The Edmund Fitzgerald: What Really Happened That Night?

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On November 10, 1975, the SS Edmund Fitzgerald vanished beneath the waters of Lake Superior during one of the most devastating storms in Great Lakes history. All 29 men aboard were lost, and not a single distress call was received. Just miles from the safety of Whitefish Bay, one of the largest freighters on the Great Lakes disappeared, leaving behind questions that remain unanswered
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AI GeneratedThe SS Edmund Fitzgerald, a massive steel freighter, sank in Lake Superior on November 10, 1975, claiming the lives of all 29 crew members. Despite the crew's experience, a combination of hurricane-force winds, mechanical failures, and design vulnerabilities led to the ship's sudden disappearance without a distress call.
The Great Lakes of North America are among
the largest bodies of fresh water on Earth.
Covering more than 94,000 square miles,
these five enormous lakes form an inland waterway
stretching more than 1,000 miles across the United States and Canada.
But despite their name, these are no ordinary lakes.
They are vast inland seas capable of producing violent storms,
hurricane-force winds,
and towering waves that have sent thousands of vessels to the bottom.
The largest and deepest among them is Lake Superior,
covering nearly 32,000 square miles
with depths exceeding 1,300 feet. Its freezing waters and unpredictable
November storms have made it one
of the most dangerous waterways in North America.
On November 10th, 1975,
one of the largest freighters operating on the Great Lakes,
the 729-foot Edmund Fitzgerald,
was battling a powerful storm while carrying more than 26,000
tons of iron ore.
Shortly after 710 p.m., the massive vessel vanished from radar.
So what happened aboard the Edmund Fitzgerald during those final hours?
How could a massive steel freighter disappear
so suddenly without a single distress call?
And after more than 50 years of investigations,
do we really know what sent the Edmund Fitzgerald
to the bottom of Lake Superior?
Let's try to find out.
Hello, I'm Mike Drobberg, Marine Corps veteran and filmmaker,
and we will try to answer these questions
on today's episode of Forgotten History.
One of the toughest 26 days in Marine Corps history.
36th President of the United States died this afternoon.
Telling their children and women in here to call it off.
On the morning of November 9th, 1975,
the Edmund Fitzgerald was loading at a dock in Superior,
Wisconsin, at the western end of Lake Superior.
Taconite pellets, processed from iron ore for use in steelmaking,
poured into the ship's cargo hold.
By early afternoon, the Fitzgerald carried more than 26,000 long tons.
The destination was Zug Island on the Detroit River.
Reaching it meant crossing Lake Superior
and passing through the Soo Locks
into the lower lakes. Fitzgerald had been built for this work.
Launched in 1958, the freighter
measured 729 feet long
and had spent years carrying raw materials to the region's steel
mills. The pilot house stood near the bow,
far ahead of the engine room and stern accommodations.
Between them stretched a long cargo deck fitted with 21 hatch openings.
After loading, crew members replaced the steel covers
that protected the cargo hold from water coming over the deck.
Captain Ernest McSorley commanded a crew of 29, including himself.
McSorley was 63,
and had worked as a captain since 1951.
He had taken command of the Fitzgerald in 1972.
The senior officers also had extensive experience on the Great Lakes.
Rough weather was a familiar part of their work,
especially late in the shipping season.
At about 2.15 that afternoon, Fitzgerald departed Superior.
Another loaded freighter, the Arthur M.
Anderson, left Two Harbors,
Minnesota later that afternoon, bound for Gary, Indiana.
Under Captain Jesse Burney Cooper,
the Anderson would also cross Superior towards the Soo Locks.
The captains established radio contact as they headed across the lake.
A storm was developing in the southwest
and gale warnings were issued that afternoon.
McShorley and Cooper discussed the weather
and chose a route closer to the Canadian shore,
where the land could offer protection from the anticipated winds.
It was an established precaution among Great Lakes captains.
From there, the ships were turned southeast towards Whitefish Bay.
As darkness settled over the lake,
both freighters continued along the northern route,
with the Anderson initially ahead.
During the night,
the Fitzgerald and the Anderson continued
east across northern Lake Superior.
At one in the morning on November 10th,
the Fitzgerald reported winds of 52 knots,
roughly 60 miles an hour, and waves about 10 feet high.
An hour later, the National Weather Service issued a storm warning.
The captains had chosen the northern route
to shelter their ships from the worst of the storm.
But to reach Whitefish Bay,
they would eventually have to turn southeast,
leaving that protection behind
and exposing their ships to the full force of the storm.
The faster Fitzgerald pulled ahead at about 3 that morning.
By the time McSorley sent
his morning report to the company,
he could no longer give a firm arrival time at the Soo Locks.
The weather was now setting the pace of the voyage.
Near Michipicoten Island, Cooper moved the Anderson farther west
to give his ship more room before turning southeast.
McSorley was already farther along.
The Fitzgerald was rolling, he reported, but he would continue.
Their courses separated and by mid-afternoon,
the Anderson was roughly 16 miles behind.
At about 3.30, McSorley called Cooper.
A section of the railing was down
and two vents had been lost or damaged.
The Fitzgerald had developed a list.
The loaded freighter was leaning to one side
as it continued through the storm.
McSorley reduced speed and asked Cooper to stay with him
until he reached Whitefish.
Slowing would give Anderson a chance to close the gap,
but it also meant a longer passage to shelter.
Cooper asked whether the pumps were still running.
McSorley confirmed that both were operating.
For now, Fitzgerald was still moving
with the Anderson coming up behind.
McSorley reported another failure.
Both of Fitzgerald's radars were out.
It was about 4.10
that afternoon, less than an hour after McSorley's damage report.
He was already managing a listing
ship when he lost the equipment that allowed
his officers to locate the shoreline and nearby traffic
through poor visibility.
McSorley asked Anderson to track him and provide navigation information
for the rest of the passage.
Cooper could still locate Fitzgerald on radar.
From miles behind, the Anderson would help guide
the damaged ship towards Whitefish Bay. McSorley
also sought information about the radio beacon at Whitefish Point.
Its signal could provide another
means of checking his direction towards the point.
At about 4.39, the Coast Guard station
at Grand Marais confirmed that the beacon was not operating.
Fitzgerald would have to continue
without it. Between 5 and 5.30,
McSorley reached the northbound Swedish freighter Avafors.
The pilot aboard that ship could see the Whitefish Point light,
although the radio beacon remained out.
There was still a light marking the approach.
If Fitzgerald could reach a position where it
was visible through the weather.
During the conversation,
McSorley apparently turned to address someone aboard his own ship
while the radio remained on transmit.
Those listening aboard the Avafors heard
him order people to stay off deck.
An unclear exchange about the event followed.
McSorley then reported the bad list
and heavy seas washing over the deck.
He described the conditions as among the worst he had ever encountered.
The next position report put
the Fitzgerald approximately 35 miles from Whitefish Point.
Even after hours of working towards the bay,
McSorley still had that distance to cover
with a damaged ship and no working radar.
He told the Anderson that he intended
to pass approximately 2.5 miles offshore from Whitefish
Point before entering the relative safety of Whitefish Bay.
Cooper had his own ship to keep
under control. South of Caribou Island,
he later described waves reaching 18 to 25 feet. The
Anderson's crew continued checking Fitzgerald's position
while navigating through those seas
It's easier than themselves.
At about 6.20, the ships compared courses again.
McSorley was steering southeast and Anderson was
still following. Their radio exchanges kept
the two crews connected as they approached Whitefish
Point. Cooper could supply the route information McSorley needed,
but reaching the bay still
depended on Fitzgerald staying afloat for the rest
of the passage. Shortly before 7 that evening,
the Anderson encountered two waves
that Cooper remembered in particular detail.
According to Cooper, the first wave swept over the ship from behind
and drove forward along the deck, forcing the bow down.
The Anderson rose out of the water,
only to be struck by another large wave.
Cooper watched the waves continue in the direction of Fitzgerald.
He later believed they might have contributed to its loss,
but he could not see what happened to the ship ahead.
At about 7, the Anderson placed the Fitzgerald roughly 10 miles
in front and slightly east of its own course.
The distance between the ships had narrowed since mid-afternoon.
Ten minutes later,
Anderson's first mate, Morgan Clark,
contacted Fitzgerald about a northbound vessel ahead.
McSorley wanted to know whether he would clear it.
Clark assured him that the other ship would
pass to his west. Before ending the conversation,
Clark asked how Fitzgerald was managing.
McSorley replied, we're holding our own.
McSorley requested no rescue assistance and Clark signed off,
expecting to speak with Fitzgerald
again. At about 7.20pm,
a check of Anderson's radar showed no contact with the Fitzgerald.
Heavy seas had interfered with the radar picture before,
temporarily obscuring the ship's return.
This time, however,
the missing contact was accompanied by another troubling observation.
Visibility had improved.
Lights along the shore could be seen more than 20 miles away.
and the lights of another vessel
were visible at a distance of 19 miles.
The Fitzgerald should have been much closer than either.
Its lights were nowhere in sight.
The Anderson called again, but received no answer.
Cooper's crew made repeated attempts
to contact Fitzgerald, but every call was met with silence.
Cooper then contacted other vessels
in the area, asking whether anyone had seen
or heard from the missing freighter. He even had
He even had his crew verify
that the Anderson's radio was working properly.
There was no sign of Fitzgerald.
With the massive freighter missing from radar and all attempts at
communication unsuccessful, Cooper notified
the United States Coast Guard that the Edmund Fitzgerald
had disappeared. By the time
the Anderson reached the relative safety
of Whitefish Bay, the Coast Guard faced a serious problem.
There were no rescue vessels
immediately available
that could safely reach Fitzgerald's last known position.
The Coast Guard tug, Nahant, stationed at Sault Ste.
Marie, was unable to venture into
the enormous seas and had also suffered mechanical failure.
The woodcutter, Woodrush,
stationed nearly 300 miles away in Duluth,
Minnesota, would require approximately 24 hours
to reach the search area.
With no Coast Guard vessels close enough to conduct an
immediate surface search,
authorities turned to merchant ships already on Lake Superior.
At approximately nine that evening,
the Coast Guard contacted Captain Cooper
and asked whether he could turn Anderson around
and search for survivors.
Cooper hesitated. He warned that the seas outside the bay were enormous
and that the Anderson might make only two
or three miles an hour heading back into them.
The Coast Guard asked him
to judge whether he could return without putting his vessel
in unacceptable danger.
Cooper answered, I'll give it a try, but that's all I can do.
The Anderson turned back towards the open water
and Fitzgerald's last known position.
The ship pounded and rolled as the crew searched
for any sign of the missing freighter. The William
Clay Ford also left Whitefish Bay to assist.
The Coast Guard sent an aircraft and dispatched
cutters, but those vessels needed time to reach the search area.
In the opening hours,
Nearby merchant crews carried much
of the burden looking for their fellow sailors.
The search produced wreckage from the Fitzgerald,
including damaged lifeboats,
but no signs of survivors.
The crews continued looking through the night.
The following morning, the freighter Roger Blau recovered
an inflatable raft near Coppermine Point.
Identifying markings connected it to the Fitzgerald.
As the search continued,
crews recovered additional life-saving equipment and debris,
but none of the 29 men was found.
On November 14th, a Navy aircraft detected
a strong magnetic contact northwest of Whitefish Point.
Sonar surveys located the wreckage below,
but the searchers could not yet examine it closely enough
to reconstruct the loss.
Fitzgerald's final radio reports had ended at the surface.
The next evidence lay more than 500 feet beneath it.
The following May, investigators returned
with the Navy's remotely operated underwater vehicle, CURV 21.
Its cameras could reach the wreck
and record what the storm had left on the lake bottom.
The cameras found the Fitzgerald
in two enormous sections
resting in the Canadian waters about 530 feet below the surface.
The bow stood upright on the bottom. The stern was upside down.
Between them, the middle of the hull had been torn apart.
On the inverted stern, investigators could read the ship's name.
Investigators had to work backward from that damage.
Had the hull broken while the ship was still afloat,
or had it failed as the Fitzgerald sank,
and what could have overwhelmed it
so quickly after the final radio call?
The Coast Guard Marine Board favored progressive flooding through
the hatch closures that failed
to keep the water out. As waves crossed the cargo deck,
water entered the hold and accumulated.
The added weight brought the ship lower,
leaving the deck more exposed to the turbulent seas.
In the board's account,
that process continued until Fitzgerald could no longer remain afloat.
But the earlier damage complicated the explanation.
McSorley had reported
broken fittings and a list hours before the disappearance.
The board could not determine
precisely what caused that damage.
It considered an object striking the ship
or breaking loose aboard it,
as well as possible damage near the shoals north of Caribou Island.
Those possibilities could help explain how
flooding began elsewhere in the vessel,
but none was established as the initiating event.
The National Transportation Safety Board
identified a different final step in its May 1978 report.
Earlier flooding had left Fitzgerald
listing and riding lower in the water.
Heavy seas then imposed enough force to collapse
one or more hatch covers.
Water poured into the cargo hold through the failed openings.
The NTSB concluded that this final flooding
was too rapid for the crew to send a distress call.
The NTSB also discovered another contributing
factor. In 1969, 1971, and 1973, changes to
federal regulations allowed Great Lake freighters
to carry heavier loads, causing them to sit
deeper in the water.
This meant that there was less distance between the ship's deck
and the surface of the lake,
making it easier for large waves to wash over the vessel.
Although Fitzgerald was operating within the permitted load limits,
investigators concluded
that these regulatory changes had made
the ship more vulnerable to flooding during severe storms.
Investigators also discovered
that Fitzgerald's enormous cargo hold lacked watertight walls
dividing it into separate compartments.
This meant that once water entered the hold,
it could spread throughout
the cargo area rather than being contained in one section.
Cooper believed that the Fitzgerald had passed dangerously close
to shallow water near Caribou
Island. The NTSB rejected grounding
as a likely cause based on its reconstructed route in the
absence of corresponding damage on the exposed stern bottom.
It also concluded that the hull
broke during the descent
or upon striking the bottom rather than splitting on the surface.
These were investigative conclusions drawn from incomplete evidence.
The precise sequence was never witnessed.
And McSorley's last report remained
the final word from any of the 29 men.
The remembrance had begun the morning after the sinking.
In the early hours of November 11th,
1975, Reverend Richard Ingalls went to the Mariner's Church in Detroit
and rang the church bell 29 times,
once for each man lost aboard the Edmund Fitzgerald.
He then knelt at the altar and prayed for the crew.
The late Gordon Lightfoot would carry that act
of remembrance to listeners around the world
in his song, The Wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald.
On July 4th, 1995, an expedition recovered Fitzgerald's bronze bell.
It became a memorial
at the Great Lakes Shipwreck Museum at Whitefish Point,
near the shelter the crew had been trying
to reach. Each toll honored
a man whose life extended beyond that final voyage.
With years of work and relationships
that mattered to those who knew them.
As we remember the Fitzgerald, we honor those 29 sailors
and the families who have kept their memory alive.
Let us know your thoughts about
the Edmund Fitzgerald tragedy in the comments below.
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