, when they sent a guy up north, he never came back.
In another mission, a six-man team is to set up networks of agents
and destroy communications
installations.
I was dropped into the North by air on June 28,
1964, but when we landed, they fire-shot
at us, then surrounded us, and my whole team was captured.
Vu Van Chi is a member of yet another team of secret commandos,
codenamed Team Hector.
And then, in the end,
Before I left for the North, I visited my parents.
Normally, in my profession, I cannot tell anyone about what I do.
But this time, I did let my father know that I have a mission,
and I will be back within a couple of months.
His team is transported by helicopter into the north.
Oh, boy, don't want me to move on.
My team was surrounded by a regiment,
and we fought with them until the next morning.
They called for reinforcements and surrounded us.
Then they captured us.
The CIA knew by 1961 that the Northern Vietnamese intelligence service
was capturing the teams
and forcing them to operate their radios.
Because fortunately, enough of the teams were able to tell
their controllers back in Saigon,
we've been captured and we are being forced to transmit.
Several things made us suspect that there was a double agent
within our headquarters. The enemy already had our landing coordinates.
They were able to capture us and so then we hit the ground.
That should have sent a warning message,
a very strong warning message that there's something wrong.
The project is turning into a rout at the hands of the enemy
and by 1963 it is transferred from CIA
to Pentagon control.
And CIA wants out of there. They're out.
Give this to the military. Well what they gave the
military was a bag of worms.
It was something that wouldn't work but that Robert McNamara convinced
I mentioned the president that it would.
It was a hoax.
There was great pressure from Mr. McNamara directly
for us to increase the number of those teams.
I attempted to point out that these were not a particularly
effective device for gathering intelligence.
We were losing far more men than I felt was worthwhile.
Instead of abandoning the program, U.S. authorities see an opportunity
to use the agents to spread disinformation without telling them.
And more teams are sent to meet their certain fate.
Inexplicably, the operation continues for seven more years.
What we learned actually many years later is that the reasons
that they were being captured almost upon arrival
is that there had been a serious penetration.
The result of having such a well-placed mole is death
or years of misery for almost all the agents.
After they arrested me, they interrogated me,
but I didn't give them any information.
So they tortured me. They beat me very hard.
Hopeless. I was very hopeless.
But at the same time, I was also very hopeful.
I am a Catholic,
and my Catholic faith helped me to get through those times.
And I also began to understand the ideal of human freedom,
democratic freedom.
Those two things together helped me endure.
Their families are informed that the agents have been killed.
Even though the U.S. and South Vietnamese
governments have good information, they are alive.
The reason being that we knew they were alive is because
the North Vietnamese announced over the radio,
either in English or over the Vietnam News Agency
or Radio Hanoi domestically in Vietnamese,
that here was a team who had been captured.
They read the names of the people.
By 1973, with the signing of the Paris Peace Accords,
American prisoners of war are returned home,
but not the Vietnamese agents.
325 of them are jailed in North Vietnam,
and the U.S. government does not acknowledge their existence.
And yet, most of the men remain loyal to their country,
to the United States, and to the job they set out to do.
Thank you very much.
I am very proud of my mission, and I still believe in it.
I work for freedom and democracy and oppose communism.
I'm very proud of that.
The only thing that I didn't agree
with is the way the Americans treated me.
Special operations, covert operations, is a tough business.
You get high losses, and guys don't come home.
And you expect that. You don't want it to happen.
But you don't throw away 500 guys. That's wrong.
With the passage of time, the jailed secret agents
are eventually released from prison in North Vietnam.
Many have served 20 years.
It has been more than 25 years since these covert operations,
but even now, as more and more details
of the secret wars are coming to light,
they are the most controversial
of the many ways America waged its war in Vietnam.
After Vietnam, questions continued
to be raised about secret operations.
Congressional hearings in 1975 shed new light on the CIA
and its clandestine operations, including assassination.
Later, in the 1980s, the Contra War in Central America began
as a covert operation run by the CIA.
Congress once again raised questions about secret methods.
Despite these controversies, many feel that some secret actions
do have a place in a free democratic society even today.
If a hostile foreign power acquired a chemical agent
and we believed he was about to use it against the United States,
Should we wait until they use it before we act?
Or, deniably, covertly, preemptively strike them,
prevent this agent from being delivered?
We're big boys and girls here.
You're not going to allow someone to turn loose nerve gas
in the United States city before you act, could you?
While the debate continues to swirl over the secrecy
and sometimes violence of covert operations,
it is easy to overlook the heroism and the bravery
of the soldiers whose stories are just now emerging from the shadows.
I'm Jack Smith. Good night.