These Shahed Drones Were Used In Iran s First Direct Attack on Israel WSJ Equipped

Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
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3 Video Views·Mar 13, 2026
This is an Iranian-made Shahed drone.
These suicide drones are cheap, precise and hard to shoot down.
Unlike traditional reusable drones, these are designed for one-time precision strikes.
In just the past year, Shahed drones hit commercial ships in the Red Sea,
threatened the lives of US troops in the Middle East and wreaked havoc in Ukraine.
And Iran's willingness to share them with its allies
poses an increasing threat to the US and its global partners.
The Iranian Shahed is a family of kamikaze drones
that self-destruct when they reach their target.
The family is made up of three types of drones.
The first edition, 131, which is the smallest and lightest.
The newest, 238, which uses jet power and is believed by experts to be the most expensive.
And the most commonly used, 136.
The Shahed 136 is 11.5 feet long, weighs 441 pounds
and is made out of relatively cheap materials.
The really comparative advantage of these drones is that it uses commercial parts.
It's not that sophisticated.
The engine itself is just a regular four-piston engine.
The propeller isn't anything fancy.
The airframe itself is maybe some carbon fibre to make sure that it doesn't weigh too much.
But overall, it's fairly cheap to produce.
The drone has a delta wing configuration
and uses a light frame to carry over 100 pounds of explosives.
Iran claims it can reach pre-programmed targets up to 1,500 miles away.
They're usually used in a salvo launch.
That's when multiple weapons are fired simultaneously to overwhelm the enemy's defences.
They're deployed from a truck and are initially boosted by a rocket.
But shortly after, a twin-blade propeller and a smaller piston engine take over.
The piston engine makes the drone relatively slow-moving and gives it a loud lawnmower sound.
The drones fly at low altitudes, making them harder to detect
because air defences tend to be aimed at higher altitude threats.
But they can be vulnerable to simpler defences, like anti-air guns.
Shahed drones are also quite small and harder to detect with radars
compared to their larger counterparts which fly at higher altitudes.
The Shahed 136's relatively low production cost of around $50,000
has meant that Iran can produce a lot of these.
Iran doesn't have the resources to what we in the military say, like,
gold plate their stuff.
They can't make everything multi-mission and beautiful and exquisite.
They have limited resources.
They have to use those resources in ways that fulfill their objectives.
And so they're able to scrap all these pieces and parts and put them together.
And sometimes it works.
And a lot of times it doesn't.
Take the US Reaper drone, for example.
When it's loaded to its maximum capacity,
it's over 20 times the weight and double the speed of the Shahed 136.
Its purpose is not only to strike a target,
but to assist in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,
and combat search and rescue.
And it can be used numerous times.
But at around $30 million a piece,
it costs much more than the Shahed drone.
The primary advantage of the Shahed 136's low cost
is the ability to keep producing and deploying them en masse
without breaking the bank.
In salvo launches, you're launching a bunch of missiles,
rockets, drones at the same time,
hoping that they will penetrate defenses
because there's just so many that you have to counter.
Still, the Shahed 136 has its drawbacks.
They're not good at not getting shot down.
They operate in the space between regular drones and cruise missiles.
And so they do have deficiencies operating in that middle space.
They're not this golden child that works for every purpose.
They're relatively slow.
They are very loud, so they can be detected early.
So in terms of using a few of these at a time,
that's not an option for the attacker.
But the Shahed drones have been a critical part
of Iran's strategy of proxy warfare.
It has shared these drones with militant groups in other countries
as a way to challenge its rivals
without directly being involved in the battle.
The Shahed drone has made proxies more capable.
Iran relies on its proxies for its own security
and for its own regional interests.
It has historically provided weaponry
so that they can remain strong,
so that they can remain operating in the region.
And so drones are just another means to do so.
And now we're seeing especially their use by Russia against Ukraine.
In 2022, Iranian officials agreed to transfer drone designs
and key components to Russia.
This enabled Russian forces to create their own new
and improved version of the Shahed-136,
overwhelming Ukrainian defences and targeting civilian infrastructure.
Russia has specifically been using these drones
in larger salvos against Ukraine,
particularly striking against civilian infrastructure.
And here we're talking about oil facilities,
electric facilities, the grids.
Moscow plans to manufacture 6,000 drone units
based on the Iranian Shahed-136 by 2025.
These drones are expected to feature improvements
such as active seeking and enhanced resistance against GPS jamming,
which will enable greater precision.
Iran has directly sold licensing and training
and basically the know-how involved
in developing the Shahed drone to Russia.
So now Russia is developing an industrial capacity
to produce these drones on its own.
But in Ukraine, outdated anti-aircraft guns
are proving surprisingly effective in defence.
They're old, but they work.
Ukrainian military officers and officials,
they know how to use them.
They know how to get on these guns and shoot drones down.
But again, it's hard to know when these attacks are coming
and it's hard to shoot down everything
when it's coming in large numbers.
But defence mechanisms against these drones
are continually evolving.
You need sensors that can actually detect and track them
and identify whether they actually are a threat.
And you need interceptors that are capable
of taking them down safely.
So countries are investing more money
in counter-drone technologies and defence measures.
We're seeing the United States invest in a variety of means
of missiles, of guns, of counter-drone drones.
It's all of these things to counter
this small drone threat.
The problem is that we don't have a lot of them today
and we also need to distribute them across areas of interest
in which adversaries are using these small drones.
But once those defences are honed...
I think we'll see fewer successes of the Shahid
and its family of variants.
People think that they're invulnerable, but they are not.
You can take these drones down.
It is just a matter of building up those defences
and spreading that capacity to people who need it.
Still, drone warfare is set to evolve rapidly
with faster jet-powered models like the Shahid 238
creating a diverse and increasingly tough threat.
